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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the effects of amendments to Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure 
that came into effect on January 1, 2010 (the “2010 Amendments”) and were subject to 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada in a 2014 decision (“Hryniak”). Hryniak concerned 
summary judgment. However, the dissertation largely concentrates on the effects of Hryniak and 
the 2010 Amendments outside the summary judgment context, inquiring into whether Hryniak’s 
call for a “culture shift” and the 2010 Amendments’ enshrinement of the principle of 
proportionality have had noticeable effects. It does this by analyzing three aspects of Canadian 
procedural law that were not amended in 2010 but were amended (or enacted) shortly thereafter 
and can facilitate or hinder access to justice depending on how they are used: 1) jurisdiction 
motions; 2) dismissals without an oral hearing, potentially sua sponte; and 3) interlocutory appeals. 
This more quantitative analysis of case law was complemented by results of qualitative surveys of 
lawyers about their experiences with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. 
With regard to the three procedural rules analyzed, the dissertation makes suggestions for 
their re-interpretation to minimize unnecessary interlocutory wrangling. At a broader level, the 
dissertation concludes that there have been positive effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, 
but they have been limited, and tend to have been greatest in areas where tailored amendments in 
procedural law have occurred rather than in response to broader statements that a “culture shift” is 
required in the conduct of litigation. In any event, more work is required outside the realm of civil 
procedure reform to effectively improve access to civil justice in Canada. 
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Introduction 
 
Beverley McLachlin, on her retirement from the Supreme Court, remarked that access to 
justice is the greatest threat to Canada’s legal system today.1 Access to civil justice in particular 
has been described as one of the least admirable aspects of Canada’s justice system, and a serious 
threat to the rule of law.2 Precisely what the phrase “access to justice” encompasses varies 
according to the circumstances. At its most holistic, it can include normative questions about what 
values constitute “justice” and ensuring that the substantive law encompasses such values.3 But at 
the very least, it means that civil litigation should have three characteristics: first, minimal financial 
costs; second, timeliness; and, third, simplicity.4 Based on these values, and the value of 
proportionality, Ontario amended its Rules of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 2010 (the “2010 
Amendments”).5 In its seminal 2014 decision Hryniak v Mauldin, the Supreme Court held that the 
2010 Amendments should be interpreted generously to achieve access to justice. Perhaps even 
more importantly, Karakatsanis J, for a unanimous Court, held that a “culture shift” was required 
in terms of how civil litigation is conducted.6 Is the spirit of Hryniak being heeded outside its 
specific context of summary judgment? Answering this question is the goal of this dissertation. 
 
1  Bruce Campion-Smith, “Beverley McLachlin leaves chief justice post cheering Supreme Court’s work on 
Aboriginal issues” The Toronto Star (15 December 2017), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/12/15/beverley-mclachlin-leaves-chief-justice-post-cheering-
supreme-courts-work-on-aboriginal-issues.html>. 
2  Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [“Hryniak”] at paras 1, 26; Trevor CW Farrow, “What is 
Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 [“Farrow 2014”] reviews the literature in this area at fn 1. 
I do this throughout this Introduction. 
3  E.g., Farrow 2014, ibid at 970-972. 
4  E.g., Farrow 2014, ibid at 978-979; Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale 
and Ambitions” in Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – 
The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 68-73; Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 29-
33; Trevor Farrow, “Proportionality: A Cultural Revolution” (2012) 1 J Civil Litigation & Practice 151 
[“Farrow 2012”]. 
5  RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the “Rules”], as amended by O Reg 438/08 [the “2010 Amendments”]. 
6  E.g., Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 23-28. 
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As such, this dissertation analyzes three elements of Ontario’s procedural law: first, 
jurisdiction motions (Rule 17 of the Rules); second, dismissals, possibly sua sponte, without an 
oral hearing (Rule 2.1 of the Rules); and, third, interlocutory appeals (s 19(1)(b) of the Courts of 
Justice Act7), to discover whether there have been noticeable changes in how the procedural law 
in these areas has been applied post-Hryniak. These three rules are analyzed because none was 
amended in 2010. As such, the 2010 Amendments and the holding of Hryniak are not directly 
applicable to them except insofar as the proportionality principle now applies to all aspects of 
Ontario’s procedural law. In other words, they provide some evidence of whether a “culture shift” 
is occurring outside the specific areas addressed by Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. These are 
of course not the only ways to determine whether Hryniak is having its desired effects outside the 
summary judgment context and other areas specifically addressed by the 2010 Amendments. 
However, as discussed further below, all three rules have clear access to justice implications. 
Moreover, all are in a state of uncertainty. Analyzing the three rules is therefore useful in and of 
itself, and also opens an additional line of inquiry – the effects of uncertainty in the law on access 
to justice. Specifically, because they have recently been subject to attempts to make them more 
certain and less discretionary, analyzing them enables consideration of the intersection of: the 
“rules-standards debate”; uncertainty in the law; and access to justice.  
As these parallel lines of inquiry in relation to each of the three rules are pursued, contribution 
will be brought to the literature on access to justice in the aftermath of Hryniak. Specifically, it 
will be analyzed whether the rules have been applied in a way that has facilitated, or impeded, the 
timely and inexpensive resolution of claims. A fourth line of inquiry, based upon surveys of players 
in the justice system, will follow with the goal to discover what the primarily quantitative analysis 
 
7  RSO 1990, c C43 [“CJA”]. 
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of the rules may have “missed”, and come to a holistic qualitative understanding of the effects of 
Hryniak through individuals’ lived experiences. In other words, is the “culture shift” occurring? 
This Introduction summarizes key work in the Canadian access to justice literature to place 
the subsequent analysis in each chapter in context. Specifically, definitions of access to justice are 
introduced and the role of civil procedure in access to justice initiatives is considered before 
seeking to reconcile these definitions of access to justice with the role of civil procedure. Also 
noted is the importance of the principle of proportionality, the potential to use technology to 
achieve access to justice, and how the rise of settlement and alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
intersects with this dissertation. Each chapter is then previewed, followed by a defence of the 
choice to study the three rules analyzed in the first three chapters. In conclusion, hypotheses that 
will be analyzed throughout each chapter are noted, along with what will be addressed in the 
Conclusion. 
I) OVERVIEW: PLACING THIS RESEARCH IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
CONVERSATION 
 
A. Definitions of Access to Justice 
Many scholars have written extensively about the concept “access to justice”. This concept 
can be defined very broadly, to include issues such as whether substantive law incorporates social 
justice.8 Concerns about substantive justice will be addressed in each chapter of this dissertation. 
Access to justice research and literature also frequently considers how legal professionals can 
deliver legal services in a more effective way.9 More narrow definitions, identified by Roderick 
 
8  E.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 2 at 969; Sarah Buhler, “The View from Here: Access to Justice and Community 
Legal Clinics” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 427; Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What 
Justice Should We Be Talking About?” (2008) 46:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 773. 
9  Trevor CW Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, 
eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2016) [“Farrow 2016”] at 164. 
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Macdonald and Trevor Farrow,10 and embraced by Stephen Pitel and Thomas Harrison,11 
concentrate on resolution of legal claims while minimizing delay and financial costs. 
Access to justice analysis has frequently been illustrated by a narrowing triangle,12 developed 
by the British Columbia Civil Justice Task Force13 and later used by organizations such as the 
Canadian Forum on Civil Justice and National Action Committee on Access to Justice:14 
15 
 
10  Farrow 2014, supra note 2; Farrow 2016, ibid. 
11  Stephen Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 21” (2014) 43 
Adv Q 344 at 351-352; Thomas Stuart Harrison, “Between Principle and Practicality: A Dynamic Realist 
Examination of Independence in the Canadian Justice System”, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law, Queen’s 
University, 2016.  
12  The “A2J Triangle” with this version being illustrated by Andrew Pilliar, infra note 15. 
13  Civil Justice Reform Working Group, British Columbia Justice Review Task Force, “Effective and Affordable 
Civil Justice: Report of the Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task 
Force” (November, 2006), online: 
<http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/civil_justice/cjrwg_report_11_06.pdf> at 2.  
14  Rick Craig, “Public legal education and information (PLEI) in a Changing Legal Services Spectrum” (Spring 
2009) 12 News & Views on Civil Justice Reform 9 at 10; Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and 
Family Matters, “Access to Civil & Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change” (Ottawa: Action Committee on 
Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, October 2013) at 7-8, online: <http:// www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf> [“Roadmap for Change”] at 11-12. 
15  This version is found in Andrew Pilliar, “Connecting and Understanding: AJRN and the Market for Personal 
Legal Services”, presentation to University of Saskatchewan Access to Justice Working Group, Summer 2016 
[“Pilliar SK”], slide 12. 
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The left-side of the triangle represents all persons encountering a justiciable legal issue. The 
distance from the left side towards the right tip represents the extent of time/procedural steps before 
resolving the justiciable issue. The rightmost tip represents an extreme case where an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada is necessary. The triangle’s narrowing reflects how a system that 
promotes access to justice will allow persons to resolve their disputes relatively quickly, and spend 
less time “in the system”. The A2J Triangle also recognizes that not every dispute can be resolved 
early, whether due to complexity, novelty, or a party’s insistence on resorting to courts.16  
Much access to justice scholarship has addressed matters near the left side of the triangle – 
how justiciable issues arise (the left-most third), and, in the centre third, how to deliver legal 
services in an accessible way.17 A bit further to the right (at the left edge of the right-most third) 
are alternatives to litigation, such as mediation and arbitration.18 Some work has even taken place 
to the left of the left side of the triangle – how can individuals avoid encountering a justiciable 
legal problem in the first place through education and prevention?19 A useful analogy is drawn to 
medicine – while “seeing a doctor” is necessary from time-to-time, and one occasionally must go 
to an emergency department, it is preferable to make life choices that prevent health problems 
from arising. An analogy can be drawn to the justice system – individuals should be encouraged 
to make choices that avoid a justiciable issue arising.20 
 
16  Recognized as legitimate concerns in Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 33, accepting that “even slow and 
expensive procedures can be proportionate when they are the fastest and most efficient alternative”. 
17  E.g., Andrew Pilliar, “Exploring a Law Firm Business Model to Improve Access to Justice” (2015) 32(1) 
Windsor YB Access Just 1 [“Pilliar 2015”]; Michael J Trebilcock, Legal Aid Review (Toronto: Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 2008), Section VII, online: 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/english/about/pubs/trebilcock>; Ken 
Chasse, “Access to Justice -- Unaffordable Legal Services’ Concepts and Solutions” (September 25, 2018). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2811627. 
18  E.g., Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, “Access to Justice and Beyond” (2010) 60 UTLJ 373, summarizing the 
work of Michael J Trebilock; Jeffrey S Leon & Gannon G Beaulne, “Making Up Your Mind: Trial Litigation 
vs. Arbitration in the Commercial World” (Summer 2015) 34 Adv J No 1, 10. 
19  Craig, supra note 14 at 10. 
20  Farrow 2014, supra note 2 at 980; Roadmap for Change, supra note 14. 
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A great deal has been written about issues such as these21 on the left side of the A2J Triangle. 
Those issues are undeniably important. But the aforementioned scholars, who have concentrated 
on avoiding litigation, tend to recognize that litigation is sometimes necessary.22 This is partially 
because civil litigation is constitutionally destined to remain part of our legal system,23 as recently 
confirmed by the Supreme Court, which has even held that access to the civil courts is, at least in 
some cases, a constitutional right.24 As discussed further below, public dispute resolution also 
plays an important role in a constitutional democracy such as Canada, specifically through 
developing the common law, as Karakatsanis J recognized in Hryniak.25 In any event, even if 
“alternative” dispute resolution and/or avoiding litigation are generally preferable to traditional 
litigation26 (as might be the case), studying traditional litigation can have the benefits of not only 
improving traditional litigation, but also incentivizing alternatives to improve themselves.27 The 
result of improved traditional litigation and ADR is in everyone’s best interest.28 And the interests 
of this dissertation lie close to the very right of the A2J Triangle – how do we structure our system 
of litigation to achieve access to justice once litigation has become a reality?  
 
 
 
21  These are hardly exclusive: see, e.g., Roadmap for Change, ibid. 
22  E.g., Pilliar SK, supra, note 15, whose analysis is based on this assumption; Hryniak, supra note 2, attempting 
to salvage this medium of dispute resolution; Roadmap for Change, ibid, makes this clear as well. 
23  Macdonald, supra note 4 at 32. 
24  Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 3 
SCR 31 [“Trial Lawyers”]; Paul Vayda, “Chipping away at Cost Barriers: A Comment on the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Trial Lawyers Decision” (2015) 36 WRLSI 207 at 211-212. 
25  Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 1 and 26; See also the Section, infra, entitled “Settlement, Mediation, 
Arbitration, and Privatization of Justice”. 
26  Discussions of this are found in, e.g., April G Grosse, “The Future of Dispute Resolution: The More Things 
Change, the More They Really Don’t” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 213 and Pam Marshall, “Would ADR Have 
Saved Romeo and Juliet?” (1998) 36:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 771. 
27  Joshua DH Karton, “Party Autonomy and Choice of Law: Is International Arbitration Leading the Way or 
Marching to the Beat of Its Own Drummer?” (2010) 60 UNB LJ 32. 
28  Many thanks to Janet Walker for making this point so succinctly during discussions with her in January 2017. 
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B. Civil Procedure in Access to Justice Conversations 
Procedure is perhaps the most common place to emphasize access to justice once litigation 
has commenced.29 The 2010 Amendments were an effort to amend the Rules to promote the 
resolution of lawsuits in a manner that minimizes delay and expense.30 This dissertation is 
particularly curious as to whether the 2010 Amendments have – or have not – been effective, 
especially outside of the areas most directly touched by the 2010 Amendments. 
In 2006, Michael Bryant, then Attorney General of Ontario, tapped Coulter Osborne, retired 
Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, to lead the Civil Justice Reform Project. Among other things, 
Mr. Osborne was to recommend how “to make the civil justice system more accessible and 
affordable for Ontarians.”31 In November 2007, Mr. Osborne produced a report with his 
recommendations. Many – but not all – of his recommendations have been enacted and the 2010 
Amendments are largely an attempt to enact the recommendations in the Osborne Report.32  
Perhaps the most notable of the 2010 Amendments concerned when a court may grant 
“summary judgment” – that is, disposing of all or part of a case on a motion, with affidavit 
evidence, and without a full trial.33 Despite historic reluctance to grant “summary judgment”, the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Hryniak that summary judgment powers are to be interpreted 
 
29  See, e.g., Beth Thornburg, et al., “A Community of Procedural Scholars: Teaching Procedure and the Legal 
Academy” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 93 at 100-101. 
30  E.g., O Reg 43/14; O Reg 438/08. 
31  Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift: An Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary Judgment 
Reforms” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275 [“MacKenzie SJ”], fn 18; Coulter Osborne, QC, Civil Justice 
Reform Project: Findings and Recommendations (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2007), 
online: <https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/> [“Osborne Report”] at 
Appendices A (Terms of Reference) & B (Consultation Letter). 
32  See, e.g., MacKenzie SJ, ibid, at 1280-1281; Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has Its Day in Court” (2012) 
37 Queen’s LJ 697 at 700-701 and 707-708. 
33  Rule 20 of the Rules, supra note 5, analyzed in Hryniak, supra note 2. Rule 20’s wording can be found at 
Appendix R. 
8 
 
 
broadly to promote access to justice.34 Hryniak was generally praised,35 but its effects are only 
beginning to be analyzed. For example, Shantona Chaudhary36 and Brooke MacKenzie37 have 
argued that Hryniak’s expansion of summary judgment powers has a strong theoretical foundation 
and has had positive empirical effects. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine how a 
summary procedure could disadvantage self-represented litigants.38 A recent Ontario Court of 
Appeal decision overturned the granting of summary judgment after a self-represented plaintiff 
failed to produce what the motion judge deemed an acceptable expert report in a dental malpractice 
claim.39 Chief Justice Strathy held that the motion judge failed to grant the self-represented litigant 
a sufficient amount of leeway on procedural matters. But this case involved a litigant who managed 
to retain counsel for her appeal – Macfarlane’s research suggests that rarely do these cases have 
such a “happy ending”40 and other examples are returned to in Chapter Two. 
While the effects of Hyrniak on summary judgment are interesting, this dissertation looks into 
its effects outside this narrow context. Pitel, for example, has argued that the spirit of Hyrniak – 
and, in particular, its call for a “culture shift” in how litigation is conducted – applies beyond 
summary judgment.41 Thomas Cromwell has clarified this in extrajudicial comments since retiring 
 
34  Hryniak, ibid at para 5.  
35  E.g., Shantona Chaudhary, “Hryniak v. Mauldin: The Supreme Court issues a clarion call for civil justice 
reform” (Winter 2014) 33 Adv J No 3. 
36  Ibid. 
37  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 31. 
38  E.g., Michelle Flaherty, “Best Practices in Active Adjudication” (2015) 28 Can J Admin L & Prac 291 at 297-
298; the pitfalls facing self-represented litigants are explained thoroughly by Julie Macfarlane in 
Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs 
of Self-Represented Litigants – Final Report” (May 2013), online: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/85/> 
[“Macfarlane Main Report”]; Julie Macfarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary 
Judgment Procedures Against Self-Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to 
Justice?” (Windsor, ON: The National Self-Represented Litigants Project, The University of Windsor, 
November 2015). 
39  Sanzone v Schechter, 2016 ONCA 566, 402 DLR (4th) 135. 
40  Macfarlane Main Report, supra note 38. 
41  Pitel & Lerner, supra note 11. 
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from the Supreme Court.42 Barbara Billingsley has similarly written how Hryniak’s effects have 
been felt in Alberta.43 So to what extent have Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments had effects 
outside the summary judgment context in Ontario? 
To answer this question, the three aforementioned unamended parts of Ontario’s procedural 
law will be analyzed, seeking to determine how they facilitate or impede resolution of civil claims 
with minimal delay and financial cost, with particular attention to any post-Hryniak changes. Each 
chapter will review the literature related to the particular issues raised by the specific topics. 
Together, the chapters will provide insight into the question of whether the “culture shift” that 
Karakatsanis J called for in Hryniak is occurring outside the summary judgment context and 
whether access to justice has accordingly been improved in a broader sense. Quantitative analysis 
of case law in the first three chapters will be complemented by qualitative surveys in Chapter Four. 
C. Returning to Access to Justice Definitions in Civil Procedure Analyses 
Proceeding with a relatively narrow definition of access to justice, emphasizing speed and 
minimal financial expense in the fair resolution of civil actions, is appropriate for this project. 
Scholars such as Farrow44 and Pilliar45 have persuasively argued that this definition is too narrow 
– it does not provide a holistic account of how an inability to access justice affects individuals’ 
lives and their health. Farrow offers the example of a child’s struggles at school being directly tied 
to her parent’s termination without appropriate severance a year ago.46 This critique is compelling. 
In a speech in 2012, Cromwell J said that access to justice “is not limited to access to courts, judges 
and lawyers […] we must focus on fair and just outcomes that are reasonably acceptable to the 
 
42  Queen’s University Faculty of Law Speaker Series, Kingston, Ontario, November 4, 2016. 
43  Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to Alberta: Summary Judgment, Culture Shift, and the Future 
of Civil Trials” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1 
44  Farrow 2016, supra note 9. 
45  Pilliar 2015, supra note 17. 
46  Farrow 2016, supra note 9 at 166-167.  
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participants, not on giving everyone his or her day in court when that is neither needed nor 
wanted.”47 Implicit in this is something Farrow and Macdonald have noted – that “access to 
justice” should concentrate not on the justice system itself but on outcomes for its users.48  
In this vein, Lorne Sossin and Kent Roach have argued that access to justice is not “just about 
access to the courts but also about access to markets and regulatory regimes that would lessen the 
need for access to the courts.”49 Sossin and I have previously noted that “[a]ccess to justice in this 
sense is not only about enabling individuals to access means of legal remedies […], but also about 
breaking down the barriers that often prevent people from ensuring their legal rights are 
respected.”50 This can lead to innovations within the court system, including uses of class actions, 
the role of small claims courts, and technology-facilitated access to dispute resolution.51 The result 
is that a greater number of individuals can seek legal remedies.52 We have also argued that this 
broader conceptualization of access of justice should, at the very least, inform how Crown actors 
exercise their discretion in the public law context.53 This recognizes both that: a) civil procedure, 
like access to justice, must not be understood in the abstract but through the lived experiences of 
litigants;54 and b) the line between procedural and substantive law can be “shadowy”,55 and 
procedural rules can pose practical limits on individuals’ ability to access justice in many cases. 
 
47  Justice Thomas A Cromwell, Address (Remarks delivered at the PLEAC Conference, 26 October 2012), 
[unpublished] at 2 as reported in Mary Eberts, “‘Lawyers Feed the Hungry:’ Access to Justice, The Rule of 
Law, and the Private Practice of Law” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 115 at 120, fn 32. 
48  Farrow 2016, supra note 9 at 170; Macdonald, supra note 4. 
49  Roach & Sossin, supra note 18 at 374. 
50  Gerard J Kennedy & Lorne Sossin, “Justiciability, Access to Justice & the Development of Constitutional Law 
in Canada” (2017) 45(4) FLR 707 at 711. 
51  Ibid at 710-711, citing Shannon Salter, “ODR and Justice System Integration: B.C.’s Civil Resolution 
Tribunal” (2017) 34(1) Windsor YB Access Just 112. 
52  Kennedy & Sossin, ibid at 711, citing Roach & Sossin, supra note 18 at 376. 
53  Kennedy & Sossin, ibid: this is the article’s thesis. 
54  See, e.g., Lorne Sossin, “Constitutional Accommodation and the Rule(s) of Courts” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 607 
at 633. 
55  James Wm Moore, “The Place of the New Federal Rules in the Law School Curriculum” (1938) 27 Geo LJ 
884 at 889. 
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Having said that, as persuasive as these calls for a broader conceptualization of access to 
justice are, there are likely limits. Scholars such as Thomas Harrison have observed that,56 given 
the fairly limited constitutional role of courts,57 it may be asking too much of the legal system and 
profession to respond to some of the systemic issues causing difficulties experienced by those who 
cannot access justice. The fact is that the civil justice system has evolved to deal with particular 
types of disputes in particular circumstances, and has not been designed to redress every injustice 
in society.58  
For the purposes of this project, resolution of this debate is unnecessary – hence the 
contentedness to proceed with a relatively narrow definition of access to justice. Scholars such as 
Farrow and Pilliar have tended to concentrate their research on how services are delivered to 
persons encountering justiciable legal issues. As important as these issues are, once civil procedure 
is guiding an action through the court system, it is useful and appropriate to assess whether that 
civil procedure is leading to resolution of that action promptly and with minimal financial expense. 
This work is complementary, rather than an alternative, to analyses of broader issues affecting 
access to justice. As Farrow has written: 
There is no doubt that, if a matter needs to go to court, and if a client needs to pay for a 
lawyer in order to get advice on that matter, access to the system will have been improved 
if the system and the people providing those services are available more efficiently and 
cost effectively, allowing more people access to those services.59  
 
 
56  E.g., Harrison, supra note 11 at s 2.4. 
57  Ibid at 55 and fn 183, citing Micah B Rankin, “Access to Justice and the Institutional Limits of Independent 
Courts” (2012) 30 Windsor YB Access Just 101 at Part IV.B, “referring to Alexander Hamilton’s similar and 
earlier observation in Federalist Papers No 78 The Federalist Papers, Terence Ball ed (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 378.” See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison, The 
Federalist Papers, Project Gutenberg Etext (Champaign, IL: Project Gutenberg). Accessed November 20, 
2019: 
http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1085531&site=e
host-live. 
58  Explained for a general audience in Gerard J Kennedy, “Justice for Some” The Walrus (November 2017) 47 
[“Kennedy Walrus”] at 48.  
59  Farrow 2016, supra note 9 at 166. 
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The issues of preventing legal problems from arising, and delivering legal services to 
individuals, are largely separate from how civil litigation should proceed once it begins. Moreover, 
as noted above, it is important to analyze the public civil litigation process even if the primary 
method of resolving justiciable issues in the future exists independent of this process.  
As far as substantive justice in the law is concerned, the relevance of this in legal analysis has 
been debated since Oliver Wendel Holmes Jr’s critiques of Christopher Columbus Langdell.60 
Langdell famously argued that concerns such as morality and justice are not relevant in legal 
analysis except insofar as they are already embodied in particular legal rules.61 Holmes found this 
preposterous, asserting that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience … The 
important phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and reasonableness of a 
decision, not its consistency with previously held views.”62 As interesting as this debate is, it would 
be unrealistic and hubristic to propose that this dissertation can resolve it. The 2010 Amendments 
and Hryniak focus on a distinct component of access to justice, worth investigating in and of itself. 
Accordingly, evaluating the impacts of the 2010 Amendments and Hryniak against a relatively 
narrow definition of access to justice seems appropriate. However, to the extent that analysis in 
each chapter provides insights on whether the 2010 Amendments and Hryniak have impacted 
access to justice, more broadly defined, this will be noted. 
 
60  Inspiration for this paragraph was found in David Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law Teaching and the 
Failure to Operationalize: Theory & Practice, Realism & Formalism, and Aspiration & Reality in 
Contemporary Legal Education” (2017), SJD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto at 52. 
61  Sandomierski, ibid at 51-52; Thomas C Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy” (1983) 45:1 U Pitt L Rev 1 at 5. Not 
everyone accepts this view of Langdell, however: see, e.g., Lewis A Grossman, “Langdell Upside-Down: 
James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodification” (2007) Yale J L & Humanities 
149 at 151; Bruce A Kimball, “Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian 
Caricature” (2007) 25(2) Law & Hist Rev 345; Bruce A Kimball, “Warn Students that I Entertain Heretical 
Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take as Law: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classroom of 
Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883” (1999) 17 Law & Hist Rev 57. 
62  Thomas Grey, “Holmes’s Language of Judging—Some Philistine Remarks” (1996) 70:1 St John’s L Rev 5 at 
6; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Proving Years, 1870-1882 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1963) at 156-57. 
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D. “Culture Shift” 
The phrase “culture shift” also means different things in different circumstances. 
Fundamentally, it indicates an openness to change and not being wedded to tradition for tradition’s 
sake.63 This is generally used to refer to matters near the left end of the A2J Triangle – such as 
how lawyers practise law and deliver services in a reflective manner.64 Even in the context of 
litigation, it can refer to what is difficult to capture in case law, such as a decision not to bring an 
unnecessary interlocutory motion.65 It can also be used to refer to matters within a court’s 
operations that are difficult to capture in case law, such as judicial specialization in particular areas 
of law66 and case management, including using unsuccessful interlocutory motions to nonetheless 
move matters along.67 
Even so, some evidence of a “culture shift” can be observed through analyzing court decisions, 
such as how many cases are resolved on their merits (generally, an increase will be positive, despite 
the benefits of settlement discussed elsewhere), and how many unsuccessful interlocutory motions 
are brought (causing delay and use of financial resources without helping resolve a dispute).68 As 
such, analysis of three parts of procedural law is part – if an incomplete part – of what must be 
considered in determining whether Hryniak’s call for a culture shift is being heeded.69 
 
 
63  Roadmap for Change, supra note 14 at 5, cited in, e.g., Michele M Leering, “Enhancing the Legal Profession’s 
Capacity for Innovation: The Promise of Reflective Practice and Action Research for Increasing Access to 
Justice” (2017) 34 Windsor YB Access Just 189 at 192. 
64  See, e.g., Leering, ibid at 220. 
65  Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 32. 
66  As will be returned to in the first two chapters, the Toronto Commercial List is viewed as a particularly good 
example of this: see, e.g., Warren K Winkler, “The Vanishing Trial” (Autumn 2008) 27(2) Advocates’ Soc J 3 
at 4. 
67  See, e.g., Master [as he then was] Robert N Beaudoin, “University of Windsor Mediation Services 
10th Anniversary: Remarks on the Civil Justice Review Task Force” (2006) 21 WRLSI 5 at 10, noting the 
reluctance of adopting this procedure. 
68  See, e.g., MacKenzie SJ, supra note 31. 
69  Ibid. 
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E. Technology and Access to Justice 
A fascinating literature has emerged in recent years regarding the potential to use technology 
to facilitate access to justice. Some of this is to simply save court resources, as well as parties’ and 
judges’ time. Examples include:  
• obtaining disclosure in criminal cases70 (technology already tends to facilitate discovery in 
civil cases71 but the need for undertakings and the asymmetrical discovery obligations of 
the Crown and defence has prevented this in the criminal context72); 
• videoconferences for matters such as scheduling73 – which the Ontario Superior Court 
piloted in eight locations in 2015;74 and 
• e-filing, thereby preventing unnecessary court attendances.75 
More novelly, Pro Bono Ontario has recently implemented a helpline to enable individuals to 
receive summary advice from lawyers regardless of their geographic location.76 This exemplifies 
the potential to use technology to de-mystify and de-privilege legal knowledge, another potential 
way to facilitate access to justice.77  
 
70  Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System” (2010) 14 Can Crim L Rev 111 [“Chasse E-
Discovery”], Conclusion. 
71  The subject of: the E-Discovery Canada website, hosted by LexUM (at the University of Montreal), online: 
<http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/e-discovery>; and The Sedona Canada Principles--
Addressing Electronic Discovery (January 2008), online: 
<http://www.thesedonaconference.com/content/miscFiles/canada_pincpls_FINAL_108.pdf>, discussed in, 
e.g., Ken Chasse, “‘Records Management Law’—A Necessary Major Field of the Practice of Law” (2015) 13 
Can J L & Tech 57, and incorporated in the Rules, supra note 5 at Rule 29.1.03(4). 
72  Chasse E-Discovery, supra note 70. This asymmetry is the result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326. 
73  Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell & Graham Reynolds, “Access to Justice for All: Towards an ‘Expansive 
Vision’ of Justice and Technology” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 181 [“Bailey, et al”] at 196-197. 
74  Superior Court of Justice, “Superior Court of Justice Video Conferencing Pilot Project”, online: 
<http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/video-conferencing/>. 
75  Bailey, et al, supra note 73 at 194-195; Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 71. 
76 Aidan Macnab, “Pro Bono Ontario launches telephone hotline” Canadian Lawyer (16 November 2017), 
online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/aidan-macnab/pro-bono-ontario-launches-
telephone-hotline-14951/>. 
77  Bailey, et al, supra note 73 at 195-196. 
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While something is lost when shared experiences such as face-to-face interactions do not take 
place,78 the consequences of this would seem minimal when addressing matters such as filing and 
scheduling.79 At times, even having a hearing take place with the aid of technology would appear 
preferable to forcing parties that are across the country to come together in a particular location, 
with its associated costs.80 
In more novel cases, artificial intelligence (“AI”) has been proposed as a means to make 
decisions more accurately than judges or lawyers.81 There is evidence that AI is actually better-
suited than human lawyers or judges to predict outcomes in grey areas of tax law,82 or determine 
risks of granting an individual parole83 or bail.84 If AI can perform traditional tasks such as these, 
judges can spend more time deciding civil cases. Admittedly, there are concerns about AI’s 
capacity in these areas, with there being widespread concerns that AI will reinforce and even 
amplify racial inequalities in the justice system.85 The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has 
accordingly come out strongly against the use of AI predictive software.86 
 
78  See, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017) at 7-8. 
79  Ibid at 8. 
80  This issue came before the Supreme Court after conflicting and divided Court of Appeal decisions in Endean v 
British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42, [2016] 2 SCR 162. This was previously discussed in Christopher P Naudie & 
Gerard J Kennedy, “Ontario Court of Appeal Divided on Permissibility of Hearings Outside Ontario in Multi-
Jurisdictional Class Actions” (August 2015) 4 CALR 33. 
81  E.g., Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H Yoon, “Law in the Future” (2016) 66 UTLJ 423. 
82  Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H Yoon, “Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax 
Law” (2016) 58 CBLJ 231. 
83  Ibid at 234, fn 6. 
84  Anthony J Casey & Anthony Niblett, “Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Future of Law” (2016) 66 
UTLJ 429 at 432. 
85  See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, “When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail” New York Times (June 13, 2017), 
online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-
justice.html?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress&region=FixedLeft&pgtype=
article>; Mark W Bennett & Victoria C Ploutt, “Looking Criminal and the Presumption of Dangerousness: 
Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice” (2018) 51 UC Davis L Rev 745 at 765. 
86  Reported in, e.g., Agnese Smith, “Automatic Justice” CBA National (Spring 2018) 14 at 16. 
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The opportunities to facilitate access to justice through technology are manifold. In certain 
situations, it would appear absolutely wise to use technology. While this arguably seems to put 
lawyers and judges out of work, it seems likelier that these lawyers and judges would instead be 
able to use their time to deliver more services to more clients more efficiently, thus maximizing 
access to justice.87 Admittedly, certain Rules regarding the numbers and colours of certain 
documents to be filed would have to be amended,88 but these issues seem solvable. 
The ability to use technology to achieve access to justice will be returned to in the Conclusion. 
Fundamentally, however, this appears analogous to issues such as how to deliver legal services, 
and largely independent from analyses of civil procedure. Civil procedure is fundamentally about 
how a civil action proceeds through the courts. There must always be a reasonably predictable and 
fair procedure to guide the action through the court system.89 And it is important that that procedure 
be cost- and time-efficient, with or without the aid of technology. 
F. Proportionality 
Proportionality, now enshrined in Rule 1.04(1.1) of the Ontario Rules, is an overarching 
principle guiding all of civil procedure.90 Very generally, this mandates that players in the justice 
system are to conduct litigation with the view to minimize financial cost and delay, specifically 
with regard to the issues and amounts at stake in litigation. In other words, the cost and delay must 
be “proportional” to those amounts and issues.91 Despite overlap with the concept of efficiency, 
 
87  This is a basic principle in economics, perhaps most famously seen in the transition from a largely agricultural 
based-economy to a largely manufacturing-based economy. Thanks are also due to Anthony Niblett for making 
this point in response to a question at the Ken McCarter Conference on Access to Justice at Massey College, 
the University of Toronto, 27 February 2018, citing the example of innovations within accounting firms in 
response to the emergence of electronic spreadsheets. 
88  Supra note 5 at, e.g., Rule 4.07. 
89  A balance between “reasonably fair” and “reasonably predictable” will be sought in the Conclusion. 
90  Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 27-33. 
91  Farrow 2012, supra note 4 at 154. 
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proportionality and efficiency are not synonymous – while efficiency seeks to minimize delay and 
cost, proportionality may mandate long and arguably more tedious procedures in particular cases.92  
Amounts at stake in litigation are clearly relevant to analyses of proportionality. For example, 
it makes little sense to spend one million dollars on discovery in a case involving only one hundred 
thousand dollars. But proportionality should truly concentrate on the extent to which particular 
expense and delay will increase the likelihood of achieving an ultimately just result, considering 
the amounts and issues at stake. Burlington Resources Finance Co v Canada,93 a recent decision 
of the Tax Court of Canada, downplayed the proportionality principle in the context of discovery 
obligations in cases with vast sums of money at stake. It is difficult to quarrel with the decision’s 
observation that proportionality does not “trump[] relevancy in all situations”.94 Moreover, one 
could fairly read the Tax Court of Canada Rules95 as not incorporating the principle of 
proportionality. However, the usefulness and fairness of the principle have led to it being judicially 
incorporated in all Canadian jurisdictions, including the Tax Court.96 Further, concentrating 
merely on the amount of money at stake seems, with respect, an impoverished view of 
proportionality. The very word, as well as the fact that jurisdictions such as Ontario have made the 
principle applicable to all civil procedure, implies that the amounts at stake in the litigation are 
relevant – but not determinative. Ultimately, the cost and delay caused by a particular step in 
litigation must be weighed against what could be gained from it.97 Lorne Sossin and I have argued 
that litigants – particularly government litigants – must occasionally be expected to endure 
expensive and/or time-consuming court procedures in constitutional litigation when the issues at 
 
92  Farrow 2012, ibid at 153-154; Hyrniak, supra note 2 at para 33. 
93  2017 TCC 144, [2017] 6 CTC 2001 [“Burlington”]. 
94  Ibid at para 16. 
95  Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure), SOR/90-688a. 
96  Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 31. D’Auray J agreed with this in Burlington, supra note 93. 
97  Farrow 2012, supra note 4 at 154. 
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stake have profound effects on society at large.98 Though at other times, an expensive procedure 
early on in a piece of litigation with modest sums at stake can be proportionate if it will be 
determinative of the case, as suggested in Chapter Two. And the mere fact that large sums are at 
stake should not give parties a free reign to spend unlimited amounts of time and money on 
peripheral matters that will not lead to the prompt and fair resolution of a case. 
Ultimately, the concept of proportionality clearly has significant overlap with the 
conceptualization of access to justice being used in this dissertation. The concept will be re-
evaluated in the Conclusion in light of the findings from the first four chapters. 
G. Settlement, Mediation, Arbitration, and Privatization of Justice 
The quantitative analysis of case law that will be used in this dissertation’s first three chapters 
does not explicitly consider the possibility of settlement, mediation, and/or arbitration. This means 
that many actions will not be captured by this dissertation’s analysis. Settlement is frequently to 
be applauded, as it tends to decrease costs for parties, and increases certainty.99 Ontario has made 
mediation mandatory in many circumstances to promote settlement.100 Drawing on 
Saskatchewan’s experience, Julie Macfarlane and Michaela Keet have argued that mandatory 
mediation has generally been positive, with widespread support among the bench and the bar.101 
Ontario analysis has also suggested that mediation generally, and mandatory mediation 
specifically, decreases costs to the parties.102 Mandatory mediation nonetheless has its critics – it 
 
98  Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 50.  
99  Sable Offshore Energy Inc v Ameron International Corp, 2013 SCC 37, [2013] 2 SCR 623 at para 11, per 
Abella J, citing Callaghan ACJHC (as he was then) in Sparling v Southam Inc (1988), 66 OR (2d) 225 (HC). 
100  Rules, supra note 5, Rule 24.1. 
101  Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, “Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil Mediation in Saskatchewan: 
Lessons from a Maturing Program” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 677.  
102  Robert G Hann & Carl Baar, “Evaluation of the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1): Final 
Report – The First 23 Months” (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2001), online: 
<https://archive.org/stream/mag_00041982/mag_00041982_djvu.txt>, described by Martin Teplitsky, QC, 
“Universal mandatory mediation: A critical analysis of the evaluations of the Ontario mandatory 
mediation program” (Winter 2001) 20 Advocates’ Soc J No 3, 10 [“Teplitsky 2001”]. See also Gary Smith, 
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can create perverse incentives for mediators to achieve settlement regardless of whether it is in the 
best interests of the parties103 and can undermine the voluntary nature of settlement, which is one 
of its fundamental justifications.104 Martin Teplitsky was also a vocal skeptic regarding whether 
mandatory mediation decreased costs for parties.105 
Though settlement is frequently to be applauded, it, like arbitration (which also comes with 
many benefits), impedes development of the common law. This stagnation in the common law can 
itself be an access to justice problem as an unevolved or unclear common law jeopardizes the rule 
of law,106 and leaves parties unable to order their affairs.107 Farrow also notes that the fact that a 
case did not go to trial does not mean it settled – it could have been abandoned, dismissed for 
delay, default proceedings could have ensued, and/or a party may have capitulated.108 Moreover, 
an unprincipled settlement to “avoid delay and costs” may help unclog the courts and make parties 
masters of their own destinies – but is not to be celebrated from a perspective of substantive justice. 
Insofar at the Rules incentivize such results, that is particularly problematic.109  
 
“Unwilling Actors: Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Voluntary Mandatory Mediation May Not” (1998) 
36:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 847, arguing that voluntary mediation is a very good and cost-effective process – but 
mandatory mediation may not be. 
103  See, e.g., Colleen M Hanycz, “Through the Looking Glass: Mediator Conceptions of Philosophy, Process and 
Power” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 819. 
104  See, e.g., Patricia Hughes, “Mandatory Mediation: Opportunity or Subversion?” (2001) 19 Windsor YB 
Access Just 161.  
105  Martin Teplitsky, QC, LSM, “Mandatory Mediation” (Summer 2005) 24 Advocates’ Soc J No 1, 17; Teplitsky 
2001, supra note 102. 
106  Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 1, 26. 
107  This is an essential characteristic of the common law, as Cromwell J explains in Bhasin v Hrynew, 
2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 at para 66 (concerning contractual obligations), as described by Shannon 
O’Byrne & Ronnie Cohen, “The Contractual Principle of Good Faith and the Duty of Honesty in Bhasin v. 
Hrynew” (2015) 53:1 Alta L Rev 1 at 3. 
108  Described in a February 28, 2017 phone call concerning an unsuccessful research project. See also Canadian 
Forum on Civil Justice, “Civil Non-Family Cases Filed in the Supreme Court of BC: Research Results and 
Lessons Learned” (Victoria, BC, September 2015), online: <http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files//Attrition%20Study%20Final%20Report.pdf>. 
109  Brooke MacKenzie, “Settling for less: How the Rules of Civil Procedure overlook the public perspective of 
justice” (2011) 39 Adv Q 222 (specifically commenting on the incentivization of settlement in the Rules, supra 
note 5 at Rule 49, but the sentiment is applicable more broadly). 
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An increase in the rate of settlement also frequently comes at the cost of partially privatizing 
the justice system.110 Privatization has its advantages, and is also compatible with an understanding 
of legal pluralism, synthesized by Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick Macdonald, of state law 
consisting of multiple sources of law – including those that do not emanate from the state – with 
the result being multiple sources of legitimacy.111 In his seminal book Civil Justice, Privatization 
and Democracy, Farrow acknowledges that privatization has its advantages but expresses concern 
that it has become too prevalent.112 He notes five concerns about privatization. The first two are 
the common criticisms that alternative dispute resolution jeopardizes development of the common 
law and assumes benefits of mediation and arbitration that are debatable.113 He also notes that:  
• private dispute resolution vehicles frequently lack procedural protections for vulnerable 
parties; 114  
• civil dispute resolution plays a role in regulating the norms in a democratic state and, if 
this becomes less common, democratic norms will be weakened and systemic 
wrongdoing may go unacknowledged due to private resolution of particular cases;115 and 
• in an increasingly globalized economy, multi-state actors will attempt to “contract out” 
of public dispute resolution systems in attempts to avoid compliance with local laws.116  
 
110  Jonathan Silver & Trevor CW Farrow, “Canadian Civil Justice: Relief in Small and Simple Matters in an Age 
of Efficiency” (2015)(4) Eramsus L Rev 232 at 243.  
111  Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism” (1997) 12 Can J L & 
Soc 25. 
112  Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 
[“Farrow Book”]. 
113  Ibid at 219-232. 
114  Ibid at 232-251. 
115  Ibid at 251-258. An example where this occurred may be the private settlements in the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Boston concerning sexual abuse of children, later addressed in the film Spotlight, but described 
earlier in, e.g., Elizabeth E Spainhour, “Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts to Expose Settlement 
Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards” (2004) 82:6 NCL Rev 2155. 
116  Ibid at 259-268. This is not a theoretical concern, as the Supreme Court’s decision in Douez v Facebook, 2017 
SCC 33, [2017] 1 SCR 751 illustrates – though there remains a risk that compliance with local overregulation 
will disincentivize persons who would otherwise contribute to a jurisdiction’s economy from innovating within 
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It is against this background that both the 2010 Amendments and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hryniak sought to ensure that public courts will be better able to resolve civil litigation 
on the merits. This project seeks to look at the effectiveness of these reforms – and see whether a 
climate is emerging that minimizes parties’ temptations to leave the civil justice system, with the 
associated negative consequences of doing so. 
In any event, while settlement is often – though not necessarily – to be encouraged, the rules 
analyzed in this dissertation tend to avoid the types of cases that are likely to settle:  
1. A successful jurisdiction motion means an Ontario action will not be settled (unless it is 
to prevent an appeal); 
2. Rule 2.1 seeks to resolve an action very quickly, before settlement is likely117; and 
3. Appealed cases did not settle (at least on the issue being appealed – as discussed below, 
interlocutory appeals leave an “issue alive”).  
As such, this dissertation will be unable to comment on whether there has likely been an increase 
or decrease in the rate and numbers of settlements post-Hryniak, except through Chapter Four’s 
surveys. But this does not detract from all of the chapters seeking to answer the overarching 
question on the effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments on public dispute resolution. 
H. Other Elements of Access to Justice Conversation 
This Introduction has thus far sought to place this dissertation’s research in the access to 
justice conversation – a conversation that can and should be very wide-reaching. One could quibble 
that other aspects of this conversation are missing, such as lawyer knowledge and (clinical) legal 
 
or entering it: see, e.g., Lon Levin, “CATV Franchise Fee: Incentive for Regulation, Disincentive for 
Innovation” (1979) 30 Syracuse L Rev 741 at 743, explaining this phenomenon in a different context. 
117  Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, 61 CPC (7th) 153 (SCJ) at para 
11. 
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education regarding access to justice,118 the relationship between diversity and access to justice,119 
and the role of law societies120 and non-lawyers121 in this conversation. Even so, all of these and 
other considerations cannot be exhausted, both because of the need to narrow this dissertation’s 
analysis, and because comprehensively explaining all elements of the access to justice literature 
would be impossible, with attempting to do so inevitably being exclusionary to some extent. 
I. Why Courts Matter 
As should be apparent by now, courts are not a solution to all disputes that arise in society. 
Indeed, they should not be the forum of most dispute resolution. Some issues – such as tenets of 
religious faiths122 or disputes about who is the greatest ice hockey player of all time123 – are quite 
rightly regarded as injusticiable.124 Even among theoretically justiciable matters, other forums are 
likely better-suited to resolve many of them. It would also be preferable to prevent many of these 
issues from arising through ex ante interventions by teachers, nurses, doctors, or social workers 
rather than post hoc interventions by lawyers. 
But courts still matter. The public court system has a unique constitutional role to develop the 
norms that form the basis of the rule of law in our society.125 Most individuals need not resolve 
 
118  Leering, supra note 63; Sarah Marsden & Sarah Buhler, “Lawyer Competencies and Access to Justice: Two 
Empirical Studies” (2017) 34 Windsor YB Access Just 186; Sarah Buhler, “Clinical Legal Education in 
Canada: A Survey of the Scholarship” (2015) Can Legal Educ Ann Rev 1. 
119  E.g., Brian Etherington, “Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice” (2000) 26 Queen’s LJ 
43; Patricia Hughes, “Advancing Access to Justice through Generic Solutions: The Risk of Perpetuating 
Exclusion” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 1. 
120  E.g., Richard Devlin, “Bend or Break: Enhancing the Responsibilities of Law Societies to Promote Access to 
Justice” (2015) 38 Man LJ 119; Lisa Trabuco, “What Are We Waiting For? It’s Time to Regulate Paralegals in 
Canada” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access Just 149; The Honourable Thomas A Cromwell & Siena Antsis, “The 
Legal Services Gap: Access to Justice as a Regulatory Issue” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 1. 
121  E.g., Trabuco, ibid; Cromwell & Antsis, ibid at 12-13. 
122 Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26, [2018] 1 SCR 
750 [“Wall”] at para 38; Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 50 at 710. 
123  Wall v Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2016 ABCA 255, 43 Alta 
LR (6th) 33 at para 82 (per Wakeling JA, dissenting in Court of Appeal, but majority overruled in Wall, ibid). 
124  Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 50 at 710. 
125  Trial Lawyers, supra note 24; Vayda, supra note 24. 
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most of their disputes in the public court system for it to continue to have that role. But if the public 
court system is fundamentally unavailable to large swaths of the population due to excessive delays 
and costs, that forces individuals to look for solutions elsewhere in situations that may be 
suboptimal and/or create the risk of procedural unfairness.126 This endangers the rule of law, which 
requires courts being easily accessible to protect the law’s role in regulating societal norms.127  
Accordingly, just as it is important to recognize that courts cannot and should not aspire to 
solve every problem in society, it is equally important to not throw the baby that is litigation in the 
public civil courts out with the bathwater surrounding it, even when that bathwater is sorely in 
need of change. The 2010 Amendments and Hryniak attempted to assist in this regard. This 
dissertation investigates the extent to which they have succeeded, and what that says about the 
capacity of civil procedure reform to achieve access to justice. There are parts of the access to 
justice conversation that the traditional civil justice system cannot – and may never be able to – 
deliver upon. But that does not mean that it should not deliver what it can deliver on, and that 
understanding the contours of what it can deliver on, and how it can do so, are exceptionally 
important. 
II) PREVIEWING THE CHAPTERS 
A. Chapter One: Rule 17 – Jurisdiction Motions 
Jurisdiction motions can impede the fair adjudication of actions in a timely and cost-efficient 
manner. This can be so even when parties comply with the Rules, as Corbett J of the Ontario 
Superior Court recently observed in a high-profile decision used to frame this chapter.128 At the 
 
126  Farrow Book, supra note 112 at 232-251. 
127  Maxime St-Hilaire & Joanna Baron, “Introductory Essay: The Rule of Law as the Rule of Artificial Reason” 
(2019) 92 SCLR (2d) 1 at 30; Trial Lawyers, supra note 24. 
128  Stuart Budd & Sons Limited v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2015 ONSC 519, 66 CPC (7th) 316 (SCJ) 
[“Stuart Budd”] at para 92. 
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same time, if Ontario genuinely does not have jurisdiction over a case, it should not decide the 
case for reasons of international comity, and fairness to the parties. And if the jurisdiction motion 
removes a case from Ontario’s court system early in the process, others will have the opportunity 
to use court resources that the case would have occupied. This will manifestly improve access to 
justice for everyone with the possible exception of the plaintiff. The benefits of successful 
jurisdiction motions are also not to be understated – they have the potential to dispose of a case 
(although not on its merits) or at least send it to a forum that can adjudicate in the fairest fashion. 
For all of these reasons, jurisdiction motions can promote proportionality.  
It is these competing concerns that this chapter, already published,129 seeks to analyze. In other 
words, what are the literal costs – in terms of time and money – of jurisdiction motions in Ontario? 
(This chapter only addresses jurisdiction/forum non coveniens – while conflicts of laws rules also 
address matters of enforcement and choice of law, they are less attached to civil procedure.) And 
have recent attempts to reform the common law of jurisdiction been effective? 
This is a particularly timely topic to study, given recent, consistent criticisms of the common 
law of jurisdiction in Canada. This criticism has primarily focused on the uncertain state of the 
law of jurisdiction.130 A potential solution to this problem, considered at a recent symposium I co-
organized,131 is codification of the common law through the Court Jurisdiction Proceedings and 
Transfers Act, a statute enacted in three provinces.132 This analysis thus complements the research 
presented at that conference. 
 
129  Gerard J Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 79 [“Kennedy Jurisdiction”]. 
130  E.g., Tanya J Monestier, “(Still) a ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada” (2013) 36 
Fordham Int’l LJ 397.  
131  The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, Toronto, ON: October 21, 2016 [“CJPTA Symposium”]. 
132  The “CJPTA”: enacted in British Columbia, SBC 2003, c 28; Nova Scotia, SNS 2003 (2d Sess), c 2; and 
Saskatchewan, SS 1997, c C41.1. 
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Though the primary methodology in this chapter is a quantitative analysis of case law, 
potential proposals to address the access to justice concerns presented by jurisdiction motions are 
also considered. Given past literature in this area, four potential “solutions” are investigated. First, 
should rules regarding attornment – the process by which one party accepts the jurisdiction of a 
court – be softened?133 Second, should a leave requirement be imposed to bring a jurisdiction 
motion?134 Third, should specialist adjudicators be used to adjudicate jurisdiction motions?135 
Fourth, and finally, would amending the substantive law of jurisdiction assist in addressing the 
access to justice issues raised by jurisdiction motions?136 
B. Chapter Two: Rule 2.1 
Enacted in 2014, Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules137 seeks to combine two potential facilitators of 
access to justice – civil procedure reform and more active judging – in response to a discrete but 
very real problem in Canadian civil litigation: litigation that is “on its face” frivolous, vexatious, 
and/or abusive. Cases that fall within the Rule’s ambit number in the dozens per year, causing 
significant expense for responding parties, and wasting substantial public resources.138 
To date, no scholar has investigated Rule 2.1 (the “Rule”).139 This chapter, which has also 
already been published,140 seeks to rectify this gap. Part I explores the history of and rationale for 
 
133  This was recently proposed by an Ontario Superior Court judge: Stuart Budd, supra note 128 at para 94. 
134  Leave requirements are frequently imposed to curtail procedural steps that have the potential to be abused: see, 
e.g., the below discussion on interlocutory appeals. 
135  The advantages of specialization have been particularly discussed in family law: e.g., Roadmap for Change, 
supra note 14 at 16. 
136  The topic of the CJPTA Symposium, supra note 131, and the papers presented in conjunction with it. 
137  Supra note 5. 
138  Raji v Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, [2015] OJ No 307 (SCJ) at para 6. 
139  Some law firms have published professional resources on this topic: see, e.g., “WHAT DO I TELL A CLIENT 
WHO ASKS: What Do I Do When a Debtor files a ‘Freeman of the Land’ Claim or Motion (Sub Nom: 
‘Frivolous or Vexatious Claims and Motions – a Rule 2.1 Primer’)”, online: <http://www.phmlaw.com/what-
do-i-tell-client.pdf>; Kathryn Kirkpatrick & Jeremy Ablaza, “Cautious Use of Rule 2.1 Against Vexatious 
Claims in Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP” (15 August 2017), online: <http://blg.com/en/News-And-
Publications/Publication_5040>. 
140  Gerard J Kennedy, “Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While 
Advancing Access to Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access Just 243. 
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the Rule, in the context of the access to justice discussion in Ontario, and in light of the perceived 
inadequacy of alternative mechanisms provided for in the Rules and the CJA141 for addressing the 
dangers raised by vexatious litigants. Parts II and III analyze the first three years of decisions using 
the Rule to determine how Rule 2.1 has been applied in practice, with the goal to provide guidance 
for future lawyers and judges considering using the Rule. Part IV assesses the extent to which Rule 
2.1 has helped provide speedy and cost-efficient resolution of civil actions on their merits. Part V 
considers how the Rule should be used in the future – doctrinally, institutionally, and ethically.  
The conclusions are hopeful. Rule 2.1 is powerful, and its use should prompt some pause in 
judges and lawyers. It should be applied robustly when appropriate, but continue to be interpreted 
narrowly. There are also ways to constrain its improper use, such as mandating a standard form to 
use before the Rule is employed, or having strict requirements on when it is appropriate to dispense 
with the general requirement to give a litigant notice on why his or her action has been flagged for 
potential dismissal. 
But by and large, the Rule has been very well employed. It has resulted in notable savings of 
time and financial expense for courts and defendants, respondents, and responding parties while 
almost always being fair to plaintiffs, applicants, and moving parties. Indeed, many cases are the 
model of fairness to vulnerable parties. In the few instances where the Rule’s (attempted) use has 
arguably been inappropriate, the costs in terms of delay and financial expense are usually minimal. 
While Rule 2.1 is only applicable to a small minority of cases, they are not a trivial number. The 
Rule is ultimately an inspiring example of how civil procedure can be amended to facilitate access 
to justice – and be eminently fair to parties in doing so. 
 
 
141  Supra note 7, s 140. 
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C. Chapter Three: Interlocutory Appeals 
Interlocutory appeals have the clear potential to distort access to justice, by causing 
unnecessary expense and delay, two prime impediments to access to justice. As such, Ontario law: 
a) imposes a leave requirement for interlocutory appeals; and b) legislates that interlocutory 
appeals be generally brought in the Divisional Court while final appeals are generally brought in 
the Court of Appeal.142 At the same time, appeals, including interlocutory appeals, play an 
indispensable role in achieving justice in particular cases, righting clear wrongs. Moreover, the 
clarity in the law brought by appeals can help the pursuit of justice in numerous other cases. But 
determining whether an appeal is interlocutory or final has been the source of much controversy.143 
Coulter Osborne addressed this in the Osborne Report144 but his recommendations have not yet 
been incorporated in legislation as recommended, despite requests for this by the judiciary.145 
This chapter, which has also been accepted for publication,146 begins with Part I’s explanation 
of the purposes of appeals, the history of the interlocutory/final distinction, the legislation and case 
law governing appellate jurisdiction in Ontario, and the relationship between appeals and access 
to justice. Part II gives the methodology for analyzing all cases from 2010-2017 in the Divisional 
Court and Court of Appeal where there was dispute over the interlocutory/final distinction. Part 
III analyzes these figures, in terms of numbers, results, remedies, costs, delay, clarity of the law, 
and differences between the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court. These results are not 
encouraging from an access to justice perspective, with dozens of cases each year analyzing this 
 
142  Ibid, s 19(1)(b). 
143  E.g., the dissenting (on this point) opinion of Juriansz JA in Parsons v Ontario, 2015 ONCA 158, 125 OR (3d) 
168 [“Parsons”] at para 209. See also www.conductofanappeal.com, a blog by Mark Gelowitz and W David 
Rankin. Multiple blog posts discuss this issue, leading one to wonder how frequently this gets litigated. 
144  Osborne Report, supra note 31 at c 12. 
145  Shinder v Shinder, 2017 ONCA 822, 140 OR (3d) 477 at para 7. 
146  “Final v. Interlocutory Civil Appeals: How a Clear Distinction Became so Complicated—Its Purposes, 
Obfuscation and a Simple Solution?” (2020) 45(2) Queen’s LJ ___ (forthcoming). 
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issue. Part IV suggests that the distinction between interlocutory and final appeals, including the 
leave requirement for the former, should remain. It is nonetheless suggested that this situation 
could be improved through simplifying the test for distinguishing interlocutory from final appeals. 
The experiences of England and Wales and especially British Columbia, both of which have sought 
to address this issue through legislation, demonstrate that this is a project worth considering. A 
review of British Columbia case law pre- and post-legislative amendments is a key component of 
this analysis. A simplification of appellate jurisdiction in terms of merging the Divisional Court 
and Court of Appeal is a less certain solution but also warrants consideration. 
D. Chapter Four: Surveys of Actors in the Justice System 
Qualitative surveys remain relatively rare in legal scholarship,147 perhaps due to Langdellian 
views that law is a science to be discovered through primary sources, and as such surveys have 
little to add.148 And it is indeed true that obtaining a sample of lawyers that would be representative 
in the eyes of a statistician was not realistic for this dissertation. But this is also an area where 
anecdotes matter a great deal.149 So in June through August of 2019, 90 lawyers who volunteer at 
Pro Bono Ontario (“PBO”) were surveyed, seeking to glean their opinions on Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments. Lawyers at PBO were chosen as they tend to be litigators, who would be 
familiar with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. Many such lawyers also have a private practice 
on a day-to-day basis while dealing with economically disadvantaged individuals through PBO, 
indicating a diversity of experience.  
 
147  Urszula Jaremba & Elaine Mak, “Interviewing Judges in the Transnational Context” (2014) 5:3 Law and 
Method 1 at 1. 
148  See, e.g., the discussions in Sandomierski, supra note 60 at 51-52. But also see Kimball, supra note 61 and 
Grossman, supra note 61, suggesting that this is a caricature of Langdell rather than an accurate description. 
149  Farrow 2014, supra note 2. 
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The results of the surveys were mixed. Most respondents viewed Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments as, overall, positive. But there were still reservations that many changes had negative 
consequences in terms of type and intensity of work. There was also a common view that other 
factors have intervened so that access to civil justice has not significantly improved in the 2010s.  
E. Choice of Three Rules 
The three rules chosen in Chapters One, Two, and Three may appear somewhat disparate on 
first glance. They are probably not the most direct way of assessing the effects of Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments. But several factors still bring the rules analyzed in the first three chapters 
together. First, none were directly amended in 2010. Second, each can be a great facilitator or 
hindrance to access to justice, depending on how they are used. That makes them similar to 
summary judgment. Third, as will be developed, each relates to matters courts are institutionally 
capable of addressing – and as such reform presumably has potential. In other words, they are 
emblematic of what civil procedure reform can do. Fourth, each is in a state of uncertainty or 
novelty, opening up the subsidiary research question regarding the effects of uncertainty in the law 
on access to justice. Fifth, given their being in states of uncertainty, each rule is useful to 
investigate in and of itself in ways that not all elements of procedural law may be. As such, even 
if the answer regarding the macro-level analysis surrounding the effects of Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments needs to be hedged, this dissertation will still be able to make an important 
contribution to the conversation surrounding Ontario’s procedural law. 
III) PREVIEWING THE CONCLUSION 
In answering the overall question – have the 2010 Amendments enhanced access to justice in 
Ontario – the work in this dissertation will be assessed against what others have done in analyzing 
the 2010 Amendments. Most notably, Brooke MacKenzie has analyzed the increased use of 
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summary judgment in the aftermath of Hryniak.150 This dissertation and others’ findings will be 
assessed against the conceptualizations of access to justice and proportionality that will be 
developed. The research suggests three hypotheses should be tested: 
A) Civil procedure reform has real – if limited – ability to facilitate access to justice. The 
2010 Amendments have indeed been positive developments. However, more profound 
impacts on access to justice will require broader considerations and the battle for access 
to justice must be waged on multiple fronts. 
B) Appellate courts in general, and the Ontario Court of Appeal in particular, have frequently 
interpreted procedural and/or substantive law in ways that have been an access to justice 
impediment. This has been motivated by a desire to ensure that substantive injustices do 
not occur. But it has unfortunately had negative impacts in trial judges’ ability to apply 
procedural law to ensure the timely and cost-effective resolution of claims on their merits. 
C) It is possible to err excessively in prescribing “standards” instead of “rules”. Ontario 
appears to have overprescribed standards instead of rules in various aspects of its 
procedural and substantive law. While these have been motivated by a genuine desire to 
facilitate substantive justice, they have frequently caused needless complication and 
unnecessary litigation. Efforts to become more rules-based have had positive effects. 
Finally, two other matters will be considered: 
D) what this dissertation suggests about the potential of particular reforms outside of civil 
procedure reform to achieve access to justice; and  
E) the extent to which this research can help inform discussions of similar issues in criminal 
law and family law. 
 
150  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 31. 
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A. Real – But Limited – Ability to Achieve Access to Justice 
Early research suggests that there have been positive – but limited – access to justice 
consequences resulting from the 2010 Amendments.151 This may indicate, as has been 
hypothesized before, that civil procedure reform can only achieve access to justice in limited 
ways.152 This hypothesis will be tested based on this and others’ research, also considering the 
aforementioned definitions of access to justice. This research should inform future policymakers 
on realistic ways to facilitate access to justice. 
B. Resistance from the Ontario Court of Appeal? 
The Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted the 1985 introduction of summary judgment to the 
Rules very narrowly.153 MacKenzie has observed that the Court of Appeal’s narrow interpretation 
of the 2010 Amendments also resulted in a reduced effectiveness of the 2010 Amendments 
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak.154 In Chapter One, it is noted that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Van Breda155 was likely an access to justice improvement compared to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Muscutt.156 Similarly, in Chapter Two, it is posited that the 
Court of Appeal has narrowly construed the applicability of principles of Rule 2.1 in the family 
law context.157 In Chapter Three, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal’s desire to ensure 
substantive justice has led to an unwieldy jurisprudence on the distinction between interlocutory 
and final appeals. In Chapter Four, many respondents seem to lament that the Court of Appeal has 
restricted the ability to obtain summary judgment. On the one hand, this appears motivated by the 
 
151  E.g., ibid. 
152  E.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 2. 
153  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 31 at 1278-1280, citing Aguonie v Galion Solid Waste Material Inc (1998), 38 OR 
(3d) 161 (CA) and Dawson v Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc (1998), 111 OAC 201 (CA). 
154  MacKenzie SJ, ibid at 1300. 
155  Club Resorts v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572. 
156  Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20 (CA). 
157  Frick v Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, 132 OR (3d) 321. 
32 
 
 
Court of Appeal’s desire to ensure that substantive injustices do not occur. This is indeed a purpose 
of appellate courts.158 At the same time, the Court of Appeal should consider whether it is 
prescribing “racecar” procedural justice when a “hatchback” will suffice. Based on the analysis 
throughout the entire dissertation, humble suggestions will be given on how appellate courts 
should approach their role when prescribing procedural law with access to justice implications. 
C. The Rules-Standards Debate 
While it is hypothesized that civil procedure reform may only have a limited, if real, role to 
play in achieving access to justice, another issue came up repeatedly throughout the first four 
chapters: namely, the certainty (or lack thereof) in how civil procedure rules, and underlying 
substantive law, should be applied in particular cases. The procedural and substantive law analyzed 
in the first three chapters have all been criticized for being too unpredictable.159 
The tension between the need to lay down clear legal rules that provide guidance to parties 
(and thus minimize unnecessary litigation) and the need to allow sufficient flexibility to dispense 
substantive justice in particular cases has been noted for decades.160 While Sunstein and others 
have convincingly explained how rules can be problematic, Ontario civil procedure may have erred 
excessively on the side of standards, with it being doubtful that this has led to many more 
substantively fair outcomes. Chapter One posits that some substantively fair outcomes may be 
worth sacrificing for the sake of others’ access to justice: 
[Suppose] “Rule A” is fair and just 99% of the time, and predictable and easy to 
apply 95% of the time. “Rule B” is fair and just 100% of the time, but predictable 
and easy to apply only 75% of the time. Is the fairness and justice to the 1% 
achieved through adopting Rule B worth the unpredictability and uncertainty that 
must be endured by an additional 20%? Maybe, but maybe not. […] It is at least 
 
158  Gerard J Kennedy, “Persisting Uncertainties in Appellate Jurisdiction at the Supreme Court” (2013) 100 CR 
(6th) 96 at 101. 
159  E.g.: the dissenting (on this point) opinion of Juriansz JA in Parsons, supra note 143 at para 209; and 
Monestier, supra note 130. Dismissals sua sponte are a new addition to Ontario’s Rules, supra note 5. 
160  Cass R Sunstein, “Problems with Rules” (1995) 83(4) Cal L Rev 953. 
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arguable that the unfairness and injustice to the 1% is less problematic than the 
inability of the 20% to order their affairs predictably, and resolve their potentially 
justiciable issues promptly and with minimal expense.161 
 
Obviously, toleration of substantively unfair outcomes should be minimized, but not at the 
cost of demanding “racecar” procedural justice if a “hatchback” will suffice. Another thought 
experiment, originating with Trevor Farrow162 (but synthesized by me), seems apposite: 
Suppose Procedure A leads to substantively fair and just results 100% of the time, 
but only 10% of members of the public can afford it. Now suppose Procedure B 
leads to substantively fair and just results 90% of the time, and 80% of members of 
the public can afford it. It would seem that Procedure B would be preferable, if we 
can justify the substantively unfair results to the 10%. While governmental aid or 
social support (such as New Zealand’s indemnification of many personal injury 
matters163) may mitigate the necessity of such tradeoffs, comprehensive civil justice 
legal aid is unlikely to be a government priority,164 and in certain cases may not 
even be desirable. This necessitates maximizing the utility of resources currently 
invested the civil justice system, albeit in a principled manner. 
 
This discussion will require engaging with legal theory that touches on these issues more generally. 
D. Access to Justice Through Court Practices Outside Civil Procedure Reform 
This dissertation mostly seeks to separate analyses of civil procedure reform’s effectiveness 
in achieving access to justice from changing broader, systemic issues. As noted above, analysis of 
these issues is tremendously important, but it is theoretically and pragmatically sound to separate 
them. This can be taken to an unhelpful extreme, however, so in the Conclusion, it will be noted 
how this research suggests courts can use technology, increase transparency, and allocate judges 
to cases, with the goal of facilitating access to justice. 
 
 
161  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 129 at 109-110. 
162  Farrow Book, supra note 112. 
163  Tiho Mijatov, et al, “The Idea of Access to Justice: Reflections on New Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
(or Personal Injury) System” (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Just 197. 
164  See, e.g., Faisal Bhabha, “Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots 
Dimensions” (2007) 33 Queen’s LJ 139 at 154-156. 
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E. Transsystemic Pollination: Family Law and Criminal Law 
The divides between civil, family, and criminal justice are justifiable on theoretical and 
practical grounds.165 Having said that, the divides can also seem arbitrary: like criminal law, civil 
cases frequently have a dimension of punishment and/or put a party’s liberty in jeopardy.166 
Similarly, the line between family law and property law can be difficult to draw.167 While lessons 
from one “system” are not necessarily directly applicable to others, it is nonetheless worth 
considering how what has worked – and what has not – in civil justice reform could be useful in 
these other areas with their own access to justice issues. As such, the extent to which the four 
chapters suggest the civil system can inform family law and criminal law will be analyzed. 
… 
Andrew Pilliar has described access to justice not so much as a “crisis” but rather as a “chronic 
problem”.168 The best way to consider this issue will be revisited in the Conclusion. Regardless of 
how we label this issue, civil courts in the common law world have been pilloried in culture since 
the time of Dickens,169 and it would be naïve to believe that there is a catch-all solution to achieving 
access to justice. But by assessing particular efforts to facilitate access to justice – the 2010 
Amendments – through multiple dimensions (quantitative analyses of various rules’ application, 
 
165  See, e.g., Jesse Wall, “Public Wrongs and Private Wrongs” (2018) 31 Can JL & Juris 177 (justifying criminal 
law’s different roles from tort law); Robert Leckey, “Harmonizing Family Law’s Identities” (2002) 28 Queen’s 
LJ 221 (describing family law’s unique role in the civil law of Quebec); Martha Bailey, “Judicial Jurisdiction 
Rules for Family Law Matters” (2016) (Paper presented to the Symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of 
Progress, Toronto, Ontario, 21 October 2016) [unpublished] (this paper illustrates the unique considerations of 
family law and jurisdiction motions, and it be will returned to in Chapter One). 
166  See, e.g., Adam M Dodek, “Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2010) 35 Queen’s LJ 493 at 532. 
167  See, e.g., Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “‘No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal Framework for 
Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain” (2005) 30 Queen’s LJ 715 at 718. 
168  “what will you do about access to justice this year” Legal Aid Ontario Blog (4 February 2014), online: 
<http://blog.legalaid.on.ca/2014/02/04/andrew-pilliar-what-will-you-do-about-access-to-justice-this-year/>. 
169  Charles Dickens, Bleak House (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) [originally published in 1853]. This 
has been noticed before: see, e.g., The Honourable J Roderick Barr, QC, “The Cost of Litigation: Bleak 
House in the 1990s” (March 1993) 12 Advocates’ Soc J No 1, 12; William Kaplan, QC, “The Derivative 
Action: A Shareholder’s ‘Bleak House’” (2003) 36:3 UBC L Rev 443; Kennedy Walrus, supra note 58. 
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surveys, and legal theory considerations), this dissertation seeks to be a real contribution to the 
literature in this area, so future judges, lawyers, and policymakers can consider what is – and what 
is not – likely to be effective in the future. 
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Chapter One 
Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: A View from Ontario 
The relationship between jurisdiction motions and using (or refraining from using) procedural 
law to facilitate access to justice is not always what observers notice from the case law. For 
instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s January 2016 decision in Stuart Budd & Sons Limited v 
IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC1 made headlines in the legal community.2 The press was drawn to 
the rare finding that a motion judge had displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias in his handling 
of a jurisdiction motion brought by the defendants. Justice Epstein methodically explained how 
the motion judge’s handling of the motion displaced the presumption of judicial integrity.3 It was 
difficult to quarrel with her conclusion that a reasonable observer, viewing the matter realistically 
and practically, would feel that the defendants did not receive the fair hearing of the jurisdiction 
motion to which they were entitled.4 
 
1  2016 ONCA 60, 129 OR (3d) 37 [“Stuart Budd ONCA Decision”]. 
2  See, e.g., Neil Etienne, “Appeal Court makes rare finding of bias against trial judge” Law Times (1 February 
2016), online: <https://www.lawtimesnews.com/news/general/appeal-court-makes-rare-finding-of-bias-
against-judge/262021>. The decision was also the subject of commentary by numerous law firm blogs 
including Mark Gelowitz, “Stuart Budd & Sons Limited v. IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC: Supplemental 
Reasons Pending Appeal Lead to Reasonable Apprehension of Bias” The Conduct of an Appeal blog (12 July 
2016), online: <http://www.conductofanappeal.com/stuart-budd-sons-limited-v-ifs-vehicle-distributors-ulc-
supplemental-reasons-pending-appeal-lead-to-reasonable-apprehension-of-bias>; Joel Morris & Ted Murray, 
Civil Litigation Update (20 February 2016), online: 
<https://www.harpergrey.com/~ASSETS/DOCUMENT/CIVIL%20LITIGATION%20UPDATE%20-
%20Feb%2026_16.pdf>. 
3  Seen in, e.g., Stuart Budd ONCA Decision, supra note 1 at paras 53ff.  
4  Applying the well-known test for reasonable apprehension of bias from Justice de Grandpré’s decision 
in Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at pp 394-395. Among other 
things, the motion judge: 
• did not permit oral argument from the defendants on key issues, instead deciding the motion halfway 
through the allotted time; 
• wrongly described some of the defendants’ submissions as “concessions”; 
• was needlessly discourteous towards the defendants’ counsel; 
• identified what he described as a “fatal flaw” in the plaintiffs’ materials, and chose to address this issue 
by giving the plaintiffs an unrequested adjournment to correct said flaw; 
• described the motion as an “abuse of process” on his own initiative; and 
• released supplementary reasons months after dismissing the motion in a way that suggested he was 
responding to arguments in the notice of appeal. 
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What became secondary in most analyses of Stuart Budd was its intersection with the subject 
matter of this dissertation, through the motion judge’s expressing the view that jurisdiction motions 
can impede access to justice, and specifically the need to fairly adjudicate actions in a timely and 
cost-efficient manner.5 Even if his impressions of jurisdiction motions are correct, Epstein JA 
properly observed that this did not excuse the manner in which he handled the motion. But 
jurisdiction motions could still be posing an access to justice obstacle. So are jurisdiction motions 
being abused? What are the access to justice costs – in terms of time and money – of jurisdiction 
motions in Ontario? Have efforts in the past decade to improve and clarify the common law of 
jurisdiction helped?6 And has the bar heeded the Supreme Court’s call for a “culture shift” in the 
conduct of civil litigation?7 This chapter seeks to answer these and related questions. 
Part I sets the stage for the analysis by: a) reviewing the uncertain state of the common law of 
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in Canada in general and Ontario in particular; and b) 
explaining how jurisdiction motions can facilitate or hinder access to justice. In Part II, the 
methodology for analyzing all jurisdiction motions decided in Ontario from January 1, 2010 
through December 31, 2015 is explained, keeping track of the number of motions brought, their 
success rates, the costs associated with them, the amount of time it took to resolve them, and 
whether they involved a contractual choice of forum clause. Part III analyzes the access to justice 
issues raised by jurisdiction motions. It is doubtful that the data can fairly suggest that jurisdiction 
motions are being “abused” by defendants and/or their counsel in any more than a few, isolated 
cases. However, it is agreed that, despite non-trivial improvements over the course of the past 
 
 For more detail, see Gelowitz, supra note 2. 
5  Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2015 ONSC 519, [2015] OJ No 979 (SCJ) [“Stuart 
Budd SCJ Decision”] at para 94. 
6  Club Resorts v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [“Van Breda”] and commentary on it, discussed 
below. 
7  Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [“Hryniak”] and commentary on it, discussed below. 
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decade, jurisdiction motions frequently present an access to justice obstacle. Uncertainty in the 
law seems to be the primary reason for this. Part IV considers potential proposals to address the 
access to justice concerns arising from jurisdiction motions. 
I) THE BACKGROUND LAW 
A. The Law of Jurisdiction 
Generally, an Ontario court will exercise jurisdiction over matters only when the parties agree 
that it should do so, when the defendant is a local person, or when the matter has strong connections 
to Ontario. To exercise jurisdiction more broadly would offend against the principles of comity, 
under which one court respects the authority of other courts to enjoy a similar scope of authority.8 
In cases with connections to more than one forum, a balancing of interests is necessary to 
determine when jurisdiction may be found, respecting interests of international law and comity, as 
well as the respective private interests of the plaintiff and the defendant.9  
This balancing act has bedevilled Canadian courts since the Supreme Court’s unanimous 1990 
decision, Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye10 in which it was held that, in addition to the 
traditional grounds of the parties’ consent and the defendant’s base in the forum, jurisdiction could 
be founded on a “real and substantial connection” with a province or territory.11 While Morguard 
was generally considered to have comprehensively and fairly considered the interests at stake in 
jurisdiction motions, it was criticized for not clearly stating how they were to be applied, especially 
given that Morguard only addressed intra-Canadian jurisdiction battles.12 It is against this 
 
8  Janet Walker, Castel & Walker – Canadian Conflicts of Laws, 6th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2009) at 1-1, 1-5. 
9  La Forest J explains this in depth in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 
[“Morguard”] at 1095-1103. 
10  Morguard, ibid. 
11  Ibid at 1108. 
12  This history is explained by Stephen GA Pitel, “Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other? Jurisdiction in 
Common Law Canada” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 63 [“Pitel 2018”]. See also Joost Blom, QC & Elizabeth 
Edinger, “The Chimera of the Real and Substantial Connection Test” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 373.  
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backdrop that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada developed the Court Jurisdiction and 
Proceedings Transfer Act.13 The CJPTA is a prospective uniform statute to ensure that all common 
law Canadian provinces and territories have consistent rules on jurisdiction motions. Only 
Saskatchewan,14 British Columbia,15 and Nova Scotia16 have enacted the CJPTA. 
In its 2002 decision Muscutt v Courcelles, the Ontario Court of Appeal sought to give 
guidance on the application of the “real and substantial connection” test. Justice Sharpe identified 
eight non-determinative factors that a court should consider in determining whether a “real and 
substantial connection” is established.17 Muscutt was applied with some regularity outside 
Ontario18. While Sharpe JA’s emphasis on flexibility for the purpose of maintaining fairness was 
doubtless well-motivated, certainty did not follow. Tanya Monestier critically wrote that “[under 
Muscutt], litigants engaged in jurisdictional battles as though this were the first time that a case 
like this had ever been heard”.19 
In Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, the Supreme Court again revisited the law of jurisdiction.20 
Justice LeBel attempted to establish a predictable framework for establishing a “real and 
substantial connection”, by identifying four rebuttable presumptive connecting factors for tort 
cases. LeBel J held that the existence of any one of these factors would result in the court assuming 
jurisdiction.21 He acknowledged that the law of jurisdiction should balance fairness to the parties 
against the need to have clear rules that would allow parties to govern their affairs with certainty 
 
13  Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting (Charlottetown, PE, 
August 1994) at 48. 
14  The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C41.1. 
15  Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28. 
16  Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2nd Sess), c 2. 
17  Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20 (CA) [“Muscutt”] at paras 75-109. 
18  See, e.g., Pitel 2018, supra note 12 at fn 19. 
19  Tanya J Monestier, “(Still) A ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada” (2013) 36 
Fordham Int’l LJ 397 at 413. 
20  Van Breda, supra note 6. 
21  Ibid at paras 80ff.  
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and predictability. He unapologetically stated that he was seeking to establish a framework that 
would increase order and predictability.22  
Van Breda was generally considered an improvement over Morguard and Muscutt.23 But Van 
Breda has nonetheless been subject to criticism itself, partially on the ground that it is still too 
uncertain and amorphous,24 but also because it inappropriately restricted the ability to bring a civil 
action in common law Canada.25 It is into this situation that jurisdiction motions brought in Ontario 
in the 2010s are analyzed. 
Related to the doctrine of jurisdiction is forum non conveniens. This allows a court to stay an 
action despite jurisdiction, after recognizing that another forum is clearly preferable for 
adjudication of the dispute.26 In this analysis of jurisdiction motions brought in Ontario in the 
2010s, almost all defendants who bring a motion alleging that Ontario does not have jurisdiction 
over a case allege, in the alternative, that Ontario is forum non conveniens. There are only a few 
cases where jurisdiction was found but Ontario was nonetheless held to be forum non conveniens.27 
B. Access to Justice 
Precisely what the phrase “access to justice” encompasses varies in the circumstances. At its 
most holistic, it includes normative questions about what values constitute “justice” and ensuring 
 
22  Ibid at, e.g., paras 82, 92. 
23  See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 19 at 411-413; Joost Blom, “New Ground Rules for Jurisdictional Disputes: 
The Van Breda Quartet” (2012) 53 CBLJ 1 at 18, 26-30. 
24  See, e.g., Monestier, ibid at 415-441.  
25  See, e.g., Blom, supra note 23 at 18; Hovsep Afarian, William D Black, Christopher Hubbard & Carole J 
Piovesan, “The SCC Clarifies the ‘Real and Substantial Connection’ Test” McCarthy Tétrault LLP (23 April 
2012), online: <http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5845>. 
26  Van Breda, supra note 6 at paras 109-112. 
27  See, e.g., Sullivan v Four Seasons Hotels Ltd, 2013 ONSC 4622, 116 OR (3d) 365 (SCJ) [“Sullivan”]; Kozicz v 
Preece, 2013 ONSC 2823, [2013] OJ No 2226 (SCJ) [“Preece”]; Endress + Hauser Canada Ltd v Aikman, 
2014 ONSC 3067, [2014] OJ No 2677 (SCJ); Solloway v Klondex Mines Ltd, 2014 ONSC 391, [2014] OJ No 
285 (SCJ), aff’d 2014 ONCA 391, [2014] OJ No 4572; Currie v Farr’s Coach Lines Ltd, 2015 ONSC 2352, 
[2015] OJ No 2075 (SCJ); Silveira v FY International Auditing & Consulting Corp, 2015 ONSC 338, 37 BLR 
(5th) 308 (Master) [“Silveira”]; Bouzari v Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275, 126 OR (3d) 223 [“Bouzari”], rev’g 
2013 ONSC 6337, [2013] OJ No 5690 (SCJ); Consbec Inc v Walker, 2011 ONSC 2944, [2011] OJ No 2146 
(SCJ) [“Consbec”] (the defendants conceded there was jurisdiction in this case). 
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that the substantive law encompasses such values.28 But at the very least, it means that civil 
litigation should have three characteristics: first, minimal financial costs; second, timeliness; and, 
third, simplicity.29 Based on these values, and the value of proportionality, which recognizes that 
steps taken in litigation are to be proportionate to what can realistically be gained from taking said 
steps,30 Ontario amended its Rules of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 2010.31 
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized these virtues of proportionality and simplicity, as 
well as the desire to mitigate delay and financial costs, in Hyrniak v Mauldin. Justice Karakatsanis, 
for a unanimous court, called for a “culture shift” to ensure that cases are decided on their merits 
in a manner that is fair, speedy, and with minimal financial cost.32 Hryniak concerned summary 
judgment. But appellate courts33 and notable commentators34 have repeatedly emphasized that the 
spirit of Hryniak is applicable outside this narrow context. There is no reason this should not apply 
to jurisdiction motions. The motion judge explicitly cited Hryniak in Stuart Budd.35 
Jurisdiction motions manifestly have the potential to distort access to justice. By their nature, 
they do not address the merits of a dispute. Brought at the beginning of a lawsuit, they can also 
delay resolution of an action. Affidavits, including expert evidence, are likely necessary to prove 
 
28  E.g., Trevor CW Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 [“Farrow 2014”] at 
970-972. 
29  E.g., ibid at 978-979; Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and 
Ambitions” in Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The 
Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 68-73. Underlying all of these, as well as an 
important principle in its own right, is proportionality: Hryniak, supra note 7 at paras 29-33; Trevor Farrow, 
“Proportionality: A Cultural Revolution” (2012) 1 Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 151 [“Farrow 
2012”]. 
30  E.g., Farrow 2012, ibid. 
31  RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the “Rules”], as amended by O Reg 43/08. 
32  Hryniak, supra note 7 at paras 2, 23. 
33  See, e.g., Iannarella v Corbett, 2015 ONCA 110, 124 OR (3d) 523 at para 53, concerning discovery; Canadian 
Natural Resources Limited v ShawCor Ltd, 2014 ABCA 289, 580 AR 265 at para 5, concerning the 
intersection between discovery and claims of privilege. 
34  See, e.g., Stephen GA Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 
21” (2014) 43 Advocates’ Quarterly 344 at 344-346; Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to 
Alberta: Summary Judgment, Culture Shift, and the Future of Civil Trials” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1. 
35  Stuart Budd SCJ Decision, supra note 5 at para 94. 
42 
 
 
the existence of a connection to a forum, or that another forum is obviously more convenient.36 
Drafting such affidavits, conducting cross-examinations on them, preparing motion materials, and 
the scheduling and hearing of the motion are all likely to have serious cost consequences.  
This is not to suggest that there is not a place for jurisdiction motions. If Ontario genuinely 
does not have jurisdiction over a case, it should not decide the case for reasons of international 
comity, and fairness to the parties. This fairness is especially apparent if the proceedings have been 
commenced in breach of a forum selection clause,37 or the plaintiff has chosen the forum in order 
to benefit unfairly from some legal or practical advantage, but could also be the case because the 
courts of another jurisdiction will be able to resolve the case in a more effective and efficient, and 
thus more access-to-justice-friendly, manner. And if the jurisdiction motion removes a case from 
Ontario’s court system early in the process, others will have the opportunity to use court resources 
that the case would have occupied. This will manifestly improve access to justice for everyone 
with the possible exception of the plaintiff. The benefits of successful jurisdiction motions are also 
not to be understated – they have the potential to dispose of a case (although not on its merits) or 
at least send it to a forum that can adjudicate in the fairest fashion. For all of these reasons, 
jurisdiction motions can promote proportionality. 
But given the criticism of the law of jurisdiction, it is worth concretizing what are the access 
to justice implications of jurisdiction motions. If the law is unclear, it is easy to imagine how a 
tactical motion could be brought, in an effort to “wear out” the plaintiff, causing delay and expense. 
 
36  Such evidence is usually necessary on a jurisdiction motion. As LeBel J notes at para 72 of Van Breda, supra 
note 6, jurisdiction motion decisions:  
must be made on the basis of the pleadings, the affidavits of the parties and the documents in the 
record before the judge, which might include expert reports or opinions about the state of foreign 
law and the organization of and procedure in foreign courts. 
37  See, e.g., ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 SCR 450 at para 20, per Bastarache J. 
This issue is discussed in depth in Geneviève Saumier & Jeffrey Bagg, “Forum Selection Clauses before 
Canadian Courts: A Tale of Two (or Three?) Solitudes” (2013) 46:2 UBC L Rev 439. 
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Such a motion would be antithetical to the spirit of Hryniak and appears to have been the motion 
judge’s concern in Stuart Budd. It is also worth considering the costs of successful jurisdiction 
motions to defendants, if the state of the law of jurisdiction means a defendant needs to wage an 
expensive jurisdiction motion to be appropriately relieved of defending the claim in Ontario.  
II) METHODOLOGY 
Throughout September and October 2016, the databases of QuickLaw and Westlaw were 
searched for jurisdiction motions decided in Ontario from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 
2015.38 Results were checked in January 2017, though 2016 motions were not added, as the 
appellate process for such motions was not yet complete. All cases were included where there was 
adversarial argument over whether the Ontario Superior Court (including the Small Claims Court) 
had jurisdiction over the action, or whether the Ontario Superior Court was forum non conveniens. 
A. Deciding What to Include  
Family law decisions were not included given the widespread acknowledgement that 
jurisdiction rules in the family law context raise fundamentally different considerations than those 
raised in the civil and commercial context.39 Moreover, the different procedural rules between 
family law and civil litigation makes comparisons between the two an inexact science at best.40 
Also excluded were any cases where a plaintiff or applicant was merely seeking to enforce a 
foreign judgment. Though enforcement is another quintessential aspect of private international 
 
38  The search terms were: 
“forum conv!” OR (jurisdiction AND “Van Breda”) OR “forum non” OR “Rule 17!” 
“Jurisdiction” required a qualifier as it otherwise led to far too many false positives – more than 3,000 results 
per year. Given that Van Breda was decided by the Court of Appeal in 2010, it appeared the best choice. 
39  See, e.g., Martha Bailey, “Judicial Jurisdiction Rules for Family Law Matters” (2016) (Paper presented to the 
Symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, Toronto, Ontario, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]. 
40  Family law cases are not governed by the Rules, supra note 31, but by the Family Law Rules, O Reg 99/114. 
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law, it is widely acknowledged that this issue raises different considerations than whether a court 
has jurisdiction to litigate the merits of the dispute.41 
Similarly omitted were cases where the parties did not make submissions on jurisdiction but 
the court felt obliged to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction,42 no jurisdiction was found due to failure 
to comply with the Proceedings Against the Crown Act (which are not conflicts of laws cases in 
any event),43 if there was a dispute over service ex juris but not jurisdiction,44 and/or if jurisdiction 
issues were not resolved because another issue arose preventing that.45 The rationale for excluding 
these cases in this analysis is simple – the goal is to isolate the types of incidents seen in Van Breda 
and Stuart Budd – adversarial disputes over whether the court had jurisdiction to litigate a matter, 
and the resulting increased expense in determining whether the plaintiff should be given access to 
the courts or the defendant relieved from the obligation to defend in the forum. 
However, cases where a party made submissions either that Ontario did not have jurisdiction, 
and/or whether it was forum non conveniens were included, even if a formal notice of motion was 
not served and filed.46 The failure of the defendant to bring a formal motion would appear to be a 
“technicality” – such cases raise the concerns sought to be analyzed. Also included were cases 
where it was argued either that Ontario did not have jurisdiction, and/or that it was forum non 
 
41  Justice Gascon discusses this in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [“Chevron”]. This 
is also discussed in commentary on Chevron, such as Sarah Whitmore & Vitali Berditchevski, “Jurisdiction to 
Enforce Foreign Judgments in Canada Clarified by Supreme Court of Canada” (2016) 31(2) Banking & 
Finance L Rev 411. 
42  See, e.g., Grillo Estate v Grillo, 2015 ONSC 1352, 127 OR (3d) 707 (SCJ); Electro Sonic Inc (Re), 2014 
ONSC 942, 15 CBR (6th) 256 (SCJ). 
43  Babington-Browne v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 6102, [2015] OJ No 5353 (SCJ). 
44  Thinh v Chinh, 2015 ONSC 3406, 11 ETR (4th) 177 (SCJ). This is a distinct issue from whether a court has 
jurisdiction, which is an issue of local procedural law: see, e.g., Pitel 2018, supra note 12. 
45  Moneris Solutions Corp v Groupe Germain Inc, 2014 ONSC 6102, 34 BLR (5th) 161 (SCJ). 
46  See, e.g., Toronto (City) v Tseng, 2011 ONSC 4594, 87 MPLR (4th) 220 (Master) [“Tseng”]; Umutomi c 
Safari, 2012 CSON 6962, [2012] OJ No 5822; Ghana Gold Corp (Re), 2013 ONSC 3284, 3 CBR (6th) 220 
(SCJ) [“Ghana Gold”]; Bearsfield Developments Inc v McNabb, 2013 ONSC 7063, [2013] OJ No 5141 (SCJ). 
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conveniens – both arguments are almost always raised together, and Van Breda and Stuart Budd 
exemplify both issues.  
B. Variables 
As noted above, the precise meaning of the phrase “access to justice” can be broad or narrow 
depending on the circumstances.47 Within the context of adversarial litigation – which is 
constitutionally destined to remain part of Canada’s justice system48 – it mandates, at the very 
least, that civil litigation maximize simplicity and speed, and minimize financial cost, in the 
resolution of civil actions on their merits.49 As such, this chapter sought to analyze how jurisdiction 
motions “cost” parties, in terms of time and money, and how they complicated parties’ private 
dealings. After isolating the cases using the aforementioned criteria, the following were analyzed: 
• how many motions have been brought; 
• how many motions were successful; 
• whether the motions involved a forum selection or choice of law clause, and how those 
cases are decided; 
• whether the cases were appealed, and what the results of those appeals were;  
• what are the costs awards associated with the foregoing; and 
• whether the case was a (putative) class proceeding. 
The relevance of all of these factors is explained below. 
 
47  See, e.g., Macdonald, supra note 29. 
48  Macdonald, ibid at 32; Paul Vayda, “Chipping away at Cost Barriers: A Comment on the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Trial Lawyers Decision” (2015) 36 WRLSI 207 at 211-212, analyzing the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 
2014 SCC 39, [2014] 3 SCR 31, which held that access to the courts is, at least in some circumstances, a 
constitutional right. 
49  See, e.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 28 at 978-979. 
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Two actions, David S Laflamme Construction Inc v Canada (Attorney General)50 and Moisan 
v Antonio Sanita Land Development Ltd,51 had jurisdiction motions brought and argued, only to 
have the cases dismissed on other grounds. They are accordingly included in terms of “number of 
cases brought” and for the purposes of calculating average delays and costs awards, as they shed 
light on that issue. But they shed no light on success rates or appeal rates, so only 145 cases on are 
included in the analysis on those points. 
In order to learn how long it took these cases to proceed through the court system, I emailed 
counsel on each case in an attempt to learn when the originating document was served. I would 
first email the plaintiffs’ lawyers, but, if this was not possible, the defendants’ lawyers. However, 
in the following situations email was directed to the defendants’ lawyers:  
• the plaintiff was a self-represented litigant;52  
• the jurisdiction motion was brought in relation to a third party claim commenced by the 
defendant,53 and/or 
• it was not possible to contact the plaintiff’s lawyer because he or she:  
o could not be found;54 
o had been suspended by the Law Society of Upper Canada;55 and/or 
o had died.56  
 
50  2014 ONSC 1379, 31 CLR (4th) 285 (SCJ) [“Laflamme”]. 
51  2010 ONSC 3339, [2010] OJ No 3220 (SCJ).  
52  E.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Glasford, 2015 ONSC 197, [2015] OJ No 87 (SCJ), aff’d 2015 
ONCA 523, [2015] OJ No 3622, leave to appeal denied, [2015] SCCA No 40, 2016 CarswellOnt 16122 
[“Glasford”]. 
53  E.g., CP Ships Ltd v Icecorp Logistics Inc, 2015 ONSC 6243, [2015] OJ No 5319 (Master) [“CP Ships”]. 
54  E.g., West Van Inc v Daisley, 2013 ONSC 1988, [2013] OJ No 1649 (SCJ), aff’d 2014 ONCA 232, 119 OR 
(3d) 481, leave to appeal denied, [2014] SCCA No 236, 2014 CarswellOnt 12119 [“West Van”]. 
55  E.g., 1756670 Ontario Inc v Roxboro Excavation Inc, 2011 ONSC 7289, [2011] OJ No 5911 (SCJ). 
56  E.g., Zhang v Hua Hai Li Steel Pipe Co, 2012 ONSC 4379, [2012] OJ No 3704 (SCJ) [“Zhang”]. This was 
actually an instance where the plaintiff’s lawyer could not be located, and the defendant’s lawyer had died. 
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Date of service, as opposed to issuance, of the originating document was used given that any delay 
between issuance and service cannot fairly be attributed to the jurisdiction motion. Lawyers on 73 
cases (one short of half) responded, 65 with the requested information – the other eight indicated 
they did not have (easy) access to the information.57 Many of the lawyers added comments about 
the nature of the proceeding. While one should be reluctant to draw normative lessons from these 
anecdotal comments, some are integrated below when they complement what the data already 
appears to show. 
C. Limitations of Methodology 
It must be recognized that QuickLaw and Westlaw do not report every case decided in Ontario, 
though they report the vast majority between them.58 As such, they are frequently used in 
quantitative analyses of case law.59 Moreover, QuickLaw and Westlaw do not reflect motions 
and/or appeals that were threatened, or even commenced, but were resolved. Two such cases were 
found – one where parties from a withdrawn motion could not agree on costs60 and another where 
a jurisdictional dispute was essentially rendered moot by certain defendants being placed into 
receivership.61 It would be very difficult if not impossible to quantify occurrences such as these. 
 
57  Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Yellow Pages Group Inc, 2010 ONSC 2780, [2010] OJ No 2608 (SCJ); 
Moore v Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 2011 ONSC 3692, [2011] OJ No 2994 (SCJ); Dempsey v Staples, 
2011 ONSC 1709, 12 MVR (6th) 30 (SCJ) [“Dempsey”]; Sullivan, supra note 27; Elfarnawani v International 
Olympic Committee, 2011 ONSC 6784, 20 CPC (7th) 412 (SCJ); Cannon v Funds for Canada Foundation, 
2010 ONSC 4517, [2010] OJ No 3486 (SCJ) [“Cannon”]; Di Stefano v Energy Automated Systems Inc, 2010 
ONSC 493, 68 BLR (4th) 209 (SCJ) [“Di Stefano”]; Lazer-Tech v Dejerey, 2010 ONSC 1662, [2010] OJ No 
1080 (SCJ). 
58  Ibrahim v Robinson, 2015 ONCA 21, 124 OR (3d) 106 [“Ibrahim”] is an appeal of an unreported trial 
decision. 
59  See, e.g., Craig E Jones & Micah B Rankin, “Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of Subconscious Bias in 
Second-Degree Murder Sentences in Canada” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 109 at 121, fn 58. 
60  Normerica Inc v Echo Global Logistics Inc, 2011 ONSC 6827, [2011] OJ No 5214 (SCJ) [“Normerica”] is an 
instance where the motion was withdrawn but the parties could not resolve costs. Christopher Henderson, 
lawyer for the plaintiff, informs me that the defendant brought but withdrew an appeal in Tseng, supra note 46. 
61  Described in Fraser v 4358376 Canada Inc (cob Itravel 2000 and Travelzest PLC), 2014 ONCA 553, 324 
OAC 68. 
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Costs awards do not reflect all costs incurred (indeed, typically about half of the actual 
costs62). Some cases also awarded little or no costs for reasons such as the motion’s mixed 
success,63 the case’s having raised a novel point of law,64 or the party’s agreement.65 Moreover, as 
discussed below, not all cases have reported costs orders, usually due to an encouragement from 
the judge or master to settle the issue of costs. As such, extrapolation from an imperfect (if sizable) 
sample size is necessary. Regarding delay, results are extrapolated from an imperfect if sizable 
sample size, as delay was only quantifiable based on a sample of about 44% of cases. 
There are inherent limitations of a quantitative analysis of case law. Most notably, such an 
analysis sheds minimal if any light on the normative values underlying the current state of the law 
of jurisdiction66 or the significance of the expense or delay on particular litigants. It can, however, 
provide some indication about what the literal costs of jurisdiction motions are, and whether the 
decisions in Van Breda and Hryniak have had any effects on this. This information thus contributes 
to the literature in conflicts of laws, civil procedure, and access to justice, concretizing assumptions 
underlying the factors that policymakers and judges should consider in developing the law of 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, it should be noted that the intersection of access to justice and the law of jurisdiction 
can sometimes be found in what cannot be seen in case law rather than what can be seen: for 
example, a case may not be brought due to uncertainty in the law or a party assessing that Ontario 
is closed to it as a forum after Van Breda. This will be returned to below. 
 
62  See, e.g., P Scott Horne, “The Privatization of Justice in Québec’s Draft Bill to Enact the New Code of Civil 
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation” (2013) 18 Appeal 55 at 61.  
63  E.g., Sullivan, supra note 27. 
64  E.g., ibid; Frank v Farlie Turner & Co, LLC, 2012 ONSC 6715, [2012] OJ No 5573 (SCJ) [“Frank”]. 
65  E.g., Shah v LG Chem, Ltd, 2015 ONSC 2628, 125 OR (3d) 773 (SCJ) [“Shah”]. 
66  See, e.g., Joshua B Fischman, “Reuniting ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship” (2013) 162(1) U Pa 
Law Rev 117. 
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III) RESULTS – AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS 
A. Number of Motions 
147 jurisdiction motions decided in Ontario between 2010 and 2015 were analyzed – 33 in 
2010, 23 in 2011, 26 in 2012, 25 in 2013, 18 in 2014, and 22 in 2015. This leads to both an average 
and a median of 24 cases per year. All cases are listed in Appendix A, sorted by year that the 
motion was decided. Every case is treated as part of the “year” in which the motion was decided, 
even if the appeal was decided subsequently. 
There was a general downwards trend in decisions per year. Perhaps this can be attributed to 
a particularly high number of cases in 2010, a time period in which the Court of Appeal was 
addressing Van Breda, and before the Supreme Court had weighed in on this issue. It could also 
be an indication that the spirit of Hryniak and the 2010 amendments to the Rules are being heeded 
by members of the bar, who may have become more reluctant to bring inappropriate interlocutory 
motions. More likely, this appears to reflect a small, but genuine, decrease in the number of 
jurisdiction motions brought in the aftermath of Van Breda. This would appear to be a positive 
development, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s goal in Van Breda to ensure order and 
predictability has been somewhat achieved. A related explanation would be that parties are “not 
even trying” to bring cases that could have perhaps passed the amorphous Muscutt framework, but 
do not fall within one of Van Breda’s presumptive connecting factors. This is also a positive 
development in terms of saving parties time and expense. But the “trade-off” would be denying 
plaintiffs’ ability to use the Ontario courts when it would be appropriate for them to do so. In other 
words, if the law is under-inclusive, it may create an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs, with the 
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result being a chilling effect on cases being brought.67 This “balancing of predictability and 
substantive fairness” is a common theme in conflicts of laws, as evidenced by the commentary in 
the aftermath of Van Breda. 
Isolating the cause of the apparent decline in the number of jurisdiction motions throughout 
in the 2010s with scientific precision is not possible. However, it is also worth noting that the 
numbers have not declined dramatically. More than twenty jurisdiction motions have been decided 
each year analyzed except 2014. 
B. Ultimate Success Rates of Motions 
On average about half of motions brought were ultimately (after a first appeal, if there was 
one) successful – 50% in 2010, 57% in 2011, 38% in 2012, 44% in 2013, 53% in 2014, and 64% 
in 2015. The average of the yearly rates is 52%, with the median being 57%. The overall average 
is 51%, representing 74 of 145 decisions. Each case is listed in Appendix A. The relatively higher 
rates of success in the last two years could be a reflection of Van Breda’s aforementioned “closing” 
of circumstances in which jurisdiction can be found. But the dip in success rates immediately post-
Van Breda (2012 and 2013 were the only years with a less than 50% success rate) could indicate 
that the variation between years is better explained by a simple variation in the characteristics of 
the cases. More hopefully, the higher success rates in recent years could be an indication that 
lawyers post-Hryniak are not bringing motions unrelated to the merits of the case that are unlikely 
to succeed. 
A benefit of high rates of success is that parties are not wasting time and expense on fruitless 
motions that do not address the merits of a case. Moreover, the parties are quickly redirected to a 
 
67  Brandon Kain, Elder C Marques & Byron Shaw, “Developments in Private International Law: The 2011-2012 
Term – The Unfinished Project of the Van Breda Trilogy” (2012) 59 SCLR (2d) 277 [“Kain, et al”] at 286. 
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more appropriate forum. As discussed above, this indicates principles of fairness and 
proportionality have been heeded. But as noted elsewhere in this chapter, and authors in this area 
have written before, there is another obvious access to justice concern surrounding jurisdiction 
motions – namely, if jurisdiction is not found, it may practically end a plaintiff’s chance of 
achieving justice, or will otherwise drastically increase her costs.  
In any event, the fact is that on average about half of jurisdiction motions have been 
successful. This suggests that, if brought to a hearing, jurisdiction motions are tending to raise a 
serious issue. That this is happening this frequently could be a consequence of the uncertain state 
of the law of jurisdiction, leading either the plaintiff to believe they have a reasonable basis that 
the claim can be tried in Ontario, or the defendant to believe that there is a reasonable basis to 
challenge jurisdiction. Another view would be that, following a new leading Supreme Court 
decision such as Van Breda, one would expect a brief rise in cases to establish the law. That fact 
that about two dozen cases a year remain suggests uncertainties persist. In any case, it is evident 
that uncertainty in the law has consequences. 
C. Appellate Consequences 
A decision on a jurisdiction motion “finally decides” an Ontario court’s jurisdiction over a 
matter. Appeals of Superior Court decisions accordingly proceed, as of right, to the Court of 
Appeal instead of the Divisional Court.68 An exception exists when the original decision was made 
by a master – in that case, the appeal proceeds, as of right, to the Divisional Court.69 About 30% 
 
68  Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43 [“CJA”], s 6(1)(b). In MJ Jones Inc v Kingsway General Insurance Co 
(2003), 68 OR (3d) 131 (CA), Sharpe JA explained why, post-Morguard, an appeal from an order dismissing a 
motion for an order that Ontario has no jurisdiction or, alternatively, is forum non conveniens, is a final order 
for this purpose. Practice had been different pre-Morguard.  
69  CJA, ibid, s 19(1)(c). The only examples of this in this sample are Harrowand SL v Dewind Turbines Ltd, 
2014 ONSC 2014, [2014] OJ No 2022 (Master), rev’d 2014 CarswellOnt 19177 (Div Ct) [“Harrowand”] and 
Machado v Catalyst Capital Group Inc, 2015 ONSC 6313, 27 CCEL (4th) 116 (Master), aff’d 2016 ONSC 
6719, 34 CCEL (4th) 274 (Div Ct) [“Machado”]. 
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of jurisdiction motion decisions were appealed in the 2010-2015 period – 34% in 2010, 26% in 
2011, 27% in 2012, 32% in 2013, 13% in 2014, and 41% in 2015. The median and average rates 
of appeal are therefore 29.45%, though the overall average is 30.3% (44 of 145 decisions). These 
appeals are also chronicled on a case-by-case basis in Appendix A.  
The number of appeals may seem high.70 But there are several characteristics of jurisdiction 
motions that make an appeal particularly likely and, arguably, particularly appropriate: 
• there is an appeal as of right; 
• the facts that form the basis of the jurisdiction motion are frequently not contestable and 
therefore not within the particular expertise of the motion judge71; 
• the standard of review for the determination of jurisdiction is generally correctness72 
(though a decision on whether to stay a case on grounds of forum non conveniens is 
discretionary, and thus not easily reviewed73); 
• the issues decided by the motion are exceptionally important;74 and 
• the uncertainty surrounding the law of jurisdiction (discussed elsewhere throughout this 
chapter) may make an appeal not obviously futile, and thus more attractive. 
 
70  The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal have 1,503 reported 2016 decisions, between them, based on a 
January 11, 2017 QuickLaw search. The Superior Court had 4,388, the Small Claims Court has 125, and the 
Provincial Court had 845. Crudely assuming that the former two courts are entirely separate appeals, while the 
former three are entirely separate trials, appellate courts have just over 28% the number of cases, akin to the 
jurisdiction motion appeal rate. But it seems highly likely the trial courts produce less reported decisions, 
meaning appellate courts likely have less of a percentage of the overall numbers of cases. 
71  Osborn CJ suggests this will frequently be the case in Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v 
Rothmans Inc, 2013 NLTD(G) 180, 345 Nfld & PEIR 40 at para 181. 
72  Black v Breeden, 2010 ONCA 547, 102 OR (3d) 748 [“Black”] at para 19, per Karakatsanis JA (as she was 
then). This may not apply insofar as the motion judge made findings of fact that are determinative of the legal 
issues: see Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of Canada Ltd, 2014 ONCA 497, 120 OR (3d) 598 
[“Trillium”] at para 24, per Lauwers JA. A motion judge’s determination on a forum non conveniens question, 
however, is entitled to deference: Black at para 77; Trillium at para 88.  
73  Van Breda, supra note 6 at para 112. 
74  See Part I.B above. 
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Of the 44 appeals, 24 were brought by defendants compared to 20 brought by plaintiffs. This 
represents defendants appealing 24 of 60 originally unsuccessful motions (40%) while plaintiffs 
appealed 20 of 65 originally successful motions (30.7%). The greater likelihood of the defendants 
appealing could reveal the likely tendency of defendants on jurisdiction motions to have greater 
financial resources.75 But it could also reflect Van Breda seemingly restricting the ability of 
common law Canadian courts to assume jurisdiction. Defendants could thus form the opinion that 
Van Breda gave an appeal a greater likelihood of success. 
Only ten appellate decisions overturned the motion judge – four in 2010, zero in 2011, two in 
2012, three in 2013, one in 2014, and zero in 2015. This leaves an “appeal success rate” of 22.7%. 
This excludes Stuart Budd, as the reason for the first appeal’s success was unrelated to the actual 
question of jurisdiction, instead concentrating on reasonable apprehension of bias. As discussed in 
more detail below, the motion ultimately failed.  
The successful appeals were equally likely to benefit the plaintiff and the defendant. Five 
successful appeals benefitted the plaintiff – three in 2010, and two in 2012. Five successful appeals 
also benefitted the defendant – one in 2010, three in 2013 (one of which was the allowing of a 
cross-appeal after the plaintiff appealed a motion that was originally only partially successful76), 
and one in 2014. Given that one defendant victory was the result of a cross-appeal, the rates of 
success were better for the plaintiffs on their own appeals – 4 of 24 (16.7%) for defendants, 
compared to 5 of 20 (25%) for plaintiffs. The difference correlates with the comparative number 
of appeals brought by plaintiffs and defendants. The decrease in number of successful appeals over 
the years could indicate that the law of jurisdiction is becoming more settled post-Van Breda. That 
 
75  See, e.g., Vaughan Black, “Conditional Forum Non Conveniens in Canadian Courts” (2013) 39 Queen’s LJ 41 
at 71. 
76  Prince v ACE Aviation Holdings Inc, 2014 ONCA 285, 120 OR (3d) 140, leave to appeal denied, [2014] 
SCCA No 273, 2014 CarswellOnt 14806 [“Prince”]. 
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the more recent successful appeals have benefitted the defendants could also reflect the “closing” 
of jurisdiction post-Van Breda. But the numbers are small enough that we could instead be 
witnessing statistical anomalies on a year-by-year basis. 
There were 13 unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.77 
One leave application was granted but the appeal was not heard until December 2017 and decided 
in June 2018.78 The only time the Supreme Court granted leave to hear a case, the appeal was 
allowed.79 Supreme Court practice thus has little influence on the “success rates” of appeals, 
though it is worth observing that over a third of the losing parties on appeal (15 of 44) thought it 
was at least worthwhile seeking leave to appeal to Canada’s highest court. 
What should be made of these appellate tendencies and success rates from an access to justice 
perspective? The relatively high rates of appeal is not encouraging as it leads to significant costs 
and delay, as discussed below. Having said that, the relatively low success rates – success rates 
that are decreasing in recent years – could be evidence that Van Breda has gone some way to 
clarifying the law of jurisdiction.80 We may just be at the beginning, therefore, of seeing whether 
Van Breda is achieving its goal in providing clarity to the law of jurisdiction. Whether Hryniak 
 
77  Forsythe v Westfall, [2015] SCCA No 410, 2016 CarswellOnt 3759; Glasford, supra note 52; Prince, ibid; 
Kaynes v BP plc, [2014] SCCA No 452, 2015 CarswellOnt 4021; West Van, supra note 54; Ontario v 
Rothmans Inc, [2013] SCCA No 327, 2013 CarswellOnt 17913; Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector Engineering 
Inc, [2013] SCCA No 475, 2014 CarswellOnt 3070; Aldo Group Inc v Moneris Solutions Corp, [2014] SCCA 
No 31, 2014 CarswellOnt 5661 [“Aldo Group”]; Amtim Capital Inc v Appliance Recycling Centers of America, 
[2014] SCCA No 96, 2014 CarswellOnt 7501; Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, [2012] SCCA No 246, 2012 
CarswellOnt 14887; Bond v Brookfield Asset Managements Inc, [2012] SCCA No 278, 2012 CarswellOnt 
14301; Expedition Helicopters Inc v Honeywell Inc, [2010] SCCA No 258, 2010 CarswellOnt 8911; 
Tucows.com Co v Lojas Renner SA, [2011] SCCA No 450, 2012 CarswellOnt 6413. Supreme Court leave 
applications are not included in the charts in Appendix A except for Trillium, supra note 72, given that they 
were all refused except for Trillium. 
78  Haaretz.com v Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, [2018] 2 SCR 3. Given that this chapter was already published by the 
time that this case was decided, the numbers were not revised, but it would only increase the ultimate success 
rates of the jurisdiction motions. 
79  Trillium, supra note 72. 
80  Kain, et al, supra note 67 discuss “clarification” as the principal goal of Van Breda, supra note 6, but 
recognized time would be necessary to see if that goal would be achieved. 
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has had any influence is doubtful – the overall rates of appeal do not seem to be changing and 
appeals in recent years have, if anything, been less successful. 
D. Costs Awards 
Seventy-five of the 147 jurisdiction motions analyzed had corresponding costs orders. They 
are listed in Appendix B. In five additional cases, no costs were awarded, due to reasons discussed 
above.81 These five cases were not included for the purpose of calculating numbers of costs awards, 
and average and median costs orders – costs were obviously incurred and including a “zero” warps 
the average and median statistics. There were also a number of cases with no reported costs. This 
is likely because it is common for judges to frequently decide a motion, and then encourage the 
parties to settle the issue of costs.82 
The overall average costs award for a motion is $31,940 – $23,261 in 2010, $36,295 in 2011, 
$59,941 in 2012, $29,003 in 2013, $21,746 in 2014, and $15,592 in 2015. As is obviously apparent, 
2012 is an “outlier”. This is because of an enormous $575,520 costs order in Ontario v Rothmans, 
Inc.83 This appears to reflect the heightened costs and delay endemic to tobacco litigation.84 There 
were also nine decisions in cases85 brought under the Class Proceedings Act.86 The average cost 
order in the four class action motions that had reported cost orders is $69,026.44. Due to the large 
nature of class actions, they may not be truly indicative of “typical” costs orders. When these four 
 
81  Sullivan, supra note 27; Frank, supra note 64; Shah, supra note 65; Forsythe v Westfall, 2015 ONSC 1725, 
[2015] OJ No 1266 (SCJ); Laflamme, supra note 50. 
82  See, e.g., Brisben v Lunev, 2010 ONSC 1840, [2010] OJ No 3216 (SCJ) at para 70. 
83  2012 ONSC 1804, 28 CPC (7th) 103 (SCJ) [“Rothmans”]. 
84  See, e.g., Jacob J Shelley, “The Crown’s Right of Recovery Act” (2010) 18(3) Health L Rev 15. 
85  Cannon, supra note 57; McKenna v Gammon Gold Inc, 2010 ONSC 1591, 88 CPC (6th) 27 (SCJ); Bond v 
Brookfield Asset Managements Inc, 2011 ONSC 3761, [2011] OJ No 2760 (SCJ); Frank, supra note 64; 
Trillium, supra note 72; Prince, supra note 76; Kaynes v BP plc, 2013 ONSC 5802, 117 OR (3d) 685 (SCJ), 
var’d 2014 ONCA 580, 122 OR (3d) 162, leave to appeal denied, [2014] SCCA No 452, 2015 CarswellOnt 
4021; Shah, supra note 65; Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada, 2015 ONSC 5332, 126 OR (3d) 756 (SCJ) [“Air 
Canada”]. 
86  Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6.  
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class proceedings, and the Rothmans case, are removed from the 75 cases with costs orders, the 
average costs order in the remaining 70 cases is $22,055. If the three substantial indemnity awards 
are also removed,87 the average moves down only slightly more to $21,556. 
The overall median costs award in the 75 cases is $15,000. The median is $10,125 in 2010, 
$15,719.50 in 2011, $14,595 in 2012, $20,500 in 2013, $13,000 in 2014, and $10,149.50 in 2015. 
If one removes Rothmans and the four class actions, the overall median becomes $14,129. 
Removing the three substantial indemnity costs decision leaves the median at $13,136.65. 
Forty appeals had costs orders. The overall average appellate costs order was $21,573 – 
$14,636 for appeals of 2010 decisions, $13,715.80 for 2011, $64,267 for 2012, $22,714 for 2013, 
$13,125 for 2014, and $11,313 for 2015. Again, 2012 is an outlier due to a $237,332.50 costs 
award in Rothmans.88 If Rothmans, and five class action appellate decisions with reported appellate 
costs awards, are removed from the average, it is reduced to $13,731. These numbers all exclude 
the first Stuart Budd appeal, as that appeal was not fundamentally about the law of jurisdiction. 
The median costs award from the forty appeal costs decisions is $15,000. This does not change 
when one removes Rothmans and the five class actions. The median is $15,000 in 2010, 2011, and 
2013, $25,000 in 2012, $13,750 in 2014, and $8,750 in 2015. 
Excluding Rothmans and the class actions, the average costs awards of a motion and appeal 
(added together) are therefore $35,484. The medians added together, excluding Rothmans and the 
class actions, are $29,129. This moves down by just over than $500 when the substantial indemnity 
costs decisions are also removed. It is worth remembering that costs awards (except in the cases 
 
87  Merill Lynch Canada Inc v Mineralogy Canada Acquisition Corp Pty Ltd, 2011 ONSC 3032, 2011 
CarswellOnt 3583 (SCJ); Manson v Canetic Resources Ltd, 2014 ONSC 1480, [2014] OJ No 1037 (SCJ) 
[“Manson”]; Petrook v Natuzzi Americas, Inc, 2013 ONSC 5855, [2013] OJ No 4376 (SCJ). 
88  2013 ONCA 642, 118 OR (3d) 213. 
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of substantial indemnity costs) are typically about half of actual costs incurred.89 As such, each 
party in a non-class action can reasonably expect to spend approximately $30,000-$45,000 on a 
jurisdiction motion, and $60,000-$75,000 if there is an appeal. This is a very substantial amount 
to spend on a procedure that does not address the merits of a dispute – though occasionally 
necessary and/or proportionate, this procedure also comes with significant financial expense. 
E. Delay 
As noted above, 65 lawyers reported the date of the service of the statement of claim. If there 
were multiple dates of service due to multiple defendants, the latest date of service was chosen to 
calculate delay.90 Some lawyers could not pinpoint the exact date of service but were able to give 
a range of a few days or weeks in which service would have been effected. Given that delay is 
being calculated in months, these cases were included with an estimate. Appendix C indicates the 
(latest) dates of service of the statements of claim and the dates of resolution of the motion 
(whether on the motion itself, an applicable appeal, denial of Supreme Court leave application, 
reconsideration, or an appeal from reconsideration). From there, delay would be calculated in 
months, rounding as appropriate; I erred on the side of “rounding down” due to a wish to not 
overstate the average delay. Given this, and given that certain dates of service are estimates, delay 
could not be calculated with scientific precision. But this does not mean that certain trends are not 
apparent. One case, Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada,91 involved a delay of eight years and eleven 
months from the last date of service of the statement of claim to the resolution of the motion – 
 
89  Supra note 62. 
90  E.g., dates of service on different defendants in Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector Engineering Inc, 2012 ONSC 
7331, 18 CLR (4th) 189 (SCJ) were between August 31, 2009 and May 10, 2010. 
91  Air Canada, supra note 85. The last date of service of statement of claim was September 21, 2006. This is a 
107 month delay. 
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nearly twice as long the next longest delay.92 Class counsel wrote that “this was not your typical 
jurisdiction motion - more of a contest to class definition”. 93 As a result of the very atypical nature 
of this case, the remaining 64 cases are primarily used to calculate delay. 
The average delay from service of the statement of claim to resolution of the motion was 17.7 
months in cases that did not involve an appeal. However, this decreases to 15.8 months when Air 
Canada is excluded. Moreover, the median was 12 months. Apart from Air Canada, four cases 
involved delays of over forty months. The parties in these cases may well have been waiting for 
resolution of Van Breda before proceeding with the motion. One lawyer explicitly wrote as 
much.94 When the five longest delays are removed from the average, the average delay is 12.8 
months. Excluding Air Canada, the average per year was 14.75 months in 2010 (of 4 samples), 
13.3 months in 2011 (of 7 samples), 16.1 months in 2012 (of 9 samples), 17.5 months in 2013 (of 
11 samples), 18.9 months in 2014 (of 9 samples), and 11.9 months in 2015 (of 7 samples). 
In cases with appeals, but no leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada, the average 
delay from service of the statement of claim to resolution of the motion is 24.8 months. The median 
is 24 months. In the five cases with leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada, the average 
time to resolution of the motion (one of the cases being returned to the Superior Court) is 30.6 
months, with the median being 29 months. The average delay in all 65 cases is about 22.3 months. 
Excluding Air Canada, the average is just over 21 months, with the median being 16 months. 
Ultimately, it is clear that jurisdiction motions cause very significant delay. The above 
averages may be slightly higher than a typical litigant would experience today due to a few 
“outliers” in the aftermath of Van Breda. Even so, a party facing a jurisdiction motion can 
 
92  Haufler (Litigation Guardian of) v Hotel Riu Palace, 2013 ONSC 6044, 117 OR (3d) 275 (SCJ) [“Haufler”] 
had a delay of 58 months, 49 months less than the delay in Air Canada, ibid. 
93  Charles M Wright via email dated December 18, 2016. 
94  David Sloan, counsel on Haufler, supra note 92. 
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realistically expect a delay of over a year if there is no appeal. If there is an appeal (present in 
about 30% of the cases), the total delay is likely to be over two years. And in the case of a Supreme 
Court leave application (the case in about 10% of total cases), the total delay is about 30 months. 
This is all before the merits of a case are considered. Moreover, despite a decrease in delay in 
2015, the overall length of delay appeared to increase over the course of the decade, suggesting 
that Hryniak is not having effects in this area of practice. 
F. Forum Selection Clauses 
Both the Supreme Court of Canada and notable commentators have recognized that forum 
selections should be encouraged to allow parties to order their contractual affairs through selecting, 
in advance, the forum to adjudicate potential disputes.95 Twelve of the 147 cases analyzed used 
forum selection clauses to grant a jurisdiction motion.96 No cases explicitly declined to enforce an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, though several cases held choice of forum clauses to be 
inapplicable97 and one case declined to use a non-exclusive forum selection clause as a reason to 
decline jurisdiction.98 There were also three cases involving defendants bringing a 
 
95  Supra note 37. 
96  Silveira, supra note 27; CP Ships, supra note 53; Szecsodi v MGM Resorts International, 2014 ONSC 1323, 
[2014] OJ No 946 (SCJ); Kavanagh v Magna Exteriors and Interiors Corp (cob Servicios Decoplas), 2014 
ONSC 4540, [2014] OJ No 4949 (SCJ) [“Kavanagh”]; Preece, supra note 27; Bale-eze Industries Inc v 
Frazier Industrial Co, 2012 ONSC 4892, [2012] OJ No 3996 (SCJ); Ironrod Investments Inc v Enquest Energy 
Services Corp, 2011 ONSC 308, [2011] OJ No 544 (SCJ); Furfari v Juncos, 2011 ONSC 3624, 38 CPC (7th) 
110 (SCJ); Harster Greenhouses Inc v Visser International Trade & Engineering BV, 2011 ONSC 2608, 334 
DLR (4th) 481 (SCJ) [“Harster”]; Goldmart Farms Inc v Fasig-Tipton Co, 2010 ONSC 1631, [2010] OJ No 
1683 (Master) [“Goldmart”]; Di Stefano, supra note 57; Expedition Helicopters Inc v Honeywell Inc, 2010 
ONCA 351, 100 OR (3d) 241, leave to appeal denied, supra note 77, where an appeal was required to uphold a 
forum selection clause that was not a contract of adhesion. 
97  E.g., 2249659 Ontario Ltd v Siegen, 2013 ONCA 354, 115 OR (3d) 241, rev’g 2012 ONSC 3128, [2012] OJ 
No 3263 (SCJ); Aldo Group, 2012 ONSC 2581, [2012] OJ No 1931 (SCJ), aff’d 2013 ONCA 725, 118 OR 
(3d) 81, leave to appeal denied, supra note 77. 
98  QBD Cooling Systems Inc v Sollatek (UK) Ltd, 2015 ONSC 947, [2015] OJ No 1578 (SCJ). 
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jurisdiction/forum non conveniens motion despite a forum selection clause conferring jurisdiction 
upon Ontario. All three of these motions were dismissed.99 
The predictability created by choice of forum clauses can facilitate access to justice. But this 
must be balanced against the access to justice concerns that the clauses can cause, particularly in 
the consumer protection context.100 This chapter is not the place to determine how to balance these 
concerns. John McEvoy has recently written about this issue101 and the Supreme Court recently 
declared a particular choice of forum clause unenforceable in Douez v Facebook, Inc.102 The 
divided nature of the Supreme Court’s decision in Facebook (with there being no majority 
opinion), taken in conjunction with its previous decision in Dell Computer Corp v Union des 
consommateurs,103 suggests that legislative intervention may be the preferable way to resolve this 
area. In any event, given the fact that over 10% of jurisdiction motion decisions are brought despite 
a seemingly clear choice of forum clause, it would appear that forum selection clauses are not 
providing the certainty to parties, and the corresponding reduction of litigation, that is desirable. 
G. Are Jurisdiction Motions Being “Abused”? 
Before turning to the concluding analysis of the variables related to access to justice connected 
to jurisdiction motions, a more qualitative issue will be considered – whether jurisdiction motions 
could be fairly said to be “abused”. This appeared to be a concern of the motion judge in Stuart 
Budd, who properly observed that technical compliance with the Rules does not absolve counsel 
 
99  Mackie Research Capital Corp v Mackie, 2012 ONSC 3890, 3 BLR (5th) 312 (SCJ); Misyura v Walton, 2012 
ONSC 5397, 112 OR (3d) 462 (SCJ); James Bay Resources Ltd v Mak Mera Nigeria, 2015 ONSC 1538, 39 
BLR (5th) 313 (SCJ). 
100  See, e.g., John McEvoy, QC, “Conflict of Laws and Consumer Contracts in Canada” (Paper presented to the 
Symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, Toronto, Ontario, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]. 
101  Ibid. 
102  2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 SCR 751 [“Facebook”]. 
103  2007 SCC 34, [2007] 2 SCR 801. 
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of responsibility to conduct proceedings in a manner that is fair and proportionate.104 Having said 
that, it is equally clear that counsel are permitted to bring cases and motions vigorously on behalf 
of their clients where those motions have a reasonable prospect of success, even if they do not 
necessarily succeed.  
Having read all the jurisdiction motions decided in Ontario from 2010-2015, few if any seem 
to have been brought in bad faith. Almost always, there was at least an arguable case that the 
motion could be granted. A common response to a motion being brought in bad faith or for delay 
is an award of substantial indemnity costs.105 But only three cases had awards of substantial 
indemnity costs that were not overturned on appeal.106 In one of those, it was the plaintiff against 
whom substantial indemnity costs were awarded.107  
Of course, substantial indemnity costs will not be awarded in every case where a motion has 
been abusive. But the better explanation for the frequency, and subsequent delays and costs, caused 
by jurisdiction motions would appear to be that the motions can plausibly be brought with a 
reasonable prospect of success given the uncertain state of the law.108 It should be recognized that 
jurisdiction motions could be threatened and/or withdrawn. This happened at least once in 2010 
and the parties could not resolve costs.109 But when one compares the uncertain state of the law to 
the comparatively high success rates of jurisdiction motions and the few awards of substantial 
indemnity costs, “abuse” by defendants does not appear to be the primary reason for the access to 
justice concerns surrounding jurisdiction motions. 
 
104  Stuart Budd SCJ Decision, supra note 5 at para 94. 
105  Sharpe JA described a purpose of costs awards to “sanction litigation behaviour” in Fong v Chan (1999), 46 
OR (3d) 330 (CA) at para 22. 
106  Supra note 87.  
107  Manson, ibid. 
108  See Monestier, supra note 19. 
109  Normerica, supra note 60. 
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H. Conclusion on Access to Justice Concerns 
Some positive trends from an access to justice perspective can be seen in the case law 
analyzed. Most obviously, the number of motions brought seems to have declined, suggesting that 
Van Breda has gone some way to providing its goals of certainty and predictability. And possibly, 
Hryniak’s spirit is being heeded outside of the summary judgment context, though this is more 
doubtful – no cases other than Stuart Budd cited its call for a change in how litigation is conducted. 
Moreover, the number of successful appeals has also decreased, suggesting that motion judges are 
finding the Van Breda framework easier to apply than the Muscutt framework. 
Having said that, the overall picture is still troubling from an access to justice perspective. 
The number of motions brought may have decreased. But almost all that have been brought seem 
to have some basis. This has occurred even when a forum selection clause was signed as an attempt 
to pre-empt jurisdiction battles. This suggests that uncertainty in the law is the primary culprit for 
the number of motions brought. Moreover, the costs are significant for a matter that does not even 
address the merits of a dispute – approximately $30,000-$45,000 on a jurisdiction motion, and 
$60,000-$75,000 if there is an appeal (which there is on over 30% of cases). Perhaps even more 
alarmingly, jurisdiction motions are delaying parties by an average of over a year without an 
appeal, and over two years with an appeal. (Some of this delay is likely due to other more mundane 
if real issues such as scheduling mistakes.110) So while Van Breda may have been a positive 
development in the law of jurisdiction, there is clearly much more to be done. 
 
 
 
110  Arsenault v Nunavut, 2015 ONSC 4302, [2015] OJ No 3494 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 ONCA 207, 30 CCEL (4th) 46 
[“Arsenault”], had two motion dates, three months apart, due to court scheduling problems. Michael Marin, 
former counsel to the plaintiff, informed of this fact during a conversation on December 20, 2016 after my 
email to him regarding date of service. 
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IV) WAYS FORWARD 
It would be difficult and perhaps even undesirable to eliminate jurisdiction motions. Even if 
one accepts that a legal dispute (such as a jurisdiction dispute) has a “right answer”, there will be 
inevitable disagreement over what that right answer is in marginal cases.111 Litigation also gives 
courts the opportunity to interpret ambiguities in statutes and develop the common law.112 
However, even if elimination of jurisdiction motions is impossible and/or undesirable, we should 
still attempt to mitigate the access to justice impediments that they cause. Reducing the number 
and complexity of jurisdiction motions would surely be welcome. 
Five potential ways to mitigate the number of jurisdiction motions and, relatedly, hopefully 
reduce the access to justice concerns inherent in them will be analyzed: revising the common law 
on attornment; a leave requirement for jurisdiction motions; having specialist decision-makers; a 
simpler procedure for obvious claims; and reconsidering the substantive law. 
A. Attornment 
The motion judge in Stuart Budd particularly criticized the case law on attornment as one of 
the principal reasons jurisdiction motions present an access to justice problem. “Attornment” is 
found when defendants have taken steps that suggest they have accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario courts, typically by taking steps to defend the merits of a proceeding.113 Attornment is not 
difficult to establish – it can be found even when a party mistakenly acts in a way that suggests it 
is defending the merits of a case, and even when it explicitly states that it intends to contest 
 
111  Ronald Dworkin famously argued that a proper legal question yields one “right answer” but that educated 
lawyers and judges can disagree in good faith over what that answer is: e.g., “Hard Cases” (1975) 88 Harv L 
Rev 1057.  
112  Hryniak, supra note 7 at paras; Warren K Winkler, “The Vanishing Trial” (Autumn 2008) 27(2) Advocates’ 
Soc J 3 at 4. 
113  Walker, supra note 8 at 11-2. 
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jurisdiction.114 Presumably implicit in Stuart Budd’s motion judge’s criticism of the doctrine is the 
suggestion that motions are sometimes brought prematurely because defendants will be deemed to 
have “attorned” to a jurisdiction if they do not challenge jurisdiction as soon as practical. This 
requirement that defendants move promptly also risks creating inefficiency as a jurisdiction motion 
cannot generally be heard in conjunction with other pre-trial motions. 
One can legitimately gripe that the current law of attornment puts a defendant in an unenviable 
situation early on in litigation – an expensive motion must be brought promptly, or else a desirable 
way to proceed is closed. But as noted above, almost all jurisdiction motions that are brought 
appear to have an arguable basis. Moreover, only 6 motions held attornment to be a reason to 
assume jurisdiction,115 and in all but one116 of those, there were additional reasons to assume 
jurisdiction. There were also six cases were attornment was found, conceded, and/or assumed, but 
turned out to be irrelevant.117 It would not appear, therefore, that revising the law of attornment 
will significantly improve the access to justice problems caused by the law of jurisdiction.  
 
114  Walker, ibid, citing Stoymenoff v Aitrouts PLC (2001), 17 CPC (5th) 387 (Ont SCJ) (concerning a party 
mistakenly defending the Ontario action) and Imagis Technologies Inc v Red Herring Communications Inc, 
2003 BCSC 366, 15 CCLT (3d) 140 (finding attornment even when a challenge to jurisdiction was expressed 
in the pleadings).  
115  Stubbs v ATS Applied Tech Systems Inc, 2010 ONSC 2838, 87 CCEL (3d) 165 (SCJ), aff’d 2010 ONCA 879, 
272 OAC 386; Zhang v Hua Hai Li Steel Pipe Co Ltd, 2013 ONCA 103, [2013] OJ No 677, aff’g Zhang, 
supra note 56 (though this was not the basis of the motion judge’s decision); Wolfe v Wyeth, 2011 ONCA 347, 
282 OAC 64, aff’g 2010 ONSC 2368, 84 CPR (4th) 43 (SCJ) (again, not the primary basis of the motion 
judge’s decision); Nadi Inc v Montazemi-Safari, 2012 ONSC 4723, [2012] OJ No 4005 (SCJ) [“Nadi”]; Title v 
Canadian Asset Based Lending Enterprise (Cable) Inc, 2011 ONSC 922, [2011] OJ No 611 (SCJ), rev’d on 
other grounds, 2011 ONCA 715, 108 OR (3d) 71, where Newbould J found attornment “in addition” to 
jurisdiction. Similarly, attornment was a reason, but not the only reason, jurisdiction was found/assumed in 
Patterson v EM Technologies, Inc, 2013 ONSC 5849, [2013] OJ No 4249 (Master) [“Patterson”].  
116  Nadi, ibid. 
117  Preece, supra note 27, found attornment but allowed the motion due to a forum selection clause. Kavanagh, 
supra note 96 found attornment but nonetheless allowed the motion on the basis of forum non conveniens. 
Harster, supra note 96 was prepared to assume defendants had attorned but nonetheless allowed the motion on 
the basis of a forum selection clause. Attornment was also conceded in Dempsey, supra note 57, Consbec, 
supra note 27, and Century Indemnity Co v Viridian Inc, 2013 ONSC 4412, [2013] OJ No 3265 (SCJ), as the 
defendants only made a forum non conveniens argument. 
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In any event, the rules on attornment have a strong rationale. The benefits flowing from a 
successful jurisdiction motions are best realized if the motion is brought as soon as possible. 
Revising the law of attornment could be a disincentive to a prompt resolution of a claim. This is 
another reason to be cautious about revising the law of attornment. 
B. Leave 
When there is risk of a rule of procedural law being abused, a leave requirement is frequently 
imposed.118 Insofar as it would prevent jurisdiction motions being abused, the leave requirement 
could be helpful. This is one of the rationales for the leave requirements behind, for example, 
interlocutory appeals119 and interlocutory steps in proceedings under the Construction Act.120 
However, given the importance of being able to challenge jurisdiction, the leave requirement could 
likely only fairly require the defendant to show that the motion has a “reasonable prospect of 
success” or a “fairly arguable case”.121 Given the current law of jurisdiction, few of the jurisdiction 
motions brought seem to have been obviously inappropriate. Unless the substantive law is 
clarified, therefore, the leave requirement would likely be easily met in almost all cases and add 
just another procedural hurdle for the parties. This would serve to hinder, rather than facilitate, 
access to justice. 
 
118  This is seen, for instance, in the ability to bring a claim under the Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5, s 
138.8 (explained by Millwright Regional Council of Ontario Pension Trust Fund (Trustees of) v Celestica Inc, 
2014 ONCA 90, 118 OR (3d) 641 at para 40, var’d on other grounds, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v 
Green, 2015 SCC 60, [2015] 3 SCR 801).  
119  S 19(1)(b) of the CJA, supra note 68, explained by John Sopinka & Mark A Gelowitz, The Conduct of an 
Appeal, 3d ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2012) at § 1.12. 
120  RSO 1990, c C30, s 67(2), which holds that “Interlocutory steps, other than those provided for in this Act, 
shall not be taken without the consent of the court obtained upon proof that the steps are necessary or would 
expedite the resolution of the issues in dispute.” The Divisional Court applied this in Atlas-Gest Inc v 
Brownstones Building Corp (1996), 46 CPC (3d) 366 in the interests of upholding the prompt resolution of a 
dispute on its merits. 
121  This appears to be the standard of, e.g., the leave requirement to judicially review a determination of refugee 
status under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 72(1): see, e.g., Bains v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 47 Admin LR 317 (Fed CA) at paras 1, 3, explained by 
Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 1 
at 8-9. 
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C. Specialized Decision-Makers 
Specialized decision-makers can improve access to justice, by becoming familiar with the 
substantive law and procedure related to a particular area of law. This expertise is likely to increase 
efficiency and decrease errors. This has been particularly discussed in the family law context,122 
but has been considered in the civil context as well. For example, the Toronto Commercial Court 
is considered to be a particularly good example of a specialized group of Superior Court judges 
working in a particular context, with the result being improved access to justice.123 Could 
something similar happen with jurisdiction motions? Of the jurisdiction motions analyzed, the one 
that had the least delay – less than one month – was a Toronto Commercial List case.124 
Nine of the decisions analyzed were decided by masters instead of judges.125 Is there any 
evidence that these experts in civil procedure are adjudicating these cases differently? Only three 
of the nine motions were successful (less than average). Of the six with reported costs decisions,126 
the average costs award was $20,393.40 ($1,162.60 less than the average for all cases, excluding 
Rothmans, the class actions, and the substantial indemnity costs awards), but the median was 
$22,783.45 ($9,646.80 more than the median for all such cases). The average delay in the four 
cases about which this chapter has information on date of service was 9.5 months, slightly less 
than the average delay of about a year.127 These are interesting observations but given the small 
 
122  E.g., Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access to Civil & Family Justice: 
A Roadmap for Change” (Ottawa: Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, 
October 2013) at 16. 
123  See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 112 at 4. 
124  Ghana Gold, supra note 46. 
125  Goldmart, supra note 96; Tseng, supra note 46; Kais v Abu Dhabi Education Council, 2011 ONSC 75, [2011] 
OJ No 22 (Master); Alexander v Alexander, 2012 ONSC 2826, [2012] OJ No 2099 [“Alexander”]; Kazi v 
Qatar Airlines, 2013 ONSC 1370, [2013] OJ No 992 (Master) [“Kazi”]; Patterson, supra note 115; 
Harrowand, supra note 69; Silveira, supra note 27; Machado, supra note 69. 
126  Goldmart, ibid; Kais v Abu Dhabi Education Council, 2011 ONSC 100, [2011] OJ No 29 (Master); Alexander, 
ibid; Kazi, ibid; Harrowand SL v Dewind Turbines Ltd, 2014 ONSC 3388, 2014 CarswellOnt 7916 (Master); 
Silveira, ibid. 
127  See the four masters’ decisions in Appendix C. 
67 
 
 
sample size, it would be inappropriate to draw any normative implications from looking at the 
masters’ records compared to the judges’. 
Another concern about having specialized decision makers in the realm of jurisdiction motions 
is that there are only about two-to-three dozen motions a year. This is a sizable number but may 
not be enough to truly justify a “roster” of judges akin to the Toronto Commercial List. Even so, 
there could be judges assigned by the Regional Senior Judge to address jurisdiction motions 
brought in a particular area. For example, Justice Fred Myers was assigned almost all cases in 
Toronto that raised Rule 2.1, the summary dismissal which came into effect on July 1, 2014. This 
has seemingly led to a streamlined jurisprudence under the Rule.128 
Ultimately, it is uncertain if specialized decision-makers – whether a set roster of judges (who 
could share the motions) or masters – would be a particularly good or feasible solution to access 
to justice concerns raised by jurisdiction motions. But a pilot project may well be a worthy 
experiment.  
D. A Simpler Procedure for Obvious Claims 
There are some instances where it is patently obvious that Ontario does not have jurisdiction 
over the claim.129 Mandating a formal motion on notice with legal argument seems 
disproportionate to the difficulty in resolving the relevant legal issues in these cases. Allowing a 
judge to dispose of a claim merely upon being notified by the defendant that there are no 
connecting factors with Ontario may be appropriate. Indeed, Chapter Two will explore how Rule 
2.1 of the Rules has permitted a similar proceeding for facially abusive matters in accordance with 
 
128  According to QuickLaw, Myers J’s analysis in Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 
ONSC 6100, 37 CLR (4th) 1 (SCJ) has been cited 55 times as of January 12, 2017, including by the Court of 
Appeal in Scaduto v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 OAC 87; Gerard J Kennedy, “Rule 
2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to 
Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access to Just 243 [“Kennedy Rule 2.1”] at 270. 
129  See, e.g., Manson v Canetic Resources Ltd, 2014 ONSC 261, [2014] OJ No 288 (SCJ). 
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the principle of proportionality.130 As will be explored in the next chapter, this would likely need 
to be restricted only to matters that are clearly without connection to Ontario – but this could be a 
way to dispose of matters that are “abusive” of Ontario’s process by attempting to enter into the 
Ontario judicial system without any reason to do so. 
E. Revisiting Van Breda – or Adopting the CJPTA 
1. Clarifying the Common Law 
There have been calls since Van Breda to further clarify the law of jurisdiction and/or forum 
non conveniens.131 The uncertainty in the law seems to be the primary cause of the number of 
jurisdiction motions brought post-Van Breda, and it is costing significant time and money to 
hundreds of litigants, including those who sought to pre-empt these issues through forum selection 
clauses.132 While some flexibility is often necessary to ensure fairness,133 the law of jurisdiction 
seems to have erred excessively in that direction. It is a trite observation that, other things being 
equal, a good rule is a simple one, as a simple rule provides clarity and minimizes the likelihood 
of disputes.134 
It also goes without saying that further clarification would be welcome. Ideas in this respect 
include having a court decline jurisdiction pursuant to forum non conveniens only when it 
considers itself a “clearly inappropriate” forum135 to clarifying how much “presence” a defendant 
must have in a forum to ground a finding of jurisdiction136 to making the presumptive connecting 
 
130  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 128. 
131  See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 19; Chilenye Nwapi, “Re-Evaluating the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
in Canada” (2013) 34 WRLSI 59. 
132  Supra Part III.F. 
133  See, e.g., Kain, et al, supra note 67 at 310; Blom, supra note 23 at 18. 
134  Ibid. 
135  Nwapi, supra note 131. 
136  See Kain, et al, supra note 67 at 286. 
69 
 
 
factors more objective.137 This study is not the place to address which of these may be particularly 
valuable – but they should be seriously considered.  
2. The CJPTA 
Alternatively, the CJPTA could be considered as an alternative, clearer procedure to resolve 
jurisdiction matters. This attempt to promote certainty through codification has been gaining 
support for the past two decades.138 A recent edition of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal was in large 
part dedicated to analyzing whether and how this would be a good way forward.139 Stephen Pitel, 
once a skeptic of the CJPTA, has recently suggested that it is generally preferable to the common 
law.140 There are undeniably disadvantages to codification of the common law, such as insufficient 
flexibility, the inability to cope with unforeseen circumstances, and the need for excessive 
litigation in the immediate aftermath of codification.141 However, legislators and policymakers 
should think clearly whether “enough is enough” on this specific topic of jurisdiction motions. The 
benefits that would likely apply to clarifying the common law of jurisdiction would probably be 
even more applicable to the adoption of the CJPTA, as it would be part of a movement to put all 
of common law Canada on the same page. The status quo of having only three provinces use the 
statute can lead to potentially undesirable incentives to “forum shop.”142  
 
137  Monestier, supra note 19 at 411 and 414ff. 
138  See, e.g., Stephen GA Pitel, “Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection” (2010) 60 UNB LJ 177 at 
178. 
139  Janet Walker, “Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada: The CJPTA–A Decade of Progress” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 9. 
140  Stephen GA Pitel, “Question-and-Answer period” (Symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, Toronto, 
Ontario, 21 October 2016). 
141  Evidence scholars, for example, have grappled with this issue for years: for a summary, see Ron Delisle, Don 
Stuart, David M Tanovich & Lisa Dufraimont, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 11th ed (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2015) at 30-34. 
142  While forum-shopping is frequently frowned upon as it seems antithetical to the interests of the defendant and 
society at large, not all forum-shopping is necessarily illegitimate: see, e.g., Nwapi, supra note 131 at 104; 
Elizabeth Edinger, “The Problem of Parallel Actions: The Softer Alternative” (2010) 60 UNB LJ 116 at 118. 
70 
 
 
The CJPTA not being implemented more broadly to date appears to be the consequence of: a) 
concerns that one may legitimately have about the CJPTA;143 b) that it arguably reduces the power 
of a province’s courts to uniquely develop the common law, which such reduction of powers being 
something many provincial Attorneys-General may be reluctant to facilitate;144 and c) introducing 
legislation to respond to such an issue of civil procedure being unlikely to be a provincial 
government priority.145 
Despite these limitations with the CJPTA, it appears, subject to the caveat in the next 
subsection, the preferred solution of those discussed in this chapter for improving the law of 
jurisdiction. Changing the law of attornment comes with significant disadvantages, and attempts 
to have judicial clarification of the law of jurisdiction appear to have had limited effectiveness to 
date. As such, the benefits of codification appear to outweigh the disadvantages. This is not to 
suggest the CJPTA cannot be complemented by specialist judges and a simpler procedure for truly 
obvious cases. But given that most of the access to justice problems in this area appear to be the 
result of uncertainty in the law, codification appears the most obvious solution. 
3. Forum of Necessity – the Access to Justice Implications 
A caveat is required when discussing the adoption of the CJPTA as an alternative legal 
framework to consider the law of jurisdiction. As is well known, the CJPTA contains a “forum of 
necessity”, allowing a province to assert jurisdiction for the sole reason that it is not realistic for a 
 
143  See, e.g., Sagi Peari, “Three Objections to Forum of Necessity: Global Access to Justice, International 
Criminal Law and Proper Party” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 225. 
144  Contra the example of Ian Scott, discussed in W Brent Cotter, “Ian Scott: Renaissance Man, Consummate 
Advocate, Attorney General Extraordinaire” in In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian 
Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 
145  M Jerry McHale, QC, “Access to Justice: A Government Perspective” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 351 at 355; Hazel 
Genn, “Understanding Civil Justice” (1997) 50(1) Curr Legal Probs 155 at 159. 
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plaintiff to access justice in another jurisdiction.146 Whether this would truly improve access to 
justice is debatable. On the one hand, it seems obvious that a forum of necessity would help 
plaintiffs obtain justice in circumstances when doing so is otherwise impossible or extremely 
expensive. Insofar as access to justice requires considering not just procedure but substantive 
justice,147 a forum of necessity is a clear benefit to access to justice. But even placing aside the 
well-known theoretical problems of a forum of necessity (much like “universal jurisdiction”, it 
may violate principles of public international law148), it would also likely create confusion and 
uncertainty about when it is to apply. It is widely accepted that a jurisdiction that would torture the 
plaintiff is a circumstance when a forum of necessity is warranted,149 but what actions short of 
torture are required? The expiry of a limitation period is generally considered insufficient to invoke 
a forum of necessity150 – except when it arguably is.151 When great financial burden to the plaintiff 
should lead to the invocation of the forum of necessity is also an open question.152 It seems 
inevitable that a forum of necessity would create more litigation over jurisdiction motions. The 
cost and time involved in that litigation causes the parties access to justice problems, as does the 
inability of other litigants to have their day in court as a result of that litigation. These 
considerations must be balanced against the fairness to the rare plaintiff who is denied a forum to 
 
146  See, e.g., Michael Sobkin, “Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203; Chilenye Nwapi, “A Necessary 
Look at Necessity Jurisdiction” (2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 211. 
147  See, e.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 28 at 970-972 
148  See, e.g., Kimberly N Trapp & Alex Mills, “Smooth Runs the Water Where the Brook is Deep: The Obscured 
Complexities of Germany v Italy” (2012) 1 Cambridge J Int’l & Comp L 153 at, e.g., 162-165. 
149  Bouzari, supra note 27. 
150  See, e.g., Sobkin, supra note 146 and examples cited therein, such as Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2013 ONSC 7494, 
28 CCLI (5th) 229 (SCJ). 
151  Ibrahim, supra note 58. This decision was partially based on the defendant’s action. The Court of Appeal did 
note that it was relevant that the law on forum of necessity had changed to the plaintiff’s detriment prior to the 
motion being heard. 
152  Sobkin, supra note 146. 
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adjudicate her claim. That plaintiff’s interests may be more important and are certainly more acute, 
but do they outweigh the lesser but real interests of a larger group of people? 
Consider this thought experiment. “Rule A” is fair and just 99% of the time, and predictable 
and easy to apply 95% of the time. “Rule B” is fair and just 100% of the time, but predictable and 
easy to apply only 75% of the time. Is the fairness and justice to the 1% achieved through adopting 
Rule B worth the unpredictability and uncertainty that must be endured by an additional 20%? 
Maybe, but maybe not. The maxim “hard cases make bad law” recognizes that the unfairness and 
injustice in the 1% of cases is that “hard case”. It is at least arguable that the unfairness and injustice 
to the 1% is less problematic than the inability of the 20% to order their affairs predictably, and 
resolve their potentially justiciable issues promptly and with minimal expense.  
This chapter should not be taken to suggest that a CJPTA without a forum of necessity would 
be Rule A, while a CJPTA with a forum of necessity would be Rule B. This analysis is 
insufficiently comprehensive to come to such a conclusion. In any event, Michael Sobkin,153 Sagi 
Peari,154 and Angela Swan155 have addressed this issue more comprehensively than is possible 
here. But it is not controversial that, other things being equal, simple rules are preferable to 
complicated ones.  
A forum of necessity will almost of necessity create jurisdiction battles. While Van Breda 
makes it clear that the presence of the plaintiff in a forum is an insufficient basis to give that forum 
jurisdiction over the case,156 it nonetheless is relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis.157 As 
Michael Sobkin notes, the line between “forum of necessity” and “forum non conveniens” can 
 
153  Ibid. 
154  Supra note 143. 
155  “The Other End of the Process: Enforcement of Judgments” (Paper presented to the Symposium, The CJPTA: 
A Decade of Progress, Toronto, Ontario, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]. 
156  Van Breda, supra note 6 at para 86. 
157  See, e.g., Thompson v Our Lady of the Missions, 2011 ONSC 382, [2011] OJ No 512 (SCJ) at para 17. 
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become blurred.158 As an example, one plaintiff testified that it would be exceptionally difficult 
for her to pursue a wrongful dismissal claim in Nunavut (where the employment and dismissal 
took place, and whose law governed the employment contact) due to a risk of “re-
traumatization”.159 But after losing her jurisdiction battle in Ontario, she is indeed pursuing a claim 
in Nunavut.160 Given the obvious costs in terms of time and money that uncertainty in the law has 
created in the realm of jurisdiction motions without an explicit forum of necessity, we should be 
careful before adopting a rule that has the potential to create more uncertainty and unpredictability 
in the law. 
IN SUM 
After the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the decision in Stuart Budd, the matter was 
returned to the Superior Court. The Superior Court proceeded to dismiss the defendants’ motion 
yet again,161 and awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs of both motions in the amount of 
$50,130.33.162 The defendants appealed yet again, with the Court of Appeal this time dismissing 
the appeal with a costs award of $13,000.163 
By the time of the second appeal, over forty-five months had passed since the statement of 
claim was served on the defendants, and there had been over $84,000 in costs orders,164 meaning 
actual costs were likely twice that. The case had become a paradigm of precisely what the first 
motion judge had warned about. It is ironic that he was the only one of 147 motion judges to invoke 
 
158  Sobkin, supra note 146. 
159  Arsenault, supra note 110. 
160  Michael Marin, former counsel to the plaintiff, informed of this fact during a conversation on December 20, 
2016 after my email to him regarding date of service. 
161  Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONSC 2980, [2016] OJ No 2372 (SCJ). 
162  Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONSC 3798, [2016] OJ No 3033 (SCJ). The 
Court of Appeal held that the costs of the first motion were to be in the discretion of the judge hearing the 
second motion. 
163  Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONCA 977, [2016] OJ 6644. 
164  The defendants were awarded $20,000 for the costs of the first appeal. 
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Hryniak, only to have his decision overturned for reasons (albeit good reasons) unrelated to the 
merits of the motion before him.  
There is undeniably a place for jurisdiction motions in our justice system, to promote 
international comity and judicial economy, and give effect to parties’ contractual agreements. But 
it is also clear that the present law of jurisdiction is posing significant access to justice problems, 
costing parties significant legal fees and considerable delay. Stuart Budd is admittedly an extreme 
example, but jurisdiction motions are regularly delaying the resolution of claims by years, and 
costing parties well over $50,000. A small minority of this is attributable to abuse. But most of it 
appears to be attributable to the uncertain state of the law of jurisdiction in Canada, and/or the 
types of access to justice issues that plague our system of civil litigation more generally, such as 
delay due to excessively busy courts. The complicated nature of the law of jurisdiction resulted in 
this chapter, unlike the other three in this dissertation, to not keep special track of the intersection 
of the chapter’s topic (jurisdiction motions) and self-represented litigants, with there being few 
cases involving self-represented litigants, possibly due to the complex nature of the law.165 
Van Breda has gone some way to clarifying the law of jurisdiction, and thus mitigating the 
access to justice concerns surrounding jurisdiction motions. But the general call in Hryniak for a 
simpler and more proportionate procedure appears to have had minimal impact in this specific 
area. In other words, like much of Ontario procedural law, it appears as though there remains a 
long way to go in making jurisdiction motions, which are inevitable, less of an impediment to 
access to justice. The subsequent chapters and the Conclusion of this dissertation will review in 
more detail what that way may entail, in line with other trends in procedural law.
 
165  Though the presence of a self-represented litigant in one case resulted in queries regarding dates of service to 
be directed to a defendant’s lawyer: Glasford, supra note 52. 
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Chapter Two 
Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure:  
Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to Justice? 
 
“[The plaintiff] seeks an order requiring the government to: provide him with a job, fix issues 
concerning his love life, […], allow him to carry a weapon for personal safety, […], and to 
provide the plaintiff with a stealth video and audio recording device to record community thugs 
operating in public in violation of his rights. He also seeks damages in the amount of $151 
million.”1 
  
 “[The plaintiff]’s argument does not deserve respectful treatment. But she does.”2 
Sometimes, the just way to resolve an action is obvious. Enacted in 2014, Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s 
Rules of Civil Procedure3 seeks to combine two potential solutions to Canada’s access to justice 
crisis4 – civil procedure reform5 and more active judging6 – in response to a discrete but real 
problem in Canadian civil litigation: namely, litigation that is “on its face” frivolous, vexatious, 
and/or abusive. Cases that fall within Rule 2.1’s ambit number in the dozens per year, potentially 
causing disproportionate expense for responding parties, and wasting significant public resources.7 
To date, no scholar has investigated Rule 2.1 (the “Rule”).8 This chapter seeks to rectify this 
gap. Part I explores the history of and rationale for the Rule, in the context of the access to justice 
 
1  Asghar v Ontario, 2015 ONSC 4071, [2015] OJ No 3326 (SCJ) [“Asghar v Ontario”] at para 2. 
2  Lin v Rock, 2015 ONSC 2421, [2015] OJ No 1851 (SCJ) [“Lin v Rock”] at para 13. 
3  RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the “Rules” or the “Rules of Civil Procedure” will be used interchangeably]. 
4  See, e.g., Trevor CW Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 [“Farrow 2014”] 
at fn 1 for an extensive review of the literature in this area. 
5  Ontario extensively amended its civil procedure effective January 1, 2010 to facilitate the more timely and 
inexpensive resolution of civil actions on their merits: O Reg 438/08. This was largely to implement the 
recommendations of the “Osborne Report”: Coulter Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform Project: Findings and 
Recommendations (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2007), online: 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/> at Appendix A (Terms of Reference) & 
B (Consultation Letter). For a discussion of this, see: Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift: An 
Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary Judgment Reforms” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275 at 1280-
1281, fn 18; Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has Its Day in Court” (2012) 37 Queen’s LJ 697 at 700-701 
and 707-708. 
6  See, e.g., Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [“Hryniak”] at paras 74-79. 
7  Raji v Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, [2015] OJ No 307 (SCJ) [“Raji #1”] at para 6. 
8  Some law firms have published professional resources on this topic: see, e.g., “WHAT DO I TELL A CLIENT 
WHO ASKS: What Do I Do When a Debtor files a ‘Freeman of the Land’ Claim or Motion (Sub Nom: 
‘Frivolous or Vexatious Claims and Motions – a Rule 2.1 Primer’)”, online: <http://www.phmlaw.com/what-
do-i-tell-client.pdf>; Kathryn Kirkpatrick & Jeremy Ablaza, “Cautious Use of Rule 2.1 Against Vexatious 
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crisis in Ontario, and in light of the perceived inadequacy of alternative mechanisms provided for 
in the Rules and the Courts of Justice Act9 for addressing the dangers raised by vexatious litigants. 
After explaining methodology in Part II, in Part III all 190 decisions using Rule 2.1 decided 
between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2017 are analyzed, to determine how Rule 2.1 has been applied 
in practice, with the goal to provide guidance for future lawyers and judges considering using the 
Rule. Part IV analyzes the effects on access to justice of Rule 2.1, in terms of providing speedy 
and cost-efficient resolution of civil actions on their merits. Part V considers how the Rule should 
be used in the future – doctrinally, institutionally, and ethically.  
The conclusions are hopeful. Rule 2.1 is powerful, and its use should prompt some pause in 
judges and lawyers. By and large, however, the Rule has been very well employed. It has resulted 
in significant savings of time and financial expense,10 for both courts and defendants, while almost 
always being fair to plaintiffs.11 As discussed in particular depth in Part V.D, despite the Rule’s 
potential to disadvantage self-represented and/or marginalized litigants due to its lack of in-court 
time, many cases are the model of fairness to vulnerable parties. In the few instances where the 
Rule’s (attempted) use has arguably been inappropriate, the costs in terms of delay and financial 
expense are usually minimal. While Rule 2.1 is only applicable to a small minority of cases, they 
are not a trivial number. The Rule is ultimately an inspiring example of how civil procedure can 
be amended to facilitate access to justice – and be thoroughly fair to parties in doing so. 
 
Claims in Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP” (15 August 2017), online: <http://blg.com/en/News-And-
Publications/Publication_5040>. 
9  RSO 1990, c C43 [the “CJA”]. 
10   Quantifying a comparison between Rule 2.1 and Rule 21 with scientific precision would be difficult if not 
impossible but the discussion in Part I.C should indicate the significantly greater costs of Rule 21. 
11  Unless the circumstances require more specificity, the terms “defendants”, “respondents”, and “responding 
parties” will be used interchangeably in this chapter when referring to parties against whom Rule 2.1 is not 
(proposed to be) used while “plaintiffs”, “applicants”, and “moving parties” will be used interchangeably when 
referring to parties against whom Rule 2.1 is proposed to be used. 
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I) RULE 2.1’s HISTORY 
A. Access to Justice 
Precisely what the phrase “access to justice” encompasses varies according to the 
circumstances. At its most holistic, it includes normative questions about what values constitute 
“justice” and ensuring that substantive law encompasses such values.12 At the very least, it means 
that civil litigation should have three characteristics: first, minimal financial costs; second, 
timeliness; and, third, simplicity.13 Even those who have argued that access to justice should be 
interpreted in a much broader manner, such as Trevor Farrow, agree that simple and efficient civil 
procedure is an important tool for achieving access to justice.14 
It is within this spirit of ensuring timely and cost-effective resolutions of civil claims that 
Ontario amended its Rules of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 2010.15 These reforms also 
enshrined the principle of proportionality, which recognizes that steps taken in litigation are to be 
proportionate to what can realistically be gained from taking said steps.16 In its seminal 2014 
decision Hyrniak v Mauldin, Justice Karakatsanis, for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, 
held that these reforms should be interpreted generously to achieve access to justice. She also 
called for a “culture shift” to ensure that cases are decided on their merits in a manner that is fair, 
speedy, and with minimal financial cost.17  
 
12  Farrow 2014, supra note 4 at 970-972. 
13  E.g., ibid at 978-979; Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and 
Ambitions” in Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The 
Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 68-73. Related to this is the important 
principle of proportionality: Hryniak, supra note 6 at paras 29-33; Trevor Farrow, “Proportionality: A Cultural 
Revolution” (2012) 1 Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 151 [“Farrow 2012”]. 
14 Trevor CW Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, 
eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2016) at 166. 
15  The Rules, supra note 3, as amended by O Reg 438/08. 
16  E.g., Farrow 2012, supra note 13. 
17  Hryniak, supra note 6 at paras 2, 23. 
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Hryniak concerned summary judgment. But appellate courts18 and notable commentators19 
have repeatedly emphasized that Hryniak’s spirit applies outside this narrow context. This spirit 
includes the recognition that a full, traditional trial is frequently not necessary for a court to justly 
resolve matters, and that more summary procedures that bring swift ends to proceedings can play 
indispensable roles in this respect.20 It is against this backdrop, and with these considerations in 
mind, that Rule 2.1 became part of the Rules effective July 1, 2014: to provide an efficient and 
cost-and-time-effective mechanism to address a particular type of proceeding. 
B. Frivolous, Vexatious, and Abusive 
Rule 2.1 combines the terms “vexatious”, “frivolous”, and “abusive” – terms that overlap 
considerably in the case law.21 The former two terms are unfortunately not well defined in case 
law.22 “Vexatious” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “without reasonable or probable cause 
or excuse; harassing; annoying”23 and by the Ontario Court of Appeal as “broadly synonymous 
with the concept of abuse of process developed by the Courts in the exercise of their inherent right 
to control proceedings.”24 Black’s Law defines “frivolous” as “lacking a legal basis or legal merit; 
not serious; not reasonably purposeful”25, a definition accepted by the Ontario Court of Appeal.26 
 
18  See, e.g., Iannarella v Corbett, 2015 ONCA 110, 124 OR (3d) 523 at para 53, concerning discovery; Canadian 
Natural Resources Limited v ShawCor Ltd, 2014 ABCA 289, 580 AR 265 at para 5, concerning the 
intersection between discovery and claims of privilege. 
19  See, e.g., Stephen GA Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 
21” (2014) 43 Adv Q 344 at 344-346; Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to Alberta: Summary 
Judgment, Culture Shift, and the Future of Civil Trials” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1. 
20  Hryniak, supra note 6 at para 29; Pitel & Lerner, ibid. 
21  Butera v Fragale, 2010 ONSC 3702, 2010 CarswellOnt 4669 (SCJ) at para 19. 
22  876502 Ontario Ltd v IF Propco Holdings (Ontario) 10 Ltd (1997), 37 OR (3d) 70 (Gen Div) at 77. 
23  Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed [“Black’s Law”], sub verbo “vexatious”. 
24  The dissenting opinion of Blair JA in Foy v Foy (1979), 26 OR (2d) 220 (CA), accepted in subsequent case 
law: see Dale Streiman & Kurz LLP v De Teresi (2007), 84 OR (3d) 383 (SCJ) at para 7. 
25  Black’s Law, supra note 23, sub verbo “frivolous”. 
26  Currie v Halton Regional Services Police Board (2003), 179 OAC 67 (CA) at para 17.  
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The term “abusive” relates to the doctrine of abuse of process, which the Supreme Court of 
Canada has noted aims to preserve the integrity of the court process.27 The Supreme Court has 
approvingly cited Goudge JA’s description of abuse of process: 
[The doctrine of abuse of process] engages the inherent power of the court to 
prevent the misuses of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to 
a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. It is a flexible doctrine unencumbered by 
the specific requirements of concepts such as issue estoppel. […]28 
 
These three terms overlap.29 “Abusive” is the broadest, and frivolous and vexatious litigation 
is almost certainly also going to be abusive. However, “vexatious” is the commonly used term if 
referring to persons in case law. “Abusive” tends to refer to litigation itself. As such, “abusive” 
and “vexatious” will be used synonymously hereafter, unless circumstances call for more 
specificity. “Frivolous” will generally be avoided, as it seems to truly be a subset of vexatious and 
abusive. 
Whether any of this terminology is appropriate is debatable. The National Self-Represented 
Litigant Project (“NSRLP”) has noted that “vexatious” can be used as an inappropriate label to 
dismiss the claims of marginalized persons.30 And as will be discussed, many individuals who file 
claims that fall within Rule 2.1’s ambit appear to be suffering from mental illness and these labels 
may seem excessively and wrongly stigmatizing. “Ineffective” and “inappropriate” litigation may 
be more suitable. But these descriptions also appear less precise, and collapsing the three above 
 
27  Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 SCR 227 [“Behn”] at para 40. 
28  Ibid [emphasis added by LeBel J], citing Canam Enterprises Inc v Coles (2000), 51 OR (3d) 481 (CA) 
[“Canam”] at para 55. 
29  Maheau v IMS Health Canada, 2002 FCT 558, 20 CPC (4th) 523 (Prothonotary), rev’d on other grounds, 2003 
FCT 1, 226 FTR 269, aff’d 2003 FCA 462, 314 NR 393.  
30  Julie Macfarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures Against Self-
Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to Justice?” (Windsor, ON: The 
National Self-Represented Litigants Project, The University of Windsor, November 2015) [“NRSLP 
Vexatiousness”]. 
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terms may already be leading to a lack of precision in language. In addition, such litigation remains 
“abusive” in that it abuses the court’s process (another reason that “abusive” is a preferable term 
to “vexatious”), even if through no fault of the plaintiff. In any event, “vexatious”, “frivolous”, 
and “abusive” appear throughout the case law and the Rules and it would appear distracting not to 
use them in this chapter, which fundamentally seeks to understand the Rule’s effects. And concerns 
about accuracy aside, there remains a school of thought in linguistics that attempts to change 
language to reduce stigma can be of limited effectiveness, transferring the stigma and perceived 
euphemistic connotations to the new terminology.31 So while a discussion about changing 
terminology is worthwhile, it can also be left for another day. The terms “abusive” and “vexatious” 
will be used for the reasons noted above.  
C. Vexatious Litigants Prior to Rule 2.1 
Rule 21.01(b) of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to bring a motion to 
dismiss a proceeding on the grounds that “it discloses no reasonable cause of action”.32 This rule 
is a modern codification of the historic power of common law courts to prevent abuses of their 
processes, with actions that do not disclose a cause of action being abuses of process.33 As such, 
this Rule can be used to strike abusive pleadings. Rule 25.11 of the Rules, which allows a court to 
strike “all or part of a pleading or other document” if it is “scandalous, vexatious, or frivolous”34 
or “is an abuse of process of the court”35 is another tool in this respect. However, these rules have 
their limits. First, they require a formal motion, requiring legal argument and notice to the allegedly 
abusive party. In addition to being expensive and time-consuming, in the words of Myers J, this 
 
31  Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New York: Viking Penguin, 2002) 
[2003 paperback version] at 212.  
32  Rules, supra note 3. 
33  Pitel & Lerner, supra note 19 at 348. 
34  Rules, supra note 3, Rule 25.11(b). 
35  Ibid, Rule 25.11(c). 
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can lead to “the proposed cure caus[ing] a fresh outbreak of the disease”, giving the allegedly 
vexatious litigant a new opportunity to act vexatiously.36 Second, if the vexatious party is engaged 
in a pattern of behaviour, these will need to be brought repeatedly. 
Alternatively, s 140 of the CJA prescribes a procedure to have a litigant declared “vexatious”37 
if he or she has “instituted vexatious proceedings in any court” or “conducted a proceeding in a 
vexatious manner”.38 The consequences of this are that no further proceedings may be instituted 
or continued by the vexatious litigant without leave of a Superior Court judge.39 Once granted, a 
“vexatious litigant order” allows a responding party to ensure any further proceeding or step 
therein brought by the vexatious litigant has at least some prima facie merit. It also helps the 
vexatious litigant by ensuring judicial oversight over all litigation steps, saving all parties – 
including the vexatious litigant – unnecessary expense.40  
Though the remedies resulting from s 140 of the CJA are more powerful than those available 
from Rule 21 or 25.11, they present other difficulties. First, s 140 requires a separate application 
to be commenced41 – an expensive and lengthy process.42 Though Rule 38.13 of the Rules, which 
became effective July 1, 2014, mandates that applications under this section are generally to be 
heard in writing, and factums are not required, an application record is still necessary.43 Vexatious 
litigants still have many opportunities to respond vexatiously, through submitting an affidavit, and 
cross-examining other parties on their affidavit(s). If a vexatious litigant has acted vexatiously 
 
36  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 8. 
37  CJA, supra note 9, s 140(1)(a). 
38  Ibid, s 140(1)(b). 
39  Ibid, ss 140(1)(c-d). 
40  Science Applications International Corp v Pagourov, 2012 ONSC 6514, [2012] OJ No 5696 (SCJ), aff’d 2013 
ONCA 563, 2013 CarswellOnt 12629 [“Pagourov”] at para 49, citing Law Society of Upper Canada v Chavali 
(1998), 21 CPC (4th) 20 (Ont Gen Div) at para 26, aff’d (1998), 31 CPC (4th) 221 (CA). 
41  S 140(1). 
42  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 8. 
43  Rules, supra note 3, Rule 38.13. 
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against many different parties, it may not be in the financial interests of any one of them to bring 
a s 140 application. Second, a vexatious litigant declaration is difficult to obtain. It can only be 
granted if a person has “persistently and without lawful grounds”44 acted in a vexatious manner. 
Given that it affects how a person can exercise his or her right to access the courts, it has 
historically been considered an extraordinary remedy.45  
The limitations of s 140 of the CJA and Rules 21 and 25.11 of the Rules are well-founded. 
But they still leave parties responding to abusive actions in the unenviable position of bringing 
expensive motions and/or applications to address vexatious litigants. As Myers J wrote in Raji:46  
The court has always had difficulty with the Catch-22 nature of dealing with 
vexatious litigants. Any time that proceedings are brought to try to end a vexatious 
proceeding, the vexatious litigant is provided with a fresh opportunity to conduct 
that proceeding in a vexatious, expensive, wasteful, and abusive manner. 
[…] Imposing a quick and limited written process that provides one opportunity to 
the plaintiff to show why the claim should not be dismissed is an important advance 
toward meeting the goals of efficiency, affordability, and proportionality in the civil 
justice system as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak. 
 
It was to address this situation, where it is easy to understand why a defendant would consider 
paying an unprincipled settlement to have the plaintiff “go away”, that Rule 2.1 was enacted. 
II) METHODOLOGY 
An attempt was undertaken to find all reported cases using Rule 2.1 from its coming into force 
on July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2017. This was done through searching QuickLaw and Westlaw 
throughout 2017. There are limitations of such an approach. Notably, though QuickLaw and 
Westlaw report most decided reported cases in Ontario, they do not necessarily report every single 
 
44  CJA, supra note 9, s 140(1) [emphasis added]. 
45  Kallaba v Bylykbashi (2006), 207 OAC 60 (CA) at para 31. This is not the case across Canada. For instance, 
the Alberta Court of Appeal held in Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 277, 515 AR 58 that no “substantial 
prejudice” results from prospective court access restrictions given that it is of course still possible to access the 
courts. 
46  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 8. 
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case.47 Nonetheless, quantitative analyses of case law frequently proceed from their use.48 
Moreover, given the summary nature of Rule 2.1, there is good reason to suspect many decisions 
that use it are not reported. There are also inherent limitations to a quantitative analysis of case 
law – notably, it is difficult to draw normative lessons from such an analysis.49 However, the 
normative values implicated by Rule 2.1 will be addressed in Parts III, IV, and particularly V, of 
this chapter. 
While reviewing these cases, the following facts were recorded: 
• What cases have emerged as “leading” to provide guidance to members of the bar and 
bench on how to apply the Rule. 
• How many cases were being resolved pursuant to the Rule and how many attempts to use 
the Rule are successful. 
• The rates of appeals and successful appeals, which suggest something about the clarity of 
the Rule’s meaning and/or whether the judges are misapplying it (accepting that an 
appellate court overruling a lower court is not necessarily an indictment of the lower court 
decision50). 
• Any costs orders involved, as costs orders shed light on financial expense, and are thus 
relevant to assessing whether the Rule is having a positive effect on access to justice. 
 
47  Khan v Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, 2017 CarswellOnt 16235 [“Khan”] is an appeal of an 
unreported trial decision. 
48  See, e.g., Craig E Jones & Micah B Rankin, “Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of Subconscious Bias in 
Second-Degree Murder Sentences in Canada” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 109 at 121, fn 58; Gerard J 
Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 79 
[“Kennedy Jurisdiction”]. 
49  See, e.g., Joshua B Fischman, “Reuniting ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship” (2013) 162(1) U Pa 
L Rev 117; Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid. 
50  Fischman, ibid at 142. 
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• How long Rule 2.1 is delaying the resolution of actions: in the case of successful uses of 
the Rule, it is evidence of how promptly cases are being resolved on their merits. In the 
case of unsuccessful uses, it can be assessed whether the Rule is in fact a hindrance to 
access to justice, as this must be weighed against the Rule’s ability to help achieve access 
to justice in other cases. 
• The identity of the judge deciding the motion and whether this affects the aforementioned 
“access to justice”-related variables. This is particularly important to analyze given that 
Justice Fred Myers has decided a disproportionate number of cases, having been 
appointed by the Toronto Team Leader-Civil to address the Rule.51 Justices Robert 
Beaudoin of the Superior Court in Ottawa and Ian Nordheimer sitting on the Divisional 
Court in Toronto (prior to his elevation to the Court of Appeal) have also decided a 
disproportionate number of cases using Rule 2.1. 
• Whether the case was prompted by a judge’s own initiative, or referred to the judge by a 
responding party or the registrar, to discover who is employing the Rule. 
• The reason why the proceeding was alleged to be vexatious. Very short descriptions of 
all cases are found in Appendix D, though certain prominent types of cases are highlighted 
below in Parts III.C.2 and III.C.5. 
• Whether the party against whom Rule 2.1 was sought to be employed was a self-
represented litigant. 
All of these details are recorded in Appendix D. 
 
51  Goralczyk v Beer Store, 2016 ONSC 2265, [2016] OJ No 1763 (SCJ) [“Goralczyk #1”] at para 6. 
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The Rules of the Small Claims Court52 were also amended as of July 1, 2014,53 with Rules 
12.02(3) and 12.02(7) essentially mimicking Rule 2.1 of the Rules. Unfortunately, given that most 
Small Claims Court cases are not reported,54 it is very difficult if not impossible to assess the 
effectiveness of this rule change through a quantitative analysis of case law. It is noted, however, 
that one Divisional Court decision allowed an appeal of a Small Claims Court case on the grounds 
that use of Rule 12.02(3) of the Rules of the Small Claims Court was inappropriate.55 
III) HOW IT WORKS 
As noted above, one purpose of this analysis is to provide the first doctrinal analysis of Rule 
2.1, assisting future lawyers, judges, and scholars seeking to use and/or analyze this Rule.56 As 
such, it was necessary to analyze the cases as scientifically as possible to determine “leading” 
cases.57 It must be recognized that “objectively” determining how a legal rule works in practice 
through case law is, to a certain extent, an impossible exercise.58 But textbooks and articles can 
still be very useful to practitioners and scholars.59 In this respect, this section of this chapter not 
only “sets the stage” for the subsequent analysis of the Rule’s utility as an access to justice 
mechanism, but is also useful in and of itself. 
 
52  O Reg 258/98. 
53  O Reg 44/14, s 11(3). 
54  See, e.g., Lorian Hardcastle, “Recovering Damages Against Government Defendants: Trends in Canadian 
Jurisprudence” (2015) 69 SCLR (2d) 77 at 83-84. 
55  Capital One Bank (Canada Branch) v Ramirez-Rodriguez, 2017 ONSC 3536, [2017] OJ No 2917 (Div Ct). 
56  The utility of this endeavour was noted by Justice David Stratas in “The Decline of Legal Doctrine” (Keynote 
Address Delivered at the Canadian Constitution Foundation Law & Freedom Conference, Hart House, 
University of Toronto, 8 January 2016), online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxTqMw5v6rg>; David 
Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: Some Doctrine and Cases,” March 26, 2018, online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924049>. 
57  See, e.g., Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research” (2012) 17(1) Deakin L Rev 83 at 110. 
58  Ibid at 84, drawing on Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr, “The Path of Law” (1897) 10(8) Harvard L Rev 457 at 465-
466. I am bringing my biases, as are the judges who have used and will use the Rule – much of the Critical 
Legal Studies movement, and related feminist and critical race critiques of law, are based on observations such 
as these: see, e.g. Patricia J Williams, “The Pain of Word Bondage” in The Alchemy of Pain and Rights 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), c 8.  
59  Supra note 56. 
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A. The Mechanics 
Rule 2.1.01 provides (omitting references to forms and regulations): 
(1) The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the 
proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse 
of the process of the court. 
 
Summary Procedure 
 
(2) The court may make a determination under subrule (1) in a summary manner, 
subject to the procedures set out in this rule.  
 
(3) Unless the court orders otherwise, an order under subrule (1) shall be made on 
the basis of written submissions, if any, in accordance with the following 
procedures: 
1. The court shall direct the registrar to give notice […] to the plaintiff or applicant, 
as the case may be, that the court is considering making the order. 
2. The plaintiff or applicant may, within 15 days after receiving the notice, file with 
the court a written submission, no more than 10 pages in length, responding to the 
notice. 
3. If the plaintiff or applicant does not file a written submission that complies with 
paragraph 2, the court may make the order without any further notice to the plaintiff 
or applicant or to any other party. […] 
 
Request for Order 
 
(6) Any party to the proceeding may file with the registrar a written request for an 
order under subrule (1).  
 
Notification of Court by Registrar 
 
(7) If the registrar becomes aware that a proceeding could be the subject of an order 
under subrule (1), the registrar shall notify the court. 
 
Rule 2.1.02 prescribes a similar procedure for a frivolous, vexatious, and/or abusive motion. 
The Rule’s language contemplates that “unless the court orders otherwise”, determinations 
under it are to be made on the basis of written submissions, after notice. In 13 cases, a judge has 
dispensed with the notice requirement and dismissed the motion or proceeding without notice. 
These rare instances are returned to below. In almost all other cases, the judge will either issue 
notice that he or she is considering using Rule 2.1 or decline to do so. The cases where notice was 
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neither issued nor a decision made declining to do so are three cases where Rule 2.1 was raised by 
a party in the context of a broader motion.60  
Generally speaking, a judge becomes aware of a potentially abusive proceeding after being 
informed by the other side or having it otherwise come to their attention through a step in a 
proceeding. The judge then decides whether to order notice to the party that the Court is 
considering dismissing his or her action. The party is then permitted to respond as to why the 
action should not be dismissed. After receiving those submissions (or not receiving them61), the 
judge will decide whether to dismiss the action. 
Appeals of dismissals of actions under Rule 2.1 proceed to the Divisional Court or Court of 
Appeal as per normal appellate practice.62 Decisions not to use Rule 2.1 are presumably 
interlocutory matters where leave to appeal to the Divisional Court would be required.63 However, 
no decision to not use Rule 2.1 appears to have been appealed. The Court of Appeal has prescribed 
particular procedural steps to be followed if a party wishes to employ the Rule in that Court.64 
B. No Evidence or Legal Argument 
No evidence is permitted in Rule 2.1 considerations65 as formal motions under Rule 20 allow 
for – very brief, if appropriate – dispositive evidence.66 Legal submissions are generally forbidden 
 
60  Nguyen v Economical Mutual Insurance Co, 2015 ONSC 2646, 49 CCLI (5th) 144 (SCJ) [“Nguyen v 
Economical”]; Fine v Botelho, 2015 ONSC 6284, [2015] OJ No 5321 (SCJ) [“Fine”]; Caliciuri v Matthias, 
2017 ONSC 748, [2017] OJ No 547 (SCJ) [“Caliciuri”]. 
61  This happens not infrequently: see, e.g., Strang v Ontario, 2017 ONSC 1625, [2017] OJ No 1297 (SCJ); Reyes 
v KL, 2017 ONSC 2304, [2017] OJ No 2195 (SCJ) [“Reyes v KL”]. 
62  CJA, supra note 9, ss 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c); John Sopinka & Mark A Gelowitz, The Conduct of an Appeal, 3d 
ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2012) at § 5.1-5.2.  
63  CJA, ibid, s 19(1)(b); Sopinka & Gelowitz, ibid at § 5.46. 
64  Simpson v The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, 5 CPC (8th) 280 
[“Simpson”] at paras 45-46. 
65  Ibid at paras 10-12. 
66  Of course, submissions and evidence under Rule 20 are frequently not brief (in Hryniak itself, they were 
extensive) but there is nothing inherent about the Rules mandating needless detail, with the principle of 
proportionality suggesting that brevity can be – and in certain cases, should be – appropriate. 
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as well. Though the Rule’s language contemplates responding submissions in certain 
circumstances, in practice, judges almost never ask for them.  
One exception and one caveat have nonetheless emerged to this general prohibition on legal 
submissions or evidence when applying Rule 2.1. The exception is when the responding party’s 
reason for submitting that the action is abusive and/or vexatious is because the issues have been 
finally determined in another proceeding.67 The soundness of this “attempt to re-litigate” exception 
is discussed in Part V.A.2, below.  
The caveat is when the judge deems it appropriate to ask the responding party for submissions 
due to concern that there may be a serious issue that warrants attention, albeit in another forum. 
For example, in one case, the plaintiff alleged that his child had been kidnapped. Myers J noted 
that the pleading left no doubt about the abusiveness of the proceeding, including racist attacks 
upon an obstetrician, as well as the inappropriateness of the civil courts to address any legitimate 
concern. He still sought submissions from the defendant’s counsel, as an officer of the court, in 
case “something horrible was indeed happening”68 that would require a prompt response, such as 
from the police or child protection authorities. The defendant’s counsel submitted that the child 
had been taken into protective custody, allowing Myers J to give directions to the plaintiff on how 
to challenge such a decision. This is appropriate to prevent an injustice, but should have no bearing 
on the decision to use Rule 2.1, but rather simply give guidance to the plaintiff. 
C. The Test to Use the Rule 
In deciding whether to order notice, two factors have emerged as relevant. First, when read 
extremely generously, no cause of action should be discernible. Second, there should be something 
 
67  See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 64. 
68  Kadiri v Harikumar, 2015 ONSC 4894, [2015] OJ No 4103 (SCJ) [“Kadiri”] at para 7. 
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emerging from the pleadings that suggests the extremely attenuated process is appropriate – largely 
because of a fear that the litigant will act vexatiously. Myers J originally proposed these two 
criteria,69 and the Court of Appeal endorsed them in Scaduto v Law Society of Upper Canada.70  
1. “On Its Face” Being Frivolous, Vexatious, and/or Abusive 
How can one say that a pleading “on its face” appears abusive? Perhaps the most common 
phrase is that it is for “the clearest of cases” that cannot possibly succeed,71 also described as 
“usually obvious”72 and “not for close calls.”73 Summarizing this area of law, Trimble J held that 
a claim must be “so clearly frivolous as to make a motion under another Rule, on evidence and 
proper formal notice, a waste of time, money, and resources for the parties and the public.”74 
Upon reading the pleadings and any submissions, a judge must look for any cause of action, 
even one buried in an otherwise abusive pleading. Myers J wrote the following in Gao #2: 
It should be borne in mind however, that even a vexatious litigant can have a 
legitimate complaint. […] Care should be taken to allow generously for drafting 
deficiencies and recognizing that there may be a core complaint which is quite 
properly recognized as legitimate75 
 
The Court of Appeal has asked parties to consider whether summary judgment or pleadings 
motions are preferable to uses of Rule 2.1.76 Even so, Rule 2.1 has been enacted for a reason and 
 
69  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 9. 
70  2015 ONCA 733, 343 OAC 87 at para 12, leave to appeal ref’d, [2015] SCCA No 488, 2016 CarswellOnt 
21905 [“Scaduto”]. 
71  Scaduto, ibid at para 8. 
72  Asghar v Alon, 2015 ONSC 7823, [2015] OJ No 6573 (SCJ) [“Asghar v Alon”] at para 4. 
73  Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6100, 37 CLR (4th) 1 (SCJ) at para 9. 
74  Beatty v Office of the Children’s Lawyer, 2016 ONSC 3816, [2016] OJ No 3024 (SCJ) [“Beatty”] at para 13. 
75  Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, 31 CPC (7th) 153 (SCJ) [“Gao #2”] 
at para 18. 
76  Khan, supra note 47 at para 12. 
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should be applied “robustly” when appropriate77 or “to its fullest extent, if applicable.”78 While 
generous and broad readings of pleadings are warranted, “tortured” readings are not.79 
2. Hallmarks of Abusiveness 
Rules 20, 21, and 25.11 all allow for summary determination of claims that can clearly be 
shown to have no merit. As such, something more is generally required to employ Rule 2.1. This 
accords with the Rule being designed to address instances where a “proposed cure” (i.e, a 
dispositive motion) would “cause[] a fresh outbreak of the disease.”80 Essentially, there should be 
something in the impugned pleading or other document that suggests a party will conduct the 
litigation vexatiously. Myers J has suggested that the following are helpful indicia that a claim 
may be (but is not necessarily) likely to be abusively litigated:81 
• Curious formatting 
• Many, many pages 
• Odd or irrelevant attachments—e.g., copies of letters from others and 
legal decisions, UN Charter on Human Rights, all usually, extensively annotated. 
• Multiple methods of emphasis including: highlighting (various colours), 
underlining, capitalization. 
• Repeated use of ‘‘ ’’, ???, !!! 
• Numerous foot and marginal notes. […] 
• Rambling discourse characterized by repetition and a pedantic failure to clarify. 
• Rhetorical questions. 
• Repeated misuse of legal, medical and other technical terms. 
• Referring to self in the third person. 
• Inappropriately ingratiating statement. 
• Ultimatums. 
• Threats of violence to self or others[,] directed at individuals or organizations. 
 
While these are helpful indicia in determining whether it is appropriate to allow a responding 
party to short-circuit the traditional motions and need for evidence and/or legal argument, as 
 
77  Scaduto, supra note 70 at para 8. 
78  Beatty, supra note 74 at para 15. 
79  Ibid at para 19. 
80  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 8. 
81  Gao #2, supra note 75 at para 15. 
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discussed in the next section, this is not strictly necessary.82 Moreover, as discussed below, they 
do not indicate, in and of themselves, that the plaintiff does not have a viable cause of action or 
that resort to Rule 2.1 is appropriate. 
3. Two Non-Determinative Criteria? 
A claim sufficiently devoid of merit can still be dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1 even in the 
absence of indicia that a plaintiff will behave vexatiously.83 This is understandable. If the action is 
manifestly devoid of merit – such as a claim based upon the plaintiff’s being upset that lifeguards 
allegedly chastised him for swimming too slowly in the fast lane of a pool84 – the proportionality 
principle cautions against further resources being expended. The second criterion is therefore a 
helpful guide that Rule 2.1 is appropriate, but judges retain discretion to use the Rule regardless. 
The reverse does not hold. Two decisions of Myers J illustrate why the second criterion is not 
a standalone basis to use Rule 2.1. In the first, a statement of claim alleged medical malpractice in 
a manner that was not obviously implausible. However, it was 400 pages long, and lacked a 
coherent narrative. When notice was ordered under Rule 2.1, the plaintiff began by explaining 
himself before insulting Myers J: “what started as a perfectly acceptable explanation quickly 
became a vexatious rant.”85 Rather than dismiss the claim pursuant to Rule 2.1, Myers J struck it 
pursuant to Rule 25.11, but permitted the plaintiff to submit a revised pleading. He also advised 
the plaintiff to obtain legal advice and informed him of a resource on how to draft pleadings.86 
In the second, Myers J had similarly ordered a revised pleading be submitted. After the 
plaintiff submitted such a revised pleading, the defendant again sought to use Rule 2.1. Myers J 
 
82  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 9. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Asghar v Toronto (City), 2015 ONSC 4650, 42 MPLR (5th) 138 (SCJ). 
85  Rallis v Scarborough Hospital, 2016 ONSC 2263, [2016] OJ No 1773 (SCJ) [“Rallis”] at para 3. 
86  Ibid at para 5. 
92 
 
 
declined to do so, but nonetheless noted that the Court should watch how the case unfolded. In 
doing so, he explained the nature between the two Rule 2.1 criteria: 
In most Rule 2.1 cases the frivolous nature of the claim is clear and the real question 
is whether a motion to strike or to dismiss should be heard in court in the usual way 
or whether the motion should be dealt with under the attenuated process of Rule 
2.1. Here, the issues are reversed. There is reason to fear that the plaintiff may have 
difficulty following the process of the court and his pleading does bear some 
hallmarks of a querulent litigant. However, in my view, as he may well have a cause 
of action, [he] should have his day in court.87 
 
Though the defendants could quite understandably be concerned by how the plaintiffs in these 
two cases conducted themselves, given the interest in permitting even vexatious parties to have a 
day in court if they have a legitimate grievance, it would seem appropriate to not treat signs of 
abusiveness as a reason to use Rule 2.1, unless there truly is no viable cause of action. 
4. Dismissal Without Notice 
Rule 2.1’s language contemplates that a court may depart from the requirement that notice be 
given to an affected party. And in thirteen cases, the notice requirement has been dispensed with. 
These rare instances fall into four categories: 
1. Five proceedings commenced in violation of vexatious litigant orders;88 
2. Four cases where the relief sought was not available in the court where the proceeding 
was commenced (i.e., the Divisional Court when the Divisional Court could not provide 
the relief, or the Superior Court when an appeal was necessary);89 
 
87  Asghar v Alon, supra note 72 at para 5. 
88  Park v Short, 2015 ONSC 1292, [2015] OJ No 926 (SCJ); Park v Crossgate Legal Services, 2016 ONSC 4864, 
[2016] OJ No 4021 (SCJ); Reyes v Buhler, 2016 ONSC 5559, [2016] OJ No 4635 (SCJ) [“Reyes v Buhler”]; 
Reyes v Jocelyn, 2016 ONSC 5568, [2016] OJ No 4642 (SCJ) [“Reyes v Jocelyn”]; Reyes v Embry, 2016 
ONSC 5558, [2016] OJ No 4636 (SCJ) [“Reyes v Embry”]. 
89  Coady v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONSC 7543, [2016] OJ No 6194 (Div Ct); Lin v Fluery, 2017 
ONSC 3601, 2017 CarswellOnt 8926 (Div Ct), aff’d 2017 ONCA 695, 2017 CarswellOnt 13756 [“Lin v 
Fluery”]; Khan v 1806700 Ontario Inc, 2017 ONSC 3726, 2017 CarswellOnt 9122 (Div Ct); Lin v Rock, supra 
note 2. 
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3. Three attempts to re-litigate, one of which was brazenly acknowledged as such,90 with 
the other two being plaintiffs attempting to re-litigate matters already dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 2.1;91 and 
4. A claim based on the allegation “that the military has implanted brainwashing devices in 
[the plaintiff and] hospital staff threw bugs on him […] so he could be interrogated”.92 
There are obvious natural justice concerns with dismissing a proceeding without giving a party 
an opportunity to be heard. This is codified in the common law procedural fairness principle audi 
alteram partem.93 Hearings are important not only to ensure that justice be seen to be done, but 
also because it is likely to lead to better decision-making.94 
Having said that, procedural fairness is a flexible concept. And in the case of Rule 2.1, all but 
the last case where a claim was dismissed without giving the plaintiff any opportunity to be heard 
outside his or her pleadings involved litigants who either: a) already had an opportunity to be heard 
and then proceeded to manifestly abuse the court system; or b) needed to be directed to another 
forum. As such, the opportunity to be heard was fulfilled. In the last case, Myers J reminded 
 
90  D’Orazio v Ontario (Attorney General), 2016 ONSC 4893, [2016] OJ No 4031 (SCJ) [“D’Orazio”]. 
91  Lee v Future Bakery Ltd, 2016 ONSC 1764, [2016] OJ No 1266 (SCJ) [“Lee v Future”]; Nguyen v Bail, 2016 
ONSC 2365, [2016] OJ No 1840 (SCJ). 
92  Shafirovitch v Scarborough Hospital, 2015 ONSC 7627, 85 CPC (7th) 149 (SCJ) [“Shafirovitch”]. 
93  The Hon Louis LeBel, “Notes for an Address: Reflections on Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness in 
Canadian Administrative Law” (February 2013) 26 Can J Admin L & Prac 51 at 53, based upon a presentation 
to the Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia Administrative Law Conference 2012 in 
Vancouver, British Columbia on October 26, 2012. While this specifically concerns administrative law, this 
principle applies to civil litigation as well: e.g., Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner v Mosher, 2015 
ONCA 772, 340 OAC 311 at paras 60-63. 
94  Jonathan Haidt, “Moral Psychology and the Law: How Intuitions Drive Reasoning, Judgment, and the Search 
for Evidence” (2013) 64:4 Ala L Rev 867 at 873, building on his work in Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012); Justice Peter 
Lauwers, “Reflections on Charter Values” (Keynote Address Delivered at the Runnymede Society Law & 
Freedom Conference, Hart House, University of Toronto, 12 January 2018), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5WTRCO-u9U> at ~18:00-18:20; The Honourable Justice Peter 
Lauwers, “What Could Go Wrong with Charter Values” (2019) 91 SCLR (2d) 1. 
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himself of the Court’s duty towards self-represented litigants, and also noted that “there is perhaps 
a salutary effect to allow the litigant an opportunity to be heard”.95 But he then concluded:  
I will not be disrespectful to the plaintiff by treating him with anything less than 
full candour. If the plaintiff believes that the military has implanted brainwashing 
devices in him and […] hospital staff threw bugs on him to force itching so he 
could be interrogated, he needs assistance that a court cannot provide. The plaintiff 
may wish to consult with the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee96 
 
This dilemma about dispensing with the notice requirement is discussed below in Part V.A.  
The Court of Appeal reviewed the adequacy of notice in the court below in Van Sluytman v 
Muskoka.97 It took a substantive rather than formalistic approach to notice, noting that the appellant 
had clearly received formal notice in many of the eight actions he had commenced. Even if formal 
notice had not been sent in all, the Court was amply satisfied that no injustice had occurred as the 
purpose of notice – the right to be heard – was satisfied. The Court of Appeal also considered the 
notice requirement in Okel v Misheal, where it held that the form of notice could be flexible, as 
long as the party’s right to be heard was fulfilled.98 
5. Types of Cases Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 2.1 
It is fair to say that in the vast majority of successful uses of the Rule, the lack of a cause of 
action is obvious. In Gao #2, Myers J suggested seven attributes – six of them recognized as 
characteristics of vexatious litigants in case law under s 140 of the CJA – that would likely be 
apparent in cases where Rule 2.1 is employed.99 Three years into the Rule’s history, many of these 
anticipated characteristics do describe multiple cases where Rule 2.1 was used to dismiss a claim: 
 
95  Shafirovitch, supra note 92 at para 3. 
96  Ibid at para 5. 
97  Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), 2018 ONCA 32, 2018 CarswellOnt 301, leave to appeal 
denied, [2018] SCCA No 206, 2018 CarswellOnt 18335 [“Van Sluytman”]. 
98  2014 ONCA 699, [2014] OJ No 4842 [“Okel”] at para 10.  
99  Supra note 75 at paras 14, 16. 
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• “Bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine an issue that has already been 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction”;100 
• “Persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals”;101 
• “Rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings to repeat and supplement 
them in later proceedings including bringing proceedings against counsel who have acted 
for or against them in earlier proceedings”102 – this extended to suing Myers J after he 
dismissed a plaintiff’s case;103 
•  “OPCA”104 litigants who frequently assert that neither statutory nor common law applies 
to them;105 and 
•  “bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief 
sought”,106 with examples of this including: 
o A claim alleging a conspiracy to falsely implicate the plaintiff as a terrorist, conduct 
human experiments, and take over Africa, with Toronto-chambered judges of the 
Superior Court being part of this conspiracy;107 
o An attempt to have the United States pay approximately $510 Billion American 
dollars in redemption of “bank bonds” that were obviously fake;108 and 
o A request that Ontario provide the plaintiff with a job and fix his love life.109 
 
100  Ibid at para 14(a), exemplified in, e.g., Hurontario Travel Centre v Ontario (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 
4246, [2015] OJ No 3469 (SCJ). 
101  Gao #2, supra note 75 at para 14(c), exemplified in, e.g., El Zayat v Hausler, 2016 ONSC 6099, [2016] OJ No 
4984 (Div Ct). 
102  Gao #2, ibid at para 14(b). 
103  Raji v Myers, 2015 ONSC 4066, 75 CPC (7th) 115 (SCJ) [“Raji v Myers”]. 
104  “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument”: see Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 74 Alta LR (5th) 1. 
105  Gao #2, supra note 75 at para 16, exemplified in, e.g., Ali v Ford, 2014 ONSC 6665, [2014] OJ No 5426 
(SCJ). 
106  Gao #2, ibid at para 14(f). 
107  Raji v Myers, supra note 103. 
108  Zeleny v Canada, 2016 ONSC 7226, [2016] OJ No 6101 (SCJ). 
109  Asghar v Ontario, supra note 1. 
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These are cases where Rule 2.1 was used to dismiss an action after notice, giving litigants the 
opportunity to explain themselves. The Rule indeed seems to be being applied to clear cases. 
6. Types of Cases Where Notice is Not Ordered 
There are rare cases where a defendant’s proposed use of Rule 2.1 has been obviously 
inappropriate, attempting to bring in the merits through lengthy submissions110 or simply lacking 
any facial reason to believe the claim or motion is abusive.111 This has resulted in admonishments 
from the bench.112 More frequently, however, notice is not ordered when the claim appears badly 
drafted,113 excessively simple,114 or likely to elicit a very strong defence,115 but where a plausible 
cause of action is nonetheless discernible. Another common example where notice is not ordered 
despite a judge’s suspicions is where there is an allegation that the claim is an attempt to re-litigate, 
but this is not obvious.116 At other times, a plaintiff’s actions appear tactically suspicious, but are 
not facially illegitimate or incompatible with a cause of action. The best example of this would be 
a late-breaking attempt by a defendant to bring a third party claim against the plaintiff’s lawyer.117 
There are good reasons to be apprehensive of such litigation tactics that may have an improper 
motive – but they are not necessarily incompatible with a legitimate cause of action, and Rule 2.1 
is not the mechanism to address them. 
 
110  E.g., Covenoho v Ceridian Canada, 2015 ONSC 2468, [2015] OJ No 1889 (SCJ); Kyriakopoulos v Lafontaine, 
2015 ONSC 6067, [2015] OJ No 5029 (SCJ) [“Kyriakopoulos”]; Ramsarran v Assaly Asset Management Corp, 
2017 ONSC 2394, [2017] OJ No 1937 (SCJ) [“Ramsarran”]; Carby-Samuels v Carby-Samuels, 2017 ONSC 
2911, [2017] OJ No 2406 (SCJ). 
111  E.g., MacLeod v Hanrahan Youth Services, 2015 ONSC 8018, [2015] OJ No 6771 (SCJ) [“Hanrahan”]. 
112  Kyriakopoulos, supra note 110; Hanrahan, ibid. 
113  Posadas v Khan, 2015 ONSC 4077, 75 CPC (7th) 118 (SCJ) [“Posadas”]; Carby-Samuels v Carby-Samuels, 
2016 ONSC 4974, [2016] OJ No 4188 (SCJ); 2222028 Ontario Inc v Adams, 2017 ONSC 690, [2017] OJ No 
565 (SCJ) [“Adams”]. 
114  Ghasempoor v DSM Leasing Ltd, 2015 ONSC 7628, [2015] OJ No 6422 (SCJ). 
115  Polanski v Scharfe, 2016 ONSC 4892, [2016] OJ No 4039 (SCJ). 
116  Bisumbule v Conway, 2016 ONSC 6138, [2016] OJ No 5209 (SCJ); Troncanada & Associates v B2Gold Corp, 
2016 ONSC 6271, [2016] OJ No 5190 (SCJ); Volynansky v Ontario (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 1692, 
[2017] OJ No 1330 (Div Ct). 
117  Charendoff v McLennan, 2015 ONSC 6883, [2015] OJ No 6469 (SCJ) [“Charendoff”]. 
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D. Family Law 
Having considered Rule 2.1 in the context of civil litigation, I now turn to the extent to which 
it or an equivalent approach applies in the family law context. In Frick v Frick,118 the Court of 
Appeal cautioned against bringing the Rule into the family law context through Rule 1(8.2) of the 
Family Law Rules, which reads that a “court may strike out all or part of any document that may 
delay or make it difficult to have a fair trial or that is inflammatory, a waste of time, a nuisance or 
an abuse of the court process”. 119 Though family and civil litigation have much in common 
regarding access to justice issues, there are important distinguishing aspects.120 Moreover, the 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not generally directly apply in the family law context. In Court of 
Appeal family law appeals, however, where the Rules of Civil Procedure do apply,121 the Court of 
Appeal has used Rule 2.1.122 It has also been used in the Superior Court family law context when 
the plaintiff was subject to a vexatious litigant order.123 
IV) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE LAW 
A. Overall Numbers, Courts, and Success Rates 
There were 190 reported cases indicating requests to use Rule 2.1 (whether by a judge, 
registrar, or responding party) between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2017, an average of 63 per year. 
This compares to approximately 9,130 reported Superior Court/Divisional Court/Court of Appeal 
decisions per year.124 Many of the 190 Rule 2.1 decisions also have reported decisions for notice, 
 
118  2016 ONCA 799, 132 OR (3d) 321 [“Frick”]. 
119  O Reg 114/99 [“Family Law Rules”]. 
120  Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 
[“Farrow Book”] at 71, fn 86; Mary-Jo Maur, Nicholas Bala & Alexandra Terrana, “Costs and the Changing 
Culture of Canadian Family Justice” (February 6, 2017) Queen’s University Legal Research Paper No 087, 
online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919492>. 
121  Family Law Rules, supra note 119, Rule 38.  
122  Okel, supra note 98. 
123  Hawkins v Schlosser, 2015 ONSC 646, [2015] OJ No 372 (SCJ). 
124  Based on February 28, 2018 Westlaw searches, Sidhu v Knight, 2016 ONSC 8166, 2016 CarswellOnt 21037 
(SCJ) appears to be the 2016 Divisional Court/Superior Court case with the “highest” number in its neutral 
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disposition, and/or costs. The total numbers per year also include criminal and family cases, as 
well as cases that have multiple reported decisions per year. As such, it would appear that well 
over 1% (likely much higher) of decided civil cases per year involve Rule 2.1. While far from the 
norm, this is not a trivial number. Dozens of cases a year is in any event not a small number in and 
of itself, being well over double numbers for other procedural matters such as jurisdictional 
disputes.125 In the absence of Rule 2.1, one can only imagine what sort of mischief – ranging from 
wasted court time to unprincipled settlements – these cases would have caused. 
In 162 of these 190 cases, the first use of Rule 2.1 was in the Superior Court, in 21 it was in 
the Divisional Court, and in 7 it was in the Court of Appeal. The chart below illustrates whether 
the request to dismiss a proceeding, or step therein, was granted, dismissed, or subject to another 
remedy, depending on the court in which the use of the Rule originated: 
TABLE 2A: OVERALL RESULTS OF RULE 2.1 CASES 
Disposition Number of 
Cases 
 
Superior 
Court 
Divisional 
Court 
Court of 
Appeal 
Granted 136 111 19 6 
 After Notice 121 99 16 6 
 Unclear About Notice 2 2 0 0 
 Without Notice 13 10 3 0 
Partially Granted 2 1 0 1 
Notice Ordered of Dismissal Being 
Considered but Final Disposition 
Not Reported 
 
13 13 0 0 
 
citation, while DeMarco v Nicoletti Estate and Daboll, 2015 ONSC 8155, 2015 CarswellOnt 21018 (SCJ) 
appears to be the 2015 case with the “highest” number in its neutral citation. Based on a February 27, 2018 
Westlaw search, JPB v CB, 2016 ONCA 996, 2016 CarswellOnt 21847 appears to be the 2016 Court of Appeal 
decision with the “highest” number in its neutral citation, while Reischer, Re, 2015 ONCA 929, 344 OAC 132 
appears to be the 2015 Court of Appeal decision with the “highest” number in its neutral citation. 
125  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 48. 
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Disposition Number of 
Cases 
 
Superior 
Court 
Divisional 
Court 
Court of 
Appeal 
New Pleading Ordered 1 1 0 0 
Resolved After Claim Partially 
Withdrawn 
 
1 1 0 0 
Dismissed 37 35 2 0 
 No Notice Ordered 27 26 1 0 
 After Notice  4 3 1 0 
 In Context of Broader 
Motion 
3 3 0 0 
 After Amended 
Pleading Served 
1 1 0 0 
 After Appeal 2 2 0 0 
Total 190 162 21 7 
 
In 136 of 177 decisions where the result is known – over 75% of cases – Rule 2.1 was used to 
dismiss the action, or step therein. In four additional cases, the proceeding was partially 
dismissed,126 a new pleading was ordered,127 or the matter was resolved.128 That leaves 37 of 177 
cases – 20.9% – where the attempted use was unsuccessful. This is an approximately four-to-one 
ratio of successful to unsuccessful uses. It is worth noting that in 27 of the 37 unsuccessful uses, 
notice was not ordered, and in an additional three, the Rule was only raised in the context of a 
broader motion, implying that little costs or delay resulted from the use of Rule 2.1 per se. 
B. Origin: Responding Party, Judge, or Registrar 
In 119 of the 190 cases, it appears clear or implicit that the responding party requested the use 
of Rule 2.1. In 14 cases, a judge appears to have raised the issue on his or her own initiative. In 
 
126  Reyes v Esbin, 2016 ONSC 254, [2016] OJ No 97 (SCJ) [“Reyes v Esbin”]; Collins v Ontario, 2017 ONCA 
317, [2017] OJ No 1982. 
127  Rallis, supra note 85. 
128  Clarke v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2015 ONSC 2564, 2015 CarswellOnt 5611 (SCJ). 
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three, the registrar appears to have prompted the use of the Rule. In 54 cases, it was unclear how 
the matter came before the court. This could be suggestive that registrars and judges are being 
insufficiently proactive in using Rule 2.1. After all, the Rule’s language suggests that a court is to 
use it “on its own initiative”.129 A suggestion on how the registrars and judges could be more 
proactive is given below. However, in every case where the court (whether by judge or registrar) 
prompted the use of the Rule, its use was successful. This minimization of inappropriate uses of 
the Rule is unquestionably positive from an access to justice perspective. 
C. Number of Appeals 
In 175 of the 190 cases – that is, over 90% – there was no reported appellate decision 
reviewing the decision whether to use Rule 2.1. Insofar as there were no substantive injustices in 
these cases, this low rate of appeals appears positive. In all of the other fifteen cases, the appeal 
arose from a dismissal of the action. In thirteen of those cases, the lower court result was affirmed. 
Five of these decisions led to unsuccessful leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada.130  
Only two cases had successful appeals. One was Frick, where the trial judge sought to import 
Rule 2.1 jurisprudence into family law litigation.131 The case’s delay and costs were unfortunate 
for the parties, but the Court of Appeal reached largely the same result as the trial judge, albeit by 
a different rationale. Moreover, it was valuable to clarify Rule 2.1’s applicability in family law.132 
The negative access to justice consequences of the use of Rule 2.1 in Frick are thus minimal. 
 
129  Rule 2.1.01(7). 
130  Lin v Springboard, 2016 ONCA 787, [2016] OJ No 6072, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] SCCA No 562, 2017 
CarswellOnt 2700; Lin v ICBC Vancouver Head Office, 2016 ONSC 3934, [2016] OJ No 3223 (Div Ct), aff’d 
2016 ONCA 788, [2016] OJ 6071, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] SCCA No 561, 2017 CarswellOnt 807 [“Lin v 
ICBC”]; Ibrahim v Toronto Transit Commission, 2016 ONCA 234, [2016] OJ No 1631, leave to appeal ref’d, 
[2016] SCCA No 231, 2016 CarswellOnt 15338; Scaduto, supra note 70; Van Sluytman, supra note 97, which 
consolidated several different Superior Court decisions, as seen in Appendix D. 
131  Supra Part III.D. 
132  Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235. 
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That leaves only one case (less than 1% of the total) where a civil action was dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 2.1 but this was overturned on appeal. Khan v Krylov & Company LLP133 is a 
cautionary tale about judges becoming overzealous in using Rule 2.1. The case concerned an 
allegation that the defendants, the plaintiff’s lawyers in a personal injury case, forged his signature 
on a settlement, misappropriated settlement funds, and did not properly explain the settlement to 
him. While serious allegations that would likely elicit a strong defence, the appellate judges noted 
that the facts as pled gave rise to a cause of action, and they also saw no signs that the plaintiff 
would act vexatiously in the litigation. Though noting that the statement of claim was short, and 
implying that some sort of summary procedure may be appropriate to resolve it, the Court of 
Appeal held that: “Once a pleading asserts a cause of action and does not bear the hallmarks of 
frivolous, vexatious or abusive litigation, resort to rule 2.1 is not appropriate as a means for 
bringing the action to an early end. The motion judge erred in truncating the normal process.”134 
Though concerning, Khan is an outlier in terms of cases where the use of Rule 2.1 was granted. 
Rather, it bears similarity to cases where Myers J or Beaudoin J did not order notice pursuant to 
Rule 2.1.135 It also gave the Court of Appeal an opportunity to remind judges to be careful when 
using Rule 2.1. It is suggested, therefore, that this single instance of the Court of Appeal needing 
to correct an overzealous Superior Court judge does not detract, in and of itself, from Rule 2.1’s 
effectiveness. 
D. Costs 
The ability to accurately calculate the costs incurred as a result of uses of Rule 2.1 is limited. 
This is because in 134 of the 190 cases, costs are unclear, usually because the decision is silent on 
 
133  Khan, supra note 47. 
134  Ibid at para 14. 
135  See Part III.C.6. 
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the issue,136 the matter was referred to an assessment officer,137 or submissions were called for138 
but the matter may have been settled.139 In some cases, it is clear that costs were to be assessed on 
a partial,140 substantial,141 or even full142 indemnity basis, but the quantum remains unclear. 
Moreover, 43 cases had no costs ordered. This is not surprising, given that defendants likely 
incurred minimal costs, Rule 2.1 is novel law,143 and there is good reason to suspect that several 
plaintiffs against whom the Rule is used are mentally ill and it would be unjust to make a costs 
order against them.144 An additional case had no costs ordered against some defendants while the 
costs against the others are unclear.145 One case seems inapposite because the costs award was 
clearly related to issues other than the unsuccessful attempt to invoke Rule 2.1.146 This comes to a 
total of 179 out of 190 cases shedding no real light on the costs actually incurred.  
However, the eleven cases with reported costs (also appearing at Appendix E) are nonetheless 
interesting:  
  
 
136  E.g., Stefanizzi v Ontario (Landlord and Tenant Board), 2015 ONSC 859, [2015] OJ No 562 (SCJ). 
137  E.g., Lee v Future, supra note 91 at para 6. 
138  E.g., Markowa v Adamson Facial Cosmetic Surgery Inc, 2014 ONSC 6664, [2014] OJ No 5430 (SCJ). 
139  A phenomenon discussed in, e.g., Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 48. 
140  E.g., D’Orazio, supra note 90. 
141  E.g., Kadiri, supra note 68. 
142  E.g., Reyes v Buhler, supra note 88. 
143  A classic reason not to order costs: Pal v Powell (2009), 247 OAC 205 (Div Ct) [“Pal”] at paras 18-19, 22. 
144  Shafirovitch, supra note 92; the unwellness of a party can be a reason not to order costs: Pal, ibid at paras 21-
22. 
145  Goralczyk #1, supra note 51 compared to Goralczyk v Beer Store, 2016 ONSC 4416, [2016] OJ No 3597 
(SCJ). 
146  Fine, supra note 60. 
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TABLE 2B: COSTS ORDERS IN RULE 2.1 CASES 
 Case Name First Instance Costs Appeal Costs 
 
1.  Hawkins v Schlosser147 $1,148.02 None 
 
2.  Nguyen v Economical Mutual Insurance 
Co148 
 
$2,000 None 
3.  Obermuller v Kenfinch Co-Operative 
Housing Inc149 
 
Unclear $2,000 
4.  Chalupnicek v The Children’s Aid Society 
of Ottawa150 
 
None $17,684.83 (full 
indemnity) 
5.  Marleau v Brockville (City)151 $5,500 None 
 
6.  Jarvis v Morlog152 $2,256.39 
(substantial 
indemnity) 
 
None 
7.  Irmya v Mijovick153 $30,187.78 (full 
indemnity, three 
defendants) 
 
None 
8.  Khan v Krylov & Company LLP154 $2,000 
 
$3,000 
9.  Gates v Humane Society of Canada for the 
Protection of Animals and the 
Environment (cob The Humane Society of 
Canada)155 
 
$8,000 None 
10.  Son v Khan156 $2,611.93 
 
None 
11.  Hoang v Mann Engineering Ltd157 $1,500 
 
None 
 
 
147  2015 ONSC 1691, [2015] OJ No 1346 (SCJ). 
148  Nguyen v Economical, supra note 60. 
149  2015 ONSC 6800, [2015] OJ No 5743 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 ONCA 330, [2016] OJ No 2362. 
150  Chalupnicek, v Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa, 2017 ONSC 1278, 2017 CarswellOnt 272 (Div Ct) 
[“Chalupnicek”]. 
151  2016 ONSC 5901, [2016] OJ No 4961 (SCJ). 
152  2016 ONSC 5061, 2016 CarswellOnt 1269 (SCJ). 
153  2016 ONSC 5276, [2016] OJ No 4372 (SCJ). 
154  Khan, supra note 47. 
155  2016 ONSC 6051, [2016] OJ No 4957 (Div Ct). 
156  2016 ONSC 7621, [2016] OJ No 6283 (Div Ct). 
157  Hoang v Mann Engineering Ltd, 2015 ONCA 838, [2015] OJ No 6316 [“Hoang”]. 
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The average size of the nine first instance costs awards is $6,133.79. But Irmya v Mijovick is 
an extreme outlier, nearly four times the quantum of the next highest award. The average excluding 
that case is $3,127.04, which is still higher than the median of $2,256.39. The average of the three 
appellate costs awards is $8,561. Again, however, there is an extreme outlier in Chalupnicek, 
which is nearly six times the size of the next award. The average of the other two is $2,500, not 
far from the median of all three that is $3,000. Accordingly, while the small sample size being 
drawn from must be acknowledged, the typical costs awards appear in the $3,000 range for a case 
without an appeal, and about double that for a case with an appeal. 
Costs awards typically represent only half of costs actually incurred.158 Even recognizing that, 
however, compared to other preliminary motions, the costs of which have been analyzed (such as 
jurisdiction motions), these costs are very low. Chapter One suggests that “each party in a non-
class action can reasonably expect to spend approximately $30,000-$45,000 on a jurisdiction 
motion, and $60,000-$75,000 if there is an appeal.”159 And unlike jurisdiction motions, Rule 2.1 
attempts to resolve a dispute on its merits. The costs to do so appear very reasonable, according 
with the proportionality principle. 
E. Time Delay Caused by Rule 2.1 
For the purposes of calculating delay, instances where the following occurred were not 
included, as they shed little if any light on delay caused by Rule 2.1:  
• where Rule 2.1 was raised but not used in the context of a broader motion; 
• where notice was ordered but the final disposition is not reported; or 
 
158  See, e.g., P Scott Horne, “The Privatization of Justice in Québec’s Draft Bill to Enact the New Code of Civil 
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation” (2013) 18 Appeal 55 at 61, cited in Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 48, fn 
60. 
159  Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid. 
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• if the use was granted but it was unclear whether notice was ordered. 
Given that cases generally only note when notice was ordered (rather than when the matter 
was brought to a judge’s attention), delay is calculated from the date that notice is ordered. This 
appears to be very shortly after matters are brought to a judge’s attention.160 If the date where 
notice was ordered is not clear, delay could not be calculated. In Appendix F, the above chart on 
results is accordingly amended to include delay. 
Of the 121 cases where the motion was granted after notice, delay can be calculated in 102. 
The average delay is 45 days: 45 in 99 Superior Court decisions, 31 in 8 Divisional Court decisions, 
and 126 in 2 Court of Appeal decisions.161 Where appeals occurred, the average delay was 232 
days. And when a Supreme Court leave application was made, the average delay was 338 days. 
Delay in cases where the use of Rule 2.1 was granted is separated from delay where it was not 
for two reasons. First, there are asymmetrical consequences between delay when the Rule’s use is 
successful and when it is not. The former is the delay required to resolve the action finally, while 
the latter impedes the plaintiff’s ability to bring his or her case promptly. The latter is accordingly 
much more problematic from an access to justice perspective. Second, the sample size where delay 
is quantifiable in cases where the proposed use of Rule 2.1 was unsuccessful is very small – only 
five cases. The measure of the delay in those five cases is lengthy – 126 days at the trial level 
alone. For these plaintiffs, the Rule was a severe access to justice obstacle. (Admittedly, in one of 
them an amended pleading was ordered, which was to all parties’ benefit.162) But it is difficult to 
 
160  In Asghar v Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2016 ONSC 4844, [2016] OJ No 4028 (SCJ), a rare instance 
where the judge notes the date of the defendant’s letter, the delay between the date of the defendant’s letter to 
the ordering of notice is nine days. 
161  It is of course difficult to make conclusions based on the small samples of Court of Appeal and Divisional 
Court decisions. Proper statistical analysis (which I am not qualified to conduct independently) may be 
appropriate after more years of use of the Rule. 
162  Rallis, supra note 85. 
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draw many normative lessons from this small sample size. In the vast majority of cases where the 
proposed use of the Rule was unsuccessful, judges have simply elected not to issue notice. Having 
the opposing party suggest that Rule 2.1 be employed in these circumstances is doubtless annoying 
for plaintiffs, but it seems to have minimal access to justice consequences, beyond the plaintiff’s 
annoyance and the judge’s time. Suggestions on how to mitigate these access to justice 
impediments is returned to in Part V.A, below. 
F. Self-Represented Litigants? 
It was not always clear from the decisions if parties were represented by counsel. At times, it 
was inferred that a litigant was self-represented: for example, if the judge referred to the plaintiff 
making submissions when normally counsel would be referred to as making submissions.163 Self-
representation was also assumed if the judge referred to submissions in a way that it seemed a fair 
inference that a lawyer did not draft the claim.164 However, when I was reasonably uncertain, the 
case was classified as one where it was unclear whether a self-represented litigant was involved. 
Of the 190 decisions, all parties had counsel in only nine cases. 144 (75%) appear to have 
been instances where Rule 2.1 was sought to be used against self-represented litigants, though in 
one of those, the plaintiff was a lawyer himself.165 This is in line with Macfarlane’s observation of 
“some lower level civil courts reporting more than 70% of litigants as self-represented.”166 In an 
additional three-to-five of these cases, the litigant had a law degree.167 In one case, someone 
 
163  E.g., Asghar v Avepoint Toronto, 2015 ONSC 5544, [2015] OJ No 4611 (SCJ). 
164  E.g., Brown v Fred Victor Organization, 2015 ONSC 3516, [2015] OJ No 3428 (SCJ). 
165  Posadas, supra note 113. 
166  Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs 
of Self-Represented Litigants – Final Report” (May 2013), online: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/85/> 
[“Macfarlane Main Report”] at 34. 
167  Reyes v Buhler, supra note 88; Reyes v KL, supra note 61; Reyes v Esbin, supra note 126; Reyes v Jocelyn, 
supra note 88; Reyes v Embry, supra note 88. 
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purported to act as agent for the plaintiff but did not appear to be a licensed lawyer.168 In the other 
38 decisions, it was unclear whether there were self-represented parties.  
It is striking that attempts to use Rule 2.1 were unsuccessful in seven of the cases where all 
sides had counsel.169 The 22% success rate170 is much lower than the typical rate of 75-80%. This 
could indicate that the Rule is being used unfairly against self-represented litigants. However, it is 
also possible – hopefully likelier – that lawyers are less likely to take on frivolous cases. After all, 
lawyers in Ontario swear an oath or make an affirmation upon being called to the bar that they will 
not commence claims on frivolous pretences.171 In one of two cases where the Rule was used 
successfully against a party with counsel, Master MacLeod (as he then was) wrote that “it is of 
some concern plaintiffs are apparently represented by a lawyer licenced to practice law in 
Ontario.”172 The lawyer at issue has subsequently been subject to investigation by the Law Society 
of Ontario.173 One could argue that there should be costs awarded against lawyers who bring 
frivolous claims personally.174 Ultimately, though the comparatively high success rate of Rule 2.1 
against self-represented litigants could be concerning, as long as judges remain cognizant of their 
duties to assist self-represented litigants, a matter returned to below, there are not necessarily 
significant access to justice concerns with Rule 2.1 for this reason alone. 
 
168  Adams, supra note 113. 
169  Haidari v Sedeghi-Pour, 2015 ONSC 2904, 73 CPC (7th) 191 (SCJ); Craven v Chmura (2015), unreported, but 
referred to in Craven v Chmura, 2015 ONSC 4843, [2015] OJ No 4088 (SCJ); Kyriakopoulos, supra note 110; 
Charendoff, supra note 117; Ramsarran, supra note 110; Caliciuri, supra note 60; Frick, supra note 118. 
170  Chalupnicek, supra note 150; Gates v Humane Society of Canada for the Protection of Animals and the 
Environment (cob The Humane Society of Canada), 2016 ONSC 5345, [2016] OJ No 4424 (Div Ct); Hoang, 
supra note 157. 
171  Law Society of Ontario, By-Law 4, Licensing, s 21, online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147485805>. 
172  Chalupnicek v Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa, 2016 ONSC 2353, [2016] OJ No 1940 (Master) at para 8. 
173  The Law Society of Upper Canada v Glenn Patrick Bogue, Notice of Motion for Interlocutory Suspension or 
Restriction, filed March 24, 2017, File No: 17H-030 (LSO HT), online: 
<https://lawsocietytribunal.ca/Current%20Proceedings/Bogue17H-030NMT.pdf>. 
174  Permitted pursuant to Rule 57.07(1)(c) of the Rules, supra note 3, “Where a lawyer […] has caused costs to be 
incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by […] negligence or other default”. Thanks to David 
Tanovich for raising this at a Job Talk at the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor on November 19, 2018. 
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G. “Frequent Flyers” 
Twenty individuals represent, cumulatively, at least 63 of the 153 proposed uses of Rule 2.1 
that were not dismissed – over 40%. Given that most of these individuals commenced their 
different actions against different defendants, it illustrates the utility of Rule 2.1 in not forcing 
multiple defendants into bringing motions and/or vexatious litigant applications. And this is 
merely among those cases that were reported – many additional cases these individuals have 
commenced appear unreported.175 A potential way to monitor these individuals is discussed below. 
V) WAYS FORWARD 
Rule 2.1 appears to have been a fundamentally positive addition to Ontario’s Rules, resolving 
particular types of actions on their merits in a timely and cost-effective matter. Though a party’s 
“opportunity to be heard” may not be as in-depth as is traditional, procedural fairness is a flexible 
concept. The dismissal of a claim without a trial, much less the dismissal without a hearing, was 
historically seen as the quintessential example of a procedural injustice.176 But post-Hryniak, and 
bearing the principle of proportionality in mind, we have recognized that that is not always 
necessary – other, less formal procedures can fulfill the requirement of procedural fairness.177 
While the use of letters instead of formal motions may be seen to compromise the open court 
principle, that principle can yield to various other societal concerns178 and, more importantly, 
formally reported decisions leave the open court principle largely respected. It should be born in 
mind that administrative law – which shares many of the same concerns as civil litigation regarding 
 
175  Emily Mathieu & Jesse McLean, “‘Vexatious litigant’ continues to have her days in court” The Toronto Star 
(26 November 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2016/11/26/vexatious-litigant-continues-to-
have-her-days-in-court.html>; Lin v ICBC, supra note 130. 
176  Walker, supra note 5 at 697; Irving Ungerman Ltd v Galanis (1991), 4 OR (3d) 545 at 550–51. 
177  Shantona Chaudhary, “Hryniak v. Mauldin: The Supreme Court issues a clarion call for civil justice reform” 
(Winter 2014) 33 Adv J No 3 (praising Hryniak); Farrow 2012, supra note 13 (concerning proportionality); 
MacKenzie, supra note 5 (also praising Hryniak). 
178  See, e.g., R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726 (admittedly in a different context).  
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procedural fairness and audi alteram partem179 – frequently holds informal/written procedures to 
be sufficient to dismiss claims.180 
Having said that, lessons should still be critically drawn. This section begins by suggesting 
how the Rule should be interpreted going forward in light of successes and failures in its 
application to date. It is first argued that the Rule needs to continue to be interpreted restrictively 
yet applied robustly when appropriate. Specific suggestions are made regarding cases where the 
plaintiff appears to be attempting to re-litigate a proceeding, where a cause of action appears buried 
in an otherwise obviously abusive pleading, the possibility of a standard form for requesting parties 
to use, and the dangers inherent in dispensing with notice. Having established these considerations 
regarding the interpretation of the Rule from a doctrinal perspective, three specific lessons that 
could be drawn from the application of Rule 2.1 from an institutional perspective are addressed. 
First, suggestions are made regarding the potential for more proactive docket-policing by judges 
and registrars. Then, the experience of Rule 2.1 regarding the potential of specialized decision-
makers to facilitate access to justice is considered. Finally, some comments are made regarding 
the ethics of using Rule 2.1 given that it is likely to be used disproportionately against self-
represented litigants. 
A. How the Rule Should Be Interpreted Going Forward 
1. In Favour of a Restrictive Standard, Robustly Applied 
By its words, Rule 2.1 is meant to apply to litigation that is “on its face” frivolous, vexatious, 
and/or abusive. Courts have been rigorous in enforcing this requirement, even in cases where a 
 
179  LeBel, supra note 93 at 53. 
180  Noted in the introduction of Freya Kristjanson & Sharon Naipul, “Active Adjudication or Entering the Arena: 
How Much is Too Much?” (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 201; L’Heureux-Dubé J contemplated written 
submissions satisfying procedural fairness in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 
2 SCR 817 at para 33: it “cannot be said that an oral hearing is always necessary to ensure a fair hearing and 
consideration of the issues involved.” 
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small amount of legal argument or evidence could make the “certain to fail” nature of the litigation 
apparent. This standard is appropriate, partially because it accords with the Rule’s words, which 
are always where an analysis of a statute or regulation’s meaning begins,181 and also because Rule 
2.1 is meant to apply very summarily, and evidence and argument would defeat that purpose.  
In this sense, Rule 2.1 should not be conflated with Rules 21 or 25.11. These rules have 
indispensable roles to play in the resolution of actions in certain cases, weeding out hopeless cases 
and clearing courts’ dockets for all members of the public to use.182 Though strong cases can be 
made, such as those put forward by Stephen Pitel and Matthew Lerner, that such rules should be 
more broadly interpreted to permit the resolution of questions of law,183 this should not bleed into 
Rule 2.1. The common law is based on the premise that adversarial argument is likely to lead to a 
better resolution of questions of law – a premise that modern psychology has shown to be well-
founded.184 While the virtues of summary procedures are manifold,185 Rule 2.1 is the most 
summary of all, dispensing with evidence, discovery, and legal argument. Restricting its use to the 
“clearest of cases” is therefore appropriate from a policy perspective. If the law needs to be 
explained, a factum is necessary and Rule 2.1 is inappropriate. Therefore, judges should be 
reluctant to order notice if there is even a whiff of a cause of action. The cases where Rule 2.1 has 
been an obvious access to justice hindrance are instances where notice was ordered and then the 
judge declined to use the Rule after receiving the plaintiff’s submissions. Obviously, if a plaintiff 
 
181  Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2014) at § 23.81; Re 
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 35. 
182  R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 at paras 18-19. 
183  See, e.g., Pitel & Lerner, supra note 19; Gerard J Kennedy & Mary Angela Rowe, “Tanudjaja v. Canada 
(Attorney General): Distinguishing Injusticiability and Deference on Motions to Strike” (2015) 44 Adv Q 391. 
184  Supra note 94. 
185  See, e.g., Pitel & Lerner, supra 19; Hryniak, supra note 6; MacKenzie, supra note 5. 
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explains, though submissions, that his or her action is not abusive, a judge should not dismiss it – 
that is the purpose of notice. But no plaintiff should be put in that situation unnecessarily. 
Though Rule 2.1 contemplates submissions from responding parties, judges issuing notice 
should consider whether they are truly necessary. This is not to suggest that a court should never 
reach out to a responding party for representations if the goal is to help redirect the plaintiff to an 
appropriate, potentially non-legal, forum for assistance. For instance, the ability to reach out to 
responding counsel to discern whether “something horrible [i]s indeed happening” that would 
require intervention, albeit not in the civil courts, seems eminently reasonable.186 Generally, 
however, a responding party will have little to add about whether a pleading is “on its face” 
abusive, making responding submissions a waste of resources. 
In this vein, one decision where Rule 2.1 was used to dismiss a claim arguably seemed 
inappropriate. In Beatty,187 the plaintiff sought to sue, among other parties, the Office of the 
Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) for, among other things, many acts for which the OCL is prima facie 
immune under the CJA.188 The claim bore many hallmarks of abusive litigation and was also an 
attempt to re-litigate some matters raised in the pleading.189 The issue of immunity was the only 
issue that gave the judge pause in concluding that there was no valid cause of action buried within 
the claim as the OCL’s immunity is not absolute. He engaged in eleven paragraphs of legal analysis 
to determine that no applicable exceptions applied, concluding that aspects of the pleading that 
could suggest an exception applied appeared to have been inserted for colour.190 With respect, this 
amount of legal analysis leads one to wonder if the claim was actually “on its face” frivolous, 
 
186  Kadiri, supra note 68 at para 7. 
187  Supra note 74. 
188  CJA, supra note 9, s 142. 
189  Beatty, supra note 74 at para 28. 
190  Ibid at paras 36-46. 
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vexatious, or abusive; read generously, there appeared to be a (weak) cause of action lurking in 
the pleading and a pleadings motion may have been more appropriate.  
Given that this is the only claim where the employment of Rule 2.1 appears inappropriate, and 
given that no substantive injustice seems to have occurred, this does not detract from the overall 
effectiveness of the Rule in enhancing access to justice. However, it does appear to be an instance 
where Rule 2.1 was arguably, albeit understandably, used to “shortcut” proper procedure where 
adversarial argument would have been helpful. 
2. The “Attempt to Re-Litigate” Exception 
An exception to the “on its face” requirement is appropriate where a pleading may contain a 
cause of action, but the proceeding is an obvious attempt to re-litigate issues that have already 
been finally determined. Traditionally, attempts to re-litigate issues had to be addressed by either 
a vexatious litigant proceeding under s 140 of the CJA,191 or a motion under Rule 21 or 25.11.192 
As noted above in Part I.B, these are time-consuming and expensive. It is unjust to force a 
defendant, having already participated in litigation that determined an issue, to do so again. As 
such, it would appear appropriate to allow a responding party to direct a one sentence explanation 
letter to the court, merely pointing in the direction of the release or past decision. If there is any 
ambiguity about the binding nature of these precedents or release, as there sometimes will be,193 
the court should decline to use Rule 2.1. But if the pleading, when combined with the precedent 
or release, leads to the abusiveness of the new pleading being apparent “on its face”, Rule 2.1 is 
appropriate. After all, attempting to re-litigate issues is a hallmark of abusive litigation.194 
 
 
191  E.g., Pagourov, supra note 40. 
192  E.g., Power Tax Corp v Millar, 2013 ONSC 135, 113 OR (3d) 502 (SCJ). 
193  Supra note 116. 
194  Gao #2, supra note 75 at para 15; Behn, supra note 27 at para 40, quoting Canam, supra note 28 at para 56. 
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3. Cause of Action Buried in an Abusive Pleading 
When a pleading potentially contains a scintilla of a cause of action, but is otherwise obviously 
abusive,195 it would appear unfair to force the defendant to respond to obviously inappropriate 
and/or irrelevant material. It is also not in a plaintiff’s best interest to allow him or her to make 
irrelevant arguments that are destined to fail.196 As such, judicial intervention may be warranted 
as at least parts of the proceeding are “on their face” abusive. However, the appropriate remedy in 
these circumstances would be to order that a new pleading be delivered.197 This preserves any 
legitimate interest of the plaintiff, but makes it clear that he or she cannot proceed in an abusive 
fashion. The case law has already illustrated that this can be a valuable use of Rule 2.1.198 
4. A Standard Form? 
A primary cause of unsuccessful uses of Rule 2.1 is attempts by responding parties to explain 
why a proceeding is abusive, whether through: obviously inappropriate legal argument and 
attempts to put unsworn evidence before the court;199 or more understandable, but still 
inappropriate, explanations of the allegedly vexatious party’s past behaviour.200 These concerns 
could potentially be addressed by a standard form that any request to use Rule 2.1 would have to 
follow. Such a form could integrate all potential nuances to the “on its face” requirement very 
simply, like this: 
The defendant/respondent/responding party (circle one) asks the Court to consider using Rule 2.1 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss ____ (name of proceeding and document filed). 
 
The proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, and, or abusive: 
 _ in its entirety; 
 _ in part at paragraphs _____. 
 
195  Rallis, supra note 85, was, as discussed above, an instance where the plaintiff made a vexatious rant in the 
context of claiming, without obvious implausibility, medical malpractice. 
196  Shafirovitch, supra note 92 at paras 3, 5. 
197  Rallis, supra note 85. 
198  Rallis, ibid; Asghar v Alon, supra note 72. 
199  Ramlall v Jahir Ullah Pharmacy Inc #1333, 2016 ONSC 2705, [2016] OJ No 2139 (SCJ) at para 3. 
200  Raji #1, supra note 7. 
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_ The proceeding is abusive because the matters raised therein have been finally determined in a 
previous decision, a copy of which is attached. 
 
_ The proceeding is abusive because the matters raised therein are subject to a final release, a copy 
of which is attached. 
 
No strong opinion is expressed on whether such a form would be desirable. The improper uses 
of the Rule are rare enough that asking parties to submit such a form may be needless complication 
to the simple procedure that is Rule 2.1. The civil justice system does not suffer from a lack of 
paperwork. Having said that, a standard form could also streamline all cases under the Rule, and 
prevent improper uses of the Rule early on in the process. As such, a pilot project in Toronto – 
which has many practice directions for uses of particular elements of procedural law201 – may be 
an experiment worth considering. 
5. Dispensing with Notice 
Some internal angst seems to be apparent among Rule 2.1 judges about when it is appropriate 
to dispense with the notice requirement. The common law has always emphasized that some type 
of hearing before a decision is made affecting one’s legal interests is an essential part of fairness. 
Fortescue J famously wrote in Dr. Bentley’s Case in 1723, that “even God himself did not pass 
sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence […] And the same question 
was put to Eve also.”202 But submissions filed in response to notice ordered pursuant to Rule 2.1 
can generally encompass the party’s opportunity to be heard.203  
In thirteen cases, the notice requirement was dispensed with, usually because the proceeding 
was commenced in violation of a vexatious litigant order, had manifestly been brought in the 
 
201  Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Practice Directions and Policies: Toronto”, online: 
<http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/>. 
202  R v Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge (Dr Bentley’s Case) (1723) 1 Str 557 at 
567. 
203  This is most obviously apparent in administrative law: LeBel, supra note 93.  
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wrong court, and/or was an obvious attempt to re-litigate. Ordering notice in cases such as these 
appears neither necessary nor appropriate. Most importantly, the purpose of notice – the 
opportunity to be heard by a judge – had already been fulfilled or could be fulfilled in another 
venue. Moreover, the wording of Rule 2.1 prescribes notice “unless the Court orders otherwise”. 
Given that the possibility of dispensing with notice is therefore contemplated, this minimizes the 
rule of law concerns that come with dispensing with it.204 Finally, in many situations, it was in the 
moving party’s own best interest that they be redirected to a new procedure as soon as possible – 
particularly, the instances where the matter had been brought in the wrong court205 or time was 
ticking on an appeal period.206  
The one case where this was most difficult – and where Myers J appeared to have the greatest 
struggle – was Shafirovitch, where the plaintiff alleged that the military had implanted 
brainwashing devices in him, and hospital staff threw bugs on him so he could be interrogated. If 
true, these facts would amount to a cause of action. But it also seems appropriate to take judicial 
notice that these facts would not have occurred,207 and the plaintiff was therefore behaving 
vexatiously deliberately or, more likely, was mentally ill. Myers J held that “realistically, there is 
nothing” the plaintiff could have said that would have led to his not dismissing the action.208 He 
 
204  Ignoring a statute or regulation’s language is antithetical to the rule of law, though how this principle is applied 
in marginal cases is of course contestable: see, e.g., Stéphane Beaulac, “Parliamentary Debates in Statutory 
Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or Weight” (August, 1998) 43 McGill LJ 287 at 322. 
205  The access to justice implications of Ontario having multiple appellate venues is an important topic that will be 
returned to in Chapter Three. 
206  Lin v Rock, supra note 2 at para 12. 
207  Judicial notice is available when something is “either (1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the 
subject of debate among reasonable persons, or (2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort 
to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy”: R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 SCR 458 at para 
53, quoting R v Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 SCR 863 at para 48. That Canadian hospitals do not throw bugs 
upon individuals so that they can be interrogated appears to fall within the first branch. Even if the allegation 
that the military implanting brainwashing devices in persons does not fall within this category (though I am 
inclined to the view that it does), it is difficult to fathom how the plaintiff would or could have proven such an 
allegation. 
208  Shafirovitch, supra note 92 at para 3. 
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then compassionately referred the plaintiff to the Public Guardian and Trustee.209 This was 
understandable, especially as it may have appeared disingenuous to have allowed the plaintiff to 
have made submissions in these circumstances.210 However, the “right to be heard” principle is so 
important in the common law, and the precedent of allowing judges to comment on the merits of 
a dispute without any submissions so potentially dangerous, that it would seem appropriate to 
mandate submissions in these circumstances. This would leave the “no submissions” cases 
confined to instances where the plaintiffs have either already had an opportunity to be heard, or 
are certain to have that opportunity in another venue. That Shafirovitch was the only case where 
notice was dispensed with that did not fall into these categories suggests that the costs of mandating 
notice in cases such as Shafirovitch are not great, while also ensuring that justice is seen to be 
done.  
B. A More Active Role for the Court 
Rule 2.1’s wording suggests the court itself is to be the primary gatekeeper on its use. 
However, the Rule is almost always used as a result of a responding party’s request. To some 
extent, this could indicate understandable risk-adverseness from both common law judges trained 
to be passive listeners, as well as registrars who are not meant to be decision-makers. The registrars 
are likely the primary reason a court seldom employs Rule 2.1 without a responding party’s 
request. After all, registrars see the originating documents when they are filed, whereas judges 
seldom do. This reticence has advantages – Rule 2.1 is an extremely powerful tool and there have 
been no “false positives” when registrars or judges commenced the Rule 2.1 process unprompted. 
 
209  Ibid at para 5. 
210  Myers J’s concern in Shafirovitch, ibid at para 3. 
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While caution is the side on which the registrars should likely err, simple training to look for 
obviously vexatious actions could be helpful, also assisting registrars in their duties under Rule 
2.1.01(7). As Myers J once told a Continuing Professional Development class, he tells registrars 
that “if you get a claim and it’s written in crayon, call me.”211 This comment could be interpreted 
flippantly but his jurisprudence indicates that he is willing to give the benefit of the doubt to any 
pleading with even a semblance of a cause of action.  
Two practical suggestions may be of assistance. First, registrars could have a list of persons 
against whom Rule 2.1 orders have been made. Such persons should be able to file pleadings 
(unless subject to a vexatious litigant order) but these pleadings could be sent to a judge to review. 
While it is possible that these persons could bring a legitimate proceeding, given that more than 
40% of proper uses of Rule 2.1 are the result of “frequent fliers”, a simple review of their pleadings 
by a judge appears prudent. Given the minimal time investment in having a judge review a single 
originating document, such a review could have minimal costs but substantial savings to all parties.  
Second, in order to ensure that such a list is as comprehensive as possible, judges should report 
their decisions to use Rule 2.1. There are several good reasons to believe that this is not always 
done. First, there were many instances where one, but not all, of an appeal, order of notice, and/or 
first disposition was reported. Second, the Toronto Star uncovered, after an investigation, that one 
individual has commenced vastly more proceedings than have been reported.212 Third, Sachs J 
referred to another individual having commenced fifteen proceedings in the Divisional Court in a 
period of less than three years, most of which were not reported.213  
 
211  Made at Ontario Bar Association Young Lawyers Division, Evening Reception with The Honourable Mr. 
Justice Fred Myers, March 22, 2016, reported in Gerard J Kennedy, “Justice for Some” The Walrus (November 
2017) 47 at 53. 
212  Mathieu & McLean, supra note 175, contra the five cases reported in Appendix D. 
213  Lin v ICBC, supra note 130, contra the cases actually reported in the Divisional Court, in Appendix D. 
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Any screening mechanisms that the Superior Court currently employs appear to not be public 
knowledge, so these suggestions should be viewed as complementary, rather than an alternative to 
any current practices. Though principles of judicial independence give a court significant internal 
independence, the Court could also consider making any screening practices public. This would 
be in the interests of transparency to the bench and the bar, and accord with the open court 
principle. This theme of transparency will be returned to in this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
C. Specialized Decision-Makers 
Specialized decision-makers can become familiar with the substantive law and procedure 
related to a particular area of law. In addition to increasing efficiency and leading to a more 
consistent jurisprudence, this is also likely to minimize errors.214 This has been particularly 
discussed in the family law context,215 but has been considered in the civil context as well. For 
example, the Toronto Commercial List has been praised as a specialized group of Superior Court 
judges working in a particular context, and in doing so improving access to justice.216 
Myers J, as well as, to a lesser extent, Beaudoin and Nordheimer JJ, have had disproportionate 
influence on the development of Rule 2.1. Myers J was designated as the Toronto judge responsible 
for Rule 2.1 shortly after his appointment to the bench.217 Of the 162 Superior Court decisions, 96 
were decided by Myers J, and 24 were decided by Beaudoin J. This represents nearly 75% of the 
Superior Court decisions. Nordheimer J decided 13 of the 21 Divisional Court decisions prior to 
his elevation to the Court of Appeal. This appears to have resulted in a streamlined approach to 
 
214  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 48 at 105-106. 
215  E.g., Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid; Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access 
to Civil & Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change” (Ottawa: Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil 
and Family Matters, October 2013) at 16: Canadian Forum for Civil Justice, online: <http:// www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf>, cited in Kennedy Jurisdiction at 106. 
216  See, e.g., Warren K Winkler, “The Vanishing Trial” (Autumn 2008) 27(2) Advocates’ Soc J 3 at 4, cited in 
Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid at 106. 
217  Brown v Loblaws Companies Limited, 2015 ONSC 7629, [2015] OJ No 6394 (SCJ) at para 4. 
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the use of Rule 2.1, leading to predictability, relatively few improper uses, and very few successful 
appeals. Though Myers J wrote vastly more reported decisions, the fact that Beaudoin and 
Nordheimer JJ also wrote a substantial minority of decisions mitigated the risk that the 
idiosyncratic views of a single judge would have disproportionate influence. Having a limited 
group of judges – particularly in jurisdictions such as Toronto and Ottawa – review cases such as 
these therefore appears a beneficial idea from the perspective of access to justice. Nor did any of 
Justices Myers, Beaudoin, or Nordheimer write either of the successfully appealed decisions.218  
There are disadvantages to specialization. For instance, specialization can lead to a judge’s 
burn out due to lack of exposure to new issues. Specialization can also lead to a resistance to 
considering new ideas.219 However, these risks must be weighed against the benefits of 
specialization. In any event, they can be mitigated by “rotating” the specialized judges, which 
occurs in the context of class actions in Toronto.220 Ultimately, therefore, Rule 2.1 appears to be 
an instance where specialization has been a success. Not only should this be continued in this 
context, this could potentially be applied to other areas of civil litigation. 
D. Self-Represented Litigants 
Before giving an unequivocal endorsement to Rule 2.1, it is important to consider the ethical 
implications of the Rule. It has now become trite law that Rule 2.1 is “not for close cases”.221 It is 
 
218  Frick, supra note 118; Khan, supra note 47. 
219  See, e.g., Freeda Steel, “The Unified Family Court – Ten Years Later” (1996) 24 Man LJ 381 at 388. 
220  Traditionally, three judges serve in this respect, though that was reduced to two after Strathy J was elevated to 
the Court of Appeal: Drew Hasselback, “The billion-dollar judge: Class action lawsuits about more than 
frivolous claims” Financial Post (26 July 2015), online: <http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/the-
billion-dollar-judge-class-action-lawsuits-are-about-more-than-frivolous-claims>.). In addition to Strathy J, 
Perrell J (see, e.g., Spina v Shoppers Drug Mart Inc, 2012 ONSC 5563, [2012] OJ No 4659 (SCJ)), Conway J 
(see, e.g., Clark (Litigation guardian of) v Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1283, 2014 CarswellOnt 2725 (SCJ)), 
Belobaba J (see, e.g., Goldsmith v National Bank of Canada, 2015 ONSC 2746, 126 OR (3d) 191 (SCJ)), and 
Horkins J (see, e.g., Sagharian (Litigation Guardian of) v Ontario (Minister of Education), 2012 ONSC 3478, 
2012 CarswellOnt 8513 (SCJ)) have also served in this respect in the past decade. 
221  Raji #1, supra note 7 at para 9. 
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easy to imagine how Rule 2.1, given its extremely summary nature without in-face court time, can 
be used against disadvantaged, frequently self-represented, persons. As the National Self-
Represented Litigant Project has noted, self-represented litigants frequently do not understand 
summary procedures and can feel ambushed when responding to them.222 The above analysis 
indicates that the Rule is more likely to be successfully employed against self-represented litigants. 
This should create ethical pause before the Rule is employed. There is also good reason for 
believing that several individuals against whom Rule 2.1 is employed are mentally ill, presenting 
unique challenges to ensure their rights are respected.223  
The Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct224 only prescribe basic standards 
regarding professional obligations.225 Nonetheless, while they are clearly not a sufficient basis 
upon which to form an ethical decision, they still need to be considered. The LSO Rules prescribe 
particular duties when a party in litigation is self-represented.226 As one example, counsel have a 
duty not to conceal a binding authority even if not raised by other parties.227 Though this duty 
applies to counsel in all cases, it is likely to be especially germane when a self-represented litigant 
is on the other side.228 In summary procedures, it is particularly important that this rule not be 
 
222  NRSLP Vexatiousness, supra note 30. 
223  See, e.g., Shafirovitch, supra note 92. 
224  Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 
[“LSO Rules”]. 
225  Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, “Introduction” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical 
Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 5; Gerard J Kennedy, 
“Searching Through Storytelling: Book Review of In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian 
Legal Profession” (2018) 35:1 Windsor YB Access Just 177. 
226  LSO Rules, supra note 224, Rule 7.2-9 (Unrepresented persons) and the commentary to Rules 3.2-4 
(Encouraging Compromise or Settlement) and 5.1-2 (Advocacy). 
227  The contours of this duty, and its appropriateness in all circumstances, are controversial: Stephen GA Pitel & 
Yu Seon Gadsden-Chung, “Reconsidering a Lawyer’s Obligation to Raise Adverse Authority” (2016) 49:2 
UBC L Rev 521. 
228  See the Law Society’s “Dealing With Self-Represented Litigants”, online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=2147499412>. 
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ignored,229 as there is likely less opportunity for counsel and the judge to recognize the omission 
of an on-point authority. Firm admonishments and costs consequences in the face of improper uses 
of Rule 2.1, as have been seen to date,230 appear warranted. 
But the real bulwarks against abuse of Rule 2.1 are judges – the individuals assigned to assess 
whether any particular potential use of the Rule is appropriate. The above cases illustrate that 
judges are cognizant of their obligation to grant more indulgences to self-represented litigants, 
particularly on procedural matters.231 However, Rule 2.1 does not provide for any “in court” time 
for a party to explain his or her case to a judge. This reduces the opportunities that a judge has to 
ensure that the rights of self-represented litigants are protected.232 This could illustrate public 
dispute resolution systems adopting many of the features of private dispute resolution, including a 
lesser amount of procedural protections. While at times this is desirable, in the name of efficiency 
and proportionality, it also creates risks, particularly for vulnerable parties. This could in fact 
illustrate that privatization of civil justice results in some of the negative consequences Farrow 
describes arising even in the public justice system as courts feel obliged to “compete” with more 
efficient, private alternatives.233 
Appellate courts have repeatedly held that the Rules must be interpreted flexibly to treat self-
represented litigants fairly. For instance, in Sanzone v Schechter, the Ontario Court of Appeal held 
that a motions judge held a self-represented litigant to an unrealistic standard of what constituted 
 
229  Pitel & Gadsden-Chung, supra note 227, suggest that this apply not only in cases of intentional misleading, but 
also when the omission occurred as a result of recklessness or carelessness. 
230  Supra note 110. 
231  Davids v Davids (1999), 125 OAC 375 (CA) at para 36.  
232  See the discussion in Sanzone v Schechter, 2016 ONCA 566, 402 DLR (4th) 135 [“Sanzone”]. There is similar 
concern that the use of the technology in the courtroom could disadvantage marginalized populations: see, e.g., 
Suzanne Bouclin, Jena McGill & Amy Salyzyn, “Mobile and Web-Based Legal Apps: Opportunities, Risks 
and Information Gaps” (April 28, 2017). Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Fall 2017, Forthcoming; 
Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2017-17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960207. 
233  Farrow Book, supra note 120 at, e.g., 232-251. 
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an expert report while responding to the defendants’ summary judgment motion.234 In Wouters v 
Wouters, the same court held that it was inappropriate to strike a self-represented litigant’s 
pleadings after, among other things, the motion judge failed to turn his mind to whether any of the 
– admittedly improperly prepared – materials before him could have been of assistance.235 In 
Pintea v Johns, Karakatsanis J ruled on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada that a 
motion judge gave insufficient consideration to whether it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a self-represented litigant had actual knowledge of two orders she was held in contempt for 
violating.236 In Bernard v Canada, Rothstein J cautioned against overly technical interpretations 
of court rulings that would prevent a self-represented litigant from raising an argument.237  
The NSRLP has suggested that Rules 20 and 21 should be applied with particular restraint 
against self-represented litigants, noting that self-represented litigants frequently feel “ambushed” 
by summary procedures, and that judicial education and further monitoring of the outcomes of 
summary procedures may be appropriate.238 The NSRLP has also suggested that “vexatious” is a 
term disproportionately levelled against self-represented litigants.239 
These concerns are real, and there would appear little downside to the NSRLP’s 
encouragement of further judicial training to manage allegedly vexatious litigation.240 So why the 
sanguineness that these concerns can be mitigated in the context of Rule 2.1? Largely because 
Rule 2.1 addresses cases that are so egregious that there is every reason – theoretical and empirical 
 
234  Sanzone, supra note 232. 
235  2018 ONCA 26, 6 RFL (8th) 305 [“Wouters”] at paras 36-38. The impropriety was obvious but technical, 
exemplified in the failure to present evidence under oath. 
236  2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 SCR 470 [“Pintea”]. 
237  2014 SCC 13, [2014] 1 SCR 227 (partially dissenting, though the majority did not address this issue). 
238  NRSLP Vexatiousness, supra note 30. 
239  Sandra Shushani, Lidia Imbrogno & Julie Macfarlane, “Introducing the Self-Represented Litigant Database” 
(Windsor, ON: The National Self-Represented Litigants Project, the University of Windsor, December 2017) 
[“NRSLP Database”] at 7-9. 
240  NRSLP Vexatiousness, supra note 30; see also Macfarlane Main Report, supra note 166 at 125. 
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– to believe that robustly enforced substantive and procedural doctrine will constrain the potential 
for abuse. Rule 2.1 is designed to address matters that are on their face destined to fail because 
they are manifestly abusive – a much higher standard than Rules 20 and 21. As Lorne Sossin and 
I have previously observed, even when procedural restraint is called for, “it should not permit 
frivolous and vexatious matters to tie up judicial resources.”241 Procedurally, unlike the NSRLP’s 
concerns regarding Rules 20 and 21, the responding party is not permitted to bamboozle a self-
represented litigant through lawyerly tactics because they are not allowed to make submissions at 
all. An extremely generous screening of each case is required, responding to the NSRLP’s 
concerns that vexatiousness and lack of merit will be conflated.242 Adding further procedural 
protections would defeat the purpose of the Rule, which is to keep the responding party’s costs to 
an absolute minimum. It is important to remember that Karakatsanis J, the author of the unanimous 
Pintea, was also author of the unanimous Hryniak, calling for broader use of summary procedures. 
And as explained above, having read all 190 reported cases using the Rule from its first three years, 
none where its use was ultimately upheld seemed to have tenable causes of action. Many of them 
originate from the same querulant individuals. It appears to be genuine vexatiousness – and not 
mere inability to properly fill out court forms243 – that leads to the use of Rule 2.1. 
There are, moreover, numerous examples of judges offering procedural assistance to parties 
before them in Rule 2.1 cases – Di Luca J in Van Sluytman v Orillia Soliders’ Memorial Hospital 
is an eloquent example: “In reviewing this claim, I consider the fact that the Plaintiff is self-
represented and of low income. I am not holding his statement of claim to the standard regularly 
 
241  Gerard J Kennedy & Lorne Sossin, “Justiciability, Access to Justice & the Development of Constitutional Law 
in Canada” (2017) 45(4) FLR 707 at 713. 
242  NRSLP Database, supra note 239 at 9. 
243  As noted in Wouters, supra note 235, these are very different phenomena. See also Ashley Haines, “When 
Dealing with a Self-Represented Litigant, Judges May Accept Non-Compliant Documents Where 
Appropriate” CanLII Connects (19 March 2018), online: <http://canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/54989>. 
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expected with material prepared by counsel.”244 This is in line with the Court of Appeal’s 
instruction in Wouters that the Rules “are not so rigid or inflexible as to preclude the court from 
examining non-compliant documents submitted by self-represented litigants to ensure that any 
properly admissible portions are received”.245 As long as judges continue to recognize that even a 
hint of a tenable cause of action is a reason to decline to use Rule 2.1, the risk of abuse of minimal. 
Other instances of judges assisting self-represented litigants have included suggesting where to 
obtain legal advice246 to noting that the litigant has brought an appeal in the wrong court247 to 
pointing to a resource on drafting pleadings.248 While this may pose some concerns that judges are 
no longer strictly neutral,249 it still appears the best way to achieve efficient access to justice, and 
respect the rights of self-represented litigants.250 So long as judges continue to fulfill their duties 
in this regard, there is every reason to believe that concerns with denying vulnerable parties a 
hearing in the face of truly vexatious matters will be mitigated. 
The need for judges to offer assistance to parties – and read pleadings extremely generously 
– is heightened when there is a concern that a party is suffering from mental illness. In this vein, 
 
244  Van Sluytman v Orillia Soldiers’ Memorial Hospital, 2017 ONSC 692, [2017] OJ No 445 (SCJ) at para 12, 
aff’d Van Sluytman, supra note 97. 
245  Wouters, supra note 235 at para 38. 
246  Lee v Future Bakery Ltd, 2015 ONSC 3208, 2015 CarswellOnt 7464 (SCJ) at para 5. 
247  Lin v Fluery, supra note 89. 
248  Rallis, supra note 85 at para 5. 
249  A concern famously flagged by Lord Denning in Jones v National Coal Board (1957), [1957] 2 ALL ER 155 
(CA); Freya Kristjanson (as she then was) and Sharon Naipul also explored this in Kristjanson & Naipul, 
supra note 180. 
250  Kristjanson & Naipul, ibid at 221-222, explore the tests imposed by appellate courts with respect to limits in 
this regard. The test for reasonable apprehension of bias remains the final bulwark against a judge who 
assumes the role of advocate: Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v National Energy Board et al, [1978] 1 
SCR 369 at 394 (per de Grandpré J, dissenting but widely cited since then for the test for reasonable 
apprehension of bias: see, e.g., Stuart Budd & Sons Limited v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONCA 60, 
129 OR (3d) 37). The theoretical difficulties with the adversarial system of litigation as a mechanism to 
achieve access to justice – and whether such a system even exists – is a very interesting topic (see, e.g., Sasha 
Lallouz, “A Call for Ethical Accountability: The Necessity for Lawyer-Client Ethical Dialogue in a One-Sided 
Adversarial System” (2016) 37 WRSLI 45), albeit one beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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giving extensions of time251 or asking clarifications about the nature of a party’s allegations may 
be appropriate. Such correspondence would not technically be ex parte, as responding parties 
would be copied, but would presumably involve minimal expense for responding parties, thus 
according with the spirit of Rule 2.1. 
Having said that, abusive claims remain abusive, regardless of the reasons for their genesis. If 
an individual is suffering from a mental illness, the response must be compassionate and may have 
to be societal. But the courts are unlikely to be the appropriate forum for such a response. As noted 
above, in one case Myers J referred the plaintiff to the Public Guardian and Trustee252 – this is not 
something that judges should hesitate to do. Ultimately, this case recognizes that treating a 
mentally ill litigant with compassion can still be accompanied by the use of Rule 2.1. In many 
cases it seems essential to remove a person who needs help from a forum – the courts – incapable 
of providing that help.253 It can in fact be a part of stopping cycles of self-injury.254 Moreover, 
keeping these cases in the public courts can be emotionally draining on court staff, who must 
address these matters on a daily basis.255 
Finally, it is also worth remembering that demanding procedural protections of a nature such 
that there is literally no potential of an unjust result would likely be so costly as to defeat the goal 
 
251  Seen in, e.g., Goralczyk v Beer Store, 2016 ONSC 1699, [2016] OJ No 1196 (SCJ) at para 5. 
252  Shafirovitch, supra note 92 at para 5. 
253  The institutional difficulty of the courts to address and assess mental illness is noted (admittedly in another 
context) in Hugh Harradence, “Re-Applying the Standard of Fitness to Stand Trial” (2013) 59 CLQ 511 at 
537; Richard D Schneider, Hy Bloom & Mark Herrema, Mental Health Courts Decriminalizing the Mentally 
Ill (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at, inter alia, 145. 
254  See, e.g., Gary M Caplan & Hy Bloom, “Litigants Behaving Badly: Querulousness in Law and Medicine” 
(2015) 44:4 Adv Q 411; Paul E Mullen & Grant Lester, “Vexatious Litigants and Unusually Persistent 
Complainants and Petitioners: From Querulous Paranoia to Querulous Behaviour” (2006) 24 Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law 333. 
255  This point was made particularly well by Professor Rob Currie during a job talk at the Schulich School of Law 
in Halifax, Nova Scotia on November 27, 2018. 
126 
 
 
of summary procedures.256 Lest there be any confusion, as has been emphasized throughout this 
chapter, not using Rule 2.1 is the side on which judges should err. This is both because the need 
to ensure just outcomes should not be compromised257 and because justice must generally trump 
efficiency if they are in a zero-sum conflict.258 Moreover, there are enough summary alternatives 
to Rule 2.1 that electing to not use Rule 2.1 in a marginal case is likely to have costs for a defendant 
that are small when compared to the interest of preserving not only justice, but its appearance. 
However, the desire to pursue a substantively fair outcome, without consideration of the costs, can 
be taken to an unhealthy extreme.259 
IN SUM 
In 2017, one Ontario judge made headlines when he criticized – in mocking tone – parties for 
coming before him to deal with a matter he considered frivolous and manifestly a waste of the 
Superior Court’s resources.260 But after a few days of mostly gleeful media praise,261 Alice 
Woolley (prior to her appointment to the bench) wrote a thoughtful article in which she noted that 
 
256 As Karakatsanis J noted in Hryniak, supra note 6 at para 29: “There is, of course, always some tension 
between accessibility and the truth-seeking function but, much as one would not expect a jury trial over a 
contested parking ticket, the procedures used to adjudicate civil disputes must fit the nature of the claim. If the 
process is disproportionate to the nature of the dispute and the interests involved, then it will not achieve a fair 
and just result.”  
257 Hryniak, ibid at para 23. 
258 Farrow Book, supra note 120 at 271. 
259 As an example, the experience of expanded discovery rights is frequently cited as an example of a change to 
procedural law to minimize substantive injustices that has seemingly had minimal effects in doing so while 
also greatly increasing costs. Justice Thomas Cromwell noted as much in extrajudicial comments in 2013 while 
still serving on the Supreme Court: Beverley Spencer, “The Road to Justice Reform: An Interview with 
Supreme Court of Canada Justice Thomas Cromwell” The National (July-August 2013), online: 
<http://nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/Recent4/The-road-to-justice-reform.aspx>. This is also a common 
hypothesis in the United States: see, e.g., Judge (as he then was) Neil Gorsuch, “13th Annual Barbara K. Olson 
Memorial Lecture” (Address Delivered at the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy’s 2013 National 
Lawyers Convention, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 15 November 2013), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VI_c-5S4S6Y> at ~6:15-10:30. See also Hryniak, supra note 6 at para 
29. 
260  Abdulaali v Salih, 2017 ONSC 1609, 92 RFL (7th) 355 (SCJ). 
261  E.g., Christie Blatchford, “Getting to the root of Ontario’s family law mess” National Post (21 March 2017), 
online: <http://nationalpost.com/opinion/christie-blatchford-getting-to-the-root-of-ontarios-family-law-mess>. 
127 
 
 
the parties had a legitimate grievance, and regardless of how efficient the judge thought his 
solution was, it could never have been upheld by an appellate court as it was based on contradictory 
suppositions.262 This instance therefore recognizes the dangers of judges using their powers, 
including their powers to summarily dismiss matters, inappropriately. And as damaging as 
vexatious litigation can be from the perspective of the court system, well-resourced defendants can 
at times claim “abusive” when litigation is anything but – demonstrating the danger that the term, 
like “civility”, could be used to attempt to silence those who seek to disrupt the status quo.263 
Occasionally, judges even fall into the trap of emphasizing efficiency over justice. This trap must 
be strenuously avoided, particularly when there is a self-represented litigant or a concern that a 
person suffering from mental illness is affected. 
Simultaneously, litigation that is vexatious can cause significant problems. When a poorly 
resourced, potentially self-represented party comes before a court, judges should be inclined to 
grant the party more indulgences. However, the fact that a party is on the margins of society does 
not mean that he or she has a legitimate legal grievance. The disproportionate damage that 
vexatious litigation can do to the civil justice system, as well as societal perceptions of it,264 is 
undeniable. Though such litigation is far from the norm, the above analysis explains how there are 
still dozens of reported examples of it in Ontario alone every year. Inflicting the costs of this upon 
innocent parties – even well-resourced innocent parties – is manifestly unjust. In light of these 
concerns, Rule 2.1 sought to balance the interests of the court system, plaintiffs, and defendants. 
And, despite minor hiccoughs, it appears to have succeeded.  
 
262  “Judgmental Judges” Slaw (22 March 2017), online: <http://www.slaw.ca/2017/03/22/judgmental-judges/>. 
263  See, e.g., Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal Professionalism’: Historical 
Perspectives” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2016) at 128. 
264  Mathieu & McLean, supra note 175. 
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Lin v Rock265 is an example of how judges should react in the face of genuinely vexatious 
litigation. The plaintiff, the source of eight different uses of Rule 2.1, sought to bring a “motion” 
to a judge of the Superior Court to make a “complaint” about a master’s decision after another 
Superior Court judge had upheld an appeal from that master’s decision. She also sought to receive 
a $1.6 million dollar judgment. After advising her of where she could obtain legal advice, Myers 
J employed Rule 2.1, writing: 
[11] Ms. Lin is entitled to her day in court. She is entitled to be heard by a judge 
or a master and to feel that she has been heard. As a litigant, whether represented 
by counsel or self-represented, she is entitled to be treated with respect. There is a 
difference however, between treating a person with respect and treating arguments 
and positions with respect. There is no submission that Ms. Lin can make to justify 
bringing a motion to a judge of this court to make a “complaint” about Justice 
Whitaker, Master Dash or their decisions. Neither can Ms. Lin seek judgment 
before her statement of claim is finalized and with no supporting evidence. There 
is a time and a place where a judge or a master will hear Ms. Lin’s evidence about 
the [merits of her claim]. The current motion however, cannot succeed. Pretending 
otherwise pending receipt of submissions would be disingenuous bordering on 
paternalistic. 
 
[12] […] If Ms. Lin wishes to make a written complaint of misconduct by Master 
Dash to the Chief Justice under section 86.2(1) of the Courts of Justice Act she can 
send a letter to the Chief Justice’s office to start the complaints process. If Ms. Lin 
wishes to appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Whittaker, she will need legal 
advice to determine how to appeal from that type of order. […] Ms. Lin should get 
legal advice very quickly because there are very short time limits that apply to 
appeals. 
 
[13] […] It is not treating someone respectfully to be disingenuous toward her. 
Ms. Lin’s position on this motion is frivolous. She cannot obtain the relief that she 
seeks because it is not available as a matter of law […] Ms. Lin’s argument does 
not deserve respectful treatment. But she does. And it is not respectful, in my view, 
to call for submissions disingenuously while time is running on an appeal period 
or to have Ms. Lin attend court to make a “complaint” and then to subject her to 
yet another costs award. 
  
[14] Ms. Lin’s motion […] is dismissed without costs. 
 
 
265  Supra note 2. 
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Ms. Lin may or may not have had a legitimate grievance. But allowing her to take up the 
Superior Court’s time and the defendant’s resources with a motion that inevitably would have 
failed is not in anyone’s interests, including hers. Rule 2.1 has allowed judges to address truly 
frivolous, vexatious, and/or abusive motions and actions in a way that is fair to the affected parties, 
recognizing that what constitutes a fair hearing varies according to the circumstances. Other 
jurisdictions should take note if they have not already done so.266 There are risks created by the 
Rule – and potential ways to make its application more streamlined – but these are minimal and/or 
can be managed. Access to justice has been improved in narrow but very real circumstances. A 
simple amendment to the Rules – which are not merely regulatory but can also have valuable 
hortatory effects – has achieved this.267 That is worth celebrating.
 
266  Some jurisdictions already have such rules, such as Prince Edward Island (Rule 2.1 of the Prince Edward Island 
Rules of Civil Procedure, based on the fact that PEI largely uses the same Rules as Ontario: see Doyle v Roberts 
& PEI Mutual, 2015 PEISC 2, 361 Nfld & PEIR 127, explaining the link with Ontario, and Taha v Government 
of PEI, 2018 PEICA 18, 2018 CarswellPEI 56, explaining the integration of Rule 2.1) and Alberta: Court of 
Queen’s Bench, Civil Practice Court: Note 7, online: <https://albertacourts.ca/docs/default-source/qb/civil-
practice-note-7---vexatious-application-proceeding-show-cause-procedure.pdf?sfvrsn=cb2fa480_4>, effective 
September 4, 2018. Manitoba and Saskatchewan also allow a judge to waive the Court of Queen’s Bench Rules 
(potentially sua sponte) in response to vexatious actions: Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88, Rule 
2.04; The Queen’s Bench Rules, 2013, Rule 5-3. These are nonetheless distinguishable (e.g., Alberta’s procedure 
gives a different timeframe for response). The Court previous applied a “show cause” scheme in 2017 with 
respect to habeas corpus applications: see, e.g., Latham v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 69, 72 Alta LR 
(6th) 357, and Latham v Alberta, 2018 ABQB 141, 2018 CarswellAlta 318. Thanks to Donald Netolitzky, 
counsel for the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, for pointing this out in January 2019. He is the author of useful 
resources concerning responding to abusive litigation: see, e.g., Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the 
Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Phenomenon in Canada” 53:3 Alta L Rev 606; Donald J 
Netolitzky, “Lawyers and Court Representation of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [OPCA] 
Litigants in Canada” (2018) 51:2 UBC L Rev 419. 
267  Allan B Morrison, “The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System” (2012) 90 
Or L Rev 993 at 1013. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Final vs Interlocutory Civil Appeals: 
  How a Clear Distinction Became So Complicated –  
Its Purposes, Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution1 
 
“What should be a straightforward application of a simple principle has never 
been anything of the kind. Every previously untested order appears to raise the 
question anew, with unpredictable and inconsistent results – so much so that 
judges themselves have been driven to despair.”2 
 
“[This is] an issue that has bedeviled the profession for decades.”3 
 
Appellate courts sit at the pinnacle of the legal profession, providing final determinations on 
the meaning of statutes and the development of the common law.4 Their decisions are analyzed in 
law schools for many years after their release.5 The media frequently ask lawyers who lose a case 
whether they intend to appeal. As a Toronto law firm’s clever advertisement for its appellate 
practice group has advertised, “Who Wins Last, Wins”.6 Or as Justice Robert Jackson famously 
wrote regarding apex courts, “we are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible because 
we are final.”7 
But not every decision released by an appellate court is of lasting significance. Many appellate 
decisions address interlocutory issues unrelated to the merits of the dispute, concerning only the 
conduct of the litigation. These issues range from discovery rights to scheduling to the amendment 
 
1  This chapter’s title is inspired by Darryl Robinson, “How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A 
Culpability Contradiction, Its Obfuscation, and Simple Solution” (2012) 13 Melbourne J Int’l L 1. Though 
international criminal law and Ontario civil appellate practice may seem very distinct, preferring simpler law 
(unless too simple) to more complicated law is not confined to particular jurisdictions or legal subfields. 
2  John Sopinka, Mark A Gelowitz & W David Rankin, The Conduct of an Appeal, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 
2018) [“Conduct of an Appeal”], § 1.17 [citation omitted]. 
3  Mancinelli v Royal Bank of Canada, 2017 ONSC 1526, [2017] OJ No 1111 (Div Ct) [“Mancinelli”] at para 2. 
4  See the discussion in Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 [“Housen”] at, e.g, para 9. 
5  This is not without controversy: Janet Mosher, “Legal Education: Nemesis or Ally of Social Movements?” 
(1997) 35:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 613 at 624-29. 
6  “Appeals”, Lerners LLP, online: <http://www.lerners.ca/appeals/>. 
7  Brown v Allen, 344 US 443 (1953) at 540.  
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of pleadings. Interlocutory appeals have the potential to distort access to justice, by increasing 
expense and delay in reaching the merits in some cases; but they play an indispensable role in 
achieving justice in other cases. Moreover, the increased clarity in the law brought by appeals – 
even interlocutory ones – can help the pursuit of justice in numerous other cases.  
It is important, therefore, to differentiate the way that interlocutory and final appeals are 
treated. However, it is first necessary to distinguish interlocutory appeals from final appeals; this 
has been the source of significant controversy itself, with Justice Russell Juriansz of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal succinctly describing the case law in this area as “unwieldy”.8 
This chapter seeks to balance, theoretically and practically, the access to justice concerns that 
interlocutory appeals create with the access to justice concerns that such appeals address. Part I 
lays the doctrinal background necessary to analyze the distinction between interlocutory and final 
appeals. Part II explains the methodology for reviewing 119 Ontario Court of Appeal and 30 
Divisional Court decisions considering the interlocutory/final distinction that were decided in 
Ontario between 2010 and 2017. Part III analyzes characteristics of these cases to highlight the 
consequences, in terms of delay and financial expense, of uncertainty in the law in this area. 
Finally, Part IV gives suggestions for improvement of the law surrounding the interlocutory/final 
distinction, with the aim of facilitating access to justice. The experience of British Columbia is 
drawn on in particular, reviewing 105 cases it has decided wrestling with this same issue – some 
before, and some after, legislative amendments that sought to clarify the law in this regard. 
Analyzing the experiences of Ontario and British Columbia, and then mapping them on to the 
distinction’s purposes and history, leads to conclusions that are both alarming and encouraging. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal is considering this issue in dozens of cases each year. This seems an 
 
8  Parsons v Ontario, 2015 ONCA 158, 125 OR (3d) 168 [“Parsons”] at para 209 (dissenting on this issue). 
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unnecessary waste of time and resources for both litigants and the courts. But there is hope to 
simplify the law in this area and improve access to justice. The distinction between interlocutory 
and final appeals remains important, with the former tending to cause delay, costs, and procedural 
complexity that may not be worth the benefits of the appeal. But a return to first principles and a 
consideration of other jurisdictions’ experiences provide a path to a simpler rule, asking whether 
the appealed order finally determines the litigation. More provocatively, the place of the Divisional 
Court in Ontario in the appellate review of interlocutory appeals is questioned. While these paths 
forward will likely require legislative intervention, it would not only prevent needless interlocutory 
disputes, but also support the justice-oriented purposes that are served by appeals. 
I) APPEALS’ HISTORY, PURPOSES, AND RELATION TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Before delving into how the interlocutory/final distinction is working in practice in Ontario, 
some doctrine and history is necessary to set the stage. This section begins by noting the purposes 
of appeals, as well as standards of review that further explain those purposes. The history of the 
interlocutory/final distinction in England and Wales is then reviewed before appellate jurisdiction 
in Ontario is explained. Lastly, the relationship between appeals and access to justice is considered. 
A. Purposes of Appeals 
It has been frequently observed that appeals are creatures of statute and that, historically, the 
common law gave no “right” of appeal.9 Even so, appeals are very old. The Court of Exchequer 
Chamber – the predecessor to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales for appeals of common 
law decisions – dates to the fourteenth century.10 Appeals have evolved for several purposes. One 
is to ensure the law’s consistent application.11 A related purpose is to allow appellate courts to 
 
9  See, e.g., Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.1. 
10  John H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) at 137. 
11  Housen, supra note 4 at para 9. 
133 
 
 
make and refine the common law, with appellate courts having the responsibility to make law to 
an extent not shared by trial courts.12 These purposes apply equally to civil and criminal cases. 
But there is another reason for appeals: to ensure that the losing party at trial has the decision 
reviewed by a fresh set of eyes to ensure that an injustice has not occurred. This concern is 
heightened in criminal law, as an error at trial could have penal consequences. This is addressed 
in international human rights law, being codified in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.13 In the civil context, this concern, though less acute, is still significant, given the 
potential serious effects of a substantive injustice in the civil context.14 
These purposes of appeals are important. But it is also important to observe that these purposes 
are narrow. Perhaps to prevent intermediary appellate courts misusing their power, the Supreme 
Court has restricted appellate courts’ ability to interfere with trial judges’ decisions. Given their 
role as law-making courts, appellate courts are primarily only entitled to review trial courts’ 
decisions for errors of law, with trial judges’ determinations of law being reviewed on a standard 
of correctness.15 Findings of fact, on the other hand, are only to be disturbed if tainted by “palpable 
and overriding error.”16 Questions of mixed fact and law are reviewed on a spectrum of standards 
depending on the ease with which the question of law can be extracted.17 In criminal law, the 
 
12  Ibid. 
13  999 UNTS 172, art 14(5): “Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.” See also Gerard J Kennedy, “Persisting Uncertainties in 
Appellate Jurisdiction at the Supreme Court” (2013) 100 CR (6th) 96 at 101. 
14  The far-reaching consequences of inability to access to civil justice are explained in, e.g., Trevor CW Farrow, 
“A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the 
Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) [“Farrow 2016”]. 
15  Housen, supra note 4 at para 8. 
16  Ibid at para 10.  
17  Ibid at paras 26, 28; Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [“Hryniak”] at para 81. 
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Crown is not entitled to appeal on questions of fact at all.18 Throughout all of this, a principle of 
appellate restraint is strikingly apparent.19 
This division of roles is rooted in concerns about both efficiency and expertise. Trial judges 
see evidence first-hand, and are thus in a privileged position vis-à-vis appellate courts to make 
findings of fact.20 And as Iacobucci and Major JJ noted in Housen v Nikolaisen, appellate and trial 
courts have different purposes: “while the primary role of trial courts is to resolve individual 
disputes based on the facts before them and settled law, the primary role of appellate courts is to 
delineate and refine legal rules and ensure their universal application.”21 Moreover, principles of 
judicial economy and finality mandate not interfering with a trial ruling unless clearly warranted.22  
These deferential standards are not without controversy – for example, Paul Pape and John 
Adair have argued that findings of fact should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard.23 Calls 
for the Crown to have a right of appeal on findings of fact and/or inadequacy of counsel in criminal 
cases have also emerged in recent years.24 Even so, Daniel Jutras has ably argued that appeals are 
not an intrinsic good or a logical corollary to decision-making but rather have particular, discrete 
purposes, such as delineating legal rules. He notes that there may be negative unintended 
consequences from expanding those purposes, such as needless litigation and lack of finality.25 
  
 
18  Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 686(1)(a)(i), allows only the accused to appeal on evidentiary grounds. 
19  See, e.g., Housen, supra note 4; Daniel Jutras, “The Narrowing Scope of Appellate Review: Has the Pendulum 
Swung Too Far?” (2007) 32 Man LJ 61. 
20  Housen, ibid at para 18. 
21  Ibid at para 9. 
22  Housen, ibid at paras 4, 16; Jutras, supra note 19 at, in particular, 65. 
23  “Unreasonable Review: The Losing Party and the Palpable and Overriding Error Standard” (2008) 27:2 
Advocates’ J 6.  
24  These became particularly loud after the high-profile acquittal of Gerald Stanley in the death of Colton 
Boushie: see, e.g., Naoimi Mettalic, “I am a Mi’kmaq Lawyer, and I Despair Over Colten Boushie” The 
Chronicle Herald (19 March 2018), online: <http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1554354-opinion-i-am-a-
mi’kmaq-lawyer-and-i-despair-over-colten-boushie>. 
25  Jutras, supra note 19 at, in particular, 65. 
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B. Appellate Jurisdiction in Ontario 
Ontario is unique among Canada’s provinces in having two appellate courts. Understanding 
the reason is necessary for placing the subsequent analysis of interlocutory appeals in context. The 
superior courts of the provinces – in Ontario, the Superior Court of Justice – are Canada’s courts 
of “inherent” jurisdiction.26 As part of their constitutional authority to create additional courts to 
facilitate the administration of justice, provinces are permitted to create additional courts.27 Ontario 
has created the Ontario Court of Justice (frequently known as the Provincial Court), the Small 
Claims Court, masters’ chambers (both of which are technically part of the Superior Court), and a 
host of administrative tribunals to facilitate the administration of justice. The number of courts 
with judges decreased first in 1985 and again in 1990, when the High Court of Justice, the County 
Courts, District Courts, Court of General Sessions, Surrogate Court, and the District Court were 
merged into the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), later renamed the Superior Court of 
Justice.28 1990 also saw the merging of various courts into the Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial 
Division),29 later renamed the Ontario Court of Justice.30 
Ontario’s appellate courts are, like all Canadian appellate courts, creatures of statute.31 But 
Ontario’s two appellate courts – the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court – have different origins. 
The Court of Appeal’s origins trace to the establishment of the Court of Error and Appeal for 
 
26  See, e.g., MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 at paras 27-33. 
27  Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell/Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 7-1-7-3. 
28  The Honourable Louise Charron, “An Interview with the Honourable Louis Charron” (2013) 43 Ottawa L Rev 
305, fn 20; W Brent Cotter, “Ian Scott: Renaissance Man, Consummate Advocate, Attorney General 
Extraordinaire” in In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2016) at 214; The Courts Improvement Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 25 [“CIA 1996”], s 9(3). 
29  Cotter, ibid at 214; Courts of Justice Amendment Act, 1989, SO 1989, c 55, s 33. 
30  CIA 1996, supra note 28, s 9(5). 
31  Though the Supreme Court of Canada found itself to be constitutionally entrenched in Reference re Supreme 
Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433. 
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Canada in 1850.32 The creation of an independent appellate court was considered preferable to the 
previous practice of having the Governor’s Council act as an appeal court, which had occurred in 
Upper Canada since 1792.33 
The Divisional Court’s genesis is different. In 1964, the Ontario government appointed James 
C McRuer, recently retired Chief Justice of the High Court, to chair the Law Reform Commission 
of Ontario, as well as a public inquiry into civil rights in Ontario.34 Among his many 
recommendations was creating a separate court to hear applications for judicial review.35 In an era 
with an expanding administrative state, this suggestion was heeded despite being controversial,36 
leading to the establishment of the Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice.37 The Divisional 
Court’s decisions can generally be appealed to the Court of Appeal, with leave.38 
Over time, the Divisional Court’s jurisdiction expanded beyond judicial reviews to include 
appellate matters, in part due to suggestions that the Court of Appeal reform to emphasize its law-
making functions.39 In 1984, civil appeals with low dollar amounts were put in the Divisional 
Court’s jurisdiction.40 The Divisional Court, whose members are all Superior Court judges,41 also 
has appellate jurisdiction under particular statutes, such as the Class Proceedings Act.42 
 
32  Christopher Moore, The Court of Appeal for Ontario: Defining the Right of Appeal, 1792-2013 (Toronto: 
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 18. The book is a detailed and thorough history of the 
Court. 
33  Moore, ibid at 6-18. 
34  Patrick Boyer, A Passion for Justice: The Legacy of James Chalmers McRuer (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 
1994) at 297-298. 
35  Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, JC McRuer, Commissioner, Report No 1 (vol 2) (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer 1968) at 667; Boyer, ibid at 324; Moore, supra note 32 at 132-133. 
36  For criticisms, see, e.g., John Willis, “The McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ Values” 
(1968) 18 UTLJ 351 at, in particular, 354. At the same time, the Exchequer Court was reorganized into what 
later became the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal, expanding its jurisdiction over judicial reviews of 
federal government action: Moore, ibid at 133. 
37  Moore, ibid at 133. 
38  Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43 [“CJA”], s 6(1)(a). 
39  Moore, supra note 32 at 143-144. 
40  Moore, ibid at 159, currently in CJA, supra note 38, s 19(1)(a). 
41  CJA, ibid, s 18(3). 
42  Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6 [“CPA”], s 30. 
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Today, appellate jurisdiction in Ontario civil matters is split between the Superior Court, 
Divisional Court, and Court of Appeal. The Superior Court has jurisdiction over appeals from 
interlocutory orders of a master43 and costs assessments of assessment officers.44 
Apart from judicial reviews, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction over appeals of: 
• final orders of Superior Court judges, where less than $50,000 is at stake;45 
• final orders of the Small Claims Court, unless less than $1,000 is at stake;46 
• final orders of masters;47  
• interlocutory orders of Superior Court judges, with leave; 48 and 
• where otherwise prescribed by particular statutes.49 
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over most other civil appeals, notably: 
• Divisional Court orders, unless based on a question of fact alone, with leave;50 and 
• final orders of the Superior Court, unless otherwise prescribed to the Divisional Court.51 
This division is important, as the final section of this chapter will emphasize. 
C. The History of the Interlocutory/Final Distinction 
1. The English Experience 
Understanding the reason for distinguishing appeals of “interlocutory” and “final” orders 
(leading to “interlocutory appeal” referring to an appeal of an interlocutory order and “final 
appeal” referring to an appeal of a final order) requires considering the history of the issue in 
 
43  CJA, supra note 38, s 17(a). 
44  CJA, ibid, s 17(b); Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 5.4. 
45  CJA, ibid, s 19(1)(a).  
46  Ibid, s 31. 
47  Ibid, s 19(1)(c). 
48  Ibid, s 19(1)(b).  
49  Ibid, s 6(1)(b), seen in, e.g., CPA, supra note 42. 
50  CJA, ibid, s 6(1)(a). 
51  Ibid, s 6(1)(b). 
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England and Wales.52 The distinction became important primarily because different procedural 
rules applied to appeals of the two different types of orders.53 In Salaman v Warner,54 the Court of 
Appeal for England and Wales explained the “application approach”, emphasizing that the 
fundamental question that a court should ask in determining whether an order under appeal is final 
or interlocutory is whether it finally disposed of the entire case. 
Twelve years later, however, a different panel of the Court of Appeal cast doubt on Salaman. 
In Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council, it introduced the “order approach”. Criticizing the 
reasoning in Salaman, it held that courts should ask “Does the judgment or order, as made, finally 
dispose of the rights of the parties?”55 This was partially because many cases include orders that, 
if decided one way, would finally dispose of the litigation but, if decided the other, would not.56 
Examples would be orders determining jurisdiction or the applicability of a limitations period 
defence; it seemed to strike judges as unsatisfactory that appeal rights of an order that “finally” 
determines an issue would depend on which way the determination fell.57 For example, an order 
determining that the court has jurisdiction over a matter technically does not resolve the dispute, 
but permanently affects a defendant’s interest, whereas an order determining that the court does 
not have jurisdiction does resolve the dispute as the plaintiff cannot pursue his or her claim.58 
On the one hand, Bozson seems more principled than Salaman, reflecting what is actually at 
stake in an appeal. As such, Bozson was frequently defended by judges.59 However, Bozson and 
 
52  For a comprehensive overview, see Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.20-1.21. 
53  This notably concerned time frame: Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.22. 
54  [1891] 1 QB 734 [“Salaman”], explained in Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.22. 
55  [1903] 1 KB 547 [“Bozson”] at 548; Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.23-1.25. 
56  Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.63. 
57  This continues to this day: in Ontario, an order declining to set aside default judgment is final, while an order 
setting aside default judgment is interlocutory: Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.59-1.61; Laurentian Plaza Corp 
v Martin (1992), 7 OR (3d) 111 (CA); Siddiqui v Thompson, 2017 ONSC 1469, [2017] OJ No 1087 (Div Ct). 
58  MJ Jones Inc v Kingsway General Insurance Co (2003), 68 OR (3d) 131 (CA) [“MJ Jones”]. 
59  See, e.g., Haron bin Mohd Zaid v Central Securities (Holdings) Bhd [1982] 2 ALL ER 481 at 486 (JCPC), 
cited in Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.27. 
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its progeny led to more orders being considered final as almost all orders “finally” decide a right 
of the parties – even if it is a right concerning a procedural step.60 It was also more difficult to 
apply than Salaman, leading Lord Denning to hold that Bozson “was right in logic, but [Salaman] 
was right in experience.”61 In this situation, Lord Denning famously wrote that “This question of 
‘final’ or ‘interlocutory’ is so uncertain, that the only thing for practitioners to do is to look up the 
practice books and see what has been decided on the point.”62 Buckley LJ remarked in 1910: 
The rules [on how to decide whether an order is interlocutory or final] are so 
expressed and the decisions are so conflicting that […] in my opinion it is 
essential that the proper authority should lay down plain rules as to what are 
interlocutory orders, for as matters now stand it is the fact that it is impossible 
for the suitor in many cases to know whether an order is interlocutory or final.63 
 
In the 1980s, and after another request from an appellate judge64, the Civil Procedure Rule 
Committee in England and Wales expressed its preference for the more predictable application 
approach.65 The Access to Justice Act, 1999 codified this area of the law by adopting a slightly 
nuanced application approach, defining a final order as one that disposes of “the entire 
proceedings” and severely restricting appeals of other orders.66 The current English approach 
increases certainty but may fairly be regarded as being unsophisticated, classifying matters as 
interlocutory that finally determine parties’ rights.67 A return to this experience and the pros and 
cons of this trade-off will be found in Part IV. 
 
60  See Hendrickson v Kallio, [1932] OR 675 at 678 [“Hendrickson”]; Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.59-1.60. 
61  Salter Rex & Co v Ghosh, [1971] 2 All ER 865 (CA) [“Salter Rex”] at 866, reported in Conduct of an Appeal, 
ibid, § 1.27. 
62  Salter Rex, ibid at 866; see also discussion in Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.29-1.31. 
63  Re Page, Hill v Fladgate [1910] 1 Ch 489 at 493-494, quoted in Eric TM Cheung, “Interlocutory or Final 
Orders: Pouring New Wine into Old Wineskins” (2006) 36(1) Hong Kong LJ 15 at 16. 
64  Cheung, ibid at 16, quoting Steinway & Sons v Broadhurst-Clegg, 1983 WL 215526 (Eng CA). 
65  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.28. 
66  Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals), Order 2000 SI 2000/1071, art 1(2)(c) [“A2J 2000 Order”]; 
Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.34; Cheung, supra note 63 at 17; Tanfern Limited v Tanfern-MacDonald & 
Tanfern-Macdonald, [2000] 2 All ER 801, [2000] EWCA Civ 3023 [“Tanfern”]. 
67  Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.36. 
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2. The Development of the Distinction in Ontario 
Canada began to go in its own direction from England shortly after Salaman and Bozson. In 
1932, the Ontario Court of Appeal decided Hendrickson v Kallio,68 still the leading case on the 
interlocutory/final distinction in Canada.69 Middleton JA held: 
The interlocutory order from which there is no appeal is an order which does not 
determine the real matter in dispute between the parties -- the very subject matter 
of the litigation, but only some matter collateral. It may be final in the sense that 
it determines the very question raised by the application, but it is interlocutory if 
the merits of the case remain to be determined.70 
This could fairly be described as close to the application approach.71 But despite Hendrickson 
having repeatedly been affirmed as the leading on-point authority,72 caveats have been continually 
added to it. Two decisions73 of Morden ACJO held that determinations of the Superior Court’s 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis arbitration and/or administrative tribunals were “final” orders given that 
“substantive rights” were finally determined.74 Similarly, Sharpe JA has held dismissals of motions 
alleging that Ontario did not have jurisdiction and/or was forum non conveniens were “final” 
orders, rationalizing that they finally determine the forum for litigation.75 The definition of “final” 
order has also been expanded76 to include matters such as determinations of motions finding 
 
68  Hendrickson, supra note 60. 
69  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.37. 
70  Hendrickson, supra note 60 at 678. 
71  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.39. 
72  Parsons, supra note 8, at paras 42 (LaForme JA, for the majority on this point) and 195 (Juriansz JA, 
dissenting on this point). 
73  Buck Brothers v Frontenac Builders Ltd (1994), 19 OR (3d) 97 (CA); Leo Alarie & Sons Ltd v Ontario (2000), 
48 OR (3d) 204 (CA). 
74  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.42-1.44. 
75  MJ Jones, supra note 58; Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.59. 
76  For a more comprehensive list, see Conduct of an Appeal, ibid, § 1.59-1.60. 
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contempt,77 determining that a limitations period defence does not apply,78 and setting aside 
service ex juris.79 Summarizing this area, Mark Gelowitz and David Rankin write that when orders: 
have a terminating effect on an issue or on the exposure of a party, they plainly 
“dispose of the rights of the parties” and are appropriately treated as final. Where 
such orders set the stage for a determination on the merits, they do not “dispose 
of the rights of the parties” and are appropriately treated as interlocutory.80 
 
This seems as good as connecting thread as exists between the cases determining this issue. The 
rest of this chapter explores the consequences of how this works in practice. 
D. Appeals and Access to Justice 
As noted in detail in this dissertation’s Introduction,81 access to justice can be defined broadly 
or narrowly depending on the circumstances. It can include normative analyses of what constitutes 
substantive justice,82 broader analyses of social trends and projects that would lessen the need for 
formal dispute resolution,83 and alternatives to traditional litigation such as mediation and 
arbitration.84 In the context of civil litigation, it means, at the very least, that civil litigation should 
have the characteristics of timeliness, minimal financial expense, and simplicity.85 While these 
 
77  Bush v Mereshensky (2007), 229 OAC 200 (CA). 
78  Charlebois v Les Enterprises Normand Ravary Ltee (2006), 79 OR (3d) 504 (CA) [“Charlebois”]. 
79  MacKay v Queen Elizabeth Hospital (1989), 68 OR (2d) 90 (Div Ct). 
80  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.47. 
81  Introduction at 3-6, 9-12. 
82  E.g., Trevor CW Farrow, “What Is Access to Justice” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 [“Farrow 2014”] at 
969; Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice Should We Be Talking About?” 
(2008) 46:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 773. 
83  Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, “Access to Justice and Beyond” (2010) 60 UTLJ 373 at 374. 
84  See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, “Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil Mediation in 
Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 677; Robert G Hann & Carl Baar, 
“Evaluation of the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1): Final Report – The First 23 Months” 
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2001), online: 
<https://archive.org/stream/mag_00041982/mag_00041982_djvu.txt>, described by Martin Teplitsky, QC, 
“Universal mandatory mediation: A critical analysis of the evaluations of the Ontario mandatory 
mediation program” (Winter 2001) 20 Advocates’ Soc J No 3, 10. See also Gary Smith, “Unwilling Actors: 
Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Voluntary Mandatory Mediation May Not” (1998) 36:4 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 847, expressing doubt about the wisdom and utility of mandatory mediation. 
85  See, e.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 82 at 978-979. 
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characteristics are likely insufficient for a complete understanding of access to justice, they are 
nonetheless necessary.86 
Appeals can be indispensable in achieving access to justice, by righting clear wrongs and 
correcting substantive injustices. Clarity in the law brought by appeals can also allow numerous 
other parties to order their affairs with certainty and predictability – thereby increasing access to 
justice.87 While it is regrettable to have private parties bear the costs of achieving said clarity in 
the law, at times it seems appropriate – especially when a party is the government.88 
But appeals come with significant costs in terms of time and financial expenses. This seems 
particularly the case with respect to interlocutory appeals, which are disconnected from the merits 
of a dispute and the request for justice therein. (Though there may be some cases where 
determining an interlocutory matter will make settlement far more likely.) However, there are still 
benefits to interlocutory appeals. If the interlocutory appeal is necessary to pre-emptively prevent 
a substantive injustice, misuse of judicial resources, or to clarify the law, then it is permitted. 
Ontario law has sought to recognize this, allowing a judge to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory 
order if: a) “there is a conflicting decision of another judge or court in Ontario or elsewhere (but 
not a lower level court) and that it is in the opinion of the judge hearing the motion ‘desirable that 
leave to appeal be granted’”89; or b) “there is reason to doubt the correctness of the order in 
question and that the proposed appeal involves matters of such importance that leave to appeal 
 
86  See, e.g., Farrow 2016, supra note 14 at 166. 
87  Particularly important given information asymmetrices between legal professionals and their clients: Michael J 
Trebilcock, “Regulating the Market for Legal Services” (2008) 45:5 Alta L Rev 215 at 218, 220; Roach & 
Sossin, supra note 83 at 392. 
88  See, e.g., Gerard J Kennedy & Lorne Sossin, “Justiciability, Access to Justice & the Development of 
Constitutional Law in Canada” (2017) 45(4) FLR 707. 
89  Molloy J in Sahota v Sahota, 2015 CarswellOnt 6046, [2015] OJ No 2090 (Div Ct) [“Sahota”], quoting/citing 
Rule 62.02(4)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the “Rules”]. 
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should be granted.”90 The former criteria emphasize clarifying the law, while the latter look at 
proportionate access to justice. 
Appeals in general, and interlocutory appeals in particular, can therefore facilitate or hinder 
access to justice. This has been recognized in other situations regarding appeals. For example, 
bifurcating appeals is discouraged, unless there appears good reason to believe that the appellate 
answer in the first appeal will resolve the dispute.91 The distinction in treatment of interlocutory 
and final appeals in Ontario law is designed to address the double-edged nature of appeals vis-à-
vis access to justice. As Perell and Morden note:  
In general terms, the policy underlying the distinction between interlocutory and final 
orders is the proportionality principle. For judicial decisions that are of comparatively 
less importance to the parties and the public than other decisions (particularly those other 
decisions that are determinative of the outcome of the litigation), there should be no 
appeal at all, or the right of appeal should be curbed by a leave requirement.92  
 
This principle of proportionality was given general application in Ontario in 2010 in light of the 
Osborne Report.93 
The subsequent parts of this chapter seek to determine whether the balance has been struck 
appropriately. Against this background, it is important to consider the Supreme Court’s seminal 
2014 decision Hryniak v Mauldin, calling for a “culture shift” in how litigation is conducted, to 
ensure the timely and inexpensive resolution of civil actions on their merits, the spirit of which has 
 
90  Sahota, ibid at para 5, citing Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules, ibid. 
91  Bonello v Gores Landing Marina (1986) Limited, 2017 ONCA 632, 39 CCLT (4th) 175 [“Bonello”] at para 15. 
92  Paul M Perell & John W Morden in The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 2d ed (Markham: Lexis-Nexis 
Canada, 2014) at ¶ 12.40, cited in, e.g., Skunk v Ketash, 2016 ONCA 841, 135 OR (3d) 180 [“Skunk”] at para 
31. 
93  Rules, supra note 89, Rule 1.04(1.1), amended as a result of O Reg 438/08; also described in Trevor Farrow, 
“Proportionality: A Cultural Revolution” (2012) 1 Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 151 [“Farrow 
2012”], and the discussion of Karakatsanis J for a unanimous Supreme Court in Hryniak, supra note 17 at 
paras 28-33. This came after Colter Osborne’s seminal report: Coulter Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform 
Project: Findings and Recommendations (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2007), online: 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/> at c 12. 
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been held to apply outside the summary judgment context.94 Chapter One’s discussion of 
jurisdiction motions, however, suggested that Hryniak had minimal impacts where it was not 
explicitly incorporated into binding precedent.95 
II) METHODOLOGY FOR REVIEWING ONTARIO DECISIONS 
In June, July, and August of 2018, WestLaw Canada and QuickLaw Advance were searched, 
attempting to isolate all Ontario cases in the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal where there 
was dispute about whether an appeal was final or interlocutory between January 1, 2010 and 
December 31, 2017. “Interlocutory” was searched for within the same paragraph as “appeal”. This 
yielded 458 results in QuickLaw (June 27, 2018) and 488 in WestLaw (September 5, 2018, 
excluding four Supreme Court of Canada cases). These included many false positives as results 
included many cases where there was no question that the appeal was interlocutory, whether in the 
context of a final decision96 or a motion for leave.97 But the sample was still manageable.  
As previously recognized,98 there are limitations to using Westlaw and QuickLaw in this way. 
These databases do not report every case decided in Ontario. For example, in one case the 
Divisional Court addressed a leave motion after the Court of Appeal held that the appeal was 
interlocutory – but the Court of Appeal’s decision was unreported.99 Despite limitations, however, 
quantitative analyses of case law frequently use Westlaw and QuickLaw.100 It should also be 
 
94  Hryniak, ibid at paras 23-29; Stephen GA Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern 
Approach to Rule 21” (2014) 43 Adv Q 344 at 344-346. 
95  Gerard J Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 79 [“Kennedy Jurisdiction”]. 
96  See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v Giacomelli, 2010 ONSC 985, 317 DLR (4th) 528 (Div Ct). 
97  See, e.g., United States of America v Yemec, 2010 ONSC 1409, 100 OR (3d) 394 (Div Ct), transferred to Court 
of Appeal after leave granted: United States of America v Yemec, 2010 ONCA 414, 100 OR (3d) 321. 
98  See, e.g., Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95 at 90; Gerard J Kennedy, “Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor YB 
Access to Just 243 [“Kennedy Rule 2.1”]. 
99  Colenbrander v Savaria Corp, 2016 ONSC 8051, [2016] OJ No 6608 [“Colenbrander”]. 
100  See, e.g., Craig E Jones & Micah B Rankin, “Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of Subconscious Bias in 
Second-Degree Murder Sentences in Canada” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 109 at 121, fn 58. 
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recognized that normative values underlying legal rules cannot be assessed through quantitative 
analyses of case law.101 However, understanding how rules work in practice can lead to 
appreciation of the practical consequences of prioritizing different normative values in interpreting 
the law. 
The following variables were recorded:  
• the number of disputes over the interlocutory/final appeal distinction, as this illustrates 
both how large a problem this is, and whether there have been any post-Hryniak changes;  
• whether the remedy for an appeal being brought in the wrong court is:  
o quashing the appeal, thus necessitating seeking an extension of time;102 and/or  
o the Court of Appeal reconstituting itself as the Divisional Court, usually to save the 
parties time and/or money when the matter is urgent,103 
and what factors seem to lead a court to deciding which of these remedies to use;  
• what costs awards are associated with these disputes as this indicates many of the 
financial costs associated with the disputes (admittedly, costs awards typically represent 
only about half of costs actually incurred104); 
• how many cases involved self-represented litigants, as there is special concern about self-
represented litigants being able to access justice;105 
 
101  See, e.g., Joshua B Fischman, “Reuniting ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship” (2013) 162(1) U Pa 
Law Rev 117. 
102  E.g., Pinsky v Smiley, 2015 ONCA 52, [2015] OJ No 443. 
103  E.g., Pruner v Ottawa Hunt and Golf Club Ltd, 2015 ONCA 609, 127 OR (3d) 337. 
104  Infra note 147. 
105  See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures 
Against Self-Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to Justice?” (Windsor, 
ON: The National Self-Represented Litigants Project, The University of Windsor, November 2015) [“NSRLP 
Summary Procedures”]; Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and 
Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants – Final Report” (May 2013), online: 
<https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/85/> [“Macfarlane Main Report”]; Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 98, 
summarizing this work. 
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• what delay is associated with this, as delay is another major consideration regarding 
access to justice; and 
• how they are resolved, as this indicates how frequently unnecessary motions are brought. 
The rationale for isolating these factors is to allow for analysis of both how clear the law is, 
and the practical consequences of it hypothesized (lack of) clarity. All these details are recorded 
in Appendices G (Court of Appeal decisions) and H (Divisional Court decisions).106 Once these 
factors are assessed, it will be analyzed whether Hryniak itself was cited in any contested cases. 
Based on both explicit citations (though one would expect it to be cited regarding summary 
judgment, it is cited for its spirit more generally107) and quantitative trends, whether the spirit of 
Hryniak is being heeded outside the narrow summary judgment context will be assessed. 
Court of Appeal and Divisional Court cases are separated in this analysis given that the issue 
usually comes up in different ways in the two courts. In the Court of Appeal, the Court is typically 
confronted with the question of whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order that 
may be interlocutory. In the Divisional Court, the issue tends to be if leave is required, or whether 
an interlocutory order is not appealable, such as being a decision made under the Construction 
Act108 or in the Small Claims Court.109 The rarity with which a litigant brings a final appeal in the 
Divisional Court by mistake also led to a decision not to search for cases where a litigant 
mistakenly appealed a master’s final order to the Superior Court – such cases are likely extremely 
rare, and searching for them would appear to be searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. 
 
106  Whether the issue was raised by the court itself or as a result of a responding party’s motion was also kept 
track of. However, these results turned out to be uninteresting, due to this matter being unclear in many cases 
and uncertainty about how the results are in any way relevant to the proposed policy prescriptions. 
107  Infra note 114. 
108  Where interlocutory appeals are not permitted: RSO 1990, c C30 [“CLA”], s 71(3), as occurred in, e.g., 570 
South Service Road Inc v Lawrence-Paine & Associates Ltd, 2011 ONSC 3410, 3 CLR (4th) 1 (Div Ct) [“570 
South Service Road”]. 
109  Ellins v McDonald, 2012 ONSC 4831, [2012] OJ No 4556 (Div Ct) [“Ellins”]. 
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One could quibble with confining this analysis to Ontario. Other common law provinces – 
notably, British Columbia110 – have similarly struggled with the distinction between interlocutory 
and final appeals for decades. A more tailored review of British Columbia case law is returned to 
in Part IV.B.2. However, confining in this way seems an appropriate decision for multiple reasons, 
one of which is simply to have a more manageable sample size. More importantly, however, 
Ontario is unique among the provinces given the division of jurisdiction over interlocutory and 
final appeals between two courts111 – as discussed below, this may be relevant to potential 
solutions in this area. British Columbia also has different practical procedural approaches to this 
issue, as will be discussed in Part IV.B.2, that make a direct comparison to Ontario inexact. Finally, 
Ontario underwent serious reforms to its civil procedure in the past decade.112 While the rules 
surrounding interlocutory appeals per se were not amended, the principle of proportionality now 
applies to all of civil procedure,113 and the spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak has 
been held to apply beyond the specific summary judgment context.114 Confining the analysis to 
Ontario thus appears reasonable. 
Not every case where there was a dispute over the interlocutory or final nature of an appeal 
could be neatly classified as falling into the goal of this study: to discern the state of the law 
regarding this distinction, and the access to justice consequences of its hypothesized lack of clarity. 
As such, the following types of cases were not included in this analysis: 
 
110  See, e.g., Frederick M Irvine, “Annotation: Radke v. S. (M.) (Litigation Guardian of)” (2006) 27 CPC (6th) 8. 
111  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 5.1. 
112  Described in, e.g., Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has Its Day in Court” (2012) 37 Queen’s LJ 697 at 700-
701 and Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift: An Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary 
Judgment Reforms” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275 at 1280-1281. 
113  Supra note 93. 
114  See, e.g., Pitel & Lerner, supra note 94; Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety & Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 
6100, 37 CLR (4th) 1 (SCJ) at para 9 (holding that the spirit of Hryniak applies to the interpretation of Rule 2.1 
of the Rules). 
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• disputes over appeal rights in the criminal or quasi-criminal context115 (the differences in 
criminal and civil procedure are so great that comparing them seems of marginal utility);  
• attempts to appeal or judicially review arguably interlocutory decisions of administrative 
tribunals (generally not allowed),116 as this appears not relevant to civil practice, being a 
matter of administrative law;  
• disputes over proceeding with interlocutory appeals pending the Court of Appeal deciding 
what to do in the same case (not shedding light on the uncertainty in the law);117 
• when a party’s position disputing a court’s jurisdiction caused by this distinction was 
withdrawn prior to the hearing – it would be very difficult to quantify costs and delay 
caused by the withdrawn position in these cases;118  
• leave to appeal an order being sought despite the judge not being sure it was necessary;119  
• applications for judicial review of Small Claims Court interlocutory decisions (which are 
theoretically allowed to ensure the Small Claims Court did not act without jurisdiction);120 
• where the Divisional Court satisfied itself that it could hear an interlocutory appeal due to 
an allegation of bias (not caused by the distinction between interlocutory and final orders 
per se);121 and 
 
115  E.g., United States of America v Fafalios, 2012 ONCA 365, 110 OR (3d) 641. 
116  See, e.g., Aroda v Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2010 ONSC 419, 259 OAC 384 (Div Ct); Ackerman v 
Ontario (Provincial Police), 2010 ONSC 910, 259 OAC 163 (Div Ct); Ibrahim v Ontario College of 
Pharmacists, 2010 ONSC 5293, [2010] OJ No 4200 (Div Ct). 
117  See, e.g., Manicinelli, supra note 3, excused a party from filing materials pending determination from the 
Court of Appeal on whether an order was interlocutory or final. 
118  Sluyt v Sluyt, 2010 ONCA 150, 75 RFL (6th) 237. 
119  Sun v Pomes, 2012 ONSC 3031, [2012] OJ No 2270 (Div Ct). 
120  Mazinani (cob Mazinani Law Offices) v Clark, 2014 ONSC 7100, [2014] OJ No 5886 (Div Ct); Harbinger 
Network Inc v Robert Webster Co, 2016 ONSC 487, [2016] OJ No 363 (Div Ct). 
121  1147335 Ontario Inc v Thyssen Krupp Elevator (Canada) Inc, 2012 ONSC 4139, 295 OAC 71 (Div Ct). 
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• where confusion among lawyers about whether an order was final or interlocutory led to 
missing a deadline if the parties ultimately resolved the issue.122 
Though all of these matters, in some way, shed light on consequences of the fact that there is a 
distinction between interlocutory and final appeals, they seem inapposite to assess the actual 
distinction, and the access to justice consequences of its hypothesized lack of clarity. However, 
disputes over whether orders made under the Construction Act123 or the Partition Act124 were final 
or interlocutory were included. Though these statutory regimes prescribe somewhat idiosyncratic 
appellate practice, the law concerning whether an order is interlocutory or final is the same,125 and 
as such they highlight the costs of this distinction. 
III) CHARACTERISTICS OF ONTARIO CASE LAW 
A. Number of Disputes 
119 cases in the Court of Appeal, and 30 in the Divisional Court, had disputes over whether 
an order under appeal was interlocutory or final. This came up in a variety of ways, including 
motions brought by respondents to strike the appeal,126 cases where the court raised the issue on 
its own initiative,127 where the respondent raised it at the hearing of the appeal,128 or as defences 
to motions to extend time in which to appeal.129 The numbers per year can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
122  Laczko v Alexander, 2012 ONCA 803, [2012] OJ No 5423. 
123  Ravenda Homes Ltd v Ontario 1372708 Ltd, 2010 ONSC 6338, 5 CPC (7th) 440 (Div Ct) [“Ravenda”]. 
124  Nifco v Nifco, 2017 ONSC 7475, 6 RFL (8th) 212 (Div Ct) [“Nifco”]. 
125  Nifco, ibid at paras 4-6 (which makes this point implicitly); Ravenda, supra note 123 at para 6. 
126  E.g., Wong v Gong, 2010 ONCA 25, [2010] OJ No 121 [“Wong v Gong”]. 
127  E.g., Clarke (Litigation guardian of) v Richardson, 2013 ONCA 731, [2013] OJ No 5896 [“Clarke”]. 
128  E.g., Hanisch v McKean, 2014 ONCA 698, 325 OAC 253. 
129  E.g., VandenBussche Irrigation & Equipment Ltd v Kejay Investments Inc, 2016 ONCA 613, [2016] OJ No 
4185. 
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TABLE 3A: NUMBERS AND RESULTS OF DISPUTES OVER THE 
INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL DISTINCTION – ONTARIO 
 
Year CA: 
Total 
CA: 
Interlocutory 
CA: 
Final 
CA: 
Other 
Div Ct: 
Total 
Div Ct: 
Interlocutory 
Div Ct: 
Final 
Div Ct: 
Other 
 
2010 7 4 2 1 4 2 2 0 
2011 9 6 3 0 2 2 0 0 
2012 13 11 2 0 1 0 1 0 
2013 7 7 0 0 3 0 3 0 
2014 12 10 2 0 6 6 0 0 
2015 22 15 7 0 5 3 1 1 
2016 26 18 8 0 1 1 0 0 
2017 23 19 4 0 8 3 3 2 
TOTAL 119 90 28 1 30 17 10 3 
 
It is unsurprising that the Court of Appeal has dealt with this issue more frequently than the 
Divisional Court, as it is where a party would more likely go under the mistaken belief that an 
appeal can be taken as of right. This happens less frequently in the Divisional Court, except when 
specific statutes such as the Construction Act make interlocutory appeals impermissible.130  
To put the Court of Appeal’s numbers of more than twenty cases per year in recent years in 
perspective, the Court usually reports around 1,000 decisions a year.131 That 1-2% of them address 
disputes over the interlocutory/final distinction suggests misuse of resources of an important court. 
 
 
 
130  CLA, supra note 108, s 71(3)(b), litigated in, e.g., Ravenda, supra note 123. 
131  Infra note 232. 
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B. Results and Remedies 
90 of 119 Court of Appeal decisions – 75.6% – held the appeal to be interlocutory, suggesting 
that respondents do not usually raise this issue frivolously, trying to uphold a result on a 
technicality. 28 of the 119 held the appeal to be final (23.5%), allowing the appeal to proceed. 
Determining the remedy in the Court of Appeal is only relevant when the appeal is found to 
be interlocutory – otherwise, the appeal may proceed (though the costs caused by the issue being 
raised are doubtless irritating for the appellants). In 87 of 90 cases where the appeal was held to 
be interlocutory, the Court of Appeal simply quashed, dismissed, or would not entertain the appeal. 
An eighty-eighth case quashed the appeal but extended time to seek leave to appeal in the 
Divisional Court.132 In only two cases did the Court of Appeal hear the appeal, once reconstituting 
itself as the Divisional Court due to urgency,133 and once because it did not wish to bifurcate 
matters when much of the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal and the issues it was 
addressing were intertwined with the issues that should have been before the Divisional Court.134 
The results in the Divisional Court (17 orders held to be interlocutory, compared to 10 held to 
be final) are less important than the absolute numbers and the remedies, as at times holding the 
appealed order to be final allowed it to proceed,135 yet in others it did not.136 This is due to various 
statutes prescribing peculiar appellate routes to the Divisional Court,137 making the cases more 
idiosyncratic. In twenty cases, the Court declined leave to appeal, or dismissed, quashed, or refused 
to hear the appeal. In six of the thirty cases, the Court decided it could hear the appeal. In two 
 
132  Ambrose v Zuppardi, 2013 ONCA 768, 368 DLR (4th) 749 at para 11. 
133  Punit v Punit, 2014 ONCA 252, 43 RFL (7th) 84 [“Punit”] at para 18. 
134  Azzeh (Litigation guardian of) v Legendre, 2017 ONCA 385, 135 OR (3d) 721, leave to appeal ref’d, [2017] 
SCCA No 289, 2018 CarswellOnt 2058 [“Azzeh”]. 
135  E.g., Ellins, supra note 109. 
136  Petgrave (Litigation guardian of) v Maheru, 2010 ONSC 1710, [2010] OJ No 1211 (Div Ct) [“Petgrave”]. 
137  E.g., the CPA, supra note 42, s 30; CLA, supra 108, ss 70-71. 
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others it declined to decide the issue, deciding the case on other grounds138 or adjourning pending 
the Court of Appeal ruling in the same case.139 The Court also reconstituted itself as the Superior 
Court once,140 and gave sought directions once.141  
In both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal, there is an overwhelming tendency, upon 
realizing an appeal has been improperly commenced, to send the party back to square one. Rarely 
do the judges facilitate the progress of the action. This is not necessarily problematic – if the appeal 
was illicitly commenced, ending it can be entirely appropriate. At times, interpreting procedural 
law excessively strictly can be an access to justice obstacle,142 but this may not be the case when 
addressing an appeal that does not concern the merits of a dispute. And in a few rare cases where 
judges felt access to justice demanded the appeal be helped along due to urgency, this occurred. 
(Admittedly, this does not mean that there were no other cases in which judges were similarly 
concerned about urgency but for whatever reason did not act to accommodate those concerns.) 
To briefly address the four cases that did not decide the dispute over the interlocutory/final 
distinction: one involved an instance where the Court of Appeal thought, even if an order was 
final, it would be imprudent to entertain the appeal before trial;143 in the second, another factor 
rendered the dispute irrelevant;144 in the third, the Divisional Court adjourned the matter pending 
the Court of Appeal deciding whether the matter was interlocutory or final (appeals were brought 
in both courts out of caution);145 and in the last, Nordheimer J (as he then was) felt the matter was 
appropriate to dismiss pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the Rules for being facially abusive, regardless of 
 
138  Polmat Group Inc v E Ring Corp, 2015 ONSC 1233, 2015 CarswellOnt 2864 [“Polmat”]. 
139  Mancinelli, supra note 3. 
140  C&M Properties Inc v 1788333 Ontario Inc, 2015 ONSC 706, [2015] OJ No 534. 
141  Awad v Dover Investments Ltd, 2015 ONSC 3955, [2015] OJ No 3204 [“Awad”]. 
142  See, e.g., Wouters v Wouters, 2018 ONCA 26, 6 RFL (8th) 305 at para 36. 
143  Harrop (Litigation guardian of) v Harrop, 2010 ONCA 390, 85 CPC (6th) 1. 
144  Polmat, supra note 138. 
145  Mancinelli, supra note 3. 
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whether it was interlocutory or final.146 These cases evidence how frequently this issue arises, but 
provide no insight on how courts determine whether an issue is interlocutory or final. Now that we 
have discussed how courts resolve this issue and how frequently it arises, we should consider the 
financial costs of these cases. 
C. Costs 
When calculating the costs incurred by parties, it must be acknowledged that costs awards 
generally only permit recovery of approximately half of the costs actually incurred.147 Many cases 
also have no reported costs, whether because the decision is silent,148 the issue was reserved to the 
trial judge,149 settlement was encouraged and no subsequent costs decision is reported,150 no costs 
were sought,151 or the court decided it was not an appropriate case for costs, potentially because 
the court had to raise the issue on its own initiative.152 These cases accordingly cannot be used in 
determining the costs incurred by parties. Cases where the costs award was clearly animated by 
factors other than the interlocutory/final dispute were excluded, as they shed no light on the costs 
caused by the distinction per se.153 The quantum of some of the orders was also adjusted, if the 
interlocutory/final dispute reflected only about a quarter154 or half155 of issues raised. 
The average quantum of the 86 informative costs awards is $6,307. In the 70 Court of Appeal 
cases, it is $5,685. There was also a fairly small range in this sample of seventy cases – only two 
 
146  Loftus v Chamberlain, 2017 ONSC 5751, [2017] OJ No 5175 (Div Ct). 
147  P Scott Horne, “The Privatization of Justice in Québec’s Draft Bill to Enact the New Code of Civil Procedure: 
A Critical Evaluation” (2013) 18 Appeal 55 at 61. 
148  Royal Bank of Canada v Trang, 2012 ONCA 902, 97 CBR (5th) 52. 
149  570 South Service Road, supra note 108 at para 16. 
150  Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc v Romandale Farms Ltd, 2016 ONCA 404, 131 OR (3d) 455. 
151  Chand v Quereshi, 2016 ONCA 231, [2016] OJ No 1596. 
152  Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc v Lalonde, 2017 ONCA 515, 137 OR (3d) 750 [“Golden Oaks”]. 
153  See, e.g., Talbot v Bergeron, 2016 ONCA 956, 2016 CarswellOnt 19874. 
154  Shoukralla v Shoukralla, 2016 ONCA 128, 41 CBR (6th) 6, where this was one of four major issues. 
155  Westmount-Keele Ltd v Royal Host Hotels and Resorts Real Estate Investment Trust, 2017 ONCA 673, [2017] 
OJ No 4686, where this was one of two major issues. 
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of the 70 decisions awarded more than $10,000 in costs. The average costs award in the 16 
Divisional Court cases is $9,028. Despite the smaller sample size, the range was larger, with the 
median being only $5,000. Remembering that actual costs incurred are about double the size of 
costs orders, it is fair to assume that the typical party incurs at least $10,000 in costs as a result of 
a dispute over the interlocutory or final nature of an order, not including the costs of the matter 
before the motions judge. This is not an enormous amount of costs,156 but given that a dispute over 
the interlocutory or final nature of an appealed order is definitionally unrelated to a case’s merits, 
it is unfortunate that these costs are incurred. 
D. Delay 
In eleven cases where the Court of Appeal quashed an appeal, the losing party sought leave 
to appeal the matter in the Divisional Court. The average length of time between the quashing and 
determination of the leave motion (or the appeal, if leave was granted) in the ten cases where delay 
is calculable157 is approximately 7.7 months.158 This step would have been necessary even in the 
presence of clearer law. But from the perspective of a litigant’s lived experience, it comes after an 
average delay of about six months between the decision under appeal and the Court of Appeal 
quashing the appeal.159 This latter delay was for a step that in no way helped resolve the merits of 
a case and should not have been undertaken as a matter of procedure. This is an unfortunate 
occurrence given that the merits of the dispute are not addressed. This excludes a twelfth case, 
 
156  For instance, Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95 at 98 estimates that jurisdiction motions cost parties three to 
eight times this amount, depending on whether there is an appeal. 
157  Colenbrander, supra note 99 denies leave to appeal after the Court of Appeal quashed an appeal in an 
unreported decision. It accordingly could not be used in the calculations. The other cases are noted in their 
own column in Appendix G. 
158  It would be longer if one considers the appeal process in Xela Enterprise Ltd v Castillo, 2015 ONSC 866, 70 
CPC (7th) 224 (Div Ct), aff’d 2016 ONCA 437, 131 OR (3d) 193, leave to appeal denied, [2016] SCCA No 
366, 2017 CarswellOnt 2690. 
159  In these eleven cases, the delay between the decision under appeal and the Court of Appeal quashing the 
appeal was 183 days – essentially, half a year or 6 months. 
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where a determination that the motion to quash should be heard in conjunction with the substantive 
appeal led to a delay of three months.160 
E. Appeals 
Two of thirty Divisional Court decisions led to unsuccessful motions for reconsideration.161 
Nine Court of Appeal decisions led to unsuccessful Supreme Court of Canada leave applications. 
Of these cases, however, four of the Court of Appeal decisions addressed the merits162 (despite 
that only occurring in a quarter of cases163), non-interlocutory matters dominated a fifth,164 and 
four involved self-represented litigants who may have been confused about the process or were 
excessively querulant165 (though care should be taken not to unfairly stereotype self-represented 
litigants,166 there is also evidence that they may be responsible for a disproportionate share of 
inappropriate litigation, even if through no fault of their own167). In other words, no party with 
counsel appealed only fact that his or her appeal was quashed for being interlocutory. 
 
160  Lawrence v International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 773, 2017 ONCA 321, 138 OR 
(3d) 129, aff’d 2018 SCC 11, [2018] 1 SCR 267. 
161  2128445 Ontario Inc v Sherk, 2017 ONSC 5996, [2017] OJ No 5783 [“Sherk”]; Belway v Petro-Canada Fuels 
Inc, 2015 ONSC 675, [2015] OJ No 416, ref’g to reconsider 2014 ONSC 3344, [2014] OJ No 2621. 
162  Azzeh, supra note 134 (the Court addressed the interlocutory portions); and R & G Draper Farms (Keswick) 
Ltd v Nature’s Finest Produce Ltd, 2016 ONCA 481, 350 OAC 198, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] SCCA No 
399, 2016 CarswellOnt 16389, Speciale Law Professional Corp v Schrader Canada Ltd, 2015 ONCA 856, 
[2015] OJ No 6418, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] SCCA No 56, 2016 CanLII 26756, and Griffin v Dell 
Canada Inc, 2010 ONCA 29, 98 OR (3d) 481, leave to appeal ref’d, [2010] SCCA No 75, 2010 CanLII 27725 
(held to be final decisions). 
163  30 of 119 decisions: 28 where the appeal was held to be final, and 2 others where the Court heard the appeal. 
164  Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and Technology v AU Optronics Corp, 2016 ONCA 621, 132 OR (3d) 81, 
leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] SCCA No 442, 2016 CarswellOnt 17004. 
165  Olumide v Conservative Party of Canada, 2016 ONCA 314, [2016] OJ No 2284, leave to appeal refused: 
[2016] SCCA No 425, 2017 CarswellOnt 6254; Must v Shkuryna, 2015 ONCA 665, [2015] OJ No 5087, leave 
to appeal ref’d, [2015] SCCA No 482, 2016 CarswellOnt 5396; Ontario v Lipsitz, 2011 ONCA 466, 281 OAC 
67, leave to appeal ref’d, [2011] SCCA No 407, 2012 CarswellOnt 1520; Lindhorst v Stone & Co, 2011 
ONCA 657, [2011] OJ No 4594, leave to appeal ref’d, [2011] SCCA No 564, 2012 CarswellOnt 4238. 
166  NRSLP Summary Procedures, supra note 105; Yves-Marie Morrisette, “Abus de droit, quérulence et parties 
non représentées” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 23. 
167  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 98, suggesting that self-represented litigants bring a disproportionate number of 
frivolous, vexatious, and abusive actions; see also Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the Organized 
Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Phenomenon in Canada” 53:3 Alta L Rev 606; Donald J Netolitzky, 
“Lawyers and Court Representation of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [OPCA] Litigants in 
Canada” (2018) 51:2 UBC L Rev 419. 
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Ultimately, this is a fairly low rate of appeals, with there being no cases where an appellate 
court overturned the result below. This could indicate that the law is clearer than suspected,168 but 
two other explanations exist. First, disputes over the interlocutory or final nature of orders are 
always peripheral in litigation, and parties likely feel that it is not worthwhile pressing these 
matters – especially to the Supreme Court of Canada. Second, leave is almost always required to 
appeal a Divisional Court169 or Court of Appeal decision,170 disincentivizing such appeals. 
F. Self-Represented Litigants 
Of the 149 cases, self-represented litigants were present in 32 (21%), compared to 117 (79%) 
where all parties had counsel. In 8 of 30 cases in the Divisional Court, litigants were self-
represented, compared to 22 cases (73%) where all parties had counsel. This is similar to there 
being 24 cases in the Court of Appeal (20%) where there were self-represented litigants, compared 
to 94 cases where all parties have counsel (79%). This is less than other contexts, given Julie 
Macfarlane’s observation of “some lower level civil courts reporting more than 70% of litigants 
as self-represented.”171 This area of law therefore appears to confuse lawyers as well as laypeople. 
At the same time, self-represented litigants’ positions lost 79% of the time in the Court of 
Appeal (the Divisional Court’s decisions’ idiosyncrasies make the results of what is a “loss” there 
less informative). This could be because self-represented litigants are being bamboozled unfairly, 
in line with Macfarlane’s fears.172 But it is possible – hopefully likelier – that self-represented 
litigants are simply confused about the process,173 which court an appeal should be brought in, and 
 
168  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95 at 95, positing that lowering rates of appeals suggests greater clarity in the 
law. 
169  Divisional Court decisions are generally only appealable with leave: CJA, supra note 38, s 6(1)(a). 
170  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 7.5. 
171  Macfarlane Main Report, supra note 105 at 34. 
172  NSRLP Summary Procedures, supra note 105. 
173  Ibid. 
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whether leave is necessary. The uncertainty of the law would thus appear to affect self-represented 
litigants especially harshly. 
G. Effects of Hryniak 
One would have hoped that Hryniak, with its emphasis on the timely and inexpensive 
resolution of civil claims on their merits, would have contributed to a decrease in the number of 
disputes over this issue, given how far the issue is removed from the merits of a case. Reading the 
case law did lead to observations that the spirit of Hryniak has been cited in deciding whether to 
grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order,174 as well as a reason not to bifurcate an appeal.175 
However, not a single case cited Hryniak in the context of adjudicating the final/interlocutory 
distinction.176 While this could be interpreted as Hryniak being irrelevant to the interlocutory/final 
distinction, its spirit still seems as though it should permeate how parties act going forward,177 and 
perhaps how the law surrounding this distinction should be amended.  
Moreover, more cases are disputing this point in the aftermath of Hryniak being decided in 
early 2014 – exactly the opposite of what one would have hoped would be Hryniak’s effects. 
Whether this can truly be attributed to lawyers not heeding the call for a “culture shift” is debatable 
– it could be the result of the area of law becoming more unwieldy, as Juriansz JA suggested in 
Parsons.178 But if Hryniak had helped ameliorate this area of law, one would have thought that 
parties would be bringing fewer interlocutory appeals, in line with Hryniak’s call for a culture 
shift, recognizing that interlocutory appeals are frequently a disproportionate step in achieving 
 
174  Gatti v Avramedis, 2016 ONSC 606, 2016 CarswellOnt 892 (Div Ct) at para 11. 
175  Bonello, supra note 91 at para 16.  
176  Some of the cases concerned summary judgments and Hryniak was considered in the context of the merits of 
the appeal: e.g., Bonello, ibid. 
177  See, e.g., Iannarella v Corbett, 2015 ONCA 110, 124 OR (3d) 523 at para 53, concerning Hryniak’s relation to 
discovery; Pitel & Lerner, supra note 94, concerning Hryniak’s spirit and motions to strike. 
178  Supra note 8. 
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access to civil justice. (Though increased use of summary judgment could increase the number of 
interlocutory orders and thus interlocutory appeals, this would also hopefully lead to litigation 
being resolved earlier, giving less time for interlocutory orders to be made.) 
H. Conclusions on Ontario Case Law 
The most important isolated statistic may be the sheer number of cases brought where the 
parties could not determine whether an appeal was interlocutory or final. That the Court of Appeal 
is spending 1-2% of its cases addressing a matter such as this – so far removed from its purpose – 
is troubling. Tomes have been written on legal issues that arise less frequently.179 The result has 
been hundreds of litigants having their claims delayed by months and spending approximately 
$10,000 in legal costs. At times, this could be the result of an obvious procedural mistake or a 
conscious illicit attempt to have an appeal as of right – there are cases where a straightforward 
application of precedent should have resolved the issue.180 On other occasions, self-represented 
litigants could be confused about the process.181 Overall, however, it seems the primary reason 
would be the already observed uncertainty in the state of the law regarding this distinction.182 This 
is evident from the court acknowledging this to be case,183 there being no clear precedent on 
 
179  For example, the Court of Appeal hears only about a half-dozen jurisdiction motions a year (see Kennedy 
Jurisdiction, supra note 95) and a handful (if any) cases determining non-criminal procedure rights under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [the “Charter”].  
180  See, e.g., Wong v Gong, supra note 126.  
181  See, e.g., Minkofski v Dost Estate, 2014 ONSC 1904, 321 OAC 38 (Div Ct), where the judge sought to clarify 
a self-represented litigant’s grounds of appeal. 
182  Whether there are dissents on any of the foregoing was also recorded, as this is one indicator of lack of clarity 
in the law. Only a single dissent emerged in any of the decisions – Juriansz JA’s dissent in Parsons, supra note 
8, concluding that a decision to hold a post-settlement hearing out-of-province in a class proceeding was 
interlocutory, while the majority held it to be final. This could indicate that the law is not as uncertain as it may 
appear on first glance. But it could also reflect that intermediary appellate courts have fewer dissents than apex 
courts, and that dissenting on the question of whether an appeal is interlocutory or final is unlikely to be an 
issue that an intermediary appellate court judge would feel strongly enough about to write a dissent. 
183  See, e.g., Mancinelli, supra note 3 at para 2. 
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point,184 and it being not uncommon for the court rather than the responding party to raise the 
issue.185  
The state of the law surrounding the interlocutory/final distinction therefore exemplifies the 
truth in the fear that uncertain law will create needless litigation.186 Other things being equal, clear 
rules are preferable to unclear ones. Of course, absolute predictability is not possible and some 
uncertainty may be necessary to ensure a party can have a remedy.187 Whether this is the case vis-
à-vis the interlocutory/final distinction will be returned to below. But regardless of the answer to 
this normative question, it is clear that the uncertainty in this area of procedural law has had 
negative consequences in terms of misusing courts’ and litigants’ time and financial resources.  
IV) WAYS FORWARD 
The purpose and history behind the difference in treatment between interlocutory and final 
appeals has been explained, as has the perception of unnecessary confusion in this area of the law. 
Recent case law shows that this is more than mere perception, and is posing an access to justice 
obstacle for litigants. The best way forward would be to clarify the law, to avoid procedural errors 
producing needless expense and delay. Of course, the law, whether procedural or substantive, will 
never be entirely clear188 but the confusion in the interlocutory/final distinction appears unhelpful. 
This section tests potential solutions. First, consideration is given to whether it would be prudent 
 
184  See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 8. 
185  It was hard to quantify this as there were many cases where the source of the issue coming before the court 
was unclear. However, in at least ten cases, the court raised the issue on its own initiative: Simmonds v Armtec 
Infrastructure Inc, 2012 ONCA 467, [2012] OJ No 2981, further reasons at 2012 ONCA 774, 299 OAC 20; 
Clarke, supra note 127; Punit, supra note 133; Waldman v Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd, 2015 ONCA 53, 
330 OAC 142; Parsons, ibid; Durbin v Brant, 2017 ONCA 463, [2017] OJ No 2991; Golden Oaks, supra note 
152; Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society v CSD, 2017 ONCA 743, [2017] OJ No 4937; Petgrave, supra 
note 136; Beamer v Beamer, 2013 ONSC 7379, [2013] OJ No 5395 (Div Ct). 
186  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95 at 107. 
187  See, e.g., Michael Sobkin, “Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203 at 205, arguing for a “forum of 
necessity” in jurisdictional disputes, despite recognizing that this will increase litigation. 
188  See, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, “Problems with Rules” (1995) 83 Cal L Rev 955. 
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to eliminate the distinction between interlocutory and final appeals, or the leave requirement for 
interlocutory appeals. Next, the possibility of legislative intervention is considered with particular 
reference to the experiences of England and Wales and especially British Columbia. Third, thought 
is given to how Ontario courts could interpret existing legislation pending reform. Fourth, it is 
explained why complete prohibition of interlocutory appeals is a solution that would likely be 
counterproductive. Fifth, the Divisional Court’s place in the Ontario court system as an 
intermediary appellate court is questioned. 
A. Elimination 
Disputes over the interlocutory/final distinction would disappear if the leave requirement for 
interlocutory appeals was eliminated or all civil appeals required leave. 
1. Eliminating the Leave Requirement 
Eliminating the leave requirement for interlocutory appeals would not solve the issue of a 
party bringing an appeal in the wrong court, but would eliminate the expense and delay caused by 
the leave motion itself. However, the leave requirement fulfils a valuable purpose: to encourage 
proportionality in appeals. The rationale for this is logical: interlocutory appeals do not address 
the merits of a dispute, but only a collateral matter, and as such the resources and time put into 
them are often not commensurate with their importance vis-à-vis the fundamental dispute between 
the parties.189 Though some such appeals may be significant in terms of affecting a party’s chance 
to achieve justice,190 the instances of this are rare. 
Moreover, as Jutras has noted, there is no natural “right” of appeal.191 Policy choices mandate 
that appeals be restricted to matters that fulfill the purposes of appeals and are not disproportionate 
 
189  Perell & Morden, supra note 92 at ¶ 12.40, cited in, e.g., Skunk, supra note 92 at para 31. 
190  Determining the applicability of a limitation period is a good example: see, e.g., Charlebois, supra note 78, 
compared to Golden Oaks, supra note 152; see also Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.51-1.53, 1.59. 
191  Jutras, supra note 19 at, e.g., 66. 
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to the expense incurred as a result of the appeal.192 Interlocutory appeals are seldom necessary to 
fulfill the appellate role of making law – though if there are conflicting decisions on a legal point, 
that is a reason to grant leave to appeal.193 As for checking for errors, it is of course possible for a 
trial judge to err in deciding an interlocutory matter. However, it is less likely to cause an injustice 
when it does not address the merits of the dispute. As such, it is reasonable to require a party to 
show that there is reason to doubt the correctness of the order under appeal and to show that the 
matter is of sufficient importance to justify the costs of an appeal. This also reflects the fact that 
public resources are finite, and that perfection in the procedural aspects of the case is not necessary 
to preserve justice or the appearance of justice.194 
Ultimately, eliminating the leave requirement for interlocutory appeals would open the door 
to unnecessary delay, expense, and costs through fostering needless interlocutory appeals. 
Furthermore, given that interlocutory appeals are rarely necessary to secure access to justice, 
explicitly stating that they are to be exceptional has additional valuable hortatory value. 
2. A Leave Requirement for All Appeals? 
An alternative would be to mandate that all decisions require leave to be appealed. This would 
ensure that all appeals have some chance of success,195 as well as ensuring respect for the 
proportionality principle: whether final damages or discovery is at stake, the judge considering 
granting leave would have to be persuaded that the interests of justice favour having an appeal. 
Concerns about denying parties an appeal when warranted and/or proportionate can also be 
 
192  Jutras, ibid; Housen, supra note 4 at para 9; Perell & Morden, supra note 92 at ¶ 12.40. 
193  Rules, supra note 89, Rule 62.04(a). 
194  As Karakatsanis J noted in Hryniak, supra note 17 at para 29, “There is, of course, always some tension 
between accessibility and the truth-seeking function but, much as one would not expect a jury trial over a 
contested parking ticket, the procedures used to adjudicate civil disputes must fit the nature of the claim.” 
195  Frequent in leave requirements, such as the Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5, s 138.8(1), requiring “a reasonable 
possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favour of the plaintiff” to commence a proceeding.  
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mitigated. First, the threshold to appeal would presumably be rather low – probably raising a 
“serious question” (akin to the test for an interlocutory injunction196). Second, an overarching 
criterion such as the “interests of justice” (seen, in, for example, granting a stay pending appeal197) 
or the “balance of convenience” (seen in, for example, the test for an interlocutory injunction198) 
favouring granting leave could incorporate concerns about the costs of granting leave to appeal.199 
However, this may be an overreaction. The costs of the leave motion would include delay and 
financial expense for parties, albeit of a different sort than is seen now. Though the number of 
disputes over interlocutory appeals are surprisingly high, they are still a small minority of the work 
of the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court. Though a leave requirement could have the additional 
benefit of deterring frivolous appeals, costs awards are a potential200 – albeit imperfect201 – solution 
to that. The Court of Appeal appears to have little difficulty summarily dismissing appeals when 
appropriate to do so.202 Asking it to hear leave motions of unambiguously final orders may be an 
imprudent use of resources. 
 
196  RJR -- MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311 [“RJR”] at 337, describing this 
threshold as “low”. 
197  Pickering (City) v Slade (2015), 39 MPLR (5th) 173 (Ont CA).  
198  RJR, supra note 196 at 342. 
199  RJR, ibid at 342, citing Beetz J in Manitoba (Attorney General) v Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd, [1987] 1 
SCR 110 at 129: “determin[ing] which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm” from granting the relief. 
200  See, e.g., New Solutions Extrusion Corp v Gauthier, 2010 ONCA 348, [2010] OJ No 1988 at para 4. 
201  As noted above, supra note 147, costs awards are only about half of costs actually ordered. There also can be 
difficulty in enforcing costs orders: see, e.g., Apollo Real Estate v Streambank Funding Inc, 2018 ONSC 392, 
2018 CarswellOnt 2965 (SCJ). 
202  Glancing at the Court’s judgments in any given week leads one to see that many cases are dismissed with “by 
the bench” judgments or endorsements of 26 or fewer paragraphs. For example, during the week of September 
17, 2018 (a week chosen at random when this footnote was being drafted), 17 of 23 decisions fell into this 
category: 1) R v Breton, 2018 ONCA 753, 366 CCC (3d) 281; 2) R v Romano, 2018 ONCA 754, 2018 
CarswellOnt 15147; 3) R v Korof, 2018 ONCA 757, 2018 CarswellOnt 15159; 4) R v Sauve, 2018 ONCA 755, 
[2018] OJ No 4717; 5) Bisumbule c Conway, 2018 ONCA 765, [2018] OJ No 4768; 6) Chiocchio v Hamilton 
(City), 2018 ONCA 762, 143 OR (3d) 356; 7) Filice v Complex Services Inc, 2018 ONCA 763, 49 CCEL (4th) 
228; 8) White v Curtis, 2018 ONCA 767, [2018] OJ No 4767; 9) Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 
2018 ONCA 761, 142 OR (3d) 481; 10) Wiles v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2018 ONCA 766, 82 
CCLI (5th) 189; 11) Davis (Re), 2018 ONCA 768, 2018 CarswellOnt 16315; 12) R v Balouch, 2018 ONCA 
770, 2018 CarswellOnt 16309; 13) R v Bhandol, 2018 ONCA 769, 36 MVR (7th) 21; 14) R v Fiddaoui, 2018 
ONCA 759, [2018] OJ No 4740; 15) Simmonds v G&G Pool Services, 2018 ONCA 772, 143 OR (3d) 239; 16) 
R v Patterson, 2018 ONCA 774, [2018] OJ No 4831; 17) Taylor v Workplace Safety & Insurance Board, 2018 
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Ultimately, despite the current problems caused by the distinction between interlocutory and 
final appeals, the rationale for the distinction remains sound. Doing away with this distinction 
could add to the problems with the current state of the law. Despite over a century of confusion on 
the topic, the distinction has sufficient merit to justify attempts to retain it. 
B. Legislative Adoption of a Version of the Application Approach 
One may be less sanguine about the likelihood of reforming the interlocutory/final distinction 
were it not for the fact that England and Wales – the jurisdiction that was the source of this 
controversy – has already done so. Moreover, and closer to home, British Columbia has also 
amended its legislation regarding interlocutory appeals. Both these jurisdictions have sought to 
clearly define what appeals do (not) require leave (or “permission” to use the English term203) to 
be appealed. This section explains how both jurisdictions have done so, analyzing British 
Columbia’s experience in particular, before turning to the advantages of such legislative 
intervention, and ways to mitigate its acknowledged disadvantages. 
1. England and Wales 
As noted above, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee for England and Wales proposed that 
the more predictable application approach be adopted in the 1980s. And in 1999, the Access to 
Justice Act, 1999, codified this area of law.204 A “final decision” was defined as “a decision of a 
court that would finally determine (subject to any possible appeal or detailed assessment of costs) 
the entire proceedings.”205 What used to be called “interlocutory orders” that did not finally 
 
ONCA 771, [2018] OJ No 4832, contra: 1) Wood v CTS of Canada Co, 2018 ONCA 758, 142 OR (3d) 641; 2) 
R v CG, 2018 ONCA 751, 142 OR (3d) 489; 3) Carrick (Re), 2018 ONCA 752, 2018 CarswellOnt 15613; 4) 
Smith v Safranyos, 2018 ONCA 760, 143 OR (3d) 22; 5) R v JL, 2018 ONCA 756, 143 OR (3d) 170; 6) 
Ghiassi v Singh, 2018 ONCA 764, [2018] OJ No 4974. 
203  Civil Procedure Rules (UK) [“UK Civ Pro Rules”], Rule 52.3. 
204  A2J 2000 Order, supra note 66, art 1(2)(c); Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.34; Cheung, supra note 63 
at 17. 
205  A2J 2000 Order, ibid, s 2(c) [emphasis added]. 
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dispose of proceedings can be reviewed only if clearly “wrong or where it was unjust because of 
a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.”206 There remains 
criticism that this is too restrictive of appeal rights, allowing a court to avoid addressing a 
meritorious appeal through denying permission to appeal.207 But the new approach seems more 
predictable and likely to preserve scarce appellate resources.208 Though this experience is 
interesting, the difference in court levels between Ontario and England and Wales makes its 
experience less informative than those of other Canadian jurisdictions. Unlike Ontario, there are 
multiple trial courts in civil matters “below” the High Court of England and Wales; as such, appeal 
rights vary with the level of court appealed from as well as the nature of the order appealed. There 
are thus reasons that make appeal routes complicated beyond the interlocutory/final distinction.209 
Fortunately, there is another reference point closer to home. 
2. British Columbia 
a. Background 
Like Ontario, British Columbia struggled with this distinction for years.210 The Court of 
Appeal regularly held that the order approach rather than the application approach be followed,211 
despite the reticence of some of its members.212 Steps were then taken to rectify the situation.213 
In 2011, Finch CJBC issued a practice directive concerning delay caused by interlocutory appeals, 
and mandating that counsel discuss dates for such appeals prior to arguing motions for leave to 
 
206  Tanfern, supra note 66, summarizing Part 52.21 of the UK Civ Pro Rules, supra note 203. 
207  Richard Nobles & David Schiff, “The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of Justice” (2002) 65 Modern L 
Rev 676 at 687-689. 
208  Nobles & Schiff, ibid, at 688-689. There does not appear to be a more recent review of this. 
209  See, e.g., Nobles & Schiff, ibid. 
210  Irvine, supra note 110. 
211  Hayes Forest Services Ltd v Weyerhaeuser Co, 2008 BCCA 120, 78 BCLR (4th) 251, aff’g 2007 BCCA 497, 
76 BCLR (4th) 39 [“Hayes”]; Forest Glen Wood Products Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 
BCCA 480, 58 BCLR (4th) 330 [“Forest Glen Wood”]. 
212  See, e.g., Kimpton v Victoria (City), 2007 BCCA 376, 243 BCAC 158 [“Kimpton”]. 
213  See also Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.75. 
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appeal.214 This perhaps had valuable effects in terms of encouraging cooperation,215 but the real 
change occurred through legislation. Effective May 31, 2012, the Court of Appeal Act was 
amended to replace the concept of “interlocutory appeals” with one of “limited appeal orders” 
requiring leave to appeal for216 limited appeal orders in a number of situations: classically 
interlocutory matters such as scheduling, discovery, and evidentiary matters.217 This reduces doubt 
about whether leave to appeal is required.218 
b. Methodology for reviewing British Columbia cases 
To assess the effects of these amendments, a search was undertaken in WestLaw Canada and 
QuickLaw Advance in September 2018 for cases decided in the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
considering this distinction: between January 1, 2007 through May 30, 2012 using “interlocutory” 
and “appeal” within the same paragraph, and from May 31, 2012 through December 31, 2017, 
searching for: a) “limited appeal order”; or b) “interlocutory” within the same paragraph as 
“appeal”.219 The types of cases excluded in Part II were excluded here as well,220 and the same 
 
214  Expediting Interlocutory Appeals (Civil Practice Directive, 19 September 2011), online: 
<http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/court_of_ap peal/practice_and_procedure/civil_practice_directives_/Civil-
Expediting%20Interlocutory%20Appeals.htm>. 
215  It is difficult to measure the value of such symbolic steps, but there would appear to be little disadvantage to 
encouraging reflection on this issue. This is done, for instance, with respect to race-based challenges for cause 
in jury selection: see, e.g., R v Parks (1993), 15 OR (3d) 324 (CA). 
216  RSBC 1996, c 77, s 7, as am. 
217  Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001 [“BC CA Rules”]. 
218  “Litigation and Dispute Resolution in Canada” (Blake, Cassels & Graydon, 2012) at 35. 
219  Similar to Part II, above, recognizing that the change became effective May 31, 2012. 
220  E.g., the following were excluded:  
• where a panel varied a single judge denying leave to appeal: CSWU, Local 1611 v SELI Canada Inc, 2010 
BCCA 371, 8 BCLR (5th) 241, var’g 2010 BCCA 276, 7 Admin LR (5th) 40; 
• motions for leave themselves: e.g., Meade v Armstrong (City), 2010 BCCA 87, 285 BCAC 20; 
• where there was dispute over whether the matter should be considered criminal or civil (the majority 
finding it to be the former negating the need to consider the interlocutory/final decision): British Columbia 
(Director of Civil Forfeiture) v Hells Angels Motorcycle Corp, 2014 BCCA 330, 360 BCAC 170; 
• the Court holding that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a recital: Law v Cheng, 2016 BCCA 
120, 84 BCLR (5th) 238; 
• the parties agreed the matter was interlocutory, even though the judge was not sure: Quaite v Avorado 
Resort Ltd, 2010 BCCA 242, [2010] GSTC 192;  
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limitations of this analysis as that one are recognized. Evidence of six unreported decisions in 
British Columbia was found,221 compared to two in Ontario,222 despite there being fewer British 
Columbia cases in the analysis. This suggests that unreported decisions addressing this issue are 
more common in British Columbia than Ontario. 
The search in British Columbia was both narrower and broader than the search in Ontario. 
Regarding narrowness, there was no concentration on issues of costs, delay, and self-represented 
litigants because the structure of the courts in British Columbia, and lawyers’ fees, make such 
factors obviously distinguishable from the Ontario experience due to reasons having nothing to do 
with the interlocutory/final distinction. Given that searching for the effects of change in the law 
was the purpose of the analysis, numbers, results, remedies, and appeals of civil223 and family 
cases were recorded.224 Family law cases were included in British Columbia but not Ontario 
 
• where the parties agreed an order was a limited appeal order, but one party argued leave was not necessary 
given other issues being raised as of right: Hansra v Hansra, 2017 BCCA 199, 97 BCLR (5th) 240; 
• where the judge satisfied himself that no leave was necessary even though no party contested the issue: 
Gajie v Lam, 2016 BCCA 225, 387 BCAC 171; Ho Estate v Ho, 2016 BCCA 253, [2016] BCJ No 1206; 
KMM v DRM, 2017 BCCA 348, 2 RFL (8th) 14;  
• decisions under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [the “BIA”], that require leave to be 
appealed but did not consider the interlocutory/final distinction per se: Canadian Petcetera Ltd 
Partnership, Re, 2009 BCCA 255, 273 BCAC 26 (interpreting s 193 of the BIA); 
• where the parties resolved the issue on the own, as this does not illustrate how much time the Court and 
parties spent on this issue, and it was by happenstance that this was mentioned (it is hard to know how 
common an occurrence this would be): Westbank Holdings Ltd v Westgate Shopping Centre Ltd, 2009 
BCCA 370, 275 BCAC 21; and 
• a seemingly uncontroversial amendment of a self-represented litigant’s notice of appeal to a notice of 
application for leave to appeal having realized leave was necessary: see, e.g., a reference to an unreported 
decision in 1026238 BC Ltd v Pastula, 2017 BCCA 118, 95 BCLR (5th) 230 at para 3. 
221  M(AAA) v British Columbia (Director of Adoption), which was reversed in 2017 BCCA 27, 95 CPC (7th) 215 
[“M(AAA)”]; Cotter v Point Grey Golf and Country Club, which was referred to in 2015 BCCA 331, 377 
BCAC 1; McGregor v Holyrod Manor, which was referred to in 2015 BCCA 157, 370 BCAC 224; 
Keremelevski v VWR Capital Corp, which was affirmed in 2011 BCCA 469, [2011] BCJ No 2249, leave to 
appeal ref’d, [2012] SCCA No 187, 2012 CarswellBC 1881 [“Keremelevski”]; Bea v Strata Plan LMS 2138, 
which was affirmed in 2010 BCCA 463, 94 CPC (6th) 117 [“Bea”]; Forest Glen Wood Products Ltd v British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests), which was affirmed in Forest Glen Wood, supra note 211. 
222  Colenbrander, the Court of Appeal decision in which an unreported decision was referenced, supra note 99, 
and Sherk, an unreported result in which was affirmed, supra note 161. 
223  Criminal cases were also not included in the analysis: e.g., R v Carlson, 2010 BCCA 81, 282 BCAC 306. 
224  Family law and civil litigation certainly share much in common regarding the inability to achieve justice in 
courtrooms. But different statutory and social considerations render them distinguishable in many respects, 
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because they are not distinguished procedurally in British Columbia as they are in Ontario.225 The 
search was also broader than for Ontario, as it commences with cases decided in 2007, in order to 
have a comparable number of years pre- and post-legislative change.  
c. Numbers, Results, and Remedies of British Columbia Cases  
All cases analyzed appear in Appendix I. They can be summarily described as follows: 
TABLE 3B: NUMBERS AND RESULTS OF DISPUTES OVER THE 
INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL DISTINCTION – BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
Year Total Interlocutory (or 
“limited appeal”) 
Final Mixed 
Success 
Did not 
decide 
Held to be 
Unappealable 
2007 15 8 6 0 0 1 
2008 10 8 2 0 0 0 
2009 11 6 5 0 0 0 
2010 10 2 7 0 1 0 
2011 10 2 7 1 0 0 
2012 9 5 2 0 2 0 
2012 – Old Rule 5 3 0 0 2 0 
2012 – New Rule 4 2 2 0 0 0 
2013 9 3 6 0 0 0 
2014 7 3 3 0 1 0 
2015 7 5 2 0 0 0 
2016 11 7 4 0 0 0 
 
leading to reasonable justifications to distinguish the two fields, but that distinguishing should not lead to 
artificial separation: Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2014) at 71, fn 86; Mary-Jo Maur, Nicholas Bala & Alexandra Terrana, “Costs and the 
Changing Culture of Canadian Family Justice” (February 6, 2017) Queen’s University Legal Research Paper 
No 087, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919492>. 
225  N(SHF) v N(AB), 2015 BCCA 314, 62 RFL (7th) 335. 
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Year Total Interlocutory (or 
“limited appeal”) 
Final Mixed 
Success 
Did not 
decide 
Held to be 
Unappealable 
2017 6 2 4 0 0 0 
TOTAL –  
Pre-Change 
 
61 29 27 1 3 1 
TOTAL – Post-
Change 
 
44 22 21 0 1 0 
TOTAL 105 51 48 1 4 1 
 
In the 5.41226 years prior to the rule change, the average is 11.27 cases per year. In the 5.59 
years since, the average is 7.88 cases per year. The change in the law has not eliminated all 
controversies, but has led to a reduction in the number of cases by 30%, suggesting that the 
attempted clarifications have had positive effects.227 This conclusion is further supported by an 
absence of the expected spike in disputes immediately following codification to test the contours 
of the new rule.228 There were five requests for reconsideration after the amendments,229 one being 
successful.230 This compares to six requests for reconsideration prior to the amendments, meaning 
there has been a very slight decrease.231 
Many characteristics of the British Columbia case law remain the same before and after the 
changes in legislation. Both before and after these changes, only slightly more orders have been 
 
226  January 1 through May 30 being 151 days of a 366-day year. 
227  Akin to the effects in Ontario after codifying the law of jurisdiction and its effects on jurisdiction motions: 
Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95. 
228  Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid at 93; see also the dissenting reasons of Côté and Rowe JJ in Office of the 
Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 SCR 398 at para 111, where they predicted a change in law 
prescribed by the majority would “create[] a recipe for litigation.” 
229  Bradshaw v Stenner, 2013 BCCA 61, 334 BCAC 52; Wright v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada, 2015 BCCA 
528, 383 BCAC 26; Michael Wilson & Partners, Ltd v Desirée Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 139, 2017 
CarswellBC 945; MacLachlan v Nadeau, 2017 BCCA 326, 2 BCLR (6th) 223; M(AAA), supra note 221. 
230  M(AAA), ibid. 
231  Forest Glen Wood, supra note 211; Hayes, supra note 211; Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 
BCCA 329, 82 BCLR (4th) 11; Bea, supra note 221; Holland (Guardian ad litem of) v Marshall, 2009 BCCA 
582, 281 BCAC 69; Keremelevski, supra note 221. 
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held to be interlocutory than final: 29 interlocutory compared to 27 final prior to the amendments, 
and 22 limited appeal and 21 final after the amendments. The continuity in outcome could be a 
result of the fact that many orders that were once considered interlocutory were not defined as 
limited appeal orders, meaning that more orders do not require leave to be appealed.232 
Incidentally, the frequency in absolute numbers with which orders are held to be final vis-à-vis 
Ontario underscores that peculiarities of legislation make the two jurisdictions not directly 
comparable. Though smaller in terms of absolute numbers, having almost ten cases per year on 
this issue in the British Columbia Court of Appeal is also proportionately greater than in Ontario, 
which, despite having had an average of 15 cases per year in its Court of Appeal, decides roughly 
twice the number of total cases.233 The proportionally greater number of cases in British Columbia 
could be because of the tendency (that will be returned to) in British Columbia to seek directions 
on whether leave to appeal is necessary – something that rarely occurs in Ontario.234 But despite 
these caveats, it appears as though the legislative amendments have reduced and/or simplified 
litigation over the interlocutory/final distinction. 
3. Advantages of Legislation 
Ontario could benefit from following British Columbia and England and Wales in legislating 
that a version of the application approach be followed. First, this could simplify the law and reduce 
 
232  See, e.g., XY, LLC v International Newtech Development Inc, 2013 BCCA 530, 347 BCAC 274 [“XY, LLC”] at 
para 19, concerning an order regarding cross-examination. 
233  In 2017, for instance, R v Patel, 2017 BCCA 459, 2017 CarswellBC 3725 was the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal decision with the “highest” number in its neutral citation, as reported on CanLII as of September 20, 
2018. On the same date, 1162251 Ontario Limited v 833960 Ontario Limited (M-Plan Consulting), 2017 
ONCA 1025, 2017 CarswellOnt 20493, was the Ontario Court of Appeal decision with the highest number in 
its neutral citation. In 2016, Ressel v Ressel, 2016 BCCA 517, 93 BCLR (5th) 239, was the 2016 British 
Columbia Court of Appeal decision with the highest number in its neutral citation, based on a search on the 
same date, while R v Squire-Hill, 2016 ONCA 995, 19 MVR (7th) 171 was the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision with the highest number in its neutral citation.  
234  Despite exceptions: see, e.g., Awad, supra note 141. 
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litigation: other things being equal, clear rules are preferable to complicated ones.235 The British 
Columbia approach aims to prevent the need to characterize each order as interlocutory or final, 
which often occurs as a matter of first impression.236 British Columbia’s experience, though not 
conclusive, is promising. Though perfect clarity is neither possible nor desirable, greater clarity is 
beneficial to litigants.237 The law in British Columbia might need improvement. In Clifford v Lord, 
for instance, Garson JA lamented that the BC CA Rules were too rigid, giving parties rights of 
appeal where they may not be warranted.238 In XY, LLC,239 Saunders JA noted that it was an 
“anomaly” that the particular order under consideration did not require leave to appeal. Rather 
than defining what orders require leave to be appealed, therefore, Ontario could follow the England 
and Wales definition of a final order as being one that finally disposes of the entire proceedings. 
As recommended by Coulter Osborne, these orders could be appealed as of right, with all other 
appeals requiring leave.240 In this sense, Ontario would be building on successful reforms in British 
Columbia’s experience, and learning from the experience with these reforms. 
Second, codifying the application approach accords with principles of statutory interpretation. 
This interpretation allows “final” to mean just that, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as 
“coming at the end” and “[m]arking the last stage of the process; leaving nothing to be looked 
for”.241 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “final judgment” (it does not define “final”) as 
a “court’s last action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, 
 
235  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95 at 110. 
236  Paraphrasing Tanya J Monestier, “(Still) A ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada” 
(2013) 36 Fordham Int’l LJ 397 at 413, discussing the excessively complicated law of jurisdiction in the 
aftermath of Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20 (CA) [“Muscutt”]. 
237  See, e.g., Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95, arguing benefits that have accrued – and could still accrue – in 
the context of clarifying the law of jurisdiction. 
238  2013 BCCA 302, 46 BCLR (5th) 87 at para 29. 
239  XY, LLC, supra note 232 at para 19, concerning an order regarding cross-examination. 
240  Osborne, supra note 93 at c 12. 
241  Oxford English Dictionary, online: <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/70319?redirectedFrom=final#eid>, sub 
verbo, “final” [emphasis added]. 
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except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney’s fees) and enforcement of the 
judgment”.242 The plain meaning of a word such as this should be highly relevant in statutory 
interpretation.243 That the legislature did not give any other definition in the Courts of Justice Act 
suggests that the legislature had a plain meaning in mind.244 This is another reason suggesting that, 
though closely following the approach of British Columbia and listing orders that require leave to 
appeal would be preferable to the status quo, it may be optimal to follow the English approach of 
defining a final order as one that disposes of the litigation. In other words, the definition could 
focus on the nature of a final order rather than an interlocutory order. This would prevent the Court 
of Appeal from declining to hear an interlocutory appeal that is not defined as a “limited appeal 
order” because it believes that doing so would be imprudent pending resolution of all issues in the 
court below.245 
Third, codifying the application approach would be generally fair and accord with the purpose 
of the interlocutory/final distinction: to ensure proportionality in appeals.246 It allows a party to 
have an appeal as of right only when an order has determined the outcome of the litigation. It is 
true that sometimes an order that would be considered interlocutory under the application approach 
does, in fact, affect the rights of the parties in some substantive way. Defining such orders as 
interlocutory restricts the ability to have an appeal as of right when a legal right is conclusively 
determined. This concern has been repeatedly emphasized in the case law, leading a five-judge 
panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to decline the request of the province’s Attorney 
General that it reconsider its approach to this issue prior to the legislature amending the law in this 
 
242  7th ed, sub verbo, “final judgment”. 
243  Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2014) at § 2.13. 
244  Context can of course change this: Sullivan, ibid at § 3.16. 
245  Hollander v Nelson, 2013 BCCA 83, 41 BCLR (5th) 173. 
246  Perell & Morden, supra note 92 at ¶ 12.40, cited in, e.g., Skunk, supra note 92 at para 31. 
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area.247 These concerns are not without merit; in this sense, the application approach can seem 
unprincipled.  
But any line short of “does the ruling finally dispose of the litigation” will appear arbitrary. 
Holding that a party cannot obtain discovery of a document “finally” determines the party’s ability 
to see that document but hardly seems to warrant an appeal as of right. Refusing leave to amend a 
pleading to clarify the document’s relevance seems only marginally less so. But if the amendment 
concerning the document’s relevance could also be determinative of a limitation period defence, 
this seems less clear. And if refusal to amend the pleading explicitly ends the ability to rely on a 
limitation period defence, then it truly seems to determine a party’s rights.248 Such not-totally-
hypothetical examples exist on a continuum.249 Parsing this continuum seems unprincipled, and 
attempts to do so have led to the status quo, where the profession justifiably feels that it cannot 
predict proper appellate procedure.250 A slippery slope exists as soon as one opens the possibility 
of treating orders that do not finally dispose of litigation as final orders. In such circumstances, it 
can be principled to prevent the slippage by not getting on the slope.251 In any event, as will now 
be discussed, the problems associated with the admittedly imperfect application approach appear 
to be manageable. 
4. Imperfections with the Application Approach Being Manageable 
It is indeed true that this approach could be attacked for being unsophisticated and impeding 
substantive access to justice by denying a party an appeal as of right on a sufficiently important 
matter. These concerns are not totally misplaced. There may be some matters that would be 
 
247  Forest Glen Wood, supra note 211. 
248  Golden Oaks, supra note 152. 
249  See Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.59, 1.61. 
250  Nordheimer J (as he was then) in Mancinelli, supra note 3 at para 2. 
251  Eugene Volokh, “The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope” (2003) 116(4) Harv L Rev 1026. 
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deemed interlocutory under this definition – such as a finding of jurisdiction or striking out 
portions of a claim252 – that are so important, and the costs of the trial court coming to a wrong 
determination so large, that it would be proportionate to allow an appeal as of right.253 A finding 
of liability when liability and damages have been bifurcated (as frequently happens in tort cases254) 
would likely fall into this category. These understandable concerns led to the present state of 
affairs. 
Despite the validity of these concerns, they can nonetheless be mitigated. First, a list of orders 
where the legislature or Civil Rules Committee believes that there should be an appeal as of right 
can be explicitly listed in the legislation itself as exceptions to the application approach. Indeed, 
in England and Wales, findings from the first portion of bifurcated proceedings are treated as final 
orders for the purposes of appeals.255 British Columbia, on the other hand, lists all orders that 
require leave to be appealed.256 Drafting such clear exceptions to a general rule does not risk 
overcomplicating matters. A rule that says “If X, then Y; If not X, then Z” may be too simple.257 
A rule that says “Consider A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H and then do what is fair and just” may be 
too amorphous.258 But there are middle ways, such as “If X, then Y; If not X, then Z. Unless one 
of L, M, N, O, or P is present, then do Y even though X is not also present”. So long as the presence 
 
252  E.g., Kimpton, supra note 212. 
253  MJ Jones, supra note 58. 
254  Contemplated in, e.g., Whiten v Pilot Insurance, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 59 at para 122. 
255  A2J 2000 Order, supra note 66, art 1(3)(a). 
256  BC CA Rules, supra note 217, Rule 2.1. 
257  Though it is actually more complicated than Kelsen’s “If A, then B” formulation: HLA Hart, “Kelsen Visited” 
(1963) 10 UCLA L Rev 709 at 710; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1949) at 45-46.  
258  Tanya Monestier and I have argued that this was the state of the law of jurisdiction in Canada when applying 
Muscutt, supra note 236: Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95; Monestier, supra note 236. The problems of 
amorphous rules are also noted by Justice David Stratas in “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: Some 
Doctrine and Cases,” March 26, 2018, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924049> 
and “The Decline of Legal Doctrine” (Keynote Address Delivered at the Canadian Constitution Foundation 
Law & Freedom Conference, Hart House, University of Toronto, 8 January 2016), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxTqMw5v6rg>. 
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of “L, M, N, O, and P” can be determined with reasonable predictability, this seems eminently 
reasonable and predictable. Turning this thought experiment to the interlocutory/final decision, 
things could look as follows: “If the action is finally determined as a result of the appealed order, 
then the order is final for the purposes of the appeal. If the action is not finally determined as a 
result of the appealed order, then the order is interlocutory for the purposes of the appeal. Though 
if there is a final determination on the court’s jurisdiction, the defendant’s liability, or the quantum 
of damages owed, then the appeal is as of right.” This is not an endorsement of this particular 
wording – that matter will be come to shortly – but rather a suggestion that wording such as this 
could be effective. 
Second, nothing suggested regarding the application approach suggests that leave to appeal 
interlocutory orders should not be granted in appropriate cases, thereby facilitating access to 
justice. In fact, the criteria that currently exist for leave further both purposes of appeals. Rule 
62.02(4)(a) prescribes that a court may grant leave to appeal when there is conflicting authority 
from another court,259 recognizing appellate courts’ law-making role. Rule 62.02(4)(b) states that 
leave may be granted if there is good reason to doubt the correctness of the order below, and the 
issues are of such importance that the interlocutory appeal is warranted.260 This reflects appellate 
courts’ role to ensure the universal application of settled law,261 while also bringing in a 
proportionality requirement, implicitly recognizing that not all errors on interlocutory orders will 
warrant the expense entailed in correcting them. The mischief in the status quo has resulted not 
from the criteria for granting leave but the characterization to determine whether leave is 
necessary. The leave process admittedly consumes the time and resources of parties who genuinely 
 
259  Rules, supra note 89. 
260  Ibid. 
261  Housen, supra note 4 at para 9. 
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need an interlocutory appeal. But given that appeals in general, and interlocutory appeals in 
particular, are meant to be exceptional,262 this appears a price worth paying to discourage 
inappropriate use of judicial resources, and ensure that only interlocutory matters that truly deserve 
an appeal receive them. Finally, it must be remembered that interlocutory orders can be a reason 
to have a lower court decision set aside on the grounds that the interlocutory order led an unfair 
trial.263 While this creates a great deal of inefficiency – and seeking leave to appeal the 
interlocutory order is to be preferred – it does leave a (narrow) door open to a party where an 
interlocutory order led to a clear injustice. 
5. Proposed Wording 
In light of the foregoing, it is proposed that, for purposes of appeal rights under the CJA, “final 
order” be defined as: 
an order that determines:  
a) every issue in the proceeding with the exception of costs;  
b) a party’s liability;  
c) the quantum of damages owed in the proceeding; or  
d) the jurisdiction or lack thereof of the court to hear the proceeding and/or that the 
court is or is not forum non conveniens 
 
An “interlocutory order” could be defined as “any order that is not a final order”. 
Though this is the first analysis of this issue in this way, it is not the first to have recommended 
legislative adoption of the application approach. Gelowitz and Rankin have suggested that the 
“benefits of certainty and clarity [should] triumph over analytic purity”.264 Associate Chief Justice 
Osborne (after his retirement from the Court of Appeal) suggested that the distinction should be 
“jettison[ed]” – though what he actually seemed to be advocating was a strict adoption of the 
 
262  Jutras, supra note 19. 
263  Cridge v Ivancic, 2010 BCCA 476, 10 BCLR (5th) 296; Moon Development Corp v Pirooz, 2014 BCCA 64, 
352 BCAC 25. 
264  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.76. 
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application approach.265 There is every reason to believe that the application approach would 
reduce unnecessary litigation and be generally quite fair to parties. In the rare cases where its lack 
of nuance seems to lead to an unjust result, an exception can appear in legislation (preventing 
judges creating such exceptions on an ad hoc basis, which has led to the status quo) or leave to 
appeal can be granted. In defending the order approach, Donald JA astutely observed, “no single 
formula can eliminate all controversies over what is a final order”.266 Even so, abandoning the 
order approach in British Columbia seems to have been a positive development. This is not 
adoption of the common law but rather adoption of the application approach with few discrete 
exceptions. And unlike British Columbia – where legislative intervention appears to have been 
valuable but not as valuable as hoped – this proposed wording seeks to define a final order instead 
of an interlocutory order. While this restricts courts from accepting new exceptions on a case-by-
case basis, this seems to not be a devastating result, as one can always seek leave to appeal and, in 
an exceptional circumstance, can seek legislative amendment to add an additional exception. Even 
if many cases would be decided the same way as under the status quo, attempts to make appeal 
routes clear in legislation rather than through precedents that one must consistently engross oneself 
in267 has value. This appears a simple solution to a needlessly complicated problem. 
C. Interpretation in the Meantime 
Adopting the application approach would significantly change how legislation has been 
interpreted, suggesting the legislature rather than the courts should correct that interpretation.268 
 
265  Osborne, supra note 93 at c 12, quoted in Shinder v Shinder, 2017 ONCA 822, 140 OR (3d) 477 at para 7. 
266  Forest Glen Wood, supra note 211 at para 35. 
267  See the comment of Lord Denning in Salter Rex, supra note 61 at 866. 
268  Recommended by, e.g., Osborne, supra note 93 at c 12. This preference for the legislature rather than the 
courts to overturn precedent in circumstances such as these is seen in, e.g., Debra Parkes, “Precedent 
Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada” (2007) 32 Man LJ 135 at 147; Practice 
Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (HL). The ability of legislatures to do this in the face of 
stare decisis is also noted in Lorne Neudorf, “Legislatures in the Judicial Domain?” (2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 
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Parties may also have relied on these precedents in forming litigation strategies, such as in deciding 
whether to bring a motion based on a precedent concerning its appealability. Such reliance cautions 
against a court overturning itself.269 If a court begins to amend its own precedents, there may also 
be confusion about a status of the group of interrelated precedents in an area of law.270 It also 
creates the risk of the court being perceived as not interpreting legislation but making it. This could 
potentially create a perception, rightly or wrongly, that the court has exceeded its power with there 
being an associated risk that the populace will disrespect the court.271 While one could argue that 
reinterpreting legislation to accord with the application approach is in line with reasonable 
developments of the common law, the aforementioned considerations warrant caution. 
In the meantime, the Court of Appeal could decline to find any additional orders that do not 
fall within the application approach’s ambit to be final orders: in other words, the number of 
“exceptions” to the application approach would be capped. Abella J recently proposed this in the 
context of exceptions to reasonableness review in administrative law.272 Without endorsing that 
particular suggestion of Abella J (which some have suggested would cause additional problems273 
and/or be unprincipled274), the principle of constraining without overruling arguably erroneous 
 
313. This can be taken to an unhealthy extreme, as Parkes notes, as does Ian Bushnell in “Justice Ivan Rand 
and the Role of a Judge in the Nation’s Highest Court” (2010) 61 UNB LJ/34 Man LJ 101 at 103. 
269  Richard Haigh, “A Kindler, Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Burns and the Need for a Principled 
Approach to Overruling” (2001) 14 SCLR (2d) 139 at 149. 
270  David Polowin Real Estate Ltd v The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co (2005), 199 OAC 266 (CA), 
leave to appeal denied, [2005] SCCA No 388, 2006 CarswellOnt 439 at para 119, cited in Parkes, supra note 
268 at 136-137. 
271  As it stands, however, the Charter, supra note 179, which seemingly had the opportunity to have the judiciary 
exceed its constitutional role, is viewed favourably by the Canadian public: Benjamin Shingler, “Charter of 
rights, universal health care top Canadian unity poll” Global News (30 June 2014) 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/1424367/charter-universal-health-care-top-canadian-unity-poll/>. 
272  Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770 [“Wilson”]. 
273  The concurring reasons of Cromwell J, and the dissenting reasons of Moldaver, Côté, and Brown JJ in Wilson, 
ibid; see also Paul Daly, “Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on 
Standard of Review and Reasonableness” (2016) 62 McGill LJ 527 at 564, expressing optimism at this idea, 
but concern that it may not achieve its goals. 
274  Lauren J Wihak, “Wither the correctness standard of review? Dunsmuir, six years later” (2014) 27 CJALP 
173; Diana Ginn, “Some Initial Thoughts on Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd and Edmonton (City) v. 
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precedents that have been relied upon is well-founded.275 So while stare decisis cautions against 
the Court of Appeal declaring that the application approach is now to be strictly followed, it is 
nonetheless suggested that heretofore promulgated exceptions to it should be the only orders that 
do not finally resolve a case viewed as final pending legislative intervention. 
Finally, it should also be noted that – both before and after prospective legislative intervention 
– the Chief Justices of the Superior Court and Court of Appeal should not hesitate to use their 
powers to expedite the hearing of interlocutory appeals once leave has been granted. This would 
be a good way to mitigate the delay caused by interlocutory appeals. It would also not be unfair to 
other litigants as the litigants in the case where leave has been granted have already endured a wait 
pending being granted leave to appeal. 
D. Eliminating Interlocutory Appeals Altogether? 
Another solution to the quagmire caused by the interlocutory/final distinction would be to 
prohibit interlocutory appeals altogether. This is already done for decisions under the Small Claims 
Court Rules276 and the Construction Act277 given that procedures thereunder are meant to be 
extremely summary. This is also largely, if controversially, the case in the United States federal 
courts278 and has the advantage of being an extremely simple rule. While it would not eliminate 
 
Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd” (2017) 68 UNB LJ 285; the reasons of Brown and Rowe JJ 
in West Fraser Mills Ltd v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2018 SCC 22, [2018] 
1 SCR 635. 
275  A high-profile example is Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court and his ambivalent 
relationship with Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) [“Roe”]: Lewis F Powell, Jr, “Stare Decisis and Judicial 
Restraint” (1990) 47 Wash & Lee L Rev 281 at 284. Kennedy J nonetheless refused to overturn Roe, famously 
holding (with O’Connor and Souter JJ) that “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt”: Planned 
Parented v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992), opening line. See also Ilya Shapiro, “A Faint-Hearted Libertarian at 
Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice Anthony Kennedy” (2009) 33(1) Harvard J L & Publ Pol 333 at 348-351. 
Kagan J argued that the same should be the case regarding Auer v Robbins, 519 US 542 (1997) in Kisor v 
Wilkie, 588 US ___ (2019). 
276  Supra note 109. 
277  Supra note 108. 
278  Michael E Solimine, “Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts” (1989) 58 Geo Wash L Rev 
1165. 
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disputes over what is an interlocutory or final appeal, it would prevent litigation that does not 
address a dispute’s merits.  
Ultimately, however, this too may be an overreaction. For instance, in the United States 
federal courts system, if a District Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, that determination 
cannot be appealed until after a full trial on the merits – which may take years and cost millions of 
dollars.279 If the Court was wrong about this, access to justice has clearly been impeded. Declaring 
interlocutory appeals are to be exceptional – but still occasionally worthwhile – appears a more 
promising path forward. 
E. Wither the Divisional Court? 
The suggestions so far have focussed on changing the law surrounding the interlocutory/final 
distinction. But it would be a serious lacuna to not flag a potential institutional change: namely, is 
it prudent to have two separate courts for appeals of Superior Court civil decisions? While other 
common law provinces still struggle over the interlocutory/final distinction,280 they have only one 
court that must wrestle with this matter. The Divisional Court’s existence has not caused the 
uncertainty in the law regarding the interlocutory/final distinction, which clearly exists elsewhere. 
However, its existence exacerbates some of the distinction’s collateral consequences, including:  
• bringing appeals in both courts out of an abundance of caution and then needing to move 
to stay the proceeding in the Divisional Court281 – something that would not be necessary 
if there was only one court, where a motion could be brought for “leave, if necessary”; 
 
279  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 95. 
280  One need also only look at Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2 at § 1.41-1.74 to see this being apparent across 
common law Canada. Ontario may be a disproportionate source of this controversy, but hardly the only source. 
See also infra note 301. 
281  E.g., Mancinelli, supra note 3 at para 2. 
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• bringing appeals in two courts when a party seeks to simultaneously appeal interlocutory 
and final decisions, especially given the disinclination of the Court of Appeal to 
reconstitute itself as the Divisional Court, even with consent;282 and 
• the Chief Justice of the Superior Court needing to grant permission for the Court of 
Appeal to reconstitute itself as the Divisional Court when it does wish to do so.283 
A single court for appeals of Superior Court civil decisions would at least mitigate these collateral 
consequences of confusion over the interlocutory/final distinction. Indeed, British Columbia 
avoids many of these consequences. It is common in British Columbia for a party to seek directions 
on whether leave is necessary to appeal and, if so, seek leave to appeal simultaneously.284 The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal is also willing to convert a notice of appeal into a notice of 
application for leave to appeal, even when refusing leave.285 These efficient uses of judicial 
resources are more difficult given the presence of the Divisional Court in Ontario. As noted above, 
confusion about which court to bring an appeal in also appears to disproportionately impact self-
represented litigants. 
Analogous court mergers have been suggested in other contexts. Policymakers such as the late 
Ian Scott286 and scholars such as Don Stuart287 have suggested merging the criminal trial courts to, 
 
282  See, e.g., Cavanaugh v Grenville Christian College, 2013 ONCA 139, 304 OAC 163 [“Cavanaugh”].  
283  Punit, supra note 133 at para 18. 
284  E.g., Gemex Developments Corp v Coquitlam (City), 2011 BCCA 119, 81 MPLR (4th) 60. 
285  Island Savings Credit Union v Brunner, 2016 BCCA 308, 2016 CarswellBC 2187. 
286  David Stockwood, “In Conversation: Ian Scott” (1993) 12 Adv Soc J 4 at 9-10, cited in Wayne Renke, “A 
Single Trial Court for Alberta: Consultation Paper” (Edmonton, AB: Alberta Justice/Faculty of Law, 
University of Alberta, 2007), online: <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/18550-
single_trial_court_consult.pdf>; Don Stuart, “The Charter Is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed to Be 
Stunted: Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 21 Nat’l J Const L 245 at 247. 
287  Stuart, ibid at 247, makes the similarities between the criminal and civil contexts easy to see:  
The […] serious problem of systemic delay may well be better addressed by returning to the vision 
of those such as former Attorney General Ian Scott and others who called for just one federal trial 
court to handle all criminal trials […] A unified court would certainly address delays resulted from 
judge-shopping tactics and the sheer undue complexity of the current system. The status quo is 
currently propped up by claims of special expertise by judges of higher status which increasingly 
181 
 
 
among other things, pool talent and create simplicity. This has also been attempted in various 
provinces with the family courts.288  
The Divisional Court has purposes other than hearing interlocutory appeals: as noted above, 
it hears appeals of many other matters, such as masters’ decisions. Though other provinces – such 
as Alberta and British Columbia – simply prescribe an appeal of a master’s order to the Court of 
Queen’s Bench (in Alberta)289 or the Supreme Court (in British Columbia).290 The Divisional 
Court also hears appeals of civil matters with low dollar amounts at stake. While this arguably 
leaves the Court of Appeal addressing more important matters, this seems somewhat arbitrary. 
And it certainly does not further specialization, as the Court of Appeal is surely as suited to hear 
an appeal concerning $49,999 as one concerning $50,001. Nor does this distinction reflect different 
procedures followed in lower courts, as is the case for appeals of Small Claims Court decisions. 
More notably, the Divisional Court also sits as a court of judicial review. The idea of having 
a specialized court for judicial review was the impetus behind the Court’s creation, and there 
remains a point of view that it should return to that purpose.291 This may be a sufficient reason to 
keep the Divisional Court. But its jurisdiction has expanded, and given that it generally sits in 
panels of three judges, it seems unclear that expertise in administrative law will be present among 
all three judges. Even if expertise in judicial review is desirable, this could be accomplished by 
having a “list” of judges who hear such applications on the Superior Court – though there are a 
 
ring hollow given the calibre and workload of current Provincial Court judges. The single unified 
court is already the reality in Nunavut. [Citations omitted] 
288  See, e.g., Freeda Steel, “The Unified Family Court – Ten Years Later” (1996) 24 Man LJ 381; Nicholas Bala, 
Rachel Birnbaum & Justice Donna Martinson, “One Judge for One Family: Differentiated Case Management 
for Families in Continuing Conflict” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 395 at 399. 
289  Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, Rules 6.14(1), noting that a master’s order may be appealed to a 
judge, with “judge” being defined in the Appendix as a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench. 
290  Rule 23-6(8) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009, explains that a master’s order may be 
appealed to the “court”, with the “court” being defined as the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Rule 1(1).  
291  Osborne, supra note 93 at c 12. 
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limited number of Superior Court judges who would hear an insolvency proceeding or a murder 
trial, there is no separate court for these matters. This could also be the case for administrative law. 
Moreover, all other provinces – and the Federal Court – have single judges hear applications for 
judicial review, which appears to be a more efficient use of judicial resources.  
On the note of expertise, the Divisional Court also has a prescribed statutory role to develop 
expertise in class actions.292 This could be another reason to keep the Divisional Court, though the 
aforementioned comments on administrative law and judicial review apply equally to class actions. 
The Court of Appeal could also mitigate the consequences caused by the division of appellate 
functions if it were to transfer matters to the Divisional Court, or reconstitute itself as the 
Divisional Court, more regularly, perhaps taking parties’ procedural errors into account in costs 
determinations.293 But even here, this could be seen as usurping what is the Divisional Court’s 
statutory authority, with the Court of Appeal typically only doing so in cases of true urgency.294 
To be clear, a recommendation that the Divisional Court be abolished would require further 
study. Such a drastic step would be complicated. All criteria that would be relevant to such a 
decision, such as amending numerous statutes that mandate steps be taken in the Divisional Court, 
have not been considered. The abolition of the Divisional Court would also likely require 
additional judges on the Court of Appeal.295 Though this analysis does not support the Divisional 
Court’s existence facilitating access to justice vis-à-vis interlocutory appeals, it is clearly possible 
 
292  Cavanaugh, supra note 282 at para 91, per Doherty JA. 
293  The Court of Appeal is willing to award costs even against successful parties if they make serious and costly 
procedural errors: see, e.g., Knew Order Co Ltd v 2291955 Ontario Inc, 2013 ONCA 559, 2013 CarswellOnt 
12679, described by Mark Gelowitz, “Knew Order v. 2291955 Ontario: Costs Awarded Against Successful 
Appellants for Procedural Errors” Conduct of an Appeal blog (3 October 2013), online: 
<https://www.osler.com/en/blogs/appeal/october-2013/knew-order-v-2291955-ontario-costs-awarded-again>. 
294  Cavanaugh, supra note 282 at para 91, per Doherty JA. 
295  The proportion of Superior Court judges sitting on the number of Divisional Court cases that would move to 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal could potentially be transferred to the Court of Appeal to respond to this 
issue. 
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to have a court with discrete yet diverse subject matter jurisdiction work functionally: the Federal 
Court, with its varied expertise in judicial review, national security law, intellectual property, 
taxation, and maritime law, exemplifies this. What is being recommended is that there be a serious 
discussion on this topic and that further research be done concerning it. Various courts were 
merged in 1990, despite opposition, with most observers viewing this as a positive development.296 
And at least when it comes to the problems caused by the interlocutory/final distinction in civil 
appeals, the existence of the Divisional Court appears to be unhelpful. So this is a matter that is 
worth considering in more depth, as Coulter Osborne urged more than a decade ago.297 
IN SUM 
It is difficult to overstate how important appeals are from the perspective of access to justice 
– in narrow circumstances. In other circumstances, appeals are a significant access to justice 
obstacle, especially when they prevent appellate courts from focussing on their primary tasks of 
correcting injustices and delineating legal rules. Ontario law has attempted to balance the need for 
appeals with recognition of the need for finality through, among other things, treating interlocutory 
and final appeals differently. The motivations behind doing so are sound, and it would likely be 
an overreaction to eliminate their differential treatment. As is, however, the distinction has caused 
considerable mischief – and understandable judicial exasperation. The uncertainty surrounding 
this distinction has led to dozens of disputes over this matter in both the Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal every year in the 2010s. This tends to costs litigants months of time and thousands 
of dollars without addressing the merits of a dispute. The Supreme Court’s call for civil justice 
reform in Hryniak appears to have had minimal impact on this. 
 
296  Cotter, supra note 28 at 214-215. 
297  Osborne, supra note 93 at c 12. 
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Fortunately, however, there is hope – and other jurisdictions chart a path. British Columbia 
and England and Wales have sought to fix a similar problem in their case law through legislation. 
There is no question that the approaches of these jurisdictions create some risk of arbitrariness or 
lack of sophistication in terms of determining which orders can be appealed as of right. But there 
also remains discretion for appellate courts to intervene – by granting leave to appeal – if that is 
what substantive justice requires. Ontario should consider following suit, and grant appeals as of 
right only to orders that finally dispose of litigation, or are of such importance that the legislature 
or Civil Rules Committee has clearly prescribed that there should be an appeal as of right. In the 
meantime, it is humbly suggested that a simple rule is better than a complicated one, and courts 
should interpret Ontario’s procedural law to move in that direction. 
Both substantive justice and a fair process are essential to achieving access to justice.298 But 
a fair process must be proportionate to what is at stake299 and reasonably predictable.300 
Unfortunately, the current status of the interlocutory/final appeal distinction in Ontario (and, it 
would appear, Canada in general301) is anything but proportionate or predictable. Fortunately, there 
are ways forward that lead one to hope that this situation could be remedied. 
 
298  Farrow 2014, supra note 82 at 971. 
299  See, e.g., Hryniak, supra note 17 at para 29; Farrow 2012, supra note 93. 
300  Seen in as diverse areas of law as international trade law (see Ian A Laird, “Betrayal, Shock and Outrage - 
Recent Developments in NAFTA Article 1105” (2003) 3 Asper Rev Int’l Bus & Trade L 185 at 195), 
administrative justice (see Lorne Sossin, “Designing Administrative Justice” (2017) 34 Windsor YB Access 
Just 87 at 97), and environmental protection (see Jason MacLean & Chris Tollefson, “Climate-Proofing 
Judicial Review after Paris: Judicial Competence, Capacity, and Courage” (2018) 31 J Env L & Prac 245 at 
247, citing Government of Canada, “Environmental and Regulatory Reviews: Discussion Paper” (June 2017), 
online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-
reviews/share-your-views/proposed-approach/discussion-paper.html>). 
301  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 2, § 1.44, citing case law from across the common law provinces, such as: Van 
de Wiel v Blaikie, 2005 NSCA 14, 230 NSR (2d) 186, per Cromwell JA (as he then was); Curtis v Smith’s Home 
Centre Limited (Smith’s Home Hardware), 2009 NLCA 14, 286 Nfld & PEIR 113, per Wells JA; and Proprietary 
Industries Inc v Workum, 2005 ABQB 472, 49 Alta LR (4th) 397, per Kent J. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The 2010 Amendments and Hryniak v Mauldin:  
The Perspective of the Lawyers Who Have Lived Them  
 
Access to justice is generally cited as the most pressing concern facing Canada’s justice 
system, one that must be addressed through many different avenues.1 One commonly proposed 
response is reforming procedural law. Accordingly, Ontario significantly amended its procedural 
law effective January 1, 2010, aiming to facilitate the timely and inexpensive resolution of civil 
actions on their merits.2 In the 2014 decision Hryniak v Mauldin, the Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously held that the 2010 Amendments should be interpreted generously to facilitate access 
to justice.3 Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments were subject to significant praise at the time, 
recognizing the need for novel solutions to longstanding problems.4 Empirical research since has 
suggested that there has been some progress in resolving certain types of claims more efficiently 
and with less cost.5 But there have also been criticisms of these developments6 and anecdotal 
evidence that they have negatively impacted vulnerable parties.7 
 
1  Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 at paras 1, 26; Trevor CW Farrow, “What is Access to 
Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 [“Farrow 2014”] reviews the literature in this area at fn 1. The 
various approaches to addressing this issue are discussed in more detail below in Part I.A. 
2  O Reg 438/08 [the “2010 Amendments”], amending the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the 
“Rules”]. 
3  Supra note 1 [hereinafter “Hryniak”]. 
4  See, e.g., Shantona Chaudhary, “Hryniak v. Mauldin: The Supreme Court issues a clarion call for civil justice 
reform” (Winter 2014) 33 Adv J No 3. 
5  See, e.g., Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift: An Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary 
Judgment Reforms” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275; Gerard J Kennedy, “Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor 
YB Access Just 243 [“Kennedy Rule 2.1”]. 
6  See, e.g., Jonathan Lisus, “Hryniak: Requiem for the vanishing trial, or brave new world?” (Summer 2014), 33 
Adv J No 1, 6. 
7  See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures 
Against Self-Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to Justice?” (Windsor, 
ON: The National Self-Represented Litigants Project, The University of Windsor, November 2015). 
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So what is the status quo in practice? This chapter seeks to answer this question by asking the 
lawyers who have actually lived the recent developments in Ontario procedural law about their 
experiences. Specifically, volunteer lawyers at Pro Bono Ontario’s Law Help Centres were 
surveyed, chosen given that they tend to have diverse experiences and clients from multiple 
socioeconomic groups in society. The results complement previous theoretical work and empirical 
analysis of case law with the lived experiences of litigants’ legal service providers.  
Part I of this chapter provides background on the access to justice crisis in Ontario and how 
the 2010 Amendments and Hryniak sought to address it. Part II explains the background and 
methodology of the survey that the volunteer lawyers were invited to complete. Part III describes 
what the survey showed. Part IV critically summarizes these results and what lessons they provide 
regarding Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments specifically, and the potential of civil procedure 
reform as a means to facilitate access to justice more broadly. 
The results were mixed. Most respondents viewed Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments as 
positive overall. But this was hardly a unanimous view. And most respondents viewed the 
effectiveness of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments to be limited, as other factors have intervened 
or remained as access to justice obstacles. The responses did not lack all hope, but they ultimately 
suggested that the battle for access to civil justice must continue to be waged on multiple fronts. 
I) BACKGROUND 
A. The Access to Justice Crisis in Ontario 
Access to civil justice has consistently been held to be an area where Canada’s justice system 
falls short, resulting in considerable scholarship8 and reports9 attempting to address this issue. The 
 
8  Farrow 2014, supra note 1 significantly outlines the literature in this area at fn 1. 
9  See, e.g., Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access to Civil & Family 
Justice: A Roadmap for Change” (Ottawa: Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family 
Matters, October 2013) [“Roadmap for Change”]; Coulter Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform Project: 
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word “crisis” is frequently used to describe the status quo.10 Practically every Canadian will 
encounter a legal dispute at least once in their lifetime11 even though most cannot afford a lawyer 
for a matter of any complexity.12 As individuals are unable to resolve legal issues, legal problems 
tend to multiply and the significant majority of these problems go unaddressed; this results in a 
host of social and health consequences.13 
These broad phenomena – which have been documented elsewhere far more thoroughly than 
is possible here14 – require multipronged responses. This in turn leads to multiple definitions of 
access to justice, varying in light of what is at stake. Some definitions are very broad, including 
philosophical analyses of “what is justice”,15 including those arguing for the need for 
transformative social justice.16 Even when discussing access to justice vis-à-vis traditional legal 
disputes, much access to justice literature concentrates on how to deliver legal services in a more 
accessible manner17 as well as “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) such as mediation, 
arbitration, and administrative procedures that lessen the need to resort to courts.18  
 
Findings and Recommendations (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2007), online: 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/>. 
10  But see Andrew Pilliar, “what will you do about access to justice this year” Legal Aid Ontario Blog (4 
February 2014), online: <http://blog.legalaid.on.ca/2014/02/04/andrew-pilliar-what-will-you-do-about-access-
to-justice-this-year/>, who suggests “chronic problem” is a better term than crisis. 
11  Roadmap for Change, supra note 9; Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 965-966. 
12  Farrow 2014, ibid at 964, citing Beverley McLachlin, “Foreward” in Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & 
Lorne Sossin, eds, Middle Income Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) at ix. 
13  Farrow 2014, ibid at 963; Trevor CW Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam 
Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) [“Farrow 2016”] at 166-167. See also Introduction at 9-10. 
14  See, e.g., Farrow 2014, ibid. 
15  E.g., Farrow 2014, ibid at 969; Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice 
Should We Be Talking About?” (2008) 46:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 773. 
16  E.g., ibid; see also Sarah Buhler, “The View from Here: Access to Justice and Community Legal Clinics” 
(2012) 63 UNB LJ 427. 
17  E.g., Gillian K Hadfield, “The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (un)Corporate Practice 
of Law” (2014) 38 Supplement Intl Rev L & Econ 43.  
18  See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, “Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil Mediation in 
Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program” (2005) 42 Alta L Rev 677; Robert G Hann & Carl Baar, 
“Evaluation of the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1): Final Report – The First 23 Months” 
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2001), online: 
<https://archive.org/stream/mag_00041982/mag_00041982_djvu.txt>, described by Martin Teplitsky, QC, 
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These conceptions of access to justice are all important. But public civil litigation still matters, 
for a variety of reasons, including (but not limited to19) development of the common law and 
related democratic norms,20 ensuring economically disadvantaged parties have a forum to 
adjudicate claims with basic procedural fairness,21 and incentivizing mediation and arbitration to 
ensure their purported benefits are present.22 If the public civil litigation system is inaccessible due 
to excessive delay and expense, these socially important goals remain unfulfilled. This can even 
jeopardize the rule of law as an undeveloped common law leaves parties unable to order their 
affairs23 and one’s legal fate may depend on his or her economic status, which has become a 
frequent prerequisite for a chance at fair adjudication, rather than the law.24  
So in the context of civil litigation, access to justice includes, at the very least, ensuring that 
litigation is prompt, affordable, and comprehensible to litigants, so that they are not discouraged 
from pursuing it or dissatisfied if they do.25 This accords with the principle of proportionality, 
discussed in the next subsection. While these characteristics are likely insufficient for a complete 
 
“Universal mandatory mediation: A critical analysis of the evaluations of the Ontario mandatory 
mediation program” (Winter 2001) 20 Advocates’ Soc J No 3, 10. See also Gary Smith, “Unwilling Actors: 
Why Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Voluntary Mandatory Mediation May Not” (1998) 36:4 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 847, expressing doubt about the wisdom and utility of mandatory mediation. 
19  See, e.g., Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2014) [“Farrow Book”] at, in particular, 219ff. 
20  Ibid at 251-258; Hryniak, supra note 1 at paras 1, 26. 
21  Farrow Book, ibid at 219-232. 
22  Joshua D H Karton, “Party Autonomy and Choice of Law: Is International Arbitration Leading the Way or 
Marching to the Beat of Its Own Drummer?” (2010) 60 UNB LJ 32. 
23  Hryniak, supra note 1 at paras 1, 26. The connection between allowing parties to order their affairs and the 
rule of law is noted in, e.g., Malcolm Lavoie & Dwight Newman, “Mining and Aboriginal Rights in Yukon: 
How Certainty Affects Investor Confidence” (2015) Fraser Centre Institute for Aboriginal Policy Studies, 
online: <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/mining-and-aboriginal-rights-in-yukon-how-
certainty-affects-investor-confidence.pdf> at 16, drawing on Friedrich A Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) [16th impression, 1962]. 
24  Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 3 
SCR 31 [“Trial Lawyers”]; Paul Vayda, “Chipping away at Cost Barriers: A Comment on the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Trial Lawyers Decision” (2015) 36 WRLSI 207 at 211-212. 
25  See, e.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 978-979. 
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understanding of access to justice, they are still necessary.26 Facilitating timeliness, minimal 
financial expense, and simplicity were the justifiable goals of the 2010 Amendments and Hryniak, 
which will now be discussed. 
B. The 2010 Amendments and Hryniak 
In 2007, Coulter Osborne, retired Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, presented a report to the 
Ontario government recommending numerous reforms to the justice system to help facilitate 
access to justice. Many of his recommendations were enacted as the basis of the 2010 
Amendments.27 Perhaps, the most notable of the 2010 Amendments concerned when a court may 
grant “summary judgment” – disposing of all or part of a case on a motion, with affidavit evidence, 
and without a full trial.28 Also important was enshrining the principle of proportionality throughout 
civil procedure.29 These amendments can be criticized, whether due to conceptual problems with 
the proportionality principle30 or belief in the merits of the traditional trial.31 However, this chapter 
largely seeks to learn the 2010 Amendments’ effects rather than try to justify them. 
In Hryniak, the Supreme Court came down firmly on the side of viewing the proportionality 
principle, as well as the expanded ability to seek summary judgment, as positive. Karakatsanis J, 
authoring the Court’s unanimous judgment, held that excessive reliance on traditional litigation 
methods can hinder access to justice and she called for a “culture shift” in the conduct of 
litigation.32  
 
26  See, e.g., Farrow 2016, supra note 13 at 166. 
27  See, e.g., MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5 at 1280-1281; Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has Its Day in Court” 
(2012) 37 Queen’s LJ 697 at 700-701 and 707-708. 
28  Rule 20 of the Rules, supra note 2, analyzed in Hryniak, supra note 1. 
29  The subject of Hryniak, supra note 1. 
30  Colleen M Hanycz, “More Access to Less Justice: Efficiency, Proportionality and Costs in Canadian Civil 
Justice Reform” (2008) 27 CJQ 98. 
31  Lisus, supra note 6. 
32  Hryniak, supra note 1 at paras 23-33. 
190 
 
 
Despite the focus on proportionality and summary judgment, the spirit of the 2010 
Amendments and Hryniak have been held by appellate courts33 and scholarly commentators34 to 
apply more broadly. This is apparent, for instance, in Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules, which came into 
effect after Hryniak and allows a court to dismiss abusive actions through a very summary written 
procedure. As Chapter Two notes, Rule 2.1 was influenced by the spirit of Hryniak.35 
II) THE SURVEY36 
A. Background 
Qualitative surveys remain relatively rare in legal scholarship,37 perhaps due to Langdellian 
views that law is a science to be discovered through primary sources, and as such surveys have 
little to add.38 And it is indeed true that obtaining a sample of judges or lawyers that would be 
representative in the eyes of a statistician was not realistic for this dissertation. But this is also an 
area where personal, small-scale ethnographical impressions matter a great deal.39 Scholars such 
as Julie Macfarlane40 and Trevor Farrow41 have learned invaluable insights through interviewing 
 
33  See, e.g., Iannarella v Corbett, 2015 ONCA 110, 124 OR (3d) 523 at para 53, concerning discovery; Canadian 
Natural Resources Limited v ShawCor Ltd, 2014 ABCA 289, 580 AR 265 at para 5, concerning the 
intersection between discovery and claims of privilege. 
34  See, e.g., Stephen GA Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 
21” (2014) 43 Advocates’ Quarterly 344 at 344-346; Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5 at 246; Gerard J 
Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 79 
[“Kennedy Jurisdiction”] at 85; Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to Alberta: Summary 
Judgment, Culture Shift, and the Future of Civil Trials” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1. 
35  Described in depth in Kennedy Rule 2.1, ibid. 
36  The structure of this section of this chapter borrows heavily from Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 965. 
37  Urszula Jaremba & Elaine Mak, “Interviewing Judges in the Transnational Context” (2014) 5:3 Law and 
Method 1 at 1. 
38  See, e.g., the discussions in David Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law Teaching and the Failure to 
Operationalize: Theory & Practice, Realism & Formalism, and Aspiration & Reality in Contemporary Legal 
Education” (2017), SJD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto at 51-52. 
39  Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 966. 
40  Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs 
of Self-Represented Litigants – Final Report” (May 2013), online: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/85/> 
[“Macfarlane Main Report”]. 
41  Anne Griffiths, “Using Ethnography as a Tool in Legal Research: An Anthropological Perspective” Law 
Explorer (20 May 2017), online: <https://lawexplores.com/using-ethnography-as-a-tool-in-legal-research-an-
anthropological-perspective-anne-griffiths/>; Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 966, citing Anne Griffiths “Using 
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those who interact with the justice system as litigants. Such scholarship builds upon a significant 
body of work, perhaps developed most prominently in Canada by Roderick Macdonald, attempting 
to place the person who experiences the law at the heart of legal analysis.42 Moreover, the first 
three chapters of this dissertation, as well as Brooke MacKenzie’s work,43 have sought to look at 
the “raw numbers” of how Ontario procedural law has (not) changed in its application in the 
aftermath of Hryniak. There is only so much dispassionately reading case law can show – this 
chapter attempts to consider the lived experiences of those who experience the justice system. 
Admittedly, this project surveyed legal service providers while it may be preferable to speak 
to litigants – those who experience the justice system on a day-to-day basis most acutely. However, 
the impressions of these providers are still important in access to justice analysis.44 More 
importantly, finding a group of litigants who had experienced the civil justice system pre- and 
post-Hryniak and/or the 2010 Amendments seemed unrealistic.  
B. Methodology 
From June through August of 2019, lawyers who volunteer at Pro Bono Ontario (“PBO”) Law 
Help Centres were surveyed,45 seeking to discern their opinions on Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments. The questions, many of which are repeated below and all of which appear in 
 
Ethnography as a Tool in Legal Research: An Anthropological Perspective”, Chapter Six in Reza Banakar & 
Max Travers, eds, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
42  See, e.g., Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions” in Julia 
Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way Forward 
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 19; Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, 
“What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 Can J L & Soc 25; Farrow 2016, supra note 13 at 170; Justice 
Thomas A Cromwell, Address (Remarks delivered at the PLEAC Conference, 26 October 2012) [unpublished] 
at 2 as reported in Mary Eberts, “‘Lawyers Feed the Hungry:’ Access to Justice, The Rule of Law, and the 
Private Practice of Law” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 115 at 120, fn 32. 
43  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
44  Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 965. 
45  Pursuant to York University Ethics Approval, Certificate # STU - 070, dated May 22, 2018, attached as 
Appendix N. Attached at Appendices O is a Renewal-Amendment Approval, dated May 22, 2019. Attached as 
Appendix P is an Amendment Approval, dated July 18, 2019. Attached as Appendix Q is the Informed 
Consent form participants completed. 
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Appendix J, mostly fall into three categories: a) specific questions on the effects of Hryniak and 
the 2010 Amendments; b) follow-up questions allowing the respondents to explain the answers;46 
and c) questions about the respondents’ demographics.47 
PBO is a registered charity that provides legal services to Ontarians who cannot afford a 
lawyer.48 PBO has done this through a variety of projects, ranging from: providing assistance to 
the parents of sick children at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children;49 a call centre where 
individuals can to speak to a lawyer via telephone;50 acting as duty counsel in Civil Practice Court, 
the Divisional Court, and Court of Appeal for Ontario;51 and running “Law Help Centres” adjacent 
to the Superior Court in Toronto and Ottawa and the Small Claims Court in North York, where 
individuals can speak to a lawyer in person.52 When the Law Help Centres were in jeopardy of 
closing in late 2018 due to a funding shortfall, a massive campaign emerged among the bar to 
“Save Law Help” and keep the centres open.53 The Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”) recognizes 
PBO’s unique role in facilitating access to justice. For instance, LSO-licenced lawyers are asked 
 
46  The importance of which is noted in Farrow 2014, supra note 1 at 967. 
47  Clearly essentially in critical race scholarship: Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe & Sujith Xavier, “Re-Igniting Critical 
Race in Canadian Legal Spaces: Introduction to the Special Symposium Issue of Contemporary Accounts of 
Racialization in Canada” (2013) Windsor YB Access Just 1; Faisal Bhabha, “Towards a Pedagogy of Diversity 
in Legal Education” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 59 at 87. 
48  Pro Bono Ontario, “About PBO”, online: <https://www.probonoontario.org/about/>; Jacques Gallant, “Pro 
Bono Ontario help centres to remain open with funding from Ottawa, donations from lawyers” The Toronto 
Star (27 November 2018), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/11/27/pro-bono-ontario-help-
centres-to-remain-open-with-funding-from-ottawa-donations-from-lawyers.html>; Pro Bono Ontario, “Pro 
Bono Ontario Funding Backgrounder and History” (17 May 2019), online: <https://probonoontario.org/voices-
for-pro-bono/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PBO-Funding-Backgrounder-and-History-May-17-2019.pdf> 
[“Funding Backgrounder”]. 
49  Lorne Sossin, “The Helping Profession: Can Pro Bono Lawyers Make Sick Children Well?” in Adam Dodek 
& Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 150 [“Sossin SickKids”]; Funding Backgrounder, ibid at 13. 
50  Pro Bono Ontario, “Hotline”, online: <https://www.probonoontario.org/hotline/>; Funding Backgrounder, ibid 
at 10-11. 
51  Funding Backgrounder, ibid at 10. 
52  Gallant, supra note 48; Gabrielle Giroday, “Support builds in effort to stop closure of pro bono centres” 
Canadian Lawyer (12 November 2008), online: <https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/general/support-
builds-in-effort-to-stop-closure-of-pro-bono-centres/275633>; Pro Bono Ontario, “Going to Court”, online: 
<https://www.probonoontario.org/lawsuits-and-disputes/>; Funding Backgrounder, ibid at 9-10. 
53  Extensively reported in, e.g., Gallant, ibid; Giroday, ibid; Funding Backgrounder, ibid at 22-23. 
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on their annual report whether they volunteer for PBO.54 In addition, lawyers may also provide 
pro bono services for PBO despite not paying the level of insurance or dues to the LSO that would 
normally be required to provide analogous services outside of the pro bono context.55 
During their volunteer shifts, as well as through multiple emails sent to the lawyers who 
volunteer at PBO’s Law Help Centres, lawyers were invited to respond to the questions asked in 
this survey. They were given the opportunity to: a) complete the survey on their own time and 
return through email; b) complete in person during or adjacent to a volunteer shift; or c) fill out 
the survey through PBO’s website. PBO lawyers are almost all litigators, who are likely to be 
familiar with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. Many of them have a private practice in their 
“day jobs” while also working with economically disadvantaged persons through PBO. This 
diversity of experience is valuable for a survey such as this one. Of the approximately 670 lawyers 
on PBO’s volunteer roster for its Law Help Centres, 90 responded to the survey – a take-up rate 
of approximately 13.4%. Each respondent was assigned a number, prefaced by “L” (for “lawyer”) 
during the recording of the results. Individual substantive responses will be referenced by those 
numbers for the duration of this chapter. With one exception,56 the responses were not amended, 
even to correct typographical errors. 
All answers to the qualitative questions were copied into Word documents, and common 
themes were grouped. All substantive comments are reflected below. In the interests of brevity, 
many of these comments are paraphrased, but the number of respondents who made similar 
qualitative comments is noted in Part III. 
 
54  Law Society of Ontario, “Blank Copy 2018 Annual Report”, online: 
<https://portal.lso.ca/wps/PA_AnnualReport/resources/pdf/en/mar_draftform.pdf>, Question 8(c). 
55  Funding Backgrounder, supra note 48 at 6. 
56  L85’s year of call to the bar was recorded as “1015”. It seemed a safe assumption that it was obviously 2015. 
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Superior Court judges were also sought to be surveyed to add a different and important 
perspective. Trial judges deal with the Rules on a day-to-day basis. While there has been praise of 
Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments in the case law,57 there is also concern that increased summary 
judgment adds to the work of trial judges to read the evidence rather than hear it in a trial. This is 
sometimes derisively called “trial in a box”.58 However, the Office of the Chief Justice (prior to 
the appointment of Chief Justice Morawetz) declined to facilitate this request. While this is 
understandable given concerns about the judiciary speaking extrajudicially or otherwise 
performing extrajudicial activities,59 it is nonetheless a point of view that could not be explored. 
C. Limitations of Methodology 
Since the Law Help Centres are in Toronto and Ottawa, the respondents are disproportionately 
from those cities. This does limit the extent to which the lessons can be drawn from the lawyers’ 
impressions. And despite the respondents’ diversity of experience, it cannot necessarily be said to 
mirror that of the Ontario bar, especially given the geographic limitations. Nor do 90 lawyers 
constitute a particularly large sample. It would accordingly be ill-advised to change public 
policy/the law based only on the responses to this survey. However, that does not mean that the 
respondents’ impressions are uninteresting or cannot complement other work in this area. 
D. Hypotheses 
Given the high-profile nature of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, it was expected that 
respondents would have opinions on them, with this hopefully leading to greater satisfaction with 
 
57  E.g., Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6100, 37 CLR (4th) 1 (SCJ) at 
paras 7, 9. 
58  See, e.g., Hamilton v Desert Lake Family Resort Inc, 2017 ONSC 1382, 2017 CarswellOnt 2874 (SCJ) 
[“Hamilton”] at para 1, per Mew J. 
59  See, e.g., the case of Justice Patrick Smith, being controversially found to have committed misconduct by 
having accepted an interim deanship of a law school: Colin Perkel, “Canada’s chief justice urges ‘major 
reforms’ to judge oversight” City News (31 March 2019), online: 
<https://toronto.citynews.ca/2019/03/31/canadas-chief-justice-urges-major-reforms-to-judge-oversight/>. 
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the civil justice system, with parties being less inclined to settle in suboptimal circumstances. But 
it was also expected that opinions would be mixed given the aforementioned praise/criticism of 
Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. Given that the 2010 Amendments do not make any reference 
to litigants’ demographics, it was expected that few respondents would view that litigants’ 
experiences would vary in light of their demographic status. However, given the findings in 
Chapter Two that self-represented litigants can encounter special difficulty in dealing with 
summary procedures,60 it was hypothesized that the presence of self-represented litigants would 
affect respondents’ impressions. Moreover, given the need to invest finite resources in criminal 
litigation in the aftermath of Jordan to prevent stays of proceedings,61 it was expected that this 
would hurt access to civil justice in the absence of more judges being appointed. 
III) FINDINGS 
A. Demographics of Sample 
Respondents were asked whether they wished to identify their gender, whether they identified 
as a racialized person, a member of the LGBT+ community, a person with a disability, or an 
Indigenous Canadian. Respondents were also asked to state when they were called to the bar. 36 
of the respondents self-identified as female while 51 identified as male. No one identified as 
“Other” (despite the option to do so), although three preferred not to say. 14 respondents identified 
as racialized, 71 identified as non-racialized, and five preferred not to say. Two respondents 
identified as a person with a disability, and one identified as an Indigenous Canadian. None 
identified as members of the LGBT+ community. There were 45 respondents called prior to 2010 
and 42 called in or after 2010, with three not answering. 2010 was chosen as a cut-off date for 
 
60  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5 at 270-274 
61  Discussed in, e.g., Palma Paciocco, “The Hours are Long: Unreasonable Delay after Jordan” (2017) 81 SCLR 
233 [“Palma Paciocco”], analyzing R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631 [“Jordan”]. 
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recent calls as it was when the 2010 Amendments came into force. It is unsurprising that there 
were nearly as many lawyers called within the past ten years as before in light of the greater 
likelihood of junior lawyers to gain experience through pro bono work62 and the well-known 
phenomenon of lawyers stopping the full-time practice of law after gaining some experience.63 All 
quantifiable questions were analyzed to assess whether there were any notable differences in 
respondents’ answers in light of their gender, racialization, or year of call. This will be returned to 
in Part III.I. 
B. Effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments 
1. Respondents regarded Hryniak as more impactful than 2010 Amendments 
The survey’s first questions addressed the fundamental issues of this dissertation, with 
Question One asking whether “the Supreme Court’s Decision in Hryniak v Mauldin [has] affected 
your approach to and/or experience in practice in recent years?” 48.9% (44 respondents) said that 
Hryniak had affected their practice experiences, while 28.9% (26 respondents) said that it had not. 
20% (18 respondents) were not sure. The remaining 2.2% (2 respondents) indicated unawareness 
of Hryniak. Among those with an opinion, therefore, there was an approximate 5:3 ratio of 
believing that Hryniak did have an impact. 
Question Three followed up with “Have the 2010 amendments to the Ontario Rules of Civil 
Procedure affected your approach to and/or experience in practice in recent years?” 33.3% (30 
respondents) percent said that the 2010 Amendments had affected their practice experiences, while 
48.9% (44 respondents) said that they had not. 16.7% (15 respondents) were not sure. A single 
 
62  Francis Regan, “Legal Aid Without the State: Assessing the Rise of Pro Bono Schemes” (2000) 33:2 UBC L 
Rev 383 at, inter alia, 396; Mary Jane Mossman, Karen Schucher & Claudia Schmeing, “Comparing and 
Understanding Legal Aid Priorities: A Paper Prepared for Legal Aid Ontario” (2010) 29 WRLSI 149 at 195. 
63  A phenomenon that disproportionately impacts women: Fiona M Kay, Stacey Alarie & Jones Adjei, “Leaving 
Private Practice: How Organizational Context, Time Pressures, and Structural Inflexibilities Shape Departures 
from Private Law Practice” (2013) 20(2) Indiana J Global Leg Studies 22. 
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respondent (1.1%) indicated unawareness of the 2010 Amendments. In other words, there was an 
approximate 3:2 ratio asserting that the 2010 Amendments did not have an impact.  
Why is there a difference in respondents’ impressions of Hryniak vis-à-vis the 2010 
Amendments given the overlap between them? Even though no respondents explicitly said so, a 
hypothesis worth exploring might be that a seminal case such as Hryniak becomes a particularly 
acute symbol. This will be returned to below in Part IV. But much of the difference in impressions 
of the effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments is clearly attributable to respondents who were 
called to the bar for less than ten years not feeling qualified to comment on the state of things prior 
to 2010, with twenty-two respondents (24%) stating something to this effect.64 Overall, there were 
37 respondents who answered the first two questions differently, and 63.9% were called in or after 
2010. Among those called to the bar in or after 2010, only 16.7% felt the 2010 Amendments had 
impacted their practice compared to 32.6% of all respondents and 48.9% of those called prior to 
2010. Nowhere near a similar gap existed in light of year of call for opinion on the effects of 
Hryniak itself, where 53.3% of those called before 2010 said it affected their practice compared to 
42.9% of those called afterwards. 
Other respondents suggested they had limited ability to comment on the 2010 Amendments 
as they rarely came into contact with summary judgment (L84), or otherwise had a specific area 
of practice such as regulatory litigation (L80),65 tax litigation (L03),66 ADR (L79), or practising 
litigation only in conjunction with PBO (L05) that rendered Hryniak and/or the 2010 Amendments 
of limited applicability. 
 
64  L08, L12, L14, L16, L22, L24, L25, L37, L45, L51, L52, L55, L57, L59, L60, L64, L70, L74, L78, L83, L84, 
L88. 
65  As noted in Lorne Sossin, “Chapter Seven: Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries” in Colleen M 
Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 
2013) 1, different considerations and procedural rules apply in this context. 
66  Governed by the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure), SOR/90-688a. 
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2. Respondents’ Qualitative Experiences with Hryniak and 2010 Amendments 
Questions Two and Four asked the lawyers to explain their responses to Questions One and 
Three. Overall, there was consensus that Hryniak makes parties more inclined to bring summary 
judgment motions and clarified the framework for doing so. Twenty-two respondents (24%) 
explicitly indicated that they or other lawyers are more likely to bring summary judgment 
motions,67 including at an earlier time.68 L86 even noted encountering “boomerang” summary 
judgment motions where summary judgment is awarded against the party originally seeking it. 
Other respondents praised “much needed clarity” in terms of the applicability of summary 
judgment. These exact words of L04 were similar to sentiment expressed by six other respondents 
who indicated how Hryniak now permeates discussions of summary judgment and how they frame 
their arguments concerning its appropriateness.69 
However, not all respondents agreed. Indeed, eleven respondents indicated increased 
willingness to bring summary judgment motions in the immediate aftermath of Hryniak, but with 
that frequency decreasing in recent years due to impressions that Superior Court or Court of Appeal 
judges are less likely to grant it.70 Four additional respondents indicated some increased 
willingness to bring summary judgment motions but also hesitation due to risks of being 
impractical in particular cases and/or derailing litigation if not successful.71 This indicates the 
double-edged nature of summary judgment as a means to facilitate access to justice. L39’s lengthy 
response summarized many of these impressions: 
The decision initially had me considering how best to set up my cases for possibly using 
summary judgment. […] I was emboldened by the Hyrniak decision initially until it 
 
67  L08, L12, L13, L23, L31, L35, L37, L38, L39, L40, L51, L52, L53, L55, L58, L65, L66, L69, L77, L81, L86, 
L87. 
68  L13. 
69  L10, L46, L42, L36, L47, L50, L62. 
70  L08, L16, L19, L28, L32, L30, L48, L68, L75, L88, L39. 
71  L52, L58, L26, L39. 
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became clear that Courts were still reluctant to grant summary judgment in anything but 
the clearest possible cases. The risks (and costs) in proceeding outweighed the possible 
benefits in most cases. Similarly I felt that the amendments to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure would allow for a more robust taking control of actions by the courts. This 
has not been the case as courts are reluctant to use the powers given under the 
amendments where it might make scheduling mini trials or trails [sic] of issues difficult.  
 
Impressions on case management were also divided. While L39 and L68 lamented its absence, 
L63 indicated frustration with the extent to which courts have taken control of particular matters. 
L72 was more sympathetic to courts, noting that even when parties have acted promptly, the court 
may not have the resources to facilitate effective movement. 
A handful of respondents indicated objections to the premise that summary judgment is an 
effective means to facilitate access to justice. L54, for instance, believed that summary judgment 
could be as expensive as a short trial. L61 thought such motions “more complicated and time-
consuming”, and L23 expressed the view that they included “an oppressive amount of paper”. L82 
further opined that increased summary judgment and mediation mean that the “vanishing trial” is 
vanishing even more.72 
Even among the vast majority of respondents who seemed to indicate greater – but not 
absolute – openness to summary judgment as an effective means to facilitate access to justice, 
there was emphasis that certain types of litigation are not amenable to summary judgment. While 
emphasizing being “mindful of proportionality” (also noted by L90), L07 indicated that “summary 
judgment [is] not worth it unless there’s a well funded litigant”. L09’s practice usually involves 
more than two parties in the litigation and recent Court of Appeal case law restricting “partial 
summary judgment” (e.g., seeking to obtain summary judgment on behalf of a single defendant in 
a multi-defendant case) means summary judgment is now not an option in this particular type of 
 
72  In line with Jonathan Lisus’s critique: Lisus, supra note 6. 
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practice. L88 also indicated that inability to pursue partial summary judgment limited Hryniak’s 
effectiveness. 
The area of law and type of question before the court also affected respondents’ impressions. 
L27 noted that the determination of a limitation period was a quintessential example of where 
summary judgment is appropriately sought post-Hryniak. Multiple employment litigators also 
cited increased use of summary judgment as being both appropriate and helpful.73 L22 wrote: 
Post-Hryniak, summary judgment has become the standard process for wrongful 
dismissal cases that go to litigation. This means pressuring employers more effectively, 
getting to mandatory mediation early, and, when necessary, getting a judgment within 6 
months instead of 1-2 years. 
 
Another employment lawyer (L21) also noted that discoveries have become more streamlined in 
the aftermath of the 2010 Amendments.  
On the other side, however, two lawyers who practise personal injury/insurance litigation 
indicated distrust of summary judgment motions, and/or that increased attempts to use them have 
had significant costs and minimal benefits.74 
Respondents’ impressions on these first two questions were overwhelmingly – but not 
exclusively – confined to impressions regarding summary judgment. Among those who shared 
their experiences more broadly, for instance, L15 noted that, outside the summary judgment 
context, discovery rules have been interpreted in ways to expand availability of discovery in a way 
that has decreased the value of the rule change.75 L26 and L31 similarly noted that the 2010 
Amendments mandating “discovery plans” through Rule 29.1.03 has mostly been ignored, despite 
 
73  In particular, L67 and L22.  
74  L31, L73. 
75  Attempts to restrict parties to seven hours of discovery have led to attempts to seek leave to exceed that, which 
these respondents seem to feel are granted not infrequently. This is defensible from a fairness perspective but 
still has the consequences of leading to more discovery. See the discussion in Osprey Capital Partners v 
Gennium Pharma Inc et al, 2010 ONSC 2338, 93 CPC (6th) 256, per Master Glustein (as he then was). 
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L21’s view that discovery has become more streamlined. L35 felt that expanded use of the 
simplified Rules and the Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction were effects of the 2010 Amendments 
that could facilitate access to justice. Lamenting that the 2010 Amendments have not been more 
applicable outside the summary judgment context, L83 wrote that “I have made efforts to use the 
‘culture shift’ argument on a number of occasions outside of the summ[ary] judgment [context]. 
No judge has picked up on the argument.” 
C. Speed 
Turning to the access to justice variable of speed, Question 5 asked respondents whether 
“there [had] been a noticeable change in how quickly you have resolved civil cases in recent 
years”. A majority – 52.2% (47 respondents) – said there had been no change. The next most 
common response – 31.1% (28 respondents) – was one of uncertainty. Of those who substantively 
responded, only 4.4% (4 respondents) felt matters were being resolved more quickly while 12.2% 
(11 respondents) felt things were taking longer. 
The belief that there had been little change was reflected in responses to Question 6’s request 
for an explanation to the answer to Question 5. L13 said there was “no discernible change” despite 
Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments while L10 added that the process “[s]till takes too long and 
[is] too expensive”. Explaining why there has been no change, L68 wrote: “The delay in resolving 
cases is attributable to three things: (1) lack of urgency by counsel, (2) very few judges who are 
willing to actively and aggressively manage and push a case forward; and (3) long delays in getting 
court time for multi-day civil hearings.” 
Other impressions, however, were more complicated than simply believing that the status quo 
had remained. Several respondents indicated that some cases are being resolved more quickly post-
Hryniak but others are not. These included: 
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• a belief that case management leads to quicker resolution but for cases that go to trial, 
the process takes even longer, so the average remains the same (L39); 
• an impression that there are fewer settlements, but also more decisions resolved by way 
of summary judgment, which have “more or less” balanced out the delay of matters 
(L65); 
• the employment of the proportionality principle can lead to cases being resolved more 
quickly (L90); 
• feeling that the attitude of the particular judge towards dispositive motions matters 
enormously, with some cases being resolved quicker and others not (L36); 
• being uncertain about effects on delay even in the context of rising costs (L16); and 
• believing that “very strong and very weak cases can be resolved somewhat more quickly” 
but there has been no change for most (L48). 
The belief that Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments have led to some, albeit limited, effects 
was also shared by L70, who viewed Hryniak as “somewhat helpful” and L77, who viewed the 
expanded ability to seek summary judgment as a way to reduce the length of litigation. Among 
those who believe litigation is taking longer, there was a view that it was attributable to an increase 
in motions (L79) rather than Hryniak or the 2010 Amendments per se. The notion that delay is 
increasing, even when some cases are decided more quickly, is complemented by Chapter One’s 
suggestion that there have been fewer unsuccessful jurisdiction motions in later years of the 2010s, 
but delay in resolution of the remaining jurisdiction motions has increased.76 
The attitude of the respondents towards summary judgment – and the apparent uncertainty 
about whether it would be granted – also shone through some responses. L23 wrote that “A long 
 
76  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 34 at 99-100. 
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motion takes longer to schedule than a short trial. If summary judgment is appealed then there is a 
2 year delay in the prosecution of the action.” L28 added that “Courts are blocking summary 
judgment. Any attempt to make such a motion often results in wasted time and effort” while L63 
wrote “Everything takes at least as long as before but with more pointless interactions with the 
court.” This highlights Karakatsanis J’s acknowledgment in Hryniak that summary judgment 
motions themselves can be an unnecessary source of delay and expense.77 
Others suggested parties with deep pockets can use that fact to illegitimately delay matters, 
exemplified in specific complaints regarding insurers (L31) or more general observations, such as 
the court having limited means to “set a bully straight” until the end of litigation (L07). 
D. Costs 
The questions on delay were followed by questions on financial expense: “Adjusting for 
inflation, has there been a noticeable change in the financial expense (in terms of legal fees and 
disbursements) required to resolve civil actions in recent years (since 2010)?” The results were as 
follows: 
• 38.9% (35) answered expenses had increased; 
• 2.2% (2) responded that they had decreased; 
• 20.0% (18) said there had been no change; and 
• 38.9% (35) said they were not sure. 
Two respondents viewed Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments as leading to “slight 
improvements”,78 such as: “increasing the threshold for simplified rules cases up to [$100,000] 
 
77  Hryniak, supra note 1 at para 74. 
78  These exact words of L56 were similar to the sentiment expressed by L77. 
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has made it more affordable to litigate low value matters” (L50). Ultimately, however, these were 
dwarfed in most respondents’ eyes by other factors, such as: 
• cases being more complex (L56, L81); 
• more pre-trial steps that are in theory designed to decrease costs but can be a source of 
increased expense in themselves (L39), such as non-summary judgment motions (L37) 
and mandatory mediation (L38); 
• increased hourly rates for lawyers (L14) and the billable hour model itself (L15); 
• costs of document production, identified by four respondents,79 partially due to a 
proliferation of relevant documents due to increased electronic communications (though 
paradoxically, L30 said the ability to “outsource” document production can make 
litigation less expensive80); 
• increased costs of running a law firm (L31), the costs of which get passed on to clients;81 
and 
• increased costs of disbursements, such as court fees (identified by three respondents82) 
and, more notably, experts, which six different respondents identified as increasing the 
costs of litigation.83 L82 also indicated increased costs of disbursements but did not 
specify which ones. 
 
79  L16, L18, L25, L81. 
80  The outsourcing of document production, frequently offshore, has been ongoing for over a decade: see, e.g., 
Alexandra Hanson, “Legal Processing Outsourcing to India: So Hot Right Now!” (2009) 62 SMU L Rev 1889. 
81  John S Dzienkowski, “The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients” 
(2014) 82:6 Fordham L Rev 2995 at 3017; Edward Poll, “Under Water from Overhead? Here Are Ways to 
Keep Afloat” in Law Practice Today (March 2008), online: 
<http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mtt03081.shtml>.  
82  L53, L36, L87. 
83  L27, L28, L31, L38, L53, L74. 
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The lack of improvement in most respondents’ eyes – and the worsening of the status quo in the 
view of almost 40% – therefore appears attributable to many factors, unrelated to Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments. The occasional respondent (e.g., L63) did feel that Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments were themselves the source of increased expense, claiming more money was being 
“spent on unnecessary steps.” But regardless of the reason for the (lack of) change, it would appear 
that most respondents would agree with L79’s observation that “Litigation has become a forum 
for the wealthy. The exception being the Small Claims Court.” 
E. Settlement and ADR 
1. Rates and Timing of Settlement 
Questions 9, 11, and 13 asked about settlement and ADR. Question 9 asked “has there been 
an increase or decrease in the rate of settlement in recent years (since 2010)?” Nearly 85% opined 
either that there had been no change (40% or 36 respondents) or they were not sure (44.4% or 40 
respondents). Of the remainder, there was division as to whether there was an increase (8.9% or 8 
respondents) or decrease (6.7% or 6 respondents) in rates of settlement. L90, explaining an 
increase in rates of settlement, wrote that proportionality now factors into settlement decisions. 
The overwhelming majority of results, however, suggest that the situation had not changed much, 
exemplified in L37’s response that “I tell my clients that 99% of cases settle and that has not 
changed.” L19 suggested that “Everything is settling. The vast majority of young lawyers have 
virtually no chance of ever going to trial.” 
This is not to suggest that respondents had no other impressions, with L27 writing that others 
in their office were more likely to go to trial post-Hryniak, while L09 explained a tendency to “act 
more for public authorities, which tend to take a more principled approach to settlement”.  
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On the issue of timing of settlement, respondents had opposite impressions. Believing that 
settlement takes place later, L31 (who clearly acts regularly against insurance companies) 
lamented that “insurers take things to the eve of trial” only to have settlement then and L73 (who 
also clearly litigates against insurance companies) opined that insurance companies suspect juries 
will not give plaintiffs large settlements and are now willing to go to trial more often. However, 
L39 wrote that while the rate of settlement has remained the same, this frequently occurs earlier 
due to mandatory mediation. L79 even wrote that the summary judgment rule has been used in 
arbitration with the consent of all parties, resulting in earlier resolution. 
2. Satisfaction with Settlement 
Question 11 asked a related question about whether there has “been an increase or decrease 
in the quality of settlements and/or clients’ satisfaction from settlements in recent years (since 
2010)?” The results were not very different. Again, over 85% were either unsure (39.3% or 36 
respondents) or thought that there had been no change (48.3% or 43 respondents). One respondent 
did not answer. That leaves only eleven respondents opining on the question. These respondents 
were almost evenly divided on whether satisfaction had increased (6 respondents or 6.9%) or 
decreased (5 respondents or 5.7%).  
Giving their impressions, L23 and L87 believed that satisfaction with settlement had 
decreased because settlement results from litigants’ inability to afford to continue. L74 suggested 
that changes to deductibles in insurance policies was the reason for the decreased satisfaction. 
Among those who thought satisfaction had increased was the belief from L77 that Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments had reduced costs. But another respondent (L15) observed that there is no 
satisfaction in litigation, even when settlement occurs. Expressing many respondents’ conflicting 
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emotions, L36 described that Hryniak could help to avoid some unprincipled settlements, but with 
settlement remaining by far the norm given the costs of not settling: 
My clients are typically reluctant to settle. When they do, […] I have really encouraged 
them to – and they aren’t happy about it. They settle because court is too expensive and 
they cannot afford it. I do not know if that is different from years past. Maybe. I recently 
resolved a case (by getting judgment without a trial) and maybe I would have encouraged 
a settlement if a trial seemed more likely. 
 
3. Use of ADR 
Question 13 asked about ADR, which frequently leads to settlement, specifically: “Has there 
been an increase or decrease in the use of alternative dispute resolution in recent years (since 
2010)?” Here, respondents had slightly stronger opinions. The majority were either uncertain 
(32.2% or 29 respondents) or felt there had been no change (38.9% or 35 respondents). 26.7% (24 
respondents) felt the use of ADR had increased. Only two respondents (2.2%) felt the use of ADR 
had decreased. 
This view that ADR remains either very common or is increasing even further appears to exist 
for a variety of reasons, including: 
• clients not wanting to pay for trial (L38); 
• legal fees and disbursements being lower with the view that ADR is less expensive 
(expressed by five respondents84) with multiple mediations being used in complex 
matters (L39); 
• the view that litigation is uncertain (L16); and 
• mandatory mediation is present in many locations in Ontario (as noted by five 
respondents85 – this is not related to the 2010 Amendments per se). 
 
84  L10, L16, L35, L39, L68. 
85  L15, L61, L21, L87, L28. 
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Three respondents86 also emphasized that “sophisticated” clients were particularly likely to 
use or be interested in using ADR. L23 was nonetheless cognizant of the trade-offs entailed in this:  
Sophisticated parties use ADR because it is speedier and increases control. Yet this 
comes at the expense of development of the jurisprudence. The parties who can afford to 
make full and thoughtful argument are opting for ADR. Self-reps generally can’t afford 
ADR, and they are not in a position to make an argument in front of a judge that will lead 
to valuable jurisprudence. 
 
Some respondents were nonetheless skeptical of ADR, with L66 opining, “If lawyers cannot 
resolve the problem between themselves, [I’m] not sure how another lawyer can help keep it out 
of court.” 
F. Self-Represented Litigants 
Respondents were less ambivalent about the effects of self-represented litigants, as discerned 
through Question 15: “Do your answers to the foregoing questions change depending on whether 
a self-represented litigant is involved in a proceeding?”. One respondent did not answer. Of those 
who did, 31 (34.4%) answered that their approach to litigation and experience in recent years did 
change depending on whether a self-represented litigant was involved in the proceeding. But 30 
(33.3%) said it did not. 29 (32.2%) were unsure. Five respondents said their lack of opinion was 
due to the fact that they did not frequently interact with self-represented litigants.87 
Despite the division on whether the involvement of self-represented litigants affected their 
approach to litigation, those who felt that self-represented litigants did affect the litigation had 
strong opinions, and offered many views. A very interesting impression from nine respondents88 
suggested that self-represented litigants were less likely to settle and/or more likely to take more 
 
86  L16, L23, L48. 
87  L18, L35, L56, L62, L73. 
88  L02, L19, L23, L32, L38, L39, L47, L57, L83. 
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“principled” stances. This may be a contributing factor to their greater presence in court.89 Though 
one respondent (L83) put “principled” in scare quotes and added that this “results in a more drawn 
out litigation process to the detriment of the often innocent defendant.” Though understanding of 
the need to be flexible and generous with self-represented litigants, L83 cited an example of 
needing to win four motions against a self-represented litigant before a master was willing to award 
even nominal costs.  
Twelve different respondents also felt that the presence of self-represented litigants increased 
challenges, costs, and/or time required to resolve an action due to a combination of the self-
represented litigants’ need for more formalized processes and the difficulties that they had in 
understanding the process.90 For instance, L23 and L66 wrote that ADR is very difficult if only 
one party has a lawyer while L32 wrote that “Claims by self-reps are almost always dealt with by 
trial or motion. Other mechanisms do not work.” L79, who has worked as a mediator and arbitrator, 
wrote: “A self rep has a more difficult time in putting their best case forward. [This p]uts the 
mediator and arbitrator in [a] difficult position.” 
These problems that lawyers felt they encountered with self-represented litigants did not 
necessarily arise for lack of trying to prevent them. L44 wrote that “[o]ur firm approach is to offer 
to settle early and more often with self-reps”. L90 said that “While it is easier to deal with another 
lawyer, the same offers [on] the same basis are extended to self-reps.” L55 explained that, “When 
dealing with self-reps, I try to provide multiple opportunities to try to resolve the issue. I also use 
 
89  The prevalence of self-represented litigants in court is noted by, e.g., Trevor CW Farrow, et al, Addressing the 
Needs of Self-Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice System, A White Paper for the Association of 
Canadian Court Administrators (Toronto and Edmonton, 27 March 2012) at 14-16, online: <http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/Addressing%20the%20Needs%20of%20SRLs%20ACCA%20White%20
Paper%20March%202012%20Final%20Revised%20Version.pdf>; Macfarlane Main Report, supra note 40. 
90  L10, L25, L47, L23, L32, L37, L40, L50, L53, L60, L68, L87. 
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motions only as a last resort unless the plaintiff’s position is unwarranted. I also use Rule 2.1 letters 
to the Court [if] a self-represented claim is clearly vexatious.”91 
Despite a disproportionate amount of abusive litigation by a relatively small number of self-
represented litigants,92 there was an acknowledgment from respondents such as L07 that many 
self-represented litigants were in difficult situations with serious issues in disputes. L27 
summarized many respondents’ conflicting impressions: 
Self-represented litigants result in delays, sometimes through no fault of their own. They 
get many additional opportunities to meet deadlines, file material, comply with orders 
etc. Many often move from self-represented to represented over and over again, which 
also creates significant delays. My practice is in civil litigation, so it is essentially unheard 
of for them to [have] legal aid assistance. 
 
L64 offered a rare note of hope: that availability of simpler procedures post-2010 should help self-
represented litigants. But even in the face of simpler procedures, civil courts can only do what they 
have the resources to do, resources that may have to be redirected if circumstances demand as 
much, as will now be discussed. 
G. Effects of Jordan 
The 2016 Jordan93 decision imposed strict timelines on criminal trials, with there being 
presumptive stays of proceedings if these time limits are not observed.94 Question 19 inquired 
about the effects of this on civil justice through asking, “Do you believe that the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s 2016 decision in R v Jordan has had any effects on access to civil justice?” Exactly 
half of respondents (45, or 50%) felt that Jordan has hurt access to civil justice, while only 3.3% 
(3 respondents) felt that Jordan had helped access to civil justice. 31.1% (28 respondents) were 
uncertain while 7.8% (7 respondents) were unaware of the Jordan decision. 7.8% (7 respondents) 
 
91  Rule 2.1 is discussed in Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5. 
92  Ibid at 263. 
93  Supra note 61. 
94  Discussed in, e.g., Palma Paciocco, supra note 61. 
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viewed Jordan as having had no effects on access to civil justice, with four respondents citing 
Jordan being a criminal case as the reason for this.95 
The 15:1 ratio of believing Jordan has hurt as opposed to helped in civil justice is reflected 
in impressions, such as the following: 
• Twenty-three respondents96 – over a quarter of the total sample – had the impression that 
Jordan had exacerbated delay in civil matters as resources had been diverted to criminal 
matters with L48 succinctly describing this state of affairs as “Where there are not 
dedicated courts (i.e., outside of Toronto[97]), prioritizing criminal cases has made it 
much more difficult to get access to courts for civil justice”; 
• at least three respondents98 were told by court staff or judges that motions or trials needed 
to be delayed to ensure compliance with Jordan, and/or that there were insufficient 
judges to manage the criminal list under Jordan, let alone the civil system; and 
• through courts’ de-prioritizing civil matters, it is even harder for self-represented litigants 
to have their day in court (L08). 
L73, writing in Summer 2019, gave a particularly poignant observation: “As of today the next 
available court date for a trial is in 2022. This is beyond what we have ever seen before.” 
L39, who is a member of a committee with many judges, summarized many of these concerns:  
the Bench is consumed with the Jordan case and assuring that criminal justice is provided 
in a timely fashion to the detriment of civil justice. Criminal justice has priority followed 
by family and child protection followed lastly by civil. Times to get lengthy civil trials 
has increased to the point where you can wait up to 3 to 4 years for your trial date once 
you are ready to set the matter down. 
 
95  L54, L64, L77, L84. 
96  L01, L23, L48, L11, L18, L26, L38, L42, L50, L51, L55, L59, L63, L65, L68, L70, L74, L79, L81, L82, L87, 
L39, L73, L15, L19. 
97  Presumably this refers to the Toronto practice of “dedicating” judges to various areas of law such as class 
proceedings (see Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5 at fn 196) and commercial litigation (see Warren K Winkler, 
“The Vanishing Trial” (Autumn 2008) 27(2) Advocates’ Soc J 3 at 4). 
98  L51, L53, L70. 
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Some criticism was levelled more directly at the Supreme Court. L15 expressed opposition 
“to any cap […] The system is bloated and slow and has been for decades. Placing a cap/timing 
for trial in favour of rights of [the] accused may have the effect of rewarding delay in the system.” 
L19 synthesizes frustration even more succinctly: 
R. v. Jordan is terrible for civil justice. The Supreme Court should not have instituted a 
“legislative regime” that cannot be overturned by elected officials. When faced with 
allowing a murderer or fraudster to walk free, or to delay or force the settlement of a 
whiplash claim, the [motor vehicle accident] claimant loses out 100% of the time. 
 
At the same time, there was equivocation from some respondents. L07, for instance, wants 
the spirit of Jordan to be applied in criminal and family law. L44 thought Jordan may have been 
a positive effect on “accelerating and keeping the system moving.” And L28 felt Jordan has had 
positive effects on quasi-criminal matters. 
H. Presence of a Culture Shift? 
Question 21 asked whether respondents believed “a ‘culture shift’ has been occurring this 
decade [the 2010s] in the conduct of civil litigation oriented towards promoting access to justice?” 
28.9% (26 respondents) felt there had been while 46.7% (42 respondents) felt there had not. 24.4% 
(22 respondents) were unsure. 
This could suggest that the majority of respondents felt that things have not changed, or not 
changed much, and that appears to be the case to some extent. But Question 22 sought impressions 
based on the above question, and also asked what a culture shift might look like. These impressions 
were valuable in illustrating the responses. Among those who thought there were signs of a culture 
shift, impressions included: 
• a shift towards private arbitration (L59), and a recognition of the need to look for 
solutions to problems outside the courts (L35); 
• lawyers and judges becoming more patient with self-represented litigants (L57); 
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• benefits from the enactment of the proportionality principle (L90); 
• “Judges increasingly promot[ing] settlement through judicial mediation and blocking 
access to hearing time” (L22);  
• “People seem[ing] to care more as the years go by” (L70); and 
• PBO allowing parties who cannot afford lawyers to nonetheless have access to legal 
advice that allows them to appear more organized when in court (L38). 
Others felt that there had been small movement, seen in increased acknowledgment and/or 
discussion about the importance of civil justice (e.g., L60). Yet more thought that the judiciary is 
more cognizant about the problem than lawyers (L45, L53). L15 believed that the greater 
awareness around the need for access to justice has produced effects: 
I have seen a shift in lawyers’ perceptions of access to justice and a need to give back by 
volunteering or supporting the shift in other ways (support of legal aid funding) that was 
not as accepted as a few decades ago. I recall when even volunteering at clinics outside 
of practice was frowned on (taking away from billable hours and insurance issues for 
giving such advice outside of firm control); now it is strongly supported by most firms. 
But that has more to do with volunteer programs and education than any change in the 
law or Rules of procedure [sic]. 
 
Many more impressions indicated the belief in little to no progress, however. L34 exemplifies 
this, answering Question 21 “Yes” (i.e., there has been a culture shift) but then answered Question 
22 with “NOWHERE NEAR ENOUGH” (capitalization in original). Other comments in this vein 
include: 
• “There certainly should be a culture shift, but too many lawyers tend to delay cases either 
intentionally or out of an abundance of caution. There are simply not enough judges, and 
will never be enough judges, to control this behaviour” (L48); 
• “In my view the Court has attempted to make access to justice for the public, however 
many factors have intervened” (L79); 
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• “The amount of grunt work in civil litigation is crazy and shoots up the cost to the client” 
with examples including lengthy paper productions, cuts to legal clinics, and practice 
directives changing from judicial district-to-judicial district across the province (L25); 
• “The existence of access to justice would constitute a cultural shift. I don’t see that any 
meaningful progress has been made” (L46); 
• “In my experience, lawyers have continued to approach litigation the same way” (L50), 
shared by L75, who wrote: “Legal aid does not extend to civil claims and therefore the 
same issues that existed 20 years ago when I started to practice still exist today [with] 
lots of self-represented litigants trying to navigate a complex court system”; and 
• “I believe there have been many more references to a culture shift, but in practical terms, 
the profession is resistant to change. I have frequently been frustrated in attempts to 
resolve matters more efficiently by senior counsel or the bench as they are uncomfortable 
with creative approaches to dispute resolution” (L51). 
Many respondents picked up on L51’s emphasis on “talk” or “lip service” about access to 
justice, which perhaps has a positive effect on consciousness-raising,99 but lacks accompanying 
significant change: 
• “More lip service for access to justice but the system is at least as complex and expensive 
for unrepresented parties as it was before” (L63); 
• “Culture shift sounds nice but not sure cases are being resolved any faster” (L12); 
• “[M]y peers and colleagues at law school and at work nearly universally profess to be 
concerned about access to justice [but] my overall impression is that while most 
 
99  Seen in L60’s response. Consciousness-raising is not unimportant, as has been particularly noted in feminist 
scholarship: see, e.g., Janet E Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 43-44, 239. 
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recognize there is an access to justice problem, only a small fraction of the profession are 
actually doing anything about it (and I would not count myself among their ranks)” (L01); 
• “[W]hile people talk a big game, I wouldn’t say I’ve seen a marked increase in people 
actually working towards access to justice. The culture shift has been limp [sic] service 
without tangible action” (L18); 
• “For all the talk by LSO and the courts about A2J, […] Unless the case is worth hundreds 
of thousands of dollars or more, it simply is becoming cost-prohibitive to litigate” (L87); 
• “There is a lot more lip service. […] It is too expensive for most clients to go to trial so 
they settle for less than they deserve or give up.” (L78); 
• “Certainly people talk about access to justice all of the time, but recent provincial 
[government] policies and cuts seem to be moving in the opposite direction” (L84);  
• “It’s all lip service. Nothing has really changed.” (L54); and 
• “The discussion has simply become more vocal.” (L55). 
Even among those who believe there has been change, there is a view that this is not always 
positive. For instance, L23 felt Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments have led to changes that are 
not necessarily positive: “I sense a desire by judges to dispose of litigation whenever possible. The 
civil justice system will provide an outcome, but not necessarily justice.” 
The frustration seemed particularly acute among three personal injury lawyers (L31, L73, 
L74) who emphasized the particularly devastating consequences of being unemployed or 
underemployed while needing to seek treatment to recover from an injury for which one should 
be compensated. 
Turning to what a culture shift should look like, respondents suggested: 
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• Being “[c]oncerned with fairness to self-represented plaintiffs and non-institutional 
plaintiffs re[garding] cost, time and expense of court processes and proceedings” (L49); 
• “increased support for PBO within and without the Bar” (L14); 
• “[PBO] should operate like legal aid with proper funding for civil cases limited to the 
income testing which is now done. They receive hundreds of calls daily and can respond 
to only a handful” (L77); 
• “We’re all taught at law school that trials are bad and ADR is good. That’s a bad thing.” 
(L82); 
• “Faster turnover of disputes [and] expeditious hearings to reduce fees” (L21); 
• “We need to turn our minds to a more flexible system that can address the different types 
of litigation, not just one size fits all” (L04); 
• a less adversarial system of litigation, especially in Toronto (L28); and 
• “The system requires increased careful independent expert assessment in the early stages 
of any dispute – maybe the process would equate to ‘eliminating claim(s)’ with […] 
parties involved in an informal, more affordable, lower risk environment” (L07). 
Some specific suggestions were given, such as: 
• “Access to justice would increase if we reduced court time allocated to procedural 
matters and enacted tighter procedural rules. No court time should be spared on costs, for 
example” (L36); 
• “E-filing and service of documents should be prioritized. Active case management must 
be aggressive” (L68); and 
• Courts operating for longer hours and increasing limits to access the Small Claims Court 
and Simplified Procedure (L19). 
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L54 cynically dismissed the project itself, proclaiming “It is and will always be about the 
money.” L37 felt that the problem was not solvable without government involvement: “Until the 
government funds or subsidizes civil litigation, there is no access to justice.” Putting both of these 
impressions together, L66 wrote that incentives are misaligned for change: “Lawyers benefit from 
delay. Courts are public institutions run by public servants without much incentive to make things 
efficient.”  
L39 seemed to channel many different responses, recognizing that there is greater awareness 
of the problem, but being skeptical as to how much change has actually occurred, in light of legal 
uncertainty and competing pressures on lawyers: 
I think the profession and the government pays lip service to access to justice but that 
access to justice itself is difficult if not impossible when the economic pressures of 
practice on lawyers[,] in particular sole practitioners and small firm lawyers, are such 
that promoting a culture shift is difficult. In addition the government is increasing the 
disbursement costs and the courts themselves appear to chastise lawyers for failing to be 
extremely well prepared and covering all possible angles while at the same time 
criticizing lawyers for their large legal bills to their clients. Appella[te] courts and trial 
courts decisions are such that certainty in law is difficult to discern. Where there is 
uncertainty, costs increase as those with deep pockets can exploit the uncertainty while 
those without deep pockets must “cave” or run a risk that they cannot afford to run. The 
deck is stacked against those who need access to justice most being those with few 
resources. […] Steps should be taken to encourage access to justice through a robust legal 
aid funding and court fees; particularly for those having to defend against claims, should 
be lowered. 
 
I. Demographic Variables 
1. Demographics of the Client 
The vast majority of respondents felt that litigants’ demographic characteristics (such as race 
or gender) did not affect the litigants’ experiences with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments (55% 
or 49 respondents), or they were unsure (36% or 32 respondents). Among those who gave these 
responses, most did not give explanations but among those who did, impressions included 
“see[ing] no change based on the demographic status of the litigants in my practice” (L39) and 
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having “[n]ever thought about it that way” (L37). Two respondents – one racialized, one not – 
responded somewhat tersely to the question being asked with L54 writing “I deal with the merits 
of the case; not the race or gender of the client” and L55 similarly stating “I report to my clients 
on the merits of the claim, not demographic status.” 
Only 9% of respondents (8 persons) viewed litigants’ demographics as having an impact on 
those litigants’ experiences interacting with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. However, it is 
worth observing that 50% of those who felt so were racialized lawyers themselves (though they 
were still a minority, albeit 28.6%, of the fourteen racialized lawyers in the sample).  
Explaining their answers, some respondents emphasized economic (L07) or language (L36, 
L50, L57) barriers as being more important than the listed examples of race or gender per se. L79 
similarly wrote: “As long as they can clearly articulate their position race or gender does not 
matter” [emphasis added by me]. Implicit in responses such as these appears to be a suggestion 
that racialization may be correlated with linguistic and/or economic challenges, and this is posing 
difficulty to litigants post-Hryniak. 
However, other observations, though very much in the minority, were more profound and 
concerning. L19, for instance, wrote how the shortcomings of the civil justice system (including 
what they viewed as the limited effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments) can perversely 
incentivize very low-income racialized individuals to remain in the court system while pushing 
out the lower-middle class: 
In motor vehicle accident litigation, especially for minor accidents, most plaintiff’s [sic] 
come from racialized minorities. The economic aspects of running a weak whiplash 
claim, prevent most middle and high income earners from bothering to sue. But for 
someone who earns $20,000 per year, a $20,000 payout after 4 years of hassle makes 
economic sense. Most [motor vehicle accidents] are resolved through dispute resolution, 
so perhaps ADR could be seen to be of assistance to minorities in this situation. 
 
219 
 
 
L61 added, “There has been an increasing number of poor litigants, mostly from the immigrant 
population that is ignorant of their rights and are often taken advantage of.”  
L31, whose practice clearly includes many actions against insurers and was also the sole 
respondent who self-identified as an Indigenous Canadian, wrote that “There is no question in my 
mind that insurers are racist. They offer less and litigate more against immigrants.” L74, who also 
clearly practised in the personal injury area, similarly wrote: 
Generally juries are more favourable to English speaking Caucasians. This inherent bias 
in society then effects [sic] access to justice for racialized communities. Judge alone trials 
should become the standard or more common place in civil litigation even for the regular 
procedure. It’s great that now it is for simplified procedure. 
 
L23’s concern about the intersection of marginalized populations and lack of access to civil 
justice was more profound, citing the lack of case law caused by a lack of access to the civil court 
system: “In a constitutional democracy judges protect minorities. Our society will not develop in 
a way that is favourable to minorities without the development of jurisprudence.” It is worth 
emphasizing that these impressions were not common – but they are still concerning. 
2. Demographics of the Lawyers 
As noted above, only two respondents identified as persons with disabilities, only one 
identified as an Indigenous Canadian, and no one identified as a member of the LGBT+ 
community. It accordingly could not be observed whether there were notable differences in 
lawyers’ impressions of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments based on these characteristics. 
However, whether respondents’ year of call affected their answers was a subject of analysis, as 
was whether there were any noticeable differences in responses in light of race and gender. Given 
that the entire sample surveyed cannot be considered representative of the population of Ontario 
litigators, and the subsets of years of call, gender, and race are even smaller, caution must be 
emphasized in looking at these numbers. But it would be derelict not to report them.  
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a. Relevance of Year of Call 
By far the most striking difference between respondents called before and after (or in100) 2010 
was the extent to which the more senior lawyers had stronger opinions on the changes (or lack 
thereof) in civil litigation in recent years. To every single question, a larger number of post-2010 
calls indicated they were “unsure” about the answer. This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
comparative lack of pre-Hryniak experience of the more recently called lawyers. This 
“agnosticism gap” did range from question-to-question: i.e., there is a 6.5:1 gap on the question of 
whether the 2010 Amendments have affected experience but only a 1.18:1 gap on whether there 
has been a culture shift. But it was substantial in many questions, such as the effects of Hryniak 
(2.58:1), views about the length (3.58:1) and expense (3.48:1) of litigation, changes to the 
prevalence of (1.65:1) and satisfaction with (2.25:1) with settlement, and the use of ADR (3.94:1). 
Nor are any of these attributable to particularly small sample sizes – all of these questions led to 
at least fifteen (and as many as forty) lawyers answering they were “unsure” about the answers. 
The number of more recent calls being uncertain seems to have resulted in the more senior 
lawyers being likelier to have substantive views on the answers to the questions, including that: 
• Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments have affected their experience/approach to practice 
(53.3% and 48.9% among the pre-2010 calls compared to 42.9% and 16.7% among the 
post-2010 calls); 
• litigation had become longer and more expensive (24.4% and 53.3% among pre-2010 calls 
compared to 4.8% and 23.8% among post-2010 calls) – admittedly, the only respondents 
 
100  Those called to the bar in 2010 will be referred to as “post-2010 calls” for ease of reference. Given that the 
2010 Amendments became effective January 1, 2010, they did not experience practice prior to 2010 (though 
they may have had articling experience). 
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who felt litigation had become less expensive were also pre-2010 calls but they were only 
two individual respondents; 
• settlement and ADR have become more prevalent (11.1% and 31.1% among pre-2010 calls 
compared to 7.1% and 21.4% among post-2010 calls); and 
• Jordan has hurt access to civil justice (62.2% among pre-2010 calls compared to 40.5% 
among post-2010 calls). 
To be fair, in some questions, the older calls were likelier to have opinions and therefore 
likelier to be split in their opinions: for example, being likelier to believe both that satisfaction 
from settlement had increased and decreased compared to the newer calls. 
Some questions also yielded no serious differences based on year of call in the answers: for 
instance, the older and newer calls had very similar views on the relevance of a litigant’s self-
represented status. Newer calls were also slightly more likely to believe there had been a “culture 
shift” in the 2010s (33.3% answering yes compared to 40.5% answering no) than the older calls 
(24.4% compared to 53.3%). Overall, however, it is fair to say that the older calls believed that 
there had been more change. All differences in answers based on year of call can be found in 
Appendix K. 
b. Relevance of Gender 
As illustrated in Appendix L, there were not many notable differences in responses in light of 
a lawyer’s gender. Among the more notable disparities were female lawyers being more likely to 
opine that settlement had increased (13.9% compared to 5.9%), in addition to satisfaction from 
settlement (13.9% compared to 2%). Male lawyers, by contrast, were more likely to believe that 
Hryniak had affected their experience in and/or approach to practice (54.9% compared to 38.9%). 
But there do not appear to be any consistently connected differences analogous to what could be 
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found among the lawyers’ years of call. As such, more methodological research would be 
necessary to be certain that gender does or does not affect lawyers’ impressions of changes to 
Ontario litigation in recent years. 
c. Relevance of Race 
The sample size of 14 racialized lawyers, and no more than eight racialized individuals 
answering any question in the same manner, renders it particularly unsafe to draw conclusions 
about differences in responses based on race, even more so than for gender or year of call.101 This 
is amplified in light of the results, the entirety of which are found in Appendix M, where variations 
(insofar as there are any) between respondents based on their race could be reduced significantly 
by adding just one more racialized lawyer to the sample. In any event, most answers to most 
questions did not reveal a notable gap between racialized and non-racialized lawyers.102  
The one notable, possible exception to this was the increased likelihood of racialized lawyers 
to view litigants’ experiences with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments as having differed in light 
of the litigants’ demographic status. 28.6% of racialized lawyers believed this to be the case 
compared to 5.8% of non-racialized lawyers. Moreover, 63.8% of the non-racialized lawyers 
asserted that the litigants’ demographics did not affect their experience in the civil justice system 
in recent years compared to only 21.4% of racialized lawyers. The remaining gap can be attributed 
to 50% of racialized lawyers being unsure compared to only 30.4% of non-racialized lawyers. 
 
101  David M Dietz, Christopher D Barr & Mine Cetinkaya-Rundel, OpenIntro Statistics, 3d ed (2015), online: 
<https://www.openintro.org/stat/textbook.php?stat_book=os> at 178, noting that a sample size of less than 
thirty is particularly vulnerable. 
102  For example, it is worth noting that racialized lawyers were more likely to view that the rate of settlement has 
increased (28.6% compared to 7%), though also more likely to view it as having decreased (14.3% compared 
to 5.6%), with the reason being non-racialized lawyers viewing it as more likely not to have changed (42.7% 
compared to 28.6%). Another gap that appears large also appears likely attributable to coincidence (no causal 
rationale jumps to mind, in any event): racialized and non-racialized lawyers essentially having inverted 
statistics on being unsure whether litigation’s length is increasing (57.1% of racialized lawyers and 26.8% of 
non-racialized lawyers) or believing there is no change (28.6% of racialized lawyers and 59.2% of non-
racialized lawyers). 
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Indeed, as many racialized lawyers (in absolute numbers) viewed demographics to be as relevant 
to litigants’ experiences as did non-racialized lawyers despite there being five times as many non-
racialized lawyers in the sample.  
The difficulty of drawing conclusions relating to the impact of race based on these results (as 
is done for many other issues in Part IV) also arises because this project is ill-suited to delve into 
critical race scholarship in depth. However, this is an issue worthy of further study, with two 
considerations underscoring this. First, the survey asked respondents whether the effects of recent 
changes to procedural law differed in light of litigants’ demographics status. This is a different and 
more narrow question than asking about the extent to which racialization affects interactions with 
the civil justice system more broadly, something also worthy of study.103 Second, racialized 
lawyers responding in notably different ways even to the more narrow question suggests this area 
of study may contribute to recent discussions on the value of diversity in the bar.104  
 
 
103  See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, “Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice” (2015) 101 Iowa L Rev 1263. 
104  This has most obviously been an issue recently in the debate over the “Statement of Principles” at the LSO: 
see, e.g.: Justin P’ng, “The Gatekeeper’s Jurisdiction: The Law Society of Ontario and the Promotion of 
Diversity in the Legal Profession” (Spring 2019) 77 UT Fac L Rev 82; Omar Ha-Redeye, “My Friends Muddy 
the Waters: How a Statement of Principles Became a Public Fiasco” (December 15, 2017). Ethics Primer at 
King Law Chambers, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091758; and Lorne Sossin, 
“Slouching towards Inclusion: The Law Society’s Statement of Principles” Dean Sossin’s Blog (24 October 
2017), online: <https://deansblog-osgoode-yorku-ca.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/2017/10/slouching-towards-
inclusion-the-law-societys-statement-of-principles/>, contra: Léonid Sirota, “The Law Society of Upper 
Canada should stick to its statutory knitting”, CBA National (7 November 2017), online: 
<http://nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/ethics/2017/articles-november-2017-the-law-society-of-upper-
c?lang=FR>; Murray Klippenstein & Bruce Pardy, “How Social Justice Ideologues Highjacked a Legal 
Regulator” Quillette (11 February 2019), online: <https://quillette.com/2019/02/11/how-social-justice-
ideologues-hijacked-a-legal-regulator/>; and Arthur Cockfield, “Limiting Lawyer Liberty: How the Statement 
of Principles Coerces Speech” (March 15, 2018) (Queen’s Law Research Paper Series no. 2018-100, 2018). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141561. But the issue is broader: e.g., Challenges Faced by 
Racialized Licensees Working Group, Working Together for Change: Strategies to Address Issues of Systemic 
Racism in the Legal Professions (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016), online: <https://www-lsuc-
on-
ca.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/uploadedFiles/Equity_and_Diversity/Members/Challenges_for_Racialized_Licens
ees/Working-Together-for-Change-Strategies-to-Address-Issues-of-Systemic-Racism-in-the-Legal-
Professions-Final-Report.pdf> [perma.cc/DS8L-LZ2A]. 
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IV) SUMMARY AND LESSONS 
The previous section reported primarily on the survey’s responses without annotations, this 
chapter’s primary contribution to the literature. This final section nonetheless seeks to draw lessons 
in eight areas where the responses appear worthy of independent analysis and/or complement other 
work in the field. First, it is posited that the surveys’ responses suggest that Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments have had some, albeit limited, effects, on resolving certain types of cases more 
quickly. Second, a superficial contradiction will be addressed given the prevalence of responses 
suggesting that there has been little-to-no-change. Third, it will be emphasized that a substantial 
minority of respondents view increased summary judgment and case management to be 
unfavourable as there are trade-offs that come even with the benefits. Fourth, the necessity of 
exploring whether there has been a drop in the use of summary judgment in very recent years will 
be discussed. Fifth, it will be proposed that the responses suggest that explicit prescriptions in 
particular areas of practice are likelier to facilitate access to justice than more general 
consciousness-raising. Sixth, the respondents’ impressions on the effects of legal uncertainty will 
be analyzed. Seventh, the responses regarding self-represented litigants will be revisited and 
summarized from a policy perspective, leading to the eighth and final area: the role of legal aid, 
pro bono work, and government support to facilitate access to civil justice. 
A. Effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments 
1. Effects Present, if Narrow 
The responses to Questions One and Three suggest that a substantial number of litigators view 
Hryniak and, to a lesser extent, the 2010 Amendments, to have affected their experience in and/or 
approach to practice in recent years. This complements previous analysis, both by Brooke 
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MacKenzie105 and in the earlier chapters of this dissertation, that the 2010 Amendments and 
Hryniak (or their spirit106) have led to resolving at least some cases more quickly and with less 
financial expense. 
To be sure, it is not suggested that this has been universal. Many respondents suggested little-
to-no effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, with the needle moving even less (or in the 
opposite way of intentions) on questions of costs, delay, and settlement. This will be returned to 
below. But even if a substantial minority of lawyers view their practice to have changed, that 
suggests that change has occurred in a substantial number of cases, and is noteworthy in itself. 
2. Effects Depend on Area of Law and Legal Issue 
The area of law and legal issue at stake certainly seem to affect the appropriateness of 
summary judgment in particular. Three employment lawyers noted that summary judgment is 
particularly common in their field post-Hryniak, and they view this as positive, being able to 
resolve litigation quicker and with less expense.107 This has been observed in case law108 and is 
not altogether surprising: employment litigation, particularly wrongful dismissals where just cause 
is not alleged, typically involves facts that are relevant to determining issues, such as appropriate 
pay in lieu of notice, but which are also discrete.109 The ability to get a judgment more quickly can 
benefit both employees110 and employers.111 Determining a limitation period is another type of 
legal question that both respondents (e.g., L27) and case law112 have repeatedly held is appropriate 
 
105  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
106  The discussion of Rule 2.1 in Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5. 
107  L22, L67, and (to a lesser extent) L21. 
108  Peticca v Oracle Canada ULC, 2015 CarswellOnt 5450, [2015] OJ No 198 (SCJ) at paras 1-2, per Myers J. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid. 
111  See, e.g., Betts v IBM Canada Ltd/IBM Canada Ltée, 2016 ONSC 2496, 31 CCEL (4th) 60 (Div Ct), aff’g 
2015 ONSC 5298, [2015] OJ No 4461 (SCJ) [“Betts”]. 
112  See, e.g., Demide v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 3000, 47 CLR (4th) 126 (SCJ) at para 134. 
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for summary judgment post-Hryniak. In this sense, the responses complemented what case law 
already shows: that these legal issues are being decided summarily saves resources for courts and 
litigants, in addition to contributing to valuable jurisprudence.113 This is a good in itself. 
This does not extend to other areas of law, however. Three different respondents emphasized 
personal injury/insurance litigation114 as an area where the 2010 Amendments and Hryniak have 
had little if any effect and may in fact have been counterproductive. This too is unsurprising. Some 
insurance litigation – such as interpretation of insurance contracts115 – may be appropriate for 
disposition by summary judgment. But much personal injury litigation contains a great deal of 
expert testimony and complicated assessments of damages116 that seem particularly ill-suited for 
what has been critically called “trial by box”.117 
B. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
The conclusion that there have been some, albeit limited, effects of Hryniak and the 2010 
Amendments may seem contradicted by the answers to Questions Five and Seven, which suggest 
that litigation is becoming neither less expensive (and, indeed, may be becoming more expensive) 
nor quicker (though there is more equivocation on that front). Similarly, respondents thought that 
there had been little change to the rates of settlement while the use of ADR is, if anything, 
increasing. Given that Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments sought to achieve different objectives, 
it may seem as though they have had no – or even contrary – effects. 
 
113  Betts, supra note 111 has become a leading case on abandonment of employment: see, e.g., Sutherland v 
Messengers International, 2018 ONSC 2703, 46 CCEL (4th) 201 (Div Ct) at para 24, per Thorburn J (as she 
then was) and Howard Levitt, The Law of Dismissal in Canada, 3d ed (loose-leaf) (Toronto: Canada Law 
Book, 2003) at 12-14.7-12-14.8. 
114  L31, L73, L74. 
115  See, e.g., Stantec Consulting Ltd v Altus Group Ltd, 2014 ONSC 6111, 2014 CarswellOnt 14842 (SCJ), noting 
the appropriateness of summary judgment to resolve issues of contractual interpretation. 
116  See, e.g., Griva v Griva, 2016 ONSC 1820, 2016 CarswellOnt 4019 (SCJ). 
117  Hamilton, supra note 58. 
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This seeming contradiction between responses is explained by the follow-up questions, asking 
why lawyers felt this way. Their responses revealed that their reasons were usually not because 
they viewed Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments to have been ineffectual or counterproductive 
(though a few felt this way, as discussed in the next subsection). Rather, they had other reasons 
for feeling that, for instance, the costs of litigation had stayed the same or increased. There were 
numerous reasons for this, seven of which bear repeating as they complement hypotheses that have 
been raised elsewhere. 
The most prominent among these was the increased use and prevalence of expert witnesses, 
which six different respondents118 cited as a reason for litigation’s increased costs. The 
proliferation of experts is sometimes defended as necessary to ensure that judges have knowledge 
to which they normally would not have access.119 However, it has also led to the phenomenon of 
“trial by expert” where parties try to “out-expert” each other through finding an expert who will 
testify to whatever the party wants,120 advantaging parties who can afford to hire more experts.121 
There are also infamous instances of attempting to call an “expert” who is actually opining on a 
legal issue.122 That so many respondents (unprompted) cited this as a reason for increasing costs 
of litigation is an additional reason to be hesitant to accept increased expert testimony. The Rules 
are set to be amended effective January 1, 2020 to allow an expert to testify by way of affidavit in 
 
118  L27, L28, L31, L38, L53, L74. 
119  This has been argued for particularly strongly in sexual assault cases: see, e.g., R v Ennis-Taylor, 2017 ONSC 
5797, 2017 CarswellOnt 16533 (SCJ), not admitting the expert evidence due to concerns about prejudice to the 
accused and qualifications of a particular expert, but agreeing such evidence would be helpful to a jury. 
120  See, e.g., White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co, 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 SCR 182 at para 
18, per Cromwell J; David M Paciocco, “Unplugging Jukebox Testimony in an Adversarial System: Strategies 
for Changing the Tune on Partial Experts” (2009) 35 Queen’s LJ 565. 
121 The expense of extensive expert evidence was acknowledged by Binnie J in Little Sisters Book and Art 
Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, [2007] 1 SCR 38 at para 128 
(dissenting). 
122  See, e.g., Apotex Inc v Pharmascience Inc, 2004 FC 1198, 36 CPR (4th) 218, per Blais J (as he then was), aff’d 
2005 FCA 144, 332 NR 389.  
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cases of Simplified Procedure.123 However, this was cited by neither any of the participants 
expressing concern about the costs of experts, nor those who praised the expanded ability to use 
Simplified Procedure (R35, R50) or advocated for its availability being increased even further 
(R19). Nor did any respondents make the link between Simplified Procedure and expert witnesses. 
Second, four respondents cited costs of document production as the reason for the increased 
cost of litigation.124 The cost of discovery as an access to justice impediment has been chronicled 
extensively125 and it may be that increased electronic communications lead to even more 
documents being relevant for production.126 While this can be defended as essential for fairness,127 
it may be worthwhile asking whether the extent of unfairness caused by more limited documentary 
discovery is worth the costs of extensive discovery. This is especially the case given that unfairness 
can be mitigated through the ability of a judge to draw an adverse inference against a party that 
fails to produce a relevant document.128 While the 2010 Amendments attempted to enshrine the 
principle of proportionality in discovery, six respondents suggested that this had little impact129 
 
123  Rules, supra note 2 at Rule 76.09.1 (coming into effect January 1, 2020). 
124  L16, L18, L25, L81. 
125  Justice Thomas Cromwell noted the counterproductivity of expanding discovery rights in extrajudicial 
comments in 2013 while still serving on the Supreme Court: Beverley Spencer, “The Road to Justice Reform: 
An Interview with Supreme Court of Canada Justice Thomas Cromwell” The National (July-August 2013), 
online: <http://nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/Recent4/The-road-to-justice-reform.aspx>. This is also a common 
hypothesis in the United States: see, e.g., Judge (as he then was) Neil Gorsuch, “13th Annual Barbara K. Olson 
Memorial Lecture” (Address Delivered at the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy’s 2013 National 
Lawyers Convention, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 15 November 2013), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VI_c-5S4S6Y> at 6:15-10:30. See also Hryniak, supra note 1 at para 29. 
126  This has become subject to the Sedona Canada Principles on e-discovery, as described in Ken Chasse, 
“The Admissibility of Electronic Business Records” (2010) 8 Can J L & Tech 105 at 130, 149, etc. These are 
incorporated in the Rules, supra note 2, Rule 29.1.03(4). 
127  This varies in light of the circumstances: EDD Tavender, QC, “Considerations of Fairness in the Context of 
International Commercial Arbitrations” (1996) 34 Alta L Rev 509 at 522, cited in ENMAX Energy 
Corporation v TransAlta Generation Partnership, 2019 CarswellAlta 1340, 2019 ABQB 486. 
128  See, e.g., Ontario (Attorney General) v $11,633.21 in Currency (In Rem), 2009 CarswellOnt 9261 at para 4, 
per Matlow J. 
129  L16, L18, L25, L26, L31, L81. 
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and will be discussed further in Part IV.E. This is a problem that international commercial 
arbitration has also attempted to solve in recent years.130 
Three respondents also brought up, in various ways, the billable hour model for providing 
legal services as reason for litigation’s increasing costs. The billable hour model’s incentivization 
of inefficiency has been noted for years.131 The rise of alternative fee arrangements132 may only 
be peripherally related to civil procedure reform (though it arguably could be better reflected in 
the law of costs133) and is clearly another area of importance in access to justice discussions. 
Fourth, and related to lawyers’ increased rates, law firm overhead was cited as a reason for 
increased legal fees (L31), in line with previous analysis.134 It might be that this overhead/ 
bureaucracy provides important value to clients that is difficult to quantify. But law firms should 
think carefully about whether increased overhead provides value to clients that is worth the cost.135 
 
130  See, e.g., Michele Curatola & Federica De Luca, “Document Production in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A ‘Trojan Horse’ for Uncontrolled Costs” (2018) Transnational Dispute Management 4, url: 
<www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2576>; Courtney Lofti, “Documentary 
Evidence and Document Production in International Arbitration” (2015) 4 YB on Intl Arbitration 99. 
131  Brooke MacKenzie, “Better value: Problems with the billable hour and the viability of value-based billing” 
(2013) 90 Can Bar Rev 677. 
132  Albert H Yoon, “The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal Representation” 
(2014) 66 UTLJ 456 at 462; Catherine Ho, “Is This the Death of Hourly Rates at Law Firms?” Washington 
Post (13 April 2014), online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/is-this-the-death-of-
hourly-rates-at-law-firms/2014/04/11/a5697018-be97-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html> (noting that law 
firms were experimenting with alternative fee arrangements); Spiteri Estate v Canada (Attorney General), 
2014 ONSC 6167, 2014 CarswellOnt 14831 (Master) [“Spiteri Estate”] at para 25. 
133  See Spiteri Estate, ibid, navigating uncertain territory. 
134  Dzienkowski, supra note 81; Poll, supra note 81. 
135  The tendency of bureaucracies to expand even when they do not provide obvious value in service delivery is 
not confined to the legal profession. Similar criticism has been levelled at universities for increasing their 
tuition, largely to expand their administration: Paul F Campos, “The Real Reason College Tuition Costs So 
Much” The New York Times (4 April 2015), online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinion/sunday/the-real-reason-college-tuition-costs-so-much.html>. 
Similar thought could occur at the Law Society of Ontario, which has the highest fees in Canada (inevitably 
indirectly passed onto clients and, in the case of government lawyers, taxpayers), and has engaged in 
significant expenditures in recent years (see, e.g., Bruce Pardy, “This lawyer was determined to stop the law 
society’s forced ‘statement of principles’” Financial Post (14 May 2019), online: 
<https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/this-lawyer-was-determined-to-stop-the-law-societys-forced-
statement-of-principles>), the value of which can certainly be defended but also contested: see, e.g., supra note 
104. 
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Fifth, three respondents (L53, L36, L87) brought up increased court fees as a reason litigation 
has become more expensive. These are frequently defended as a user tax that disincentivizes 
needless filings136 and are recoverable at the end of litigation.137 However, they also adversely 
impact economically disadvantaged litigants138 and an application (causing time and expense) 
needs to be brought for a litigant to be absolved of the need to pay them.139 The necessity and 
amount of filing fees can certainly be questioned, therefore, especially as the enactment of Rule 
2.1 allows courts to very summarily address facially abusive matters.140 
Sixth, dozens of respondents cited the Jordan case as having diverted resources from the civil 
court system,141 with half of the respondents believing Jordan has negatively impacted access to 
civil justice. As a constitutional case, Jordan cannot be legislated away (as noted by L19) unless 
the notwithstanding clause is invoked. As such, it is understandable for courts to try to divert 
limited resources to the criminal system to avoid having criminal prosecutions stayed. However, 
it should be acknowledged that an unintended consequence of Jordan appears to be decreased 
access to civil justice. Though Jordan was certainly well-intentioned, one cannot help but wonder 
if it is too rigid142 and/or if the Supreme Court would have come to the same decision (which the 
parties in Jordan did not ask for143) had they known of such collateral consequences. Of course, 
this may be rationalized144 on the basis of the grave consequences of a criminal trial.145 
 
136  See the dissenting reasons of Rothstein J in Trial Lawyers, supra note 24. 
137  See, e.g., Henderson v Canada (2008), 238 OAC 65 (Div Ct) at paras 28 and 30, per Molloy J. 
138  Discussed by the majority in Trial Lawyers, supra note 24, and Vayda, supra note 24. 
139  See, e.g., Samuels v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONSC 6706, 2016 CarswellOnt 17204 (SCJ) at para 16. 
140  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5. 
141  L01, L23, L48, L11, L18, L26, L38, L42, L50, L51, L55, L59, L63, L65, L68, L70, L74, L79, L81, L82, L87, 
L39, L73, L15, L19. 
142  See the discussion in Palma Paciocco, supra note 61. 
143  Ibid at 241, citing Cromwell J’s dissenting reasons in Jordan, supra note 61 at para 146. 
144  Palma Paciocco, ibid at 251-252, seems to suspect that this may be the case, despite difficulties. 
145  Meaning that numerous criminal trial rights are constitutionally guaranteed in Canada: Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [the “Charter”], s 11. 
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Seventh, the lack of using technology was noted by those who cited paper productions and 
lack of e-filing as sources of unnecessary expense (L25, L68). This complements a significant 
body of work on the ability to use technology to facilitate access to justice.146 This will be returned 
to in this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
Each of these seven can be – and has been – subject to important scholarship, which is only 
superficially addressed above. However, this chapter’s survey nonetheless suggests that each of 
these is posing impediments to access to civil justice in Ontario. This underscores the need for a 
multipronged approach to achieving access to civil justice.  
C. Not All Effects Positive 
Some respondents were not convinced that Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments could even be 
considered “one step forward” in facilitating access to civil justice. Some (e.g., L54) believed that 
short trials could be less expensive than summary judgment motions. This aligns with a fear, 
acknowledged in Hryniak itself,147 that summary judgment could itself be a source of unnecessary 
delay and expense. But that was not the only objection to Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. L23 
felt that something important is lost when trials become less common. A less paper-intensive way 
to litigate with more human interaction is preferred by many lawyers, even when it is more 
expensive.148 This supports the view of some trial judges149 and commentators150 that trials are an 
 
146  See, e.g., Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell & Graham Reynolds, “Access to Justice for All: Towards an 
‘Expansive Vision’ of Justice and Technology” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 181; Anthony J Casey & 
Anthony Niblett, “Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Future of Law” (2016) 66 UTLJ 429; Christopher 
P Naudie & Gerard J Kennedy, “Ontario Court of Appeal Divided on Permissibility of Hearings Outside 
Ontario in Multi-Jurisdictional Class Actions” (August 2015) 4 CALR 33; Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett 
& Albert H Yoon, “Law in the Future” (2016) 66 UTLJ 423; Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the 
Criminal Court System” (2010) 14 Can Crim L Rev 111; Ken Chasse, “‘Records Management Law’—A 
Necessary Major Field of the Practice of Law” (2015) 13 Can J L & Tech 57. 
147  Hryniak, supra note 1 at para 74. 
148  See, e.g., Lisus, supra note 6. 
149  See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 58, noting the dangers of “trial in a box”. 
150  See, e.g., Lisus, supra note 6; see also the comments of David Rankin in Gerard J Kennedy, “Justice for 
Some” The Walrus (November 2017) 47 [“Kennedy Walrus”] at 49-50. 
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intrinsic good. One could even fear that a departure from trials – with their greater procedural 
protections – decreases the likelihood of the court coming to the “correct” result in a particular 
case.151 Trials clearly exist for a reason – being constitutionally guaranteed in criminal law152 – 
and there is a fear among respondents such as L19 that young civil litigators are unlikely to ever 
go to trial. This aligns with Colleen Hanycz’s concern that the proportionality principle leads to 
“more access to less justice”153 and is summarized by L23’s sensing “a desire by judges to dispose 
of litigation whenever possible. The civil justice system will provide an outcome, but not 
necessarily justice.” Implicit in this view is an assumption that greater procedure such as extensive 
discovery, greater use of experts, and more court time will lead to litigation coming to an 
“accurate” outcome. This has an intuitive appeal and there are likely circumstances where it is true 
– respondents to this survey suggest this is frequently the case when self-represented litigants are 
in the litigation. But evidence is lacking about the extent to which more extensive procedures lead 
to more accurate outcomes. 
From the perspective of time and costs – incurred by parties and the courts – one should 
acknowledge that summary judgment is not a panacea. But this is not a new insight, and can be 
mitigated by recognizing that certain types of claims lend themselves to summary judgment more 
than others. Many other respondents viewed summary judgment as an effective costs-savings tool 
if used appropriately. It may be that the respondents who emphasized costs of inappropriately 
sought summary judgment have simply encountered those costs more often than typical. 
 
151  See, e.g., Alan B Morrison, “The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System” 
(2011) 90 Or L Rev 993 at, e.g., 1024-1025. 
152 Charter, supra note 145, s 11(b).  
153  Hanycz, supra note 30. 
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It is difficult to compare the intangible sense of loss as trials become rarer, with the more 
objectively quantifiable savings of time and cost resulting from fewer trials.154 But it should be 
acknowledged that this loss is likely to occur as more summary procedures are used. Most 
respondents seem to feel this trade-off is worth it – at least in many cases. However, a cautionary 
flag should be planted regarding unintended consequences155 as we depart from an institution – 
the trial – that has been viewed as the paradigm of dispute resolution in the common law world for 
so long. This will be returned to in greater depth in this dissertation’s Conclusion. In the meantime, 
one should acknowledge that the benefits of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments may come with 
costs that are not easily quantified. 
D. Initial Boom Followed by a Decline? 
Part IV.B set aside an issue that repeatedly came up as a reason for the limited effects of 
Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments: namely, that an initial boom in summary judgment motions 
in the immediate aftermath of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments has been followed by a lull in 
recent years as the Superior Court and Court of Appeal have been more reluctant to grant summary 
judgment. Two respondents156 attributed this to the Court of Appeal holding that pre-Hryniak 
rationales for restricting partial summary judgment apply with equal force post-Hryniak.157 
However, other respondents implied that this is not the only reason that lower courts have been 
more reluctant to grant summary judgment.158 
 
154  Grégoire Webber has made an argument in a similar vein, that Parliament should be able to criminalize 
assisted suicide to preserve the sanctity of life, utilitarian concerns about mitigating suffering notwithstanding: 
“The Remaking of the Constitution of Canada” UK Constitutional Law Association blog (1 July 2015), online: 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/07/01/gregoire-webber-the-remaking-of-the-constitution-of-canada/>. 
155  A concern expressed by Edmund Burke that is essential to conservative thought: e.g., Edmund 
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1790]) at 96-97. 
156  L88, L09.  
157  Butera v Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, 137 OR (3d) 561. 
158  E.g., L30, L39. 
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More research, akin to MacKenzie’s analysis of 2004-2015 summary judgment motions,159 
would be required to confirm the scope of this phenomenon. L19 suggested that it is particularly 
prevalent in Hamilton. But the impressions suggest a waning interest in summary judgment except 
in clear cases. This could be the result of the experience with summary judgment indicating that 
not all claims are suited for summary judgment. This would be a positive development with only 
cases likely to have summary judgment granted proceeding down that route. In this vein, not all 
respondents viewed courts’ reticence as negative – L16 explicitly noted that lower courts were 
“appropriately” skeptical of their powers. This is putting aside the above-noted view of a vocal 
minority that the move towards summary judgment is per se a negative development. But many 
other respondents (e.g., L39, L19, L28) viewed courts as being inappropriately sheepish in recent 
years. It is hard to know which of these theories is correct. But it could indicate that more explicit 
guidance from appellate courts as to when summary judgment is appropriate is necessary, as will 
now be discussed. 
E. Explicit Guidance More Effective than Broad Statements 
Many respondents discussed summary judgment as being at the core of the 2010 
Amendments’ effectiveness, to the comparative exclusion of considerations of proportionality 
(though L90 was a notable exception in this regard) and changes to discovery rules (which two 
respondents suggested were ineffective160). Eight respondents161 went out of their way to state that 
they view the broader discussion surrounding access to justice to be one of “talk”, “lip service”, 
or something to that effect. It is likely not coincidental that summary judgment reforms are 
represented in the seminal case of Hryniak. Its status as a Supreme Court of Canada decision can 
 
159  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
160  L26, L31. 
161  L01, L12, L18, L51, L55, L63, L84, L87. 
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be viewed as a particularly visible symbol that is more effective than more general statements that 
a “culture shift” is necessary. 
This builds on work in the previous chapters, suggesting that changes to procedural law have 
been most effective where legislation/regulations (Rule 2.1,162 the new appellate jurisdiction 
legislation in British Columbia163) or directly applicable appellate jurisprudence (Van Breda on 
jurisdiction,164 Hryniak on summary judgment165) have been promulgated. In this vein, Chapter 
One recommended consideration of legislative reform regarding jurisdiction motions166 and 
Chapter Three did the same regarding interlocutory appeals.167 This is not to suggest that the 
consciousness-raising has not been real – respondents certainly feel it has been. Nor is it 
unimportant.168 However, in and of itself, it does not appear to have been particularly effective. 
This may indicate that top-down changes are necessary.169 The example of document 
production should illustrate. This is an area where four respondents continued to believe needless 
expense is incurred.170 Even though the 2010 Amendments introduced the principle of 
proportionality in discovery and mandated discovery plans, some respondents viewed these 
changes as having been ignored.171 Lawyers’ concern about being sued for malpractice if a stone 
is left unturned – no matter how expensive the unturning, or how unlikely it is to yield anything 
 
162  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5. 
163  Chapter Three at 166, citing: Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77, s 7, as am; Court of Appeal Rules, BC 
Reg 297/2001. 
164  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 34 and its analysis of Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 
SCR 572. 
165  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
166  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 34 at 108. 
167  Chapter Three at 177-178. 
168  Supra note 98. 
169  Proposed by, e.g., Lucinda Vandervort in “Access to Justice and the Public Interest in the Administration of 
Justice” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 125. 
170  L16, L18, L25, L81. 
171  L26, L31. 
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consequential172 – also leads to L48’s impression of “delay out of an abundance of caution”. Given 
these impressions, a more explicit rule regarding documentary discovery may be advisable. In the 
Small Claims Court, for instance, documents need only be disclosed if a party is relying on them,173 
and this is deemed to be acceptable from a fairness perspective, especially as a trier of fact may 
draw an adverse inference if a party refuses to produce a document deemed relevant.174 This 
practice, which is frequently found in civilian legal traditions and arbitration,175 is worthy of 
consideration, as will be discussed in more depth in the Conclusion. 
Having said that, there may be an understandable and deep-seated reason for the comparative 
non-heeding of Hryniak’s call for a “culture shift” compared to areas where more tailored 
interventions occurred: the inherent conservatism of law.176 “Conservative” in this sense does not 
refer to modern right-wing politics but rather an enduring preference for the status quo, and the 
view that change should come gradually, with time to learn and absorb its unintended 
consequences. This view is defensible: Jordan is an instance where a serious change was made 
suddenly and quickly and appears to have had unintended negative consequences. The story is the 
same with respect to the expansion of discovery rights.177 As such, it may be more realistic to 
expect change to be gradual, even when the amount of progress seems less than one would hope. 
 
 
172  L39 had the impression that judges paradoxically berate lawyers for not covering every conceivable angle in a 
case, while simultaneously expressing the view that bills are too high. 
173  Rules of the Small Claims Court, O Reg 258/98, Rule 18.02. 
174  Supra note 128. 
175  See, e.g., Rolf Trittmann & Boris Kasolowsky, “Taking Evidence in Arbitration Proceedings between 
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions - The Development of a European Hybrid Standard of Arbitration 
Proceedings” (2008) 31:1 UNSW LJ 330; Practical Law Arbitration, “Document production in international 
arbitration” (London: Thomson Reuters, 2019), online: <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-382-
1150?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true>. 
176  Something critical scholars have noted for at least eighty years: see, e.g., Moses J Aronson, “Mr Justice Stone 
and the Spirit of the Common Law” (1940) 25 Cornell L Rev 489 at 494. 
177  Supra note 125. 
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F. Uncertainty in the Law 
At least six respondents, in various ways, cited uncertainty in the law as a factor that increases 
legal costs, even in the aftermath of Hryniak. This emerges in various ways, including:  
• wealthy parties exploiting that uncertainty to the detriment of poorer resources parties 
(L39); 
• this uncertainty pushes parties out of the public court system (L16);  
• a lack of case law leaving parties, particularly vulnerable minorities, unable to order their 
affairs (L23); 
• the belief that the identity of a particular judge will matter enormously in determining 
whether he or she will be amenable to summary procedures (L36); and 
• practice directives differing across the province, increasing work on lawyers who need 
to prepare in light of modified procedures, increasing costs to clients (L25). 
The uncertainty in the law in some of these areas may be worthwhile. Differing practice 
directives from one judicial district to another enables pilot projects178 and may also be necessary 
given the different resources in the different judicial districts.179 Judges need to exercise 
judgment,180 especially as the pursuit of a just outcome may require a level of discretion and lack 
of perfect predictability.181 But respondents noted that these benefits come with negative 
 
178  See, e.g., “Practice Advisory Concerning the Provincial Civil Case Management Pilot – One Judge Model” 
(effective 1 February 2019), online: <http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/civil-case-management-pilot>. 
179  For example, Toronto and Ottawa have dozens of resident judges while Kenora has only one: Helen Burnett, 
“Kenora left without a full-time judge” The Law Times (23 April 2007), online: 
<https://www.lawtimesnews.com/article/kenora-left-without-a-full-time-judge-8795/>.  
180  As Jacob S Ziegel wrote in “Judicial Free Speech and Judicial Accountability: Striking the Right Balance” 
(1996) 45 UNB LJ 175 at 179, “Judges are individuals, not robots” (paraphrasing Sopinka J in John Sopinka, 
“Must the Judge be a Monk?” (Address to Canadian Bar Association, 3 March, 1989)). 
181  Julia Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation”, CARR Discussion Papers (DP 4). Centre for Analysis of 
Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, online: 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35985/1/Disspaper4-1.pdf>, cited in, inter alia, Dimity Kingsford Smith, “What Is 
Regulation – A Reply to Julia Black” (2002) 27 Australian J of Leg Philosophy 37 at 42; Michael Sobkin, 
“Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
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consequences, all of which have been theorized before, from an underdeveloped jurisprudence 
(L23) to the need for lawyers to use differing procedures (L25) to the inability to reach principled 
resolution as parties with deep pockets exploit legal uncertainty (L39). This will be explored in 
greater depth in this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
G. Self-Represented Litigants 
At least twelve respondents182 noted that the presence of self-represented litigants results in a 
need for more formalized processes, more use of court time, and greater costs needing to be 
incurred by the non-self-represented parties.183 It has long been recognized that lack of access to 
legal counsel, leading to self-represented litigants, has negative effects for the self-represented 
litigant,184 but respondents’ answers suggest that these negative consequences extend to the 
court,185 mediators/arbitrators,186 and other parties to litigation.187 
A small minority of self-represented litigants who are truly behaving vexatiously can have 
their claims disposed of pursuant to Rule 2.1.188 L55 acknowledged its utility in this regard. But 
the threshold to use Rule 2.1 is appropriately very high189 and it rightly does not apply to the 
overwhelming majority of cases with self-represented parties. Indeed, respondents such as L07 
and L27 acknowledged that many self-represented litigants have genuine legal issues with the 
delay and expense that they cause not being their fault. 
 
Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203 at 205, arguing for a “forum of necessity” in jurisdictional 
disputes, despite recognizing that this will increase litigation. 
182  L47, L23, L32, L10, L25, L37, L40, L50, L53, L60, L68, L87. 
183  Viewed to be the case by nine respondents: L02, L19, L23, L32, L38, L39, L47, L57, L83. 
184  Macfarlane Main Report, supra note 40. 
185  L27, L23. 
186  L79. 
187  L02, L19, L23, L32, L38, L39, L47, L57, L83. 
188  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 5 at 263. 
189  Kennedy Rule 2.1, ibid at 251, citing Scaduto v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 OAC 87 
at para 12, leave to appeal ref’d, [2015] SCCA No 488, 2016 CarswellOnt 21905 and Raji v Borden Ladner 
Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, [2015] OJ No 307 (SCJ). 
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There is no easy solution to this problem apart from attempting to deliver legal services more 
accessibly – another important element of access to justice conversations.190 Though the lack of 
access to legal representation could also potentially be addressed by further government funding 
of the civil justice system: the subject of the next subsection. 
H. Government Funding 
When discussing potential solutions to the access to justice crisis, at least seven lawyers191 
recommended some combination of additional government funding, legal aid in civil cases, and/or 
an expanded role for and more funding of PBO. This is in line with the view that civil litigation, 
though ostensibly addressing “private” disputes, actually performs an important public service. As 
noted in Part I, this includes vindicating legal wrongs and developing democratic norms. It can 
also prevent health and/or social problems that end up costing the public purse in other ways.192 
As such, not only would more government funding assist in facilitating access to justice, but it 
would also further valuable public purposes.193 
At the present time, however, Ontario’s provincial government appears reluctant to invest 
more in this area.194 And to be fair, the public value of civil litigation also exists on a spectrum, 
from cases of great constitutional importance195 to developing an important new common law 
doctrine196 to vindication of legal rights on an individual scale but where a wrongdoer needs to 
 
190  See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 17. 
191  L39, L37, L84, L77, L14, L75, L27. 
192  See, e.g., Farrow 2016, supra note 13 at 166-167; Sossin SickKids, supra note 49. 
193  An example is the Court Challenges Project to support certain constitutional challenges: Gerard J Kennedy & 
Lorne Sossin, “Justiciability, Access to Justice & the Development of Constitutional Law in Canada” (2017) 
45(4) FLR 707 at 716. 
194  See Nicole Brockback, “Free civil legal service to close, despite study showing it saves Ontario $5M a year” 
CBC News (7 November 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/free-civil-legal-service-to-close-
despite-study-showing-it-saves-ontario-5m-a-year-1.4894963>. 
195  See, e.g., the discussion of the law of costs in Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 
331 at paras 133-146. 
196  Such as a general duty of good faith, found in Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494. 
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have an example made of it197 to lawsuits brought as a matter of business practice198 to petty 
disputes which should not be the concern of the justice system.199 Gillian Hadfield and Thomas 
Cromwell have also convincingly questioned the extent to which inadequate government funding 
is a primary access to justice obstacle, without denying that it is one.200 So as valuable as further 
funding and support from the government may be, it is not likely to be forthcoming as a total 
solution – and may not always be desirable or effective in any event. That does not mean that it 
should not be pushed for in appropriate cases. 
IN SUM 
The 2010 Amendments and Hryniak have not solved the challenges of access to civil justice 
in Ontario.201 Given that there was significant skepticism, accompanied by significant praise, of 
Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, their ambiguous effects are not surprising. Some lawyers 
criticized Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments directly as counterproductive. More often, however, 
respondents cited a reluctance to change, misaligned incentives, and new additional sources of 
litigation expense as reasons for the continued barriers to access to civil justice. But there are still 
signs of hope, as one would have thought would have been the case in the aftermath of significant 
changes to procedural law: surveying lawyers suggests that some cases are being resolved more 
efficiently in recent years. There is also a genuine awareness of the need to facilitate access to 
 
197  See, e.g., Whiten v Pilot Insurance, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 59. 
198  The construction industry’s litigiousness jumps to mind: see, e.g., R Bruce Reynolds, “The Impact of the 
Global Financial Crisis on the Construction Sector and the Construction Bar: Version 2.0” (2011) J Can 
Construction Law 1 at 23. 
199  See, e.g., Morland-Jones v Taerk, 2014 ONSC 3061, 2014 CarswellOnt 6612 (SCJ). 
200  The Honourable Thomas A Cromwell & Siena Antsis, “The Legal Services Gap: Access to Justice as a 
Regulatory Issue” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 1 at 3-4; Hadfield, supra note 17 at 43. 
201  This should be unsurprising, as this problem dates to the time of Dickens and was notably described in Charles 
Dickens, Bleak House (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) [originally published in 1853]. As noted in the 
Introduction at 34, this has been noticed before: see, e.g., The Honourable J Roderick Barr, QC, “The Cost of 
Litigation: Bleak House in the 1990s” (March 1993) 12 Advocates’ Soc J No 1, 12; William Kaplan, QC, “The 
Derivative Action: A Shareholder’s ‘Bleak House’” (2003) 36:3 UBC L Rev 443; Kennedy Walrus, supra note 
150 at 48; Gorsuch, supra note 125 at ~ 3:49-4:14. 
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justice, to an extent that lawyers such as L15 view as not present earlier in their careers. These 
results were somewhat expected and are encouraging. But the other issues arising was also 
unexpected and are discouraging. 
What is the upshot of such conclusions? The profession must recognize that access to justice 
is not a problem that admits of a single solution. After all, so many of the anecdotes that the lawyers 
shared in response to the survey questions revealed openness and attraction to many hypothesized 
solutions to the access to justice crisis. One hopes that this sharing of experiences will lead to 
action on all of these avenues. 
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Conclusion: Towards Rules-Based Reforms? 
 
This dissertation has explored the evolution of Ontario procedural law throughout the 2010s. 
The goal has been to answer a straightforward, if multi-faceted question: have the 2010 
Amendments1 to Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure,2 and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Hryniak v Mauldin,3 achieved their goals of facilitating timely, inexpensive resolutions of civil 
actions on their merits? In response to a plethora of evidence that civil process contributes to 
rendering civil justice out of reach for many Ontarians,4 the 2010 Amendments sought to ensure 
that parties could vindicate their legal rights in a public courtroom5 and decrease the temporal and 
financial costs of doing so. Proposed benefits include disincentivizing suboptimal settlements 
(recognizing that settlement is still generally positive6) and facilitating development of the 
common law and associated democratic norms.7 
Part I of this Conclusion explains why there have been access to justice successes in the 
aftermath of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments – but why they are only limited. This is probably 
because civil procedure reform is only likely to be so effective in facilitating access to justice: it 
can prescribe predictable processes to facilitate the just resolution of actions on their merits, 
bearing in mind the principle of proportionality. But its limitations, like those of the proportionality 
principle, remain. A reconceptualization of proportionality, in light of critiques of the principle 
 
1  O Reg 438/08 [hereafter, the “2010 Amendments”]. 
2  RRO 1990, Reg 194 [the “Rules”]. 
3  2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [“Hryniak”]. 
4  Hryniak, ibid at paras 1, 26; Trevor CW Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 
[“Farrow 2014”] reviews the literature in this area at fn 1. 
5  See, e.g., Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift: An Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary Judgment 
Reforms” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275 [“MacKenzie SJ”] at 1280-1281; Janet Walker, “Summary 
Judgment Has Its Day in Court” (2012) 37 Queen’s LJ 697 [“Walker SJ”] at 700-701 and 707-708; Coulter 
Osborne, QC, Civil Justice Reform Project: Findings and Recommendations (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General, November 2007), online: <https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/>. 
6  Sable Offshore Energy Inc v Ameron International Corp, 2013 SCC 37, [2013] 2 SCR 623 at para 11, per Abella 
J, citing Callaghan ACJHC (as he was then) in Sparling v Southam Inc (1988), 66 OR (2d) 225 (HC). 
7  Hryniak, supra note 3 at paras 1, 26. 
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and analysis of Ontario’s trends, is proposed, before assessing the 2010 Amendments’ 
effectiveness against this reconceptualization. The remaining sections of this Conclusion address 
matters that require further research and where this dissertation can play a role in that further 
research. Part II discusses another phenomenon that has arisen repeatedly throughout the earlier 
chapters: the Ontario Court of Appeal frequently acting as an impediment to implementing novel 
civil procedure initiatives designed to facilitate access to justice. Part III considers the intersection 
of this dissertation with the “rules-standards debate” in legal theory, another issue that all four 
chapters’ results shed light upon in some way. Part IV considers how this dissertation’s 
conclusions could inform access to justice initiatives adjacent to civil procedure reform, 
specifically through increased transparency in enacting procedural law, uses of technology in the 
civil litigation process, judicial specialization, and more active judging. Part V discusses how this 
dissertation could help inform access to justice conversations in family law and criminal law. In 
the end, I attempt to see optimism in the midst of what is understandably a pessimistic discussion 
about access to civil justice, and civil procedure’s role therein. 
I) WHAT THE CHAPTERS SHOW: LIMITED, BUT REAL SUCCESS THROUGH 
CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM 
 
This dissertation’s Introduction8 explained the appropriateness of assessing the effectiveness 
of the 2010 Amendments against a relatively narrow definition of access to justice, concentrating 
on the increased resolution of civil actions on their merits, with decreased delay and financial 
expense. This is largely in line with the principle of proportionality, enshrined in the Ontario Rules 
in 2010.9 Many of the critiques of this definition of access of justice are compelling10 but it was 
 
8  Hereinafter, the “Introduction”. 
9  2010 Amendments, supra note 1; Hryniak, supra note 3 at paras 27-33; Trevor Farrow, “Proportionality: A 
Cultural Revolution” (2012) 1 J Civil Litigation & Practice 151 [“Farrow 2012”]. 
10  See, e.g., Trevor CW Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam Dodek & Alice 
Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC 
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proceeded with for several reasons, three of which bear repeating. First, proportionality was added 
to the Rules in 2010 and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hryniak – it is accordingly worthwhile 
assessing whether and how it is being realized in practice in addition to assessing its normative 
implications. Second, even if access to justice must consider issues beyond proportionality in 
procedure, proportionality in procedure is still part of a holistic conversation about access to 
justice, as will be discussed.11 Third, most broader questions about access to justice would have 
been very difficult to assess through the dissertation’s methodology, defended in the Introduction. 
This Conclusion nonetheless returns to proportionality – and critiques thereof – with the 
benefit of having conducted the research in Chapters One through Four. The aim is to come to a 
deeper understanding and conceptualization of the term. The findings from the first four chapters 
are then assessed against this definition before suggesting what this says about civil procedure 
reform’s potential to achieve access to justice, and where it is likely to come up short, in the context 
of broader conversations about access to justice. This will include a brief assessment of how this 
dissertation’s conclusions complement the experience of England and Wales. 
A. Reconsidering Proportionality in the Access to Justice Conversation 
1. A Note on Terminology 
At the outset, it should be noted that proportionality has a long and rich history in civilian 
legal systems distinct from its history in the common law.12 The terms “cost-effectiveness” or 
“value-for-money” may be better-suited terms than proportionality in terms of exemplifying the 
 
Press, 2016) [“Farrow 2016”] at 166-167; Justice Thomas A Cromwell, Address (Remarks delivered at the 
PLEAC Conference, 26 October 2012) [unpublished] at 2 as reported in Mary Eberts, “‘Lawyers Feed the 
Hungry:’ Access to Justice, The Rule of Law, and the Private Practice of Law” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 115 at 
120, fn 32; Andrew Pilliar, “Exploring a Law Firm Business Model to Improve Access to Justice” (2015) 32(1) 
Windsor YB Access Just 1 [“Pilliar 2015”]. 
11  Farrow 2016, ibid at 166. 
12  Eric Engle, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview” (2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ 1. 
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values that proportionality seeks to enshrine in Ontario. However, both terms are somewhat wordy. 
“Efficiency” is less wordy but comes with problematic connotations, as will be discussed in more 
depth below.13 Therefore, though its suboptimal nature as a term should be flagged, proportionality 
is the word used in Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, and must be theorized. 
2. Critiques of Proportionality 
In Hryniak, Karakatsanis J enthusiastically encouraged the principle of proportionality to be 
adopted throughout Canadian civil litigation.14 As described in the Introduction, this principle 
emphasizes that steps taken in litigation are to be proportionate to what is actually at stake in the 
litigation.15 The Introduction accepted, somewhat implicitly, the validity of this principle with 
minimal critical analysis. However, it remains important to consider criticisms of the principle 
alongside the effects of its promulgation. These can be grouped into three categories. 
First and foremost, the principle of proportionality appears to put a dollar value on justice, 
through suggesting that the less money is at stake in litigation, the less resources – financial and 
temporal – should be invested in it. This can seem vulgar and is likely to affect vulnerable parties 
in particular, who may have disputes with modest sums in absolute dollars, but are hugely 
consequential to them.16 Such vulnerable, potentially self-represented parties may also have a 
claim that cannot easily be described by a non-lawyer due to the idiosyncratic language of law. 
Such self-represented parties require more in-court time with a judge to explain their cases.17 The 
 
13  Farrow 2012, supra note 9. See also Bryant, infra note 32. 
14  Hryniak, supra note 3 at paras 27-33. 
15  Farrow 2012, supra note 9 at 154. 
16  Illustrated for a general audience in Gerard J Kennedy, “Justice for Some” The Walrus (November 2017) 47 
[“Kennedy Walrus”] at 47-48. 
17  Julie Macfarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures Against Self-
Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to Justice?” (Windsor, ON: The National 
Self-Represented Litigants Project, The University of Windsor, November 2015) [“NSRLP Self-Reps”]; see also 
John L Carroll, “Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale” (2010) 32 Campbell L Rev 455 at 466. 
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public court system has a particularly important role to ensure that these claims are adjudicated 
after adequate procedural protections,18 and the proportionality principle arguably downplays this. 
The flip side of this coin is that such an understanding of proportionality, emphasizing the dollar 
amounts at stake in litigation, can be a licence to pursue every tangential avenue if substantial 
sums are at stake.19 The proportionality principle also arguably does not reflect the broader public 
importance that a case may have, as discussed in more depth in Part I.A.3.a. 
Second, there is a danger that proportionality can lead to “more access to less justice” as 
Colleen Hanycz feared would be the case before the 2010 Amendments were enacted.20 The 
reduction of procedural protections and in-court time certainly increases access to the courts in 
terms of numbers of cases being decided on their merits – the analysis of Rule 2.1 in Chapter Two 
suggests as much,21 as does Brooke MacKenzie’s review of decisions regarding summary 
judgment motions.22 But decreasing the resources put into each case also comes with a risk that 
the results will be a less satisfying McJustice,23 instead of the more nourishing justice resulting 
from a full trial. In other words, there is a concern that by being able to decide more cases, courts 
will become less good at deciding each one. 
 
18  Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 
[“Farrow Book”] at 232-251. 
19  See, e.g., Burlington Financial Resources Co v Canada, 2017 TCC 144, [2017] 6 CTC 2001 [“Burlington”] at 
para 16, and the critique thereof in the Introduction at 17-18. 
20  Colleen M Hanycz, “More Access to Less Justice: Efficiency, Proportionality and Costs in Canadian Civil 
Justice Reform” (2008) 27 CJQ 98. 
21  Gerard J Kennedy, “Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While 
Advancing Access to Justice?” (2018) 35 Windsor YB Access Just 243 [“Kennedy Rule 2.1”] at 272-274. 
22  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
23  Akin to a “McJob” or another McDonalds product that is not nourishing in the sense that it does not lead to a 
better job: Oxford English Dictionary, online: 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/245114?redirectedFrom=McJob#eid>, sub verbo, “McJob”. The term 
“McJustice” has been used to describe a similar phenomenon in the criminal justice system: see, e.g., Joseph 
DiLuca, “Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution?” (2005) 50 Crim LQ 14. 
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Third, and related to the foregoing, there are procedural fairness concerns with an emphasis 
on proportionality, particularly for vulnerable parties, as described in Chapter Two.24 Civil 
procedure is obviously concerned with helping the court arrive at an “accurate” result in each 
case.25 Excessive delay can be a problem in this regard as memories fade, evidence is lost, and 
parties grow old and die. But excessive speed can also be problematic as insufficient time and 
resources are devoted to investigation. For example, emphasizing speed can increase a substantive 
mistake’s likelihood through denying parties information in discovery.26 This jeopardizes civil 
procedure’s purpose of providing a process that facilitates the legally “correct” result.27 Just as, 
justice delayed can be justice denied, justice hurried can be justice buried. Attempting to balance 
thoroughness and promptness is present in a wide variety of litigation, from criminal28 to civil29 to 
administrative30 to international.31 In this vein, Michael Bryant, the former Ontario Attorney 
General and law professor who is now Executive Director of the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, has written that “‘efficient justice’ is to justice what ‘efficient music’ is to music.”32 
While Bryant’s concerns are largely based on a concern that attempts to increase speed in the 
justice system will increase errors, this is not his – or others – only concern in this respect. 
 
24  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 270-274. 
25  E.g., Robert G Bone, “Economics of Civil Procedure” in The Oxford Handbook of Law & Economics – Volume 
III: Public Law and Legal Institutions, 3d ed, Francesco Parisi, ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 
143. 
26  Carroll, supra note 17 at 466. 
27  Alan B Morrison, “The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System” (2011) 90 Or 
L Rev 993 at, e.g., 1024-1025. 
28  Palma Paciocco, “The Hours are Long: Unreasonable Delay after Jordan” (2017) 81 SCLR 233. 
29  Aguas v Rivard Estate, 2011 ONCA 494, 107 OR (3d) 142 at para 50, per Juriansz JA (dissenting, but the 
sentiment remains uncontroversial), citing Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 
44, [2000] 2 SCR 307 [“Blencoe”] at para 146. 
30  Blencoe, ibid, at para 146, per LeBel J (dissenting in part in the result). 
31  Alex Whiting, “In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered” (2009) 50 
Harv Int’l LJ 323. 
32  “Legal ‘reforms’ punish people Supreme Court sought to protect” The Toronto Star (9 April 2018), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/04/09/legal-reforms-punish-people-supreme-court-
sought-to-protect.html>. 
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Procedural protections – that indeed take time and resources – are also necessary for the perception 
of justice. These concerns are particularly acute in analyses of procedural law, given that a 
substantive body of procedural justice literature suggests that the perception of a fair process – 
allowing a party to present its case after gaining access to all relevant information – increases the 
parties’ and the public’s faith in the justice system.33 Indeed, the process, especially a formal 
process where parties can present their views, can matter just as much if not more than the result 
in terms of perceiving the legitimacy of awards and institutions that grant them.34 This leads to a 
primary goal of procedural law being facilitating fairness by giving parties a hearing.35 The 
proportionality principle and summary procedures such as those advocated by Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments could be seen as moving away from this. Indeed, the failure to observe this 
principle led to what is viewed as a rare procedural injustice in the use of Rule 2.1, discussed in 
Chapter Two.36  
Uniting all of these is a strange implication of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments’ emphasis 
on proportionality: that access to justice can be increased through restricting (though not 
eliminating) access to the courts.37 This seems counterintuitive and requires a defence. 
 
33  This is well-synthesized in Jona Goldschmidt & Loreta Stalans, “Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial 
Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants” (2012) 30 Windsor YB Access Just 139 at 157-159. 
34  Ibid; E Allan Lind & Tom R Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Plenum Press, 
1988) at 76-81; Edgar Allan Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice: Tort Litigants’ Views of Trial, Court-Annexed 
Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement Conferences (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1989), online: 
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3708.html> at 78-80; Julian V Roberts & Loretta J Stalans, Public 
Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000) at 149. 
35  In administrative law as well as civil litigation: Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 254-255, citing Ontario 
Provincial Police Commissioner v Mosher, 2015 ONCA 772, 340 OAC 311 at paras 60-63; The Hon Louis 
LeBel, “Notes for an Address: Reflections on Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness in Canadian 
Administrative Law” (February 2013) 26 Can J Admin L & Prac 51 at 53, based upon a presentation to the 
Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia Administrative Law Conference 2012 in Vancouver, 
British Columbia on October 26, 2012. 
36  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 268, citing Shafirovitch v Scarborough Hospital, 2015 ONSC 7627, 85 CPC 
(7th) 149 (SCJ) [“Shafirovitch”]. 
37  This theme runs throughout Chapter Two; thanks also due to Professor Joseph HH Weiler of NYU School of 
Law for suggesting this succinct summary – increasing access to justice by restricting access to the courts – 
during a mock job talk performed at NYU School of Law on October 29, 2018. 
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3. A Sophisticated Understanding – And Defence – of Proportionality 
These concerns are real, but a nuanced understanding of proportionality can overcome them.  
a. Financial Concerns 
Regarding the financial concern, the amount of money at stake in litigation is likely to be 
relevant – but not determinative – to what is considered proportionate procedure.38 For instance, 
Lorne Sossin and I have suggested that expensive and time-consuming procedures may be 
warranted, despite modest sums of money being in play, if resolving the question of law is likely 
to have significant effects on society at large.39 This is most obviously the case when the 
government is a litigant and/or human rights are at stake.40 Though it may extend to private law 
claims that have a significant public dimension such as environmental claims.41 Large sums being 
at stake should also not be a licence to spend unlimited amounts of time and money on peripheral 
matters that will not lead to the prompt and fair resolution of a case.42 
More difficult are cases where an expensive procedure appears necessary to fairly adjudicate 
an action with modest sums of money at stake. Sometimes, ensuring justice and its appearance 
indeed mandates that the expensive procedure be followed – with costs awards correcting (at least 
in part) the burden at the end. This is likeliest to be the case in Small Claims Court matters43 or 
matters adjacent to the Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction.44 Ensuring justice and its appearance in 
 
38  Introduction at 17-18. 
39  Gerard J Kennedy & Lorne Sossin, “Justiciability, Access to Justice & the Development of Constitutional Law 
in Canada” (2017) 45(4) FLR 707.  
40  Ibid. 
41  See, e.g., Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation, 2018 ONCA 472, 141 OR (3d) 1 at paras 86-88. 
42  See the discussion of Burlington, supra note 19 in Introduction at 17-18.  
43  There is of course a tension between ensuring access to the Small Claims Court and having it maintain its simple 
character: see, e.g., Shelley McGill, “The Evolution of Small Claims Court: Rising Monetary Limits and Use of 
Legal Representation” (2015) 32 Windsor YB Access Just 173.  
44  The Ontario Superior Court will occasionally grant costs awards greater than the value of a judgment to ensure 
respect for a plaintiff’s decision to vindicate his or her legal rights instead of accepting an unprincipled 
settlement: see, e.g., Van Winkle v Siodlowski (2009), 99 OR (3d) 471 (SCJ). 
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these circumstances may simply be worth the cost, lest the law become disrespected. At other 
times, class proceedings may be the appropriate vehicle to address this concern, particularly in the 
consumer protection realm.45  
Perhaps most difficult is where there is realistically no way to expect a party to pursue or the 
public to absorb the cost of a claim with a very modest sum at stake: say, $3,000, where the matter 
concerns a single but complicated fraud. The principle of proportionality may indeed countenance 
against pursuing the action. Insisting on procedural protections to allow this claim to proceed may 
come with other negative consequences, as discussed in more depth below, opening the door to 
unrealistic expectations of what constitutes appropriate and/or necessary procedural justice.46 
One could argue that the amount of money should be completely irrelevant to the assessment 
of appropriate procedure. This argument would proceed on the basis that the amount the state will 
have to spend to see a process through does not affect how much money is at play in society, but 
merely who has said money. As such, only justice, which cannot be quantified, is at play in the 
litigation. In any event, the amount of money at stake does not tell one how consequential that is 
to the affected parties. For instance, $200 for a poor widow may be worth more to her than 
$2,000,000 to Jeff Bezos: this type of observation has been noted since biblical times.47 There is 
accordingly no particular reason to view the amount of money at stake as important in assessing 
 
45  Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, “Access to Justice and Beyond” (2010) 60 UTLJ 373 at, e.g., 378, summarizing 
the work of Michael J Trebilock. 
46  The validity of the concerns about “slippery slopes” is discussed in Eugene Volokh, “The Mechanisms of the 
Slippery Slope” (2003) 116(4) Harv L Rev 1026. 
47  One thinks of the story in Luke 21:1-4 (NSRV): 
[Jesus] looked up and saw rich people putting their gifts into the treasury; he also saw a poor widow 
put in two small copper coins. He said, “Truly I tell you, this poor widow has put in more than all 
of them; for all of them have contributed out of their abundance, but she out of her poverty has put 
in all she had to live on.” 
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proportionality, though every litigation step could still be assessed for the extent to which it 
advances the likelihood of a just result.48  
This indicates why the sums at stake should not be determinative. There is inherent good in 
the public vindication of a private wrong,49 and any attempt to declare that the public court system 
shall only deal with cases involving more than $1,000,000 would almost certainly be undesirable.50 
But arguing that it is irrelevant appears to overstate the matter. First, while it is not certain that a 
case concerning $2,000,000 is more consequential to the parties than one involving $200, it is 
likelier. Other things being equal, even Jeff Bezos cares more about $2,000,000 than $200, and 
even the poor widow cares more about the $200 than she would about 2 cents. Total sums may be 
a crude measure for measuring importance to parties, as ancient and biblical wisdom tells us, but 
it seems to logically have a correlation. Second, the amount of money at stake in the litigation is 
readily assessable and thus pragmatically useful. Third, the downstream effects on society at large 
related to “who has the money” are greater if the actual sums in the litigation are larger. Fourth, 
insofar as society is concerned about allocation of resources, the amounts at stake are surely 
relevant. Just as the Canada Revenue Agency does not generally seek to collect amounts less than 
$2,51 there would be a similar reason to not expect the public to spend $100,000 in assisting a party 
(however poor) to collect $100. These examples illustrate that, other things being equal, cases with 
 
48  Carroll, supra note 17 at 466. 
49  E.g., Nathan B Oman, “The Honor of Private Law” (2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 31. 
50  Thanks to Professor Liam Murphy of NYU School of Law for pointing this out during a presentation in NYU 
Law’s “JSD Forum” on February 1, 2019. 
51  See, e.g., Government of Canada, “How to make a payment”, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/corporations/corporation-payments/make-a-payment.html>; Government 
of Canada, “Line 484 - Refund”, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/tax/individuals/topics/about-your-tax-return/tax-return/completing-a-tax-return/deductions-
credits-expenses/line-484-refund.html>. 
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the larger sums should take priority just as, other things equal, an act’s consequences are relevant 
in criminal and tort law, even when the defendant’s moral blameworthiness is the same.52  
There are also practical consequences to declaring sums at stake being irrelevant. This would 
make it difficult to defend mandatorily proceeding in the Small Claims Court when less than 
$25,000 is at stake,53 or Simplified Procedure if less than $100,000 is at stake.54 It is also difficult 
to imagine the public accepting treating a case worth $500,000 the same as one worth $5,000. As 
will be discussed shortly, public perception cannot be determinative of what is appropriate 
procedure. But nor is it irrelevant, lest the reputation of the justice system be jeopardized. 
b. “More Access to Less Justice”? 
The concern that the proportionality principle leads to “more access to less justice” may be 
well-founded in certain circumstances. At times, the “more justice” of more extensive procedures 
is proportionate to the expense entailed in following them. Just as the phrase “value for money” 
does not necessarily mean “buy the cheapest option”, “proportionality” does not always mean 
“follow the cheapest procedure.”  
But if additional resources are not expended on cases that do not require them, allowing more 
cases to be resolved on their merits, that is positive. MacKenzie suggests this is occurring55 and 
this dissertation supports this. For example, it makes no sense to spend $25,000 on a trial if the 
same result will be achieved by spending $10,000 on a summary judgment motion. More difficult 
is where spending the additional $15,000 increases a just result’s likelihood – but only marginally 
so. This is discussed below. 
 
52  This bleeds into the controversial if very present idea of “moral luck” but the importance of consequences shows 
little sign of disappearing: see, e.g., Bebhinn Donnelly, “Possibility, Impossibility and Extraordinariness in 
Attempts” (2010) 23 Can J L & Juris 47 at 64, fn 35. 
53  Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43 [“CJA”], s 23(1). 
54  Rules, supra note 2 at 76.02(1). 
55  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
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Let us put this another way by returning to the health care analogy. A drug that will save the 
lives of ten individuals may be so costly that administering it to those ten individuals will prevent 
twenty thousand others from attending routine check-ups. The consequences for each of the twenty 
thousand may be less dire than for each of the ten. However, the cumulative consequences for the 
twenty thousand – from missed early warning signs of serious problems to the inability to obtain 
drugs that will keep high blood pressure in check to everything in between – may be greater than 
the inability to save the ten lives. There is something disquieting about such utilitarian calculations, 
which is why deontological considerations are also important in our justice system. But we do not 
live in a perfect world without the necessity of any such trade-offs. It is at least arguable that the 
access for the twenty thousand is greater than the optimal result for the ten. Something analogous 
is surely present in the civil justice system.56 While increasing access may come at the expense of 
some justice, the earlier chapters of this dissertation suggest the trade-offs are less than feared, at 
least in certain circumstances. And if the access is greatly improved, it is suggested that the trade-
off is worth it. To paraphrase Voltaire, perfect justice should not be an enemy of good justice. 
c. Procedural Protections for Vulnerable Parties 
The concern about procedural protections for vulnerable parties is a real one. It is the public 
courts’ possessing of these protections, frequently lacking from private dispute resolution, that is 
a primary concern about the privatization of dispute resolution.57 But as suggested in Chapter Two, 
such protections can be compatible with summary procedures.58 Nor is emphasizing 
proportionality incompatible with granting indulgences to vulnerable parties. Rather, it is part of 
a sophisticated conception of proportionality. Mitigating the likelihood of a substantively unjust 
 
56  Louis Kaplow, “Information and the Aim for Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?” (2013) 67 Stanford L 
Rev 1303 [“Kaplow 2013”]. 
57  Farrow Book, supra note 18 at 232-251. 
58  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 272-274. 
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result should be given substantial value on the ledger in assessing whether a procedure is 
proportionate. But it cannot be given infinite value to the exclusion of everything else. Recall the 
following thought experiment from the Introduction:59 
Suppose Procedure A leads to substantively fair and just results 100% of the time, but 
only 10% of members of the public can afford it. Now suppose Procedure B leads to 
substantively fair and just results 90% of the time, and 80% of members of the public can 
afford it. […] Procedure B would be preferable, if we can justify the substantively unfair 
results to the 10%. While governmental aid or social support […] may mitigate the 
necessity of such tradeoffs, comprehensive civil justice legal aid is unlikely to be a 
government priority,60 and in certain cases may not even be desirable. This necessitates 
maximizing the utility of resources currently invested in the civil justice system, albeit in 
a principled manner. 
 
This illustrates that having a system of procedure with literally no potential of an unjust result is 
unrealistic, something already recognized in other areas of law. For instance, the law of negligence 
holds defendants to a standard of reasonableness, not perfection. This is so even in the realm of 
medical malpractice which,61 unlike much of procedural law, literally involves life-and-death. 
Mandating a standard of perfection in every case would prevent the treating of other patients. 
d. Ensuring the Perception of Fairness  
Procedural law’s unique role in ensuring the perception of fairness may require less tolerance 
for “errors”.62 This concern has merit, but can be taken to an unhealthy extreme. Analogously, in 
criminal law, avoiding wrongful convictions is emphasized, at expense of wrongful acquittals. 
Blackstone’s maxim, “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”,63 
 
59  Introduction at 33, originating with Trevor Farrow, but synthesized here. 
60  See, e.g., Faisal Bhabha, “Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots Dimensions” 
(2007) 33 Queen’s LJ 139 at 154-156. 
61  Ganger (Guardian ad litem of) v St. Paul’s Hospital (1997), 40 BCLR (3d) 116 (CA) at para 159. 
62  Goldschmidt & Stalans, supra note 33 at 157, fn 102. 
63  William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4, Wayne Morrison, ed (London: 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 358 [p 283 of this edition], cited and expounded upon in Craig E Jones 
& Micah B Rankin, “Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of Subconscious Bias in Second-Degree Murder 
Sentences in Canada” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 109 at 137-138. 
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exemplifies this. Asymmetrical consequences between a wrongful conviction and a wrongful 
acquittal mandate this. But even with these stakes, the Crown need not establish a person’s guilt 
to a scientific certainty.64 Nor do we suggest that it is better that ten million guilty people be set 
free, rather than one innocent should suffer. That would paralyze the criminal justice system’s 
ability to effectively function.65 
Moreover, a party’s perception of what is necessary procedure may be unreasonable. A party 
expecting that anything short of trumpets being played upon his or her entering the courtroom has 
an erroneous perception of what is appropriate procedure.66 It would seem advisable to try to 
change the perception or, if that is not possible, politely decline to adhere it.67 As a more realistic 
example, a party expecting a traditional trial can likely be persuaded that a summary judgment 
motion, which does include a hearing, is a procedurally fair mechanism to address his or her 
claim.68 When truly vexatious parties abuse the court system, their perceptions of entitlement to 
Cadillac-style procedural justice may need to be respectfully disagreed with, after giving them the 
opportunity to be heard.69 But if the perception is widespread, some accommodation may be 
necessary, lest the public turn away from the justice system.70 This can be problematic when the 
 
64  Well explained in Michael Plaxton, “Are Wrongful Convictions Wrong? The Reasonable Doubt Standard and 
the Role of Innocence in Criminal Procedure” (2002) 46 CLQ 407. 
65  Alluded to in Jones & Rankin, supra note 63 at 138, noting that the consequences of a “Type 1 error” (wrongful 
conviction) are sufficiently great to outweigh a “Type 2 error” (wrongful acquittal) by “several” times. 
66  Thanks to Professor Liam Murphy of NYU School of Law for pointing this out during a presentation in NYU 
Law’s “JSD Forum” on February 1, 2019. 
67  This has obviously occurred with respect to changing the public’s perception of impaired driving: see, e.g., Marie 
Comiskey, “Justice Peter de Carteret Cory and His Charter Approach to Regulatory Offences” (2007) 65 UT 
Fac L Rev 77 at 92. 
68  See, e.g., MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5; Shantona Chaudhary, “Hryniak v. Mauldin: The Supreme Court issues a 
clarion call for civil justice reform” (Winter 2014) 33 Adv J No 3. 
69  Emily Mathieu & Jesse McLean, “‘Vexatious litigant’ continues to have her days in court” The Toronto Star (26 
November 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2016/11/26/vexatious-litigant-continues-to-have-
her-days-in-court.html>, cited in Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 263, 269. 
70  Commonly discussed in the criminal justice system (see, e.g., R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726 [“NS”] 
at para 95, per Abella J (dissenting)), but arising in the civil justice system as well: see, e.g., Seana C McGuire 
& Roderick A Macdonald, “Tales of Wows and Woes From the Masters and the Muddled: Navigating Small 
Claims Court Narratives” (1998) 16 Windsor YB Access Just 48. 
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consequences are grave – say, a large portion of the population demanding capital punishment for 
jaywalking – but the stakes of civil procedure are unlikely to lead to such trade-offs. 
e. Concluding Thoughts on Proportionality 
All of this is to suggest that, though civil procedure must recognize the paramount importance 
of achieving substantive justice and the perception of fairness, we should not be wedded to lengthy 
and expensive procedures if other procedures fulfill these goals. Nor should the fairest procedure 
imaginable to reach the factually “true” outcome be mandated regardless of the costs.71 As such, 
increasing financial and temporal expenses by 150% to increase the likelihood of a just result by 
10% may simply not be worth it. Some may argue that this is merely putting a price tag on justice 
in a roundabout way. Criticism has been levelled against law and economics for attempting such 
counterintuitive quantifications.72 But most public policy – which civil procedure undoubtedly is 
– inherently involves trade-offs. Even if they cannot be quantified with precision, suggesting that 
Factor A trumps everything else will likely have negative consequences.73  
A sophisticated understanding of proportionality merely recognizes that all aspects of the 
justice system must be recognized as having costs, even if those costs are not easily quantifiable.74 
Fairness – in terms of facilitating a correct result and mandating a hearing – is among civil 
procedure’s purposes. But so are predictability and efficiency.75 Turning to the subjects discussed 
in earlier chapters of this dissertation, an appeal as of right, full trial, summary judgment motion, 
 
71  Kaplow 2013, supra note 56 at 1365-1366. 
72  For a review, see, e.g., Claire A Hill, “Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioural Law and Economics” 
(2004) 29 Queen’s LJ 563. 
73  Noted in, e.g., Gary Lawson, “Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Dr. Suess” (2000) 
24 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 381 at 386. 
74  Kaplow 2013, supra note 56 at 1363. 
75  David Bamford, Trevor CW Farrow, Michael Karayanni, Erik S Knutsen, Shirley Shipman & Beth Thornburg, 
“Learning the ‘How’ of the Law: Teaching Procedure and Legal Education” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 45 
[“Bamford, et al”] at 56. 
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motion to strike, or request to use Rule 2.1 all have benefits. The more extensive of these 
procedures’ benefits include increasing the likelihood of achieving a substantively just result, as 
well as the perception thereof. But they also come with costs to predictability and efficiency, in 
terms of time, money, preventing others from accessing the courts, and, on occasion, the perception 
that the court process is being abused by persons behaving vexatiously.76 And the probability that 
they will increase the likelihood of (the perception of) a just result must be weighed against these 
costs. Though there may be a correlation between investment of resources into a claim and a just 
result (though Chapter Four notes that the extent to which this is true is uncertain77), investment 
of resources into a claim for its own sake appears unwise. What is important is that resources be 
invested wisely. As John Carroll, recognizing the benefits and dangers of proportionality, wrote 
about the principle in discovery, we should ask “is this [procedure] worth the cost given the 
information which it will produce?” and, as a result, the justice it will produce.78 If proportionality 
is construed in this way, it incorporates both deontological (in terms of recognizing the paramount 
importance of substantive justice) and consequentialist (in terms of recognizing that the concern 
is one of many) concerns and appears a useful tool against which to assess the effectiveness of 
civil procedure reform. 
B. Summary of Chapters in Terms of Achieving Proportionality 
Now it is time to evaluate this nuanced understanding of proportionality against findings from 
earlier chapters. The first three chapters investigated elements of Ontario’s procedural law that 
were not directly amended in 2010, making the 2010 Amendments and the holding of Hryniak not 
directly applicable, but can facilitate or hinder the prompt resolution of actions on their merits 
 
76  Noted in Chapter Two: Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 263, citing Mathieu & McLean, supra note 69. 
77  Chapter Four at 233. 
78  Carroll, supra note 17 at 466. 
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depending on how they are used, helping assessment of whether the spirit of the 2010 Amendments 
and Hryniak is being heeded more generally.  
Chapter One analyzed how jurisdiction motions pose an access to justice obstacle, against the 
backdrop of recent, consistent criticisms of the law of jurisdiction.79 Specifically, it looked at the 
intersection of jurisdiction motions not only with Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, but also the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s attempt to clarify the law of jurisdiction in Club Resorts v Van Breda.80 
There have been notable and positive if modest improvements in the 2010s as the number of 
jurisdiction motions brought has decreased, while the rate of success has increased.81 Isolating the 
reason for this is not possible to discern with scientific precision. While it is possible that the spirit 
of Hryniak has something to do with this, it appears likelier that the primary reason is Van Breda, 
which unapologetically sought to clarify the law of jurisdiction, even at the cost of causing expense 
and inconvenience to parties by denying them the opportunity to litigate in their preferred forum.82 
Chapter Two looked at a new element of the Rules: Rule 2.1, allowing judges to dismiss 
actions after a written process, potentially sua sponte, if they appear facially vexatious or abusive.83 
There are dangers associated with the Rule, particularly with respect to the fair treatment of self-
represented litigants, and three instances of arguably inappropriate use of the Rule are cited.84 
Nonetheless, the Rule generally seems an effective and procedurally fair mechanism to address a 
particular type of claim, saving responding parties, courts, and other litigants significant time and 
 
79  Gerard J Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 
79 [“Kennedy Jurisdiction”]. 
80  2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [hereinafter “Van Breda”]. 
81  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 91-93. 
82  Ibid at 83-84. 
83  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21. 
84  Ibid at: 268, citing Shafirovitch, supra note 36; 265-266, citing Beatty v Office of the Children’s Lawyer, 2016 
ONSC 3816, [2016] OJ No 3024 (SCJ); and 260, citing Khan v Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, 2017 
CarswellOnt 16235 [“Khan”]. 
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resources. Rule 2.1 was enacted in the immediate aftermath of Hryniak, with the principle of 
proportionality in mind. Hryniak is also cited in leading cases interpreting Rule 2.1.85 But are the 
positive effects of Rule 2.1 caused by Hryniak and its call for a “culture shift” or because a new, 
specific rule of procedural law was enacted? Almost certainly, it is bit of both. It seems clear that 
the Rule would not have been enacted but for the spirit of the 2010 Amendments. But it seems 
equally clear that a specific new regulation was required to have these effects. 
Chapter Three investigates the distinction between interlocutory and final appeals, which 
Nordheimer J (as he then was) succinctly described as “an issue that has bedevilled the [legal] 
profession for decades.”86 Despite being definitionally unrelated to a case’s merits, the number of 
disputes over this issue has not decreased in the aftermath of Hryniak, which is not cited by a 
single case wrestling with this issue for its emphases on proportionality and the need for a culture 
shift in how civil litigation is conducted.87 A different trend was apparent in British Columbia – 
this, however, followed legislative intervention attempting to address this specific issue.88  
Chapter Four reported the results of a survey asking lawyers who had experienced the 2010 
Amendments and Hryniak what they viewed the effects of those Amendments to be. There was a 
perception among many respondents that summary judgment was being pursued more often, which 
most, though not all, respondents viewed as positive.89 There was also a view among many 
respondents that this led to certain types of cases being resolved more quickly and with less 
financial expense.90 However, most respondents nonetheless believed that litigation was, in the 
 
85  Kennedy Rule 2.1, ibid, at, e.g., 248, citing, e.g., Raji v Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, [2015] 
OJ No 307 (SCJ) [“Raji”]. 
86  Mancinelli v Royal Bank of Canada, 2017 ONSC 1526, [2017] OJ No 1111 (Div Ct) at para 2. 
87  Chapter Three at 158. 
88  Ibid at 165-170, citing Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77 [“CoA Act”], s 7, as am. 
89  Chapter Four at 225-227. 
90  Ibid at 226-227.  
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main, becoming neither quicker nor less expensive, with most respondents citing myriad reasons 
outside of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments per se as the cause of this.91 
Each of these show some positive effects in the conduct of civil litigation in Canada vis-à-vis 
minimizing unnecessary interlocutory disputes and resolving actions on their merits more quickly 
and with fewer costs. But these improvements have still been modest. Moreover, they tend to have 
been in response to discrete, tailored interventions by the courts (Van Breda seemingly being the 
likelier reason for the effects on jurisdiction motions than Hryniak), regulators (the enactment of 
Rule 2.1 providing a new tool to address a particular type of claim again seeming more important 
than Hryniak per se), or legislatures (the British Columbia’s legislature amending the law 
surrounding interlocutory appeals). It would seem too harsh a conclusion to suggest that Hryniak 
has had no effect outside the summary judgment context – the surveys suggest some change has 
indeed occurred, and it is somewhat difficult to separate Hryniak from the enactment of Rule 2.1 
in particular. But these effects of Hryniak outside summary judgment seem amorphous and less 
effective than the other more tailored, if less wide-reaching, interventions. 
C. Where Civil Procedure Reform Can Facilitate Access to Justice – And Where it 
Likely Will Not 
 
It appears that there have been real effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments. MacKenzie 
has also suggested this is the case with respect to summary judgment in particular92 and Catherine 
Piché, though critical of the state of access to justice in Ontario, believes the recent reforms have 
been helpful.93 Certain cases have been resolved on their merits more quickly – or inappropriate 
interlocutory wrangling has been avoided – and this has only very rarely come at the expense of 
 
91  Ibid at 227-232.  
92  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
93  Catherine Piché, “Administering Justice and Serving the People: The Tension between the Objective of 
Judicial Efficiency and Informal Justice in Canadian Access to Justice Initiatives” (2017) 10(3) Erasmus L Rev 
137 at 140. 
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procedural or substantive injustices.94 In other words, the increased speed and lesser financial 
expense has some costs, but they have been minimal. This seems positive.  
These changes appear real; however, they seem confined to discrete areas: in particular, where 
legislation/regulations (Rule 2.1, the new appellate jurisdiction legislation in British Columbia) or 
binding appellate jurisprudence (Van Breda on jurisdiction, Hryniak on summary judgment) have 
been promulgated. This may indicate that top-down changes are necessary.95 This is a reason 
Chapter One recommended legislative reform regarding jurisdiction motions96 and Chapter Three 
did the same regarding interlocutory appeals.97 On the other hand, Hryniak’s call for a “culture 
shift” appears to have only been heeded minimally outside areas where more tailored interventions 
occurred. This could suggest that this term is too amorphous to be helpful outside of 
consciousness-raising – consciousness-raising that Chapter Four suggests has occurred.98 
Despite limited positive effects of Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments, civil procedure reform 
appears only so effective in facilitating access to justice. In this context, it is worth revisiting the 
“Access to Justice Triangle” as introduced in the Introduction:99  
 
94  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 110; Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 274. 
95  Proposed by, e.g., Lucinda Vandervort in “Access to Justice and the Public Interest in the Administration of 
Justice” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 125. 
96  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 108. 
97  Chapter Three at 177-178. 
98 Chapter Four at 215, acknowledging that this is not unimportant: see, e.g., Janet E Halley, Split Decisions: 
How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 43-44, 239, 
noting that this has been particularly important in feminist legal scholarship. 
99  This version comes from Andrew Pilliar, “Connecting and Understanding: AJRN and the Market for Personal 
Legal Services”, presentation to University of Saskatchewan Access to Justice Working Group, Summer 2016, 
slide 12. Developed by the British Columbia Civil Justice Task Force and later used by organizations such as 
the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice and National Action Committee on Access to Justice on Civil and Family 
Matters: see footnotes 12-14 of Introduction. 
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The triangle seeks to illustrate how different interventions can resolve justiciable issues, with 
the triangle’s narrowing reflecting a reduction of the number of people “in the system”. This 
dissertation’s research has mostly concentrated on the right-most third: how to resolve matters 
once the litigation process has begun. The importance of this was explained in the Introduction.100 
However, it was hypothesized that civil procedure reform is unlikely to have effects on, or to 
the left of, the Triangle. This is not a novel observation101 but buttresses the common-sense 
proposition that goals such as preventing justiciable issues from arising or demystifying legal 
knowledge cannot be assisted by civil procedure reform. Another factor nearer to the left of the 
A2J Triangle is delivering legal services in a more accessible way, as it is problematic for a legal 
service’s cost to exceed its value.102 This unfortunately occurs frequently, partially due to financial 
 
100  Introduction at 4-6. 
101  See, e.g., Radu Razvan Ghergus, “The Curious Case of Civil Procedure Reform in Canada, So Many Reforms 
Proposals With So Few Results” (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2009) at, e.g., 58. 
102  See, e.g., Gillian K Hadfield, “The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (un)Corporate Practice 
of Law” (2014) 38 Supplement Intl Rev L & Econ 43. 
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incentives for lawyers to practice in inefficient ways103 and concern that they will be subject to 
malpractice claims if they are insufficiently thorough.104 But Hryniak and the 2010 Amendments 
have had minimal discernible effects beyond where specific changes in procedural or substantive 
law occurred, leaving much more work to be done, as Chapter Four notes in particular.105 
D. Conclusions Complementary to England and Wales Experience 
While this is not a comparative dissertation (save for the brief comparison of Ontario and 
British Columbia law in Chapter Three), it nonetheless worth briefly considering how Ontario’s 
experiences with summary procedures appear to complement what has been hypothesized and 
experienced elsewhere – notably, England and Wales. The Osborne Report, which was the genesis 
of the 2010 Amendments, has significant similarities with the “Woolf Report”, which had the 
purpose of reforming civil procedure in England and Wales. Written by former House of Lords 
jurist Harry Woolf, the Woolf Report had the purposes of, among other things, speeding up civil 
justice and making it more affordable.106 Specifically, just as occurred in Ontario with the 2010 
Amendments, expanded ability to seek summary judgment107 was established in England and 
Wales, and the principle of proportionality was enshrined throughout civil procedure.108 
Ontario shares much in common with England and Wales. Both are common law jurisdictions 
– indeed, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s powers are based in the historic powers of the 
courts of England.109 And both jurisdictions were rife with inefficiencies, delay, and procedure 
 
103  Brooke MacKenzie, “Better value: Problems with the billable hour and the viability of value-based billing” 
(2013) 90 Can Bar Rev 677 [“MacKenzie 2013”]. 
104  Deborah L Rhode, Access to Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 100-101. 
105  Chapter Four at 235-237. 
106  See, e.g., Suzanne Burn, “The Civil Justice Reforms in England and Wales” (1999) 17 Windsor YB Access 
Just 221 at 223; Neil Andrews, “English Civil Procedure: A Synopsis” (2008) Ritsumeikan L Rev 25 at 31; 
Oscar G Chase, et al, Civil Litigation in Comparative Context, 2d ed (St. Paul, MN: West Academic 
Publishing, 2017) [“Chase, et al”] at 19. 
107  Chase, et al, ibid at 387. 
108  Ibid at 19. 
109  CJA, supra note 53, s 11(2). 
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that was unnecessary to achieve a just result. Lord Woolf himself noted “disclosure” (the English 
equivalent to Ontario’s discovery) as a quintessentially cited example of a procedure causing 
disproportionate expense.110 This is another parallel to Ontario.111 
The reforms arising from the Woolf Report have been praised for prudently using public 
resources and disposing of cases in a speedier manner by, for example, expanding the ability to 
grant summary judgment, potentially sua sponte.112 Neil Andrews has also noted that the 
involvement of judges earlier in litigation through potentially dispositive motions gives the judge 
the ability to comment upon (even if not decide) the merits of the case, allowing parties to achieve 
more informed settlement.113 There has been criticism of the Woolf Report and subsequent 
reforms. But these have mostly been for failing to comprehensively consider all issues relevant to 
access to civil justice.114 The enshrinement of proportionality and expanded summary judgment 
powers appear likely to stay. The consensus appears that these were positive developments unless 
taken to a counterproductive extreme of excessively jeopardizing the ability of the courts to come 
to accurate results in the vast majority of cases.115 
 
110  Lord Harry Woolf, “Civil Justice in the United Kingdom” (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 
709 at, e.g., 711, 723, 726. 
111  See, e.g., Justice Thomas Cromwell noting as much in extrajudicial comments in 2013 while still serving on 
the Supreme Court: Beverley Spencer, “The Road to Justice Reform: An Interview with Supreme Court of 
Canada Justice Thomas Cromwell” The National (July-August 2013), online: 
<http://nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/Recent4/The-road-to-justice-reform.aspx>. This is also a common 
hypothesis in the United States: see, e.g., Judge (as he then was) Neil Gorsuch, “13th Annual Barbara K. Olson 
Memorial Lecture” (Address Delivered at the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy’s 2013 National 
Lawyers Convention, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 15 November 2013), online: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VI_c-5S4S6Y> at ~6:15-10:30. See also Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 
29. 
112  Chase, et al, supra note 106 at 387. 
113  Ibid; Neil Andrews, English Civil Procedure: Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice System (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) [“Andrews ECP”] at 505-07. 
114  See, e.g., John Sorabji, English Civil Justice after Woolf and Jackson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) at 166ff. 
115  Ibid at, e.g., 201-202; Chase, et al, supra note 106 at 387; Andrews ECP, supra note 113 at 3.22. 
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At the same time, there is also recognition that the reforms arising from Woolf Report, like 
the 2010 Amendments, failed to achieve a panacea. For example, the Woolf Report reforms can 
be criticized for increasing inequities in access to the courts, privileging those who were already 
able to access justice while the state has an arguable obligation to ensure access to justice for all 
who need recourse to it.116 As suggested earlier, Ontario’s trade-offs in terms of increasing access 
appear to have only minimally helped those with pre-existing disadvantages in accessing the 
courts.117 This is in line with general critiques of proportionality.118 But the 2010 Amendments 
and Hryniak do not appear to have generally exacerbated the difficulties encountered by those with 
disadvantages in accessing the courts.119 Rather, as John Sorabji notes in the English context, civil 
procedure reform is likely only so capable of facilitating access to justice and addressing such 
systemic inequities.120 Andrews has noted that despite success from the Woolf Report, the reforms 
did not solve the access to justice problems arising from lawyers charging high fees, meaning a 
further report had to be commissioned to address that issue.121 How lawyers are paid122 and 
regulated123 are also hypothesized to be access to justice impediments in Ontario, through 
incentivizing excessive billing and unnecessarily capping the number of lawyers available to the 
public. Catherine Piché has construed Canada’s access to justice problems as first and foremost 
 
116  Sorabji, ibid at 166. 
117  NSRLP Self-Reps, supra note 17; Carroll, supra note 17 at 466. 
118  E.g., Sorabji, supra note 114, Chapters 6 and 7; Hanycz, supra note 20. 
119  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 270ff. 
120  Sorabji, supra note 114 at 202. 
121  Neil Andrews, “Accessible, Affordable, and Accurate Civil Justice--Challenges Facing the English System” 
(University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 35/2013, 2013) at 3-4. 
122  Pilliar 2015, supra note 10; MacKenzie 2013, supra note 103. 
123  See, e.g., Dwight Newman, Michelle Biddulph & Amy Gibson, “Grappling with the Future of Law in the 
Context of Change” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 51 at 65-67, summarizing work of Adam Dodek, among others; 
Lauren Moxley, “Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming the 
Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice” (2015) 9 Harv L & Pol’y Rev 553; Léonid Sirota, 
“Deregulate All the Lawyers” Double Aspect (9 May 2019), online: 
<https://doubleaspect.blog/2019/05/08/deregulate-all-the-lawyers/>. 
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problems with access to legal representation.124 We should be unsurprised that civil procedure 
reform was limited in its ability to facilitate access to justice in Ontario when, as in England and 
Wales, there are many other barriers to access to justice. 
E. The Broader Access to Justice Conversation 
This discussion has emphasized a relatively narrow understanding of the concept of access to 
justice – the increased, just resolution of civil actions on their merits with less delay and financial 
expense. As noted in the Introduction, there are good reasons to define access to justice much more 
broadly.125 Much work done by those defining access to justice more broadly, such as analyzing 
how lawyers practice law126 or reforming substantive law to emphasize transformative social 
justice,127 should be viewed as complementary, rather than alternatives, to civil procedure reform. 
But a relatively narrow definition of access to justice was adopted for analyzing Hryniak and the 
2010 Amendments given, among other reasons, the hypothesis that civil procedure reform is likely 
an ill-suited vehicle to achieve access to justice defined in this broader way. 
Analysis has born out this hypothesis to a significant extent – though it should be caveated 
slightly. Civil procedure reform remains a questionable vehicle to, for example, achieve 
transformative social change, though civil procedure rules may need to be applied slightly more 
flexibly in the public law realm, when a case could have far-reaching effects.128 It is also doubtful 
that the use of prescriptive, summary procedures is likely to, without more, affect how lawyers 
 
124  Supra note 93 at 140. 
125  Introduction at, inter alia, 10. 
126  Michele M Leering, “Enhancing the Legal Profession’s Capacity for Innovation: The Promise of Reflective 
Practice and Action Research for Increasing Access to Justice” (2017) 34 Windsor YB Access Just 189 at 220. 
127  E.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 4 at 969; Sarah Buhler, “The View from Here: Access to Justice and Community 
Legal Clinics” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 427; Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice 
Should We Be Talking About?” (2008) 46:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 773. 
128  Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 39. 
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practice law. Specifically, this analysis suggests particular prescriptions are likelier to change how 
lawyers practise law than statements that a “culture shift” is required. 
This Conclusion nonetheless should be caveated insofar as summary procedures are used 
against vulnerable, potentially self-represented parties. Such parties, who may disproportionately 
come from equity-seeking groups,129 are likely to benefit from the in-court time that summary 
procedures seek to curtail.130 Julie Macfarlane has amassed significant anecdotal evidence that 
summary procedures disproportionately disadvantage self-represented litigants,131 and Chapters 
Two and Three’s analysis of the case law suggests that this concern is real.132 Chapter Four concurs 
that self-represented litigants frequently require more formal processes.133 Is this concern best 
addressed by transformative social justice addressing the economic and social status of these 
individuals or adopting different procedural rules depending on whether a self-represented litigant 
is a party to the litigation? The answer is likely both, and finding a dividing line between the two 
may seem artificial. The fundamental issues causing such individuals’ problems likely have 
solutions outside courts.134 However, judges should be inclined to give self-represented litigants 
the benefit of the doubt, if doubt is present.135 This includes flexibility in filling out court forms, 
and not expecting use of technical legal language.136 This permissive attitude can be taken to an 
 
129  See, e.g., Patricia Hughes, “Advancing Access to Justice through Generic Solutions: The Risk of Perpetuating 
Exclusion” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 1. 
130  NSRLP Self-Reps, supra note 17; Carroll, supra note 17 at 466. 
131  NSRLP Self-Reps, ibid at 17; Julie Macfarlane, “The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying 
and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants – Final Report” (May 2013), online: 
<https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/85/> [“Julie Macfarlane”]. 
132  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 263; Chapter Three at 157-158. 
133  Chapter Four at 210, 240. 
134  As the Supreme Court of Canada has stated regarding relationships with Canada’s Indigenous populations, “true 
reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms”: Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 
2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 SCR 1069 at para 24. This is a reminder that court decisions can only achieve so much. 
135  See, e.g., Wouters v Wouters, 2018 ONCA 26, 6 RFL (8th) 305 [“Wouters”] at paras 36-38; Sanzone v Schechter, 
2016 ONCA 566, 402 DLR (4th) 135 [“Sanzone”]; Pintea v Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 SCR 470. 
136  E.g., Wouters, ibid; Sanzone, ibid. 
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extreme that defeats the purpose of summary procedures.137 And creating myriad exceptions to 
legal rules, including procedural rules, can be its own access to justice impediment, as noted in 
Chapters One and Three in particular. This will be re-explored in Part III of this Conclusion. 
However, an appropriate balance can be struck about the side on which to err, and Chapter Two 
suggests this largely has been struck with respect to Rule 2.1. So while this dissertation is mostly 
complementary to yet separate from conversations about transformative social justice, there is 
some overlap. 
Much of this dissertation has assumed that the substantive law is just and worthy of resort to 
the courts to enforce. This premise is of course disputable, as the critical legal studies movement 
exemplifies.138 Indeed, almost every reasonable person should disagree with this premise to some 
extent. Edmund Burke recognized that institutions such as substantive law will inevitably have to 
change, albeit preferably gradually.139 A primary way to change the substantive law is bringing a 
lawsuit. Insofar as civil procedure reform makes this easier, this project of substantive legal reform 
is facilitated. Indeed, scholars140 and judges141 have defended the desire to increase resolution of 
claims on their merits to ensure development of the common law and related democratic norms. 
 
 
137  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 274, citing Karakatsanis J in Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 29: 
There is, of course, always some tension between accessibility and the truth-seeking function but, 
much as one would not expect a jury trial over a contested parking ticket, the procedures used to 
adjudicate civil disputes must fit the nature of the claim. If the process is disproportionate to the 
nature of the dispute and the interests involved, then it will not achieve a fair and just result. 
138  See, e.g. Patricia J Williams, “The Pain of Word Bondage” in The Alchemy of Pain and Rights (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), c 8; Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal 
Professionalism’: Historical Perspectives” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical 
Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 
139  Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1790]) at 
96-97. 
140  See, e.g., Farrow Book, supra note 18 at 219-232; Brooke MacKenzie, “Settling for less: How the Rules of Civil 
Procedure overlook the public perspective of justice” (2011) 39 Adv Q 222 (specifically commenting on the 
incentivization of settlement in the Rules, supra note 2 at Rule 49, but the sentiment is applicable more broadly). 
141  Karakatsanis J in Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 1. 
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II) ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL AN IMPEDIMENT? 
The Ontario Court of Appeal is one of the highest-regarded courts in Canada, and justly so. 
But with the greatest respect to the Court of Appeal, this dissertation suggests that, when it comes 
to the use of summary procedures to achieve access to civil justice, it has consistently lagged 
behind both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court. This brief section begins with a discussion 
of the various ways in which the Court of Appeal has interpreted procedural law in ways that have 
hindered, rather than facilitated, access to justice in the specific realm of summary procedures. 
The Court’s reluctance is likely driven by a well-motivated desire to fulfill its roles to lay down 
clear legal rules and ensure that substantive injustices do not occur. But it is nonetheless posited 
that the Court has erred in excessively preventing the creative use of summary procedures to 
facilitate access to justice. A more hands-off approach to reviewing trial judges’ procedural 
decisions may be warranted. Suggestions on how that could be realized, without appellate judges 
abrogating their responsibilities, are given. 
A. Court of Appeal and Summary Procedures 
1. History 
The Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted the introduction of summary judgment to the Rules 
in 1985 narrowly.142 MacKenzie has observed that the Court of Appeal’s narrow interpretation of 
the 2010 Amendments also resulted in a reduced effectiveness of the 2010 Amendments pending 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak.143 It required the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
interpretation of Ontario procedural law to allow the 2010 Amendments to have their full effect in 
the summary judgment context. Building on the above conception of access to justice, and work 
 
142  Walker SJ, supra note 5 at 697; Irving Ungerman Ltd v Galanis (1991), 4 OR (3d) 545 at 550–51. 
143  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
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by MacKenzie,144 Pitel and Lerner,145 and Choudhary,146 this dissertation views the expanded use 
of summary procedures as an access to justice success, allowing the prompt resolution of civil 
claims on their merits, and also giving the judiciary the opportunity to develop the common law. 
Though not everyone shares this view,147 it appears that, had the Court of Appeal’s interpretation 
of courts’ summary judgment powers been allowed to stand, the positive access to justice-related 
effects of the Supreme Court’s Hryniak decision would not have been realized. 
2. Summarizing Chapters One Through Four 
Chapter One notes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Breda148 was an access to justice 
improvement compared to the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Muscutt149 and even the Court 
of Appeal’s own decision in Van Breda.150 The number of jurisdiction motions, and especially the 
number of unsuccessful jurisdiction motions, has decreased in the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court’s intervention. The result has been a notable saving of parties’ time and money.151  
Chapter Two similarly posits that the Court of Appeal has narrowly construed the applicability 
of principles of Rule 2.1 in the family law context. This could have negative impacts on the ability 
to use Rule 2.1 to achieve access to justice.152 Family law is governed by different statutory 
authority and social considerations than civil litigation and the Court of Appeal’s holding that Rule 
2.1 is not directly applicable in the family law context is understandable. Having said that, superior 
 
144  Ibid. 
145  Stephen GA Pitel & Matthew Lerner, “Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to Rule 21” (2014) 
43 Adv Q 344. 
146  Chaudhary, supra note 68. 
147  See, e.g., Jonathan Lisus, “Hryniak: Requiem for the vanishing trial, or brave new world?” (Summer 2014) 33 
Adv J No 1, 6; see also the results reported in Chapter 5 at Part IV.C. 
148  Supra note 80. 
149  Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20 (CA). 
150  Charron Estate v Village Resorts Ltd, 2010 ONCA 84, 98 OR (3d) 721. 
151  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at, e.g., 102. 
152  Frick v Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, 132 OR (3d) 321 [“Frick”]. 
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courts have inherent authority to control their own processes.153 Moreover, the Family Law Rules 
are not as flexible as the Rules of Civil Procedure, which leads to the ability to use the Rules of 
Civil Procedure by analogy when the Family Law Rules do not “cover a matter adequately”. Myers 
J’s analysis in Purcaru is convincing: 
I see no benefit in highly technical efforts to scan and parse the various rules so as 
to neatly pigeon-hole particular cases into one or another. […] There may be cases 
where Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules neatly addresses a problem on its own. 
There may also be cases where Rule 1(8.2) does “not cover a matter adequately” so 
that Rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules will then allow access to Rule 2.1 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure or other rules as necessary or appropriate in the 
circumstances. In each case the court is seeking to promote efficient and affordable 
litigation recognizing that the “process of adjudication must be fair and just. This 
cannot be compromised.” Hryniak, at para. 23.154 
 
With greatest respect to the Court of Appeal, insofar as it concluded, in Frick v Frick,155 that Rule 
2.1 is not applicable, even by analogy, in the family law context, this may be too rigid. The 
procedure that the Court of Appeal has adopted to use Rule 2.1 in the Court of Appeal itself is also 
more complicated than those which the Superior Court or the Divisional Court156 have adopted. 
Insofar as simplicity and access to justice are correlated, this is not a desirable development coming 
from the Court of Appeal. 
Chapter Three suggests that the Court of Appeal has needlessly muddied the waters between 
what is considered a final or interlocutory order for purposes of appeal. Though this observation 
has originated elsewhere,157 Chapter Three attempts to quantify what the actual costs of this have 
 
153  E.g., MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 [“MacMillan Bloedel”] at paras 18, 33. 
154  Purcaru v Vacaru, 2016 ONSC 1609, 76 RFL (7th) 333 (SCJ) [“Purcaru”] at para 15. 
155  Supra note 152. 
156  Simpson v The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, 5 CPC (8th) 280 at paras 45-
46. 
157  See, e.g., John Sopinka, Mark A Gelowitz & W David Rankin, The Conduct of an Appeal, 4th ed (Toronto: 
LexisNexis, 2018) [“Conduct of an Appeal”], § 1.17ff. 
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been, and concludes that they have been steep. This has likely been motivated by a desire to ensure 
that substantive justice is done – but it has also seemingly resulted in needless procedural disputes. 
Chapter Four reports that survey respondents believe that an initial increase in summary 
judgment post-Hryniak has fallen off after recent Court of Appeal decisions.158 While some 
respondents viewed this as positive, more seemed to feel that the Court of Appeal was needlessly 
curtailing creative uses of procedure to resolve litigation on the merits.159 
3. Partial Summary Judgment  
The Court of Appeal also recently held that pre-Hryniak cases on partial summary judgment 
that render it extremely rare160 are equally applicable post-Hryniak.161 This is motivated by a 
concern to ensure that there is not needless bifurcation of issues. While there are doubtless cases 
where this would be problematic, this concern can also extend to summary judgment generally, 
which can also create needless delay and expense if sought inappropriately.162 But in Hryniak, a 
unanimous Supreme Court held that these concerns should not dissuade parties from using 
summary judgment powers robustly when appropriate.163 The strong presumption against partial 
summary judgment does not consider the benefits of partial summary judgment motions in terms 
of finally resolving issues,164 that in turn may finally resolve the litigation, or at least finally 
remove parties from the litigation.165 This makes trials quicker, if necessary at all.166 It would also 
 
158  Chapter Four at 234-235. 
159  Ibid at 235. 
160  See, e.g., Corchis v KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, [2002] OJ No 1437, 2002 CarswellOnt 1064 (CA), applying 
Gold Chance International Ltd v Daigle & Hancock, 2001 CarswellOnt 899, [2001] OJ No 1032 (SCJ), cited in 
Butera v Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, 137 OR (3d) 561 [“Butera”] at para 26.  
161  Butera, ibid. 
162  Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 33. 
163  Ibid. 
164  Butera, supra note 160 at para 34 recognizes this, but at what cost to deterring bringing advantageous motions? 
165  This admittedly creates a risk of inconsistent results against parties: Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 60. But it 
entails significant financial costs to the party who must go through trial. 
166  A benefit of, in particular, resolution of a question of law: see, e.g., Pitel & Lerner, supra note 145. This logically 
should be the same, in the context of a particular case, for resolutions of questions of fact. 
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seem particularly appropriate when a plaintiff has sued a plethora of individuals, which is known 
to happen.167 Respondents in Chapter Four lamented the unavailability of partial summary 
judgment in circumstances such as these.168 Partial summary judgment can also further 
development of the common law, another purpose of Hryniak,169 and make settlement more 
informed and fair. Admittedly, this rationale was also dispensed to expand discovery rights – 
which was not a positive experiment.170 But unlike expanded discovery, partial summary judgment 
disposes of issues in litigation. Moreover, trial courts can control a partial summary judgment 
motion’s scope more easily than documentary discovery and limit its potential to cause mischief. 
It is true that partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of litigation – as such, it is 
not directly analogous to summary judgment. But there are cases where partial summary judgment 
appears more analogous to tort cases where the parties choose to bifurcate issues of liability and 
damages.171 Moreover, partial summary judgment can lead to development of the common law 
and its associated benefits.172 With respect, the Court of Appeal did not consider these benefits of 
partial summary judgment. Moreover, asserting that the pre-2010 case law applies post-Hryniak 
appears, with respect, unsophisticated and not in accordance with the spirit of Hryniak and its call 
for a culture shift in the use of procedural law. Nor does it consider the proportionality principle, 
which was only enshrined in 2010173 before the pre-2010 cases restricting partial summary 
judgment, and can suggest that partial summary judgment may – or may not – be appropriate. 
 
167  See, e.g., Goralczyk v Beer Store, 2016 ONSC 2265, 2016 CarswellOnt 5181 (SCJ) at para 9. 
168  Chapter Four at 201, 234-235. 
169  Pitel & Lerner, supra note 145; Hryniak, supra note 3 at paras 1, 26. 
170  Contemplated in, e.g., Whiten v Pilot Insurance, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 59 at para 122. 
171  See, e.g., Baert v Graham, 2009 SKCA 72, 337 Sask R 117, cited in Dwight Newman, “The Judgments of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 2009” (2010) 73 Sask L Rev 173 at fn 135. 
172  Pitel & Lerner, supra note 145 make this point in the context of Rule 21 motions. 
173  2010 Amendments, supra note 1; Farrow 2012, supra note 9. 
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Ultimately, there appears to be a tendency of the Court of Appeal to narrowly construe 
summary procedures designed to improve access to justice.174 Doubtless well-motivated by the 
intention to ensure a trial judge fully appreciates all relevant facts and that justice is seen to be 
done, it is nonetheless doubtful that this is a sufficient argument against summary procedures.175 
B. Sound Motivations 
Before suggesting how the Court of Appeal could improve, it should be acknowledged again 
that its reasons for interpreting these procedural rules narrowly likely come from motivations that 
can be justified. This dissertation discusses the need for appellate courts to lay down clear rules, 
and the Court of Appeal has done this regarding partial summary judgment, Rule 2.1 in the family 
law context, and summary judgment pre-Hryniak. The Court of Appeal appears particularly 
concerned to correct injustices – such as ensuring a plaintiff can avail itself of Ontario’s 
jurisdiction in Chapter One176 or have an appeal as of right in Chapter Three.177 Correcting 
injustices through ensuring consistent application of the law is indeed a purpose of appellate 
courts.178 “Correcting errors” in this way is a particularly important role of first-level appeal courts. 
Once called the Court of Error and Appeal,179 the Court of Appeal’s role can be distinguished from 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which is truly a law-making Court. Intermediary appellate courts 
are not law-making courts to the same extent.180 However, it would not be reasonable to expect 
the Supreme Court of Canada to be regularly interpreting Ontario procedural law, given the 
 
174  E.g., MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5 at 1295. 
175  MacKenzie SJ, ibid; Chaudhary, supra note 68. 
176  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 95. 
177  Chapter Three at 141-142. 
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(Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 18. 
180  Robert J Sharpe, Good Judgment: Making Judicial Decisions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018) at, 
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Supreme Court’s purpose being confined to issues of national public importance.181 In light of this, 
it would be understandable if the Court of Appeal were only an access to justice obstacle in one of 
the ways mentioned above in Section A. Erring in so many different ways, however, appears to be 
excessive, even if understandably so.  
C. Two Suggestions for the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal should be lauded for seeking to prevent substantive injustices. But the 
Court – and appellate courts generally for that matter – should reflect on their role in reviewing 
trial judges’ procedural determinations in at least two specific ways. First, consciousness-raising 
is likely appropriate. As Daniel Jutras has noted, appellate courts are not designed to address every 
conceivable injustice and attempting to do so can come with serious and negative consequences.182 
And interpreting procedural law in such a way that there is no chance of an injustice is likely to 
be so costly so as to defeat the purpose of summary procedures. Narrow interpretations of summary 
procedures from appellate courts may also deter lawyers from bringing potentially advantageous 
motions. 
How should the Court of Appeal approach its review of procedural decisions of trial courts? 
That leads to the second suggestion: giving de facto deference on determinations of appropriate 
procedure. The Supreme Court has already mandated that this is to be the case with respect to 
summary judgment motions,183 but it should probably exist more generally. This is not to suggest 
that “palpable and overriding error”-style review184 for procedural determinations should come 
into existence. However, an analogy from administrative law may be appropriate. While the 
“standard of review” for procedural fairness is technically correctness for issues of procedural 
 
181  Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40(1) explains the requirement for leave to appeal. 
182  “The Narrowing Scope of Appellate Review: Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?” (2007) 32 Man LJ 61. 
183  Hryniak, supra note 3. 
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fairness, deference to a decision-maker is known to creep in.185 This is only logical as a first-
instance decision-maker is in a privileged position to determine what is a fair procedure vis-à-vis 
a reviewing court.186 Some jurists have criticized this as being disguised reasonableness review,187 
but terminology aside, the principle of deference pervades. It may be that this is best conceived 
not as deference de jure so much as deference as respectful common sense,188 in the way that an 
appellate court may be “deferential” to a trial judge with great experience in a particular area even 
when deference de jure is not owed. 
Appellate courts should of course intervene if there has been a consequential procedural error. 
At times, this is essential to protect vulnerable parties.189 As noted above in Part I, a fair process 
is essential for justice. Courts of Appeal should not condone clear departures from the Rules as 
that is not only unfair but undermines the rule of law.190 Insofar as laying down clear legal rules 
can be preferable to standards, interventionist appellate courts can actually improve access to 
justice, giving numerous other parties the chance to order their affairs.191  
However, just as rules are not always preferable to standards, interventionist appellate courts 
are not always preferable to deferential appellate courts. And when it comes to reviewing trial 
courts’ procedural decisions, it would appear preferable for appellate courts to not assess what 
 
185  Rennie JA describes this conundrum in Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 
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procedure is called for as if it were assessing from a blank slate. To paraphrase Karakatsanis J in 
Hryniak, a court should ask itself the question of “whether the added expense and delay of fact 
finding [from its preferred procedure] is necessary to a fair process and just adjudication.”192 But 
the question for an appellate court should not be “would we have viewed this procedure” to be 
necessary as per Hryniak but instead be “could a reasonable trial judge have viewed this as a fair 
procedure” as per Hryniak. This should not be confined to summary judgment but to all procedural 
law that has the opportunity to facilitate or hinder access to justice, such as the examples in this 
dissertation. Appellate courts should also recognize that trial courts may be the source of 
innovation in the use of the Rules, and should be reluctant to discourage an innovative spirit that, 
as noted above, has produced benefits in discrete circumstances. 
III) THE RULES-STANDARDS DEBATE 
The earlier chapters of this dissertation analyzed three procedural rules that had been criticized 
for being unpredictable in how they were to be applied (in the case of jurisdiction motions193 and 
interlocutory appeals194) or were novel (in the case of Rule 2.1), leading to uncertainty in 
application. In response, efforts were undertaken – in the case of jurisdiction motions195 and Rule 
2.1,196 by the bench, and in the case of interlocutory appeals, by the British Columbia legislature197 
– to increase predictability through decreasing discretion. In Chapter Four, respondents mentioned 
(unprompted) how legal uncertainty can impact access to justice. This goes to the heart of the 
 
192  Hryniak, supra note 3 at para 4. 
193  See, e.g., Tanya J Monestier, “(Still) A ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada” 
(2013) 36 Fordham Int’l LJ 397 at 413; Janet Walker, “Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada: The CJPTA–A Decade 
of Progress” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 9 [“Walker Jurisdiction”] at 15-20. 
194  Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 157, § 1.17. 
195  Van Breda, supra note 80. 
196  Raji, supra note 85 at para 9, endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Scaduto v Law Society of Upper 
Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, 343 OAC 87 at para 12, leave to appeal ref’d, [2015] SCCA No 488, 2016 
CarswellOnt 21905 [“Scaduto”]. 
197  CoA Act, supra note 88, s 7, as am. 
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“rules-standards debate” in legal theory, asking whether justice is better served by laws that are 
open-ended and broad, with discretion for the decision-maker to facilitate substantive justice, or 
clear and narrow, allowing parties to order their affairs and without being subject to arbitrary 
decision-making. This debate affects practically all areas of law, including the availability of 
procedural mechanisms, as this dissertation evidences. 
Part A of this section introduces and summarizes the “rules-standards debate”, “one of the 
oldest” in legal scholarship.198 Part B suggests how findings from this dissertation’s first four 
chapters complement or belie many hypotheses in this area. Part C suggests that Ontario procedural 
law has erred excessively in prescribing standards instead of rules – at least in circumstances of 
determining the availability of a particular forum or procedure. It is suggested that attempts to 
make the availability of dispositive procedures more rules-based have been helpful, in terms of 
decreasing financial expense and interlocutory wrangling, with minimal costs from the perspective 
of achieving substantive justice. It is not argued that all discretionary standards should be done 
away with; rather, it is suggested that, in this discrete area, moving closer to the “rules” end of the 
rules-standards spectrum can, in the aggregate, increase access to justice. This requires further 
research and exploration. Nor it is suggested that this is the primary access to justice obstacle 
current facing our legal system, especially when compared to the need to simplify procedures that 
seek to minimize the likelihood that perfect justice will be an obstacle to good justice. But much 
like the foregoing discussion about the Court of Appeal, it would be neglectful not to raise this. 
A. The Debate 
The rules-standards debate will need to be simplified, likely excessively. The term “rules” 
can of course describe all legal norms but, in this narrow sense, refers to bright-line prescriptions 
 
198  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1220. 
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that purportedly clearly prescribe particular legal results once relevant facts are known.199 Such 
rules typically encompass a normative value that the law-maker believes should be applied in all 
cases.200 “Standards”, on the other hand, typically announce the law-maker’s policy goal and then 
give decision-makers significant discretion in how to achieve that in any individual case.201 The 
term “standards” can also encompass terms such as “factors”, “deals”,202 and “principles” (which 
seems the primary term in the United Kingdom, particularly by Julia Black, who has analyzed this 
in depth203). Some scholars seek to distinguish these other terms,204 while others (notably Cass 
Sunstein) simply put all of them together into a category of “rulelessness”.205 Strong cases can be 
made to distinguish these terms, though at other times they seem indistinguishable.206 Ultimately, 
there seems little disadvantage in following Duncan Kennedy’s consideration of these non-rules 
as types of standards.207 Not only is this the most common parlance in North America but, as will 
be noted shortly, drawing bright lines between any of these terms is somewhat artificial. As such, 
these terms will be used interchangeably unless circumstances call for more specificity, though the 
emphasis will certainly be on “standards”. 
 
199  See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, “Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles” Legal Theory Blog (6 
September 2009), online: <https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legal-theory-lexicon-rules-
standards-and-principles.html>. 
200  See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1228. The law-maker can be an appellate court or the legislature. 
201  Ibid at 1227-1228. 
202  The latter term being preferred by Navroz K Dubash & Bronwen Morgan in “The Embedded Regulatory State: 
Between Rules and Deals – Conclusion” in Navroz K Dubash & Bronwen Morgan, eds, The Rise of the 
Regulatory State of the South Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
203  See, e.g., Julia Black, “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation” (November 21, 2010). LSE 
Legal Studies Working Paper No. 17/2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1712862 [“Black 
2010”] and Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at, e.g., 100-108. 
204  See, e.g., Solum, supra note 199. 
205  Cass R Sunstein, “Problems with Rules” (1995) 83(4) Cal L Rev 953 at 967. 
206  Sunstein, ibid at 967. 
207  Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Litigation” (1975) 89 Harv L Rev 1687 [“Duncan 
Kennedy”] at 1688. 
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Rules’ proponents tend to argue that they promote certainty in the law.208 Rules allow parties 
to better order their affairs because the application of the law to the facts in which they find 
themselves is more certain.209 Rules can also reduce the cost of litigation, if it does become 
necessary, by restricting what can be deemed relevant.210 In addition, rules encourage parties to 
order their dealings so that they comply with clear laws – this incentivizes parties becoming 
masters of their own destinies.211 The precedential value of decisions interpreting or prescribing 
rules tends to be greater than decisions interpreting or promulgating a standard, which can be more 
readily distinguished.212 Finally, standards impose costs of determining how to be applied in 
particular cases.213 It is likely the privileged that can afford lawyers who can afford the cost of 
arguing for a favourable application in such circumstances.214 
There are also more deontological reasons to have rules. Rules have hortatory value in that 
they treat all parties alike.215 Though this can also be a problem in certain circumstances, as will 
be discussed shortly, ex ante rules “seem fairer” to many observers.216 Rules’ giving less discretion 
to depart from them when emotions are running high can also be a virtue as it is in such 
circumstances that fairness is especially jeopardized.217 In this vein, Chapter Two proposed a rule 
 
208  Ibid at 1229-1230; Sunstein, supra note 205 at 969, noting rules “save a great deal of time, effort, and expense.” 
209  Duncan Kennedy, ibid at 1688; Justice Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules” (1989) 56 U Chi 
L Rev 1175. 
210  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1229; Carl E Schneider, “Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View” in The 
Uses of Discretion, Keith Hawkins, ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 47 at 77. 
211  Baird & Weisberg, ibid at 1230; Lon Fuller, “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum L Rev 799 at 800-801; 
Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1698; Sunstein, supra note 205 at 974. 
212  Duncan Kennedy, ibid at 1690. 
213  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 972. 
214  Ibid at 977, 996. 
215  Ibid at 975. 
216  Ibid at 962; Schneider, supra note 210 at 74. 
217  Sunstein, ibid at 975. This principle is of course applicable in a wide variety of circumstances, and Senator Susan 
Collins argued it was a reason to confirm Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the United States Supreme Court: The 
Editorial Board, “Susan Collins Consents” The Wall Street Journal (5 October 2018), online: 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/susan-collins-consents-1538780948>. Whether this was an appropriate 
application of this principle is of course debatable. 
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that no dismissal sua sponte occur without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to be heard.218 Rules 
also tend to emerge over time, reflecting the wisdom of experience, and are less likely to lead into 
error with (potentially unforeseen) consequences than ad hoc decisions based on standards.219 As 
an example, Chapter Three suggested that the ability to give appeals as of right to decisions that 
do not finally conclude litigation was well-motivated but has led to much unnecessary litigation.220 
Standards’ advocates often emphasize that they better reflect law’s substantive objectives and 
are better at precisely applying the objectives of a law to all cases.221 Rules, on the other hand, are 
inevitably both over- and under-inclusive vis-à-vis their purposes.222 Mandating that claims under 
$25,000 proceed in the Small Claims Court assumes the costs of Superior Court procedure are 
disproportionate to the issues at stake in such a claim.223 But one could easily imagine a case 
raising issues of broader legal import such that the costs of proceeding in Superior Court are 
warranted. These risks of arbitrariness are heightened when the rule has been poorly crafted224 or 
the circumstances in which the rule was crafted have significantly changed.225 Rules can also 
encourage undesirable behaviour “right up to the line of the rule”.226 Someone who claims $25,001 
in damages due to an inflated claim for punitive damages has disingenuously circumvented the 
jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. Simultaneously, rules can have difficulty distinguishing 
 
218  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 269. 
219  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 969. This is an Edmund Burke-style “conservative” argument: Burke, supra note 
139 at 96-97. 
220  Chapter Three at 184. 
221  Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1688; Sunstein, supra note 205 at 992. 
222  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1235. 
223  Inspired by Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1689, giving the example of granting individuals legal capacity 
at the age of 21. This rule assumes a level of maturity obtained by those who are 21, but not all those who are 
21 will have this level of maturity; similarly, many individuals who are not 21 will have this level of maturity. 
224  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1235. 
225  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr famously wrote, that “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past”: “The Path of Law” 
(1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457 at 469; Sunstein, supra note 205 at 994.  
226  Pierre J Schlag, “Rules and Standards” (1985) 33 UCLA L Rev 379 at 385; Sunstein, supra note 205 at 995. 
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between flagrant and technical violations of the rule.227 Mandating that substantial indemnity costs 
be awarded in the case of an unproven fraud allegation fails to distinguish between cases when 
fraud was pled in bad faith to smear a party, vis-à-vis cases where fraud was pled in the alternative 
to negligence, and the evidence shows “merely” recklessness.228 Similarly, standards’ prescribing 
outcomes rather than methods can allow for “bottom-up” innovation, especially in complicated 
areas or where new issues consistently arise.229 These risks can be mitigated if a rule is well-
crafted, but crafting a rule well is a significant time investment.230 
Proponents of standards also observe that, though rules arguably create a perception of justice 
in treating like cases alike, it is just as much a part of procedural fairness for individuals to be able 
to argue that a departure from a rule is justified in a particular case because they are not like cases 
that have gone before.231 A case can be made that the availability of, for example, summary 
judgment should depend on a case-by-case assessment of the characteristics of the proceedings 
and the parties. Rules can impede this. 
Furthermore, the alleged certainty of rules can be illusory.232 Whether an order “finally” 
determines the litigation may turn on a technicality such as whether an indefinite stay of 
proceedings truly “terminated” the litigation.233 Standards reflect the fact that any clearly 
promulgated rule will create difficulties and uncertainties about how it is to be applied in such 
 
227  Schlag, ibid at 385. 
228  Fortunately, costs are “quintessentially discretionary”, allowing a court to take this into consideration: Nolan v 
Kerry (Canada) Inc, 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 SCR 678 at para 126. 
229  Such as financial regulation: Black 2010, supra note 203 at 11. 
230  Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992) 42 Duke LJ 557 [“Kaplow 1992”]. 
231  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 978, 995-996; Schneider, supra note 210 at 74, notes that “losing parties” in litigation 
are particularly likely to notice distinguishing characteristics between their cases and ones that have gone before. 
232  Sunstein, ibid at 1012. 
233  Seen in, e.g., when a matter is stayed as opposed to dismissed for the jurisdiction being forum non conveniens: 
Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas C Rafferty, Conflict of Laws, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 121. This is 
inspired by the famous example of determining whether a motorized tractor-lawn mower violates a prohibition 
on motorized vehicles in a park, which may depend on whether it was maintaining the park, vandalizing it, or 
simply driving through it. 
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marginal cases.234 Given this inevitability, it would seem prudent to give discretion to executive 
actors and judges to implement the rule’s purpose in an individual case.  
Though the distinction between rules and standards has been discussed for decades and 
remains the subject of study,235 the fact is that they exist on a continuum. The line between a rule 
and a standard is blurry, and few rules are truly absolute.236 A rule that courts may not exercise 
jurisdiction over matters that take place extraterritorially may be nuanced when the matters took 
place in an area where the state has de facto sovereignty.237 In this vein, context can turn something 
that seems like a rule into a standard.238 Similarly, a standard that may appear entirely open-ended 
can easily end up being quite constrained, as the law cannot allow for unlimited discretion.239 Thus, 
the antithesis of “rigid rules” is not “flexible standards” but rather the non-existent “untrammelled 
discretion”.240 The advantages and disadvantages of rules and standards have led Frederick 
Schauer to hypothesize that they eventually tend to converge.241 
Many legal realists argue that this demonstrates that many rules are in fact covert standards242 
but it seems more accurate to conceptualize that laws instead operate on a continuum. Sunstein 
and Kennedy, among others, note that the distinction between rules and standards is useful,243 and 
this dissertation suggests it has practical implications. Kennedy – hardly a legal formalist – has 
 
234  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1234. 
235  Though there is an argument that technology will eventually render this debate moot: Anthony J Casey & 
Anthony Niblett, “The Death of Rules and Standards” (2016) 92 Ind LJ 1401. 
236  Schlag, supra note 226 at 389-390; Sunstein, supra note 205 notes at 964, that these are frequently matters of 
“degree rather than kind”. 
237  Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723 (2008) discusses this in the context of Guantanamo Bay. 
238  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 960 and 965, noting that “excessive speed” may end up being interpreted narrowly. 
239  Sunstein, ibid at 960-961. Perhaps seen most famously in Canada in Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 
where a law giving the Attorney General the power to grant liquor licences with allegedly absolute discretion 
was held to not permit excluding an applicant because of his religion. 
240  Sunstein, ibid at 961. 
241  “The Convergence of Rules and Standards” (2003) NZ L Rev 303. 
242  Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1701. 
243  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 965. 
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written that, despite the legitimacy of noting that rules and standards do not exist in all-or-nothing 
opposition to each other, “there seems no basis for disputing that the notions of rule and standard, 
and the idea that the choice between them will have wide-ranging practical consequences, are 
useful in understanding and designing legal institutions.”244 He also noted that policymakers could 
prefer rules or standards depending on the circumstances, and the nature of their objectives.245 This 
certainly appears to be true with respect to the topics of this dissertation. 
Ultimately, neither rules nor standards create a panacea, and there is reason to be skeptical of 
those arguing for excessive emphasis on one, to the exclusion of the other, in all circumstances.246 
However, many of the alleged virtues of rules and standards depend upon empirical assumptions. 
Such assumptions could be mistaken. This will now be investigated vis-à-vis attempts to clarify 
the availability of particular procedural mechanisms. 
B. The Results from the First Four Chapters 
Chapter One analyzed jurisdiction motions in Ontario. The law of jurisdiction in common law 
Canada has been subject to a plethora of criticism for being too unpredictable.247 The Supreme 
Court attempted, in Club Resorts v Van Breda,248 to make the law more rules-based and less 
standards-based. The chapter suggests that the number of jurisdiction motions has decreased, and 
the number of unsuccessful jurisdiction motions has decreased even further.249 It is posited that 
this is a positive, if limited, effect on minimizing unnecessary and/or unsuccessful interlocutory 
motions.250 This has come at the expense of very few instances where a party was denied the 
 
244  Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1701. 
245  Ibid at 1701. 
246  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 1016. 
247  Monestier, supra note 193; Walker Jurisdiction, supra note 193 at 15-20. 
248  Van Breda, supra note 80. 
249  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 91-93. 
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chance to litigate in Ontario when that arguably would have been the fairest result.251 This would 
seem to make the case for rules over standards in terms of opening a forum’s availability. 
Chapter Two investigated a new part of Ontario’s procedural law (“Rule 2.1”). Through 
analyzing every reported case that used Rule 2.1 in its first three years, it is suggested that a 
streamlined jurisprudence and clear standard for its applicability have been helpful.252 The 
threshold for applying Rule 2.1 is somewhat standard-like in that judges always have the discretion 
not to apply it, but the high threshold to use it (no discernible cause of action, however generously 
read253) appears to have minimized improper attempts to invoke it. The result has been dozens of 
cases per year where a responding party was spared the expense and delay of needing to bring an 
expensive motion to dismiss an obviously meritless claim. This has come at the expense of no 
apparent substantive injustices – and very rare instances of procedural injustices. The majority of 
these procedural injustices turned out to be inconsequential.254 
Chapter Three looked at the distinction between interlocutory and final appeals. This was 
once a distinction that could be readily discerned due to a clear rule asking whether the litigation 
had ended.255 However, it has become more complicated over time as a more amorphous standard 
has replaced it, asking whether an issue has been finally determined.256 England and Wales257 and 
British Columbia258 have both attempted to make the law in this area more predictable. The 
 
251  See the discussion of Arsenault v Nunavut, 2015 ONSC 4302, [2015] OJ No 3494 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 ONCA 207, 
30 CCEL (4th) 46 in Kennedy Jurisdiction, ibid at 110. 
252  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21. 
253  Raji, supra note 85 at para 9, adopted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Scaduto, supra note 196 at para 12. 
254  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 266. 
255  Chapter Three at 139. 
256  Ibid at, inter alia, 140. 
257  Ibid at 140, citing Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals), Order 2000 SI 2000/1071, art 1(2)(c); 
Conduct of an Appeal, supra note 157, § 1.34; Eric TM Cheung, “Interlocutory or Final Orders: Pouring New 
Wine into Old Wineskins” (2006) 36(1) Hong Kong LJ 15 at 17. 
258  Chapter Three at 165, citing, inter alia, Conduct of an Appeal, ibid at § 1.75.  
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chapter’s analysis suggests that these attempts have been beneficial.259 Building on the successes 
and shortcomings in these jurisdictions and Ontario, a path forward is proposed. This path forward 
also seeks to make the law in Ontario more rules-based.260 This would restrict the number of orders 
with appeals as of right, but there would still be a possibility of appealing almost any order when 
the interests of justice require it through seeking leave.  
In Chapter Four’s survey, six respondents, unprompted, cited legal uncertainty as an access 
to justice obstacle, one that impacted economically disadvantaged parties particularly acutely.261 
At the same time, seven respondents praised Hryniak for providing “much-needed clarity” (the 
exact words of one respondent262) to the availability of summary procedures. This complements 
Brooke MacKenzie’s work that Hryniak has led to more successful summary judgment motions.263 
C. A Case for More Rules? 
As may be apparent from the previous section, it would appear that the use of rules can lead 
to many of their hypothesized benefits and, if done on certain conditions, can do so while 
mitigating rules’ vices. Ultimately, being nearer to the “rigid rules” end of the “rigid rules-
untrammelled discretion” continuum appears preferable when determining the availability of a 
particular procedural mechanism. In essence, these are instances where (slightly nuanced) rules 
are unlikely to be so crude so as to occasion injustice that cannot be reasonably mitigated.264 
1. Presence of the Virtues of Rules 
There are reasons for suspecting that rules would be particularly appropriate in this context. 
Indeed, rules – particularly rules with some but not a great deal of discretion, suggested as future 
 
259  Chapter Three at 164-170. 
260  Ibid at 176. 
261  Chapter Four at 238. 
262  Ibid at 199. 
263  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
264  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 1022. 
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paths for the laws analyzed in Chapters One, Two, and Three – tend to be particularly appropriate 
when the law-maker (as distinct from the law-applier265) is specialized and knowledgeable of the 
precedents of judicial interpretation.266 This leads to the rule being well formulated, and mitigates 
the consequences of a crude rule.267 This appears to be the case with the Civil Rules Committee 
and the judges who interpret the Rules.  
Sunstein also suggests that rules are particularly appropriate in the presence of factors such as 
those relevant to determining the availability of dispositive procedural mechanisms:  
a) the error rate in their use is relatively low: this appears to be the case for the rules 
investigated in Chapters One,268 Two,269 and, to a lesser extent, Three (and to the extent 
it is not true in Three, it is because the current law has been poorly formulated270); 
b) the negative consequences for rulelessness is high: which appears the case for the matters 
discussed in Chapters One271 and Three,272 especially post-intervention – Rule 2.1’s 
novelty makes the costs of rulelessness more difficult to calculate, though one can 
observe how the previous regime put parties in difficult situations;273 and 
c) the number of cases is large:274 manifestly the case in terms of the availability of 
procedural avenues, a question that affects practically every civil case.275  
 
265  Whose expertise may favour a standard: this is one of the rationales for deference to administrative decision-
makers: see, e.g., Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 54. 
266  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 1005-1006. 
267  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 191 at 1235. 
268  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 101-102. 
269  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 260, 266, 268. 
270  Chapter Three at, inter alia, 140-142. 
271  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 101-102. 
272  Chapter Three, Part III. 
273  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 248. 
274  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 1004 notes the importance of the principle. 
275  As a matter of fact, every case has procedural and substantive components. See also MacKenzie SJ, supra note 
5, noting the number of cases where summary judgment alone is sought. 
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To this list should be added the costs – pecuniary and non-pecuniary – of departing from rules,276 
and the severity of the consequences of a discord between a rule’s purpose and application. These 
also both favour the use of rules in determining the availability of procedural mechanisms. The 
costs of determining whether it is appropriate to use a dispositive motion prevent the court from 
dealing with the merits of the case before it and numerous others.277 Moreover, a rule prescribing 
the availability of a particular procedural vehicle seldom affects the ability of a litigant to obtain 
the remedy he or she is seeking (though it frequently affects the costs of doing so). A mismatch 
between a rule’s purpose and its application therefore has relatively manageable consequences. 
2. Manageability of the Vices of Rules 
Standards certainly mitigate the consequences of rules’ over-and-under-inclusiveness. But in 
terms of the availability of procedural mechanisms, there are reasons to believe these concerns are 
not as consequential. As noted, the consequences of over-and-under-inclusiveness are less severe: 
the ability to access a particular procedure is unlikely to be dispositive of a person’s ability to 
access a remedy. Determining the availability of a procedural vehicle in a particular case is also 
likely to cause significant expense without getting to the merits of a decision – rules, in this case, 
can mitigate the costs of figuring out what procedure to follow.278 As noted, procedure per se does 
not affect what is at stake for litigants: there will almost always (rare exceptions may include a 
limitation period) be an opportunity for an individual to raise his or her claim or defence elsewhere. 
For example, the consequences of the definition of an interlocutory appeal as of right being under-
inclusive is the need to apply for leave to appeal: hardly the end of the world. This distinguishes 
from areas where the substance of what is being regulated is constantly changing, where Julia 
 
276  Sunstein notes this is appropriate too: supra note 205 at 1002, citing Mathews v Eldridge (1976), 424 US 319. 
277  Chase, et al, supra note 106 at 19-20. 
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Black notes standards can be particularly useful.279 This remaining discretion to have an 
interlocutory appeal through obtaining leave would not defeat the purpose of the rule, which is not 
to disallow interlocutory appeals but to make them exceptional. 
3. A Cautionary Note 
Despite suggesting that much of procedural law can move away from rulelessness, it is 
certainly possible to put on too much of a straightjacket. Rules can have an adverse impact on 
vulnerable parties who were unlikely to have had the necessary power to have had a say in creating 
a rule.280 This concern is real but cuts both ways, as a wealthy person is likelier to be able to afford 
a lawyer who can argue a standard should be interpreted in his or her favour.281 
Admittedly, standards’ benefits may be more difficult to quantify than those of rules.282 But 
that should not lead us to not ask hard questions about whether those benefits can be outweighed 
by their more readily apparent costs. Only one respondent in Chapter Four thought more flexibility 
in the law would help facilitate access to justice compared to six who felt the opposite.283 In the 
three rules analyzed, perhaps only a few cases could have benefitted from a less determinate 
standard. The costs of indeterminate standards, on the other hand, are more certain and were mostly 
worth avoiding. Ultimately, clear rules to eliminate arguments over the availability of a procedure 
appear, at least to the extent seen to date, to have had minimal impacts on coming to substantive 
justice or the perception thereof, and noticeable facilitation of access to the courts and thus access 
to justice. 
 
 
279  Black 2010, supra note 203 at 12. 
280  Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1751. 
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4. Practical Suggestions  
What should such rules look like? They could start with suggestions such as those given in 
earlier chapters, especially Chapter Three, which proposes a clear definition of the types of orders 
that can be appealed as of right, with all other orders requiring leave to be appealed.284 But Chapter 
One similarly suggested narrowing discretion for Ontario to assume jurisdiction over an action.285 
Such rules could also include another recent reform to Ontario civil procedure, which added an 
automatic rule for dismissal of an action for delay if it is not set down for trial within five years.286 
While this presumption can be amended upon order, this was also motivated by a desire to create 
a simpler rule.287 Parties are now clearly incentivized to resolve actions within that time period, 
with this now being considered an acceptable maximum amount of time to resolve an action, with 
it being presumptively dismissed for delay if not resolved in that time period.288 Rules could also 
be seen in the realm of professional conduct, where new rules could seek to enforce principles 
such as proportionality and civility that further access to justice.289 These suggestions are tentative, 
but they accord with the theoretical hypotheses regarding the appropriateness of rules, and seem 
to complement what the data from the earlier chapters show. 
To conclude this section, it must be remembered that the rules-standards debate is not a new 
one, and viewing it as a catchall solution to achieving access to justice would be a mistake. In 
1975, Kennedy noted that many areas of American law had gone from one end of the continuum 
 
284  Chapter Three at 176. 
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to the other and back again, trying to strike the appropriate balance.290 But he also noted what 
works best in practice would vary according to what is at stake.291 Kaplow has suggested, and 
Sunstein has endorsed, a context-specific inquiry into the likely errors and abuses on both sides.292 
So what is at stake in civil procedure? This includes, at the very least, the ability to efficiently 
guide a process through the courts with reasonable promptness and minimal financial costs.293 This 
is in addition to the need for predictability and perceptions of fairness.294 Guiding the case to the 
right result is also particularly important. The first three chapters of this dissertation all suggest 
that haggling over the availability of particular procedures is seldom helpful to fulfilling these 
purposes. Accordingly, when prescribing the availability of particular, potentially dispositive, 
litigation tactics, adopting legal tests closer to the “rules” rather than the “standards” end of the 
rules-standards spectrum tends to realize the virtues of rules, without many of their vices. Insofar 
as critics have argued that excessive reliance on standards leads to needless litigation,295 this 
concern appears warranted. While this dissertation certainly does not argue for a rejection of all 
discretionary standards, much of Ontario procedural law appears to have prescribed standards to a 
fault. Rules can advance access to the courts – and access to justice. 
IV) ACCESS TO JUSTICE OUTSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM 
This dissertation has expressed hope that civil procedure reform can achieve real – if narrow 
– effects in improving access to justice, largely through simplification of procedural law. It is also 
 
290  Duncan Kennedy, supra note 207 at 1704. 
291  Ibid. 
292  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 1012, citing Kaplow 1992, supra note 230 at 559-60. 
293  E.g., Farrow 2014, supra note 4 at 978-979; Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, 
Scale and Ambitions” in Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century 
– The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 68-73; Hryniak, supra note 3 at paras 
29-33; Farrow 2012, supra note 9. 
294  See also Bamford, et al, supra note 75. 
295  As Côté and Rowe JJ wrote in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 SCR 398 at para 
111, criticizing the majority for adopting a test they viewed as “an unprincipled and open-ended approach […] 
that creates a recipe for litigation”. 
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clear that many types of disputes require legal assistance that no amount of tinkering with 
procedural law can resolve. Some cases should never have come to fruition, as systemic injustices 
resulted in the legal issue unnecessarily arising.296 In other cases, the issue may be how lawyers 
are paid, whether through perverse incentives to bill as many hours as possible,297 or delivering 
work where costs exceed value.298 In still others, there may simply be no economical way to 
deliver legal services.299 Responses to these situations could include the government taking on a 
role similar to that it takes on in criminal procedure, providing counsel.300 Opinions on such 
matters are split, from suggesting that it is bad policy301 to that it is constitutionally mandated.302 
Civil procedure per se would appear to have little to add here, apart from needing to be flexible 
enough (again, demonstrating how standards can be preferable to rules) to be fair to self-
represented litigants.303 This dissertation acknowledges the importance of these conversations. 
There are four other areas, however, where civil procedure reform appears adjacent to 
potential institutional changes that can make a difference in facilitating access to justice, and where 
 
296  Farrow 2014, supra note 4 at 980; Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access 
to Civil & Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change” (Ottawa: Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil 
and Family Matters, October 2013) [“Roadmap for Change”] at 7-8. 
297  MacKenzie 2013, supra note 103. 
298  Hadfield, supra note 102. 
299  See, e.g., Iain Ramsay, “The Alternative Consumer Credit Market and Financial Sector: Regulatory Issues and 
Approaches” (2001) 35 CBLJ 326 at 401. 
300  See, e.g., Lorne Sossin, “The Public Interest, Professionalism, and Pro Bono Public” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 131 at 141, discussing a Canadian Bar Association attempt to have such a right acknowledged in British 
Columbia. This is also discussed in Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 39 at 720. 
301  See, e.g., the dissenting judgment of Rothstein J in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 3 SCR 31, noting the need for public policy trade-offs in 
this regard. For additional criticism of the majority, see, e.g.: Asher Honickman, “Looking for Rights in the All 
the Wrong Places: A Troubling Decision from the Supreme Court” Advocates for the Rules of Law blog (30 
October 2014), online: <http://www.ruleoflaw.ca/looking-for-rights-in-the-all-the-wrong-places-the-supreme-
courts-troubling-decision-in-trial-lawyers-association/>; Asher Honickman, “Day Three: Asher Honickman”, 
Double Aspect (29 December 2018), online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/12/27/day-three-asher-
honickman/> (part of Double Aspect’s “12 Days of Christmas”). 
302  Sossin, supra note 300 at 141 and Kennedy & Sossin, supra note 39 at 720, discussing a Canadian Bar 
Association attempt to have such a right acknowledged in British Columbia. 
303  See, e.g., NSRLP Self-Reps, supra note 17; Wouters, supra note 135. 
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this dissertation’s conclusions can make contributions. First, the ability of technology to 
complement civil procedure in ensuring the prompt and inexpensive resolution of matters is 
considered. Second, the lack of transparency in how Ontario procedural law is made is raised. 
Third, the potential for judicial specialization in areas of law is analyzed. Fourth and finally, it is 
queried whether it would be prudent to have a single judge case manage all aspects of a particular 
case, and whether more active judging would generally be prudent. 
A. Courts and Technology 
What is a “fair hearing” can vary according to the circumstances.304 So why can a fair hearing 
not take place via technology without mandating individuals travel to a courtroom? This would 
eliminate the need for travel time, and reduce the need to expend resources on courtrooms, if some 
hearings need not have a literal courtroom, but can be electronically conducted from a judge’s 
chamber.305 Accepting electronic filings and allowing affidavits to be commissioned electronically 
– other matters adjacent to civil procedure if not civil procedure per se – are also “low-hanging 
fruit” in this respect.306 Two respondents in Chapter Four viewed that failure to use technology in 
this way, including the inability to e-file documents, as an access to justice impediment.307 
Lack of face-to-face time creates other problems, especially for self-represented litigants, who 
are likely to particularly benefit from the opportunity to explain their case to a judge, in person.308 
 
304  This is recognized in administrative law, as famously noted in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
305  Encouraged by the Supreme Court in multijurisdictional class actions in Endean v British Columbia, 2016 
SCC 42, [2016] 2 SCR 162; Christopher P Naudie & Gerard J Kennedy, “Ontario Court of Appeal Divided on 
Permissibility of Hearings Outside Ontario in Multi-Jurisdictional Class Actions” (August 2015) 4 CALR 33. 
306  See Dane Bullerwell’s tweet on December 4, 2018 at 7:04 pm EST: “When legal futurists talk about lawyers’ 
use of AI, I’m struck by how different their world is from mine. I just spent two hours driving because a jail 
didn’t have a commissioner for oaths who could commission an affidavit. Could we pick THAT low-hanging 
fruit first, please?” 
307  Chapter Four at 232. 
308  Suzanne Bouclin, Jena McGill & Amy Salyzyn, “Mobile and Web-Based Legal Apps: Opportunities, Risks and 
Information Gaps” (April 28, 2017). Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, Fall 2017, Forthcoming; Ottawa 
Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2017-17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960207. 
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This thus need not be the norm for steps that may dismiss a party’s claim (unless they fall within 
the ambit of Rule 2.1). But if a party feels it will not be disadvantaged, by participating remotely 
for most procedural matters, it would seem inappropriate to obligate an in-person appearance. 
Even regarding dispositive matters, parties could consent to a hearing by way of technology if they 
do not feel the benefits of in-court time are worth the cost. The earlier discussion of the proper 
way to conceptualize proportionality is directly germane here. Recent practice directives at the 
Superior Court in Toronto have sought to incorporate these ideas – promising news.309 
B. Increased Transparency in Making the Rules310 
The lack of transparency in how Ontario makes its procedural law became particularly salient 
while researching the history of Rule 2.1 in the context of Chapter Two. Like all of Ontario’s 
Rules, Rule 2.1 was enacted pursuant to a decision of the Civil Rules Committee, a body created 
by the Courts of Justice Act.311 While Rule 2.1’s purpose and rationale has been commented upon 
in reported decisions,312 it would nonetheless have been helpful to understand what the drafters of 
the Rule envisioned when recommending its adoption. While the views of individual committee 
members are not determinative, just as the views of individual legislators are not determinative in 
interpreting legislation, their views are nonetheless informative – just as the views of individual 
legislators are informative regarding the meaning of legislation.313  
 
309  “Practice Advisory Concerning Electronic Documents in Commercial List Proceedings” (effective 11 February 
2019), online: <http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/commercial/electronic-
documents/>. 
310  This section of this dissertation is inspired by Gerard J Kennedy, “Accountability and Transparency in Canadian 
Civil Justice”, Accountability e Transparência da Justiça Civil - Uma Perspectiva Comparada (São Paulo: 
Thomson Reuters, 2019) [“IAPL Paper”]. 
311  CJA, supra note 53, s 66(3); Osborne, supra note 5, c 17.  
312  See, e.g., Chalupnicek v Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa, 2016 ONSC 2787, 2016 CarswellOnt 6466 (SCJ), 
aff’d 2017 ONSC 1278, 2017 CarswellOnt 272 (Div Ct) at para 3. 
313  Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2014) at § 23.81, quoting 
Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 35, which in turn quotes R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 
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295 
 
 
 The rationale for the Rule, therefore, would likely be best understood through minutes of the 
Civil Rules Committee meetings that led to its enactment.314 Such minutes exist, and are apparently 
detailed.315 However, they are not publicly available. The Civil Rules Committee’s secretary 
declined a request to see them for discrete academic purposes. Despite requesting reconsideration, 
her decision is understandable given the policy that the minutes are for internal use only.  
 This predicament could have been potentially circumvented by requesting to see the minutes 
pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.316 However, created under 
the CJA, the Civil Rules Committee is not part of the Ministry of the Attorney General317 and it is 
unclear that an access to information request pursuant to FIPPA for the Civil Rules Committee’s 
minutes would be allowed. Unlike the Ministry of the Attorney General, the Civil Rules 
Committee is not mentioned on the list of government entities to which FIPPA applies on the 
Government of Ontario’s website.318 The Civil Rules Committee could also plausibly be viewed 
as analogous to actors within and documents emanating from the judicial branch of government to 
which FIPPA does not apply: judges’ and masters’ notes;319 judges’ performance evaluations;320 
the Ontario Judicial Council;321 and proceedings relating to complaints against judges and 
 
314  Given the inability to access the Civil Rules Committee minutes, one alternatively could have elected to 
interview members of the Civil Rules Committee, asking them questions such as: 
• Could you explain why the Civil Rules Committee recommended the adoption of Rule 2.1? 
• Where did opposition to Rule 2.1 come from? 
• Is there anything in the implementation of Rule 2.1 that you did not foresee? 
But getting an appropriate sample seemed difficult. And given the peripheral nature of this, it was ultimately 
decided not to proceed. 
315  Osborne, supra note 5 at c 17. 
316  RSO 1990, c F31 [“FIPPA”]. 
317  See the Ministry of the Attorney General’s website: 
https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/civil/civil_rules_committee.php. 
318  As of December 11, 2017: https://www.ontario.ca/page/directory-institutions. 
319  FIPPA, supra note 316, s 65(3). 
320  Ibid, s 65(4). 
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masters.322 Admittedly, nothing determinative was found suggesting that FIPPA does not apply to 
the Civil Rules Committee. And given its specific statutory enactment, it could best be considered 
part of the executive, rather than judicial, branch of government. The Federal Court has recently 
held this to be the case for the Canadian Judicial Council, in its role disciplining judges.323 
However, using FIPPA to seek to see the Civil Rules Committee’s minutes carried a considerable 
risk of being futile, and in any event was peripheral in discerning the purpose of Rule 2.1. 
 This secrecy exists despite Coulter Osborne (former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario) 
having recommended that there be consideration of making the Civil Rules Committee’s minutes 
publicly available in his seminal report on access to justice after his retirement from the Court of 
Appeal.324 Many of his recommendations were enacted, as discussed throughout this dissertation. 
Admittedly, Mr. Osborne was equivocal in this recommendation. In this vein, his views on the 
minutes can be distinguished from his unequivocal recommendations that the composition of the 
committee and the agendas for its meetings be made publicly available. While he thought making 
the minutes publicly available would increase transparency, he recognized a risk that members of 
the committee may be more reluctant to speak freely if they knew that they were being recorded 
and their statements could become public.325  
Secrecy is often used to preserve unaccountable power326 and, ultimately, the secrecy 
surrounding the Civil Rules Committee’s meetings does not seem necessary to preserve judicial 
independence. The Federal Court recently held that this lack of necessity to preserve judicial 
independence should result in the Canadian Judicial Council’s decisions not being immunized 
 
322  Ibid, s 65(5.1). 
323  Girouard v Canada, 2018 FC 865, 2018 CarswellNat 5089 [“Girouard”]. 
324  Osborne, supra note 5 at c 17. 
325  Ibid. 
326  E.g., Maureen Webb, “Essential Liberty or a Little Temporary Safety? The Review of the Canadian Anti-
terrorism Act” (2006) 51 CLQ 53 at, e.g., 85. 
297 
 
 
from judicial review.327 Nor is this secrecy apparent in other common law jurisdictions. In the 
United States, for instance, the Rules Enabling Act prescribes a much more open procedure for the 
Supreme Court of the United States promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.328 
Similarly, in New South Wales, the Uniform Rules Committee was designed to be a mechanism 
in which stakeholders may make public recommendations on procedural law, for the purpose of 
public accountability.329 One hopes that the Civil Rules Committee will eventually consider how 
to respond to Mr. Osborne’s recommendations. Given that the Civil Rules Committee is a quasi-
legislative body,330 the secrecy surrounding its actions is particularly problematic. 
C. Judicial Specialization in Areas of Law 
Chapter One hypothesized that it would be a worthwhile experiment to have a select group of 
judges work on jurisdiction motions to facilitate their resolution.331 Chapter Two posited that 
having a limited group of judges develop Rule 2.1 jurisprudence has streamlined case law and 
increased access to justice.332 Chapter Three suggested that having a group of Superior Court 
judges with specializations in administrative law hear judicial reviews may be preferable to the 
current status quo of the Divisional Court.333  
While tentative about all of these possibilities, judicial specialization to facilitate access to 
justice is not a new suggestion. The virtues of specialization, particularly in family law334 and 
 
327  Girouard, supra note 323. 
328  ch 651, PubL 73–415, 48 Stat 1064, enacted June 19, 1934, 28 USC § 2072. 
329  Natalina Nheu & Hugh McDonald, By the people, for the people? Community participation in law reform, vol 
6 (Sydney, NSW: Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, November 2010) at 79-80. 
330  Its power to make the Rules, supra note 2, so long as they do not conflict with provincial legislation, is explained 
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331  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 105. 
332  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 270. 
333  Chapter Three at 180-184. 
334  Freeda Steel, “The Unified Family Court – Ten Years Later” (1996) 24 Man LJ 381; Nicholas Bala, Rachel 
Birnbaum & Justice Donna Martinson, “One Judge for One Family: Differentiated Case Management for 
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commercial litigation,335 have been noted for years. It may be time to act on them. Dangers of 
specialization are present, to be sure, especially if judges become territorial and indicate lack of 
reception to new ideas when they are only one of a few judges working in an area. Though this is 
an issue that already exists in locations where there is only one judge covering a large area: for 
example, Kenora, Ontario has only a single Superior Court judge.336 And the risk can be partially 
addressed by obliging judges to take turns specializing in areas, allowing most superior court 
judges (at least in urban centres where this is feasible) to have at least two specializations. Though 
not at the core of this dissertation, this concluding suggestion regarding specialization seems 
worthy of further consideration, especially given its prevalence in civilian legal traditions.337 
D. Case Management and More Active Judging 
Historically, the model common law judge – particularly at the trial level – was meant to be 
nothing more than a passive listener. But the aftermath of the 2010 Amendments suggests that this 
model may be outdated. More active judging and case management can facilitate access to justice 
– something shown not only by Ontario’s experience, but also trends elsewhere. Regarding 
Ontario’s experience, Chapter Two of this dissertation in particular analyzed Rule 2.1’s role in 
introducing new potential for more active judging through the availability of sua sponte dismissals. 
Rule 2.1 has led to increased resolution of actions on their merits, with few if any problems for 
procedural or substantive justice.338 When the court has used the Rule on its own initiative, there 
has been only increased resolution of claims on their merits more quickly, without any unnecessary 
 
335  Warren K Winkler, “The Vanishing Trial” (Autumn 2008) 27(2) Advocates’ Soc J 3 at 4, cited in Kennedy 
Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 106. 
336  Helen Burnett, “Kenora left without a full-time judge” The Law Times (23 April 2007), online: 
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337  Chase, et al, supra note 106 at Chapter Three. 
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delay. Concerns about coming to inaccurate results appear not to have been born out.339 If 
anything, courts should be more proactive in using the Rule.340 More generally, the ability of 
judges to prescribe procedure through summary judgment is viewed by commentators such as 
MacKenzie341 – and many but not all respondents in Chapter Four342 – as a facilitator of access to 
justice.  
Many but not all respondents in Chapter Four also expressed the view that trial judges should, 
if anything, be more proactive in using their case management powers.343 In this vein, the previous 
subsection’s suggestions regarding specialization in law and procedure can also extend to the facts 
of particular cases. This, like specialization in areas of law, may not be an issue related to civil 
procedure reform per se. Rather, it reflects the wisdom of having a single judge become familiar 
with all matters of a case as it goes through the system. In other words, a judge should hear all 
aspects of a case absent good reason, and retain the ability to decide when sufficient procedure has 
occurred so that a decision can be rendered. This is already present in Ontario in some areas – the 
United Family Court seeks to ensure that a single case has a single judge,344 while the class actions 
list in Toronto also aims to have a single judge supervise all procedural elements of an action.345 
 
339  Ibid at, e.g., 266. 
340  Ibid at 259. 
341  MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
342  Chapter Four at 225-226. 
343  Ibid at 235.  
344  Bala, Birnbaum & Martinson, supra note 334. 
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about more than frivolous claims” Financial Post (26 July 2015), online: 
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Drug Mart Inc, 2012 ONSC 5563, [2012] OJ No 4659 (SCJ)), Conway J (see, e.g., Clark (Litigation 
guardian of) v Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1283, 2014 CarswellOnt 2725 (SCJ)), Belobaba J (see, e.g., 
Goldsmith v National Bank of Canada, 2015 ONSC 2746, 126 OR (3d) 191 (SCJ)), and Horkins J 
(see, e.g., Sagharian (Litigation Guardian of) v Ontario (Minister of Education), 2012 ONSC 3478, 
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Even outside the United Family Court, family law proceedings in Ontario are frequently case 
managed, with increased efficiency.346 This ensures that the parties have a decision-maker 
intimately familiar with their case, which would seem to increase the likelihood of a just result. 
The Superior Court’s “Commercial List” in Toronto is another area where judges become familiar 
not only with the law but the facts.347 This is in line with New York State establishing a 
“Commercial Part” of its courts in which some judges take only commercial cases with a certain 
value.348 
The use of such practices in areas such as commercial litigation can be criticized for being the 
product of wealthy litigants convincing the courts to amend practice to turn to their wealthy clients’ 
interests, and then not act proportionally in any individual case.349 In this sense, Toronto’s 
“Commercial List” can be criticized for being gold-plated justice while the types of cases that do 
not end up on the Commercial List languish. But this does not detract from the underlying 
soundness of the policy, or why this practice cannot be exported to other areas. Indeed, promising 
first steps in this regard have been taken in areas such as class actions and family law. This is also 
a more efficient use of resources, as a new judge does not need to become familiar with the facts 
of a case at each individual stage.350 Karakatsanis J suggested that this was sound practice in 
Hyrniak in cases of unsuccessful summary judgment motions.351  
 
346  See, e.g., the famous saga of Eleanor McCain and Jeffrey Melanson, as described in the decisions of Horkins J 
in McCain v Melanson, 2017 ONSC 916, 2017 CarswellOnt 1641 (SCJ) at paras 72-73 and McCain v 
Melanson, 2017 ONSC 4603 (SCJ) [“McCain #2”]. 
347  Winkler, supra note 335. 
348  See, e.g., Denny Chin, “Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective” 
(2012) 57 NY L Sch L Rev 671 at fn 19, citing Jed Rakoff, “Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an 
Age of Economic Expertise” (2012) 17 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 4 and Robert L Haig, “Can New York’s New 
Commercial Division Resolve Business Disputes as Well as Anyone?” (1996) 13 Touro L Rev 191. 
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Other jurisdictions – such as a British Columbia – prescribe that a single judge is to hear all 
interlocutory and final matters in a single action.352 This is common in many American states such 
as New York.353 While perhaps not an aspect of civil procedure per se, this is an institutional 
matter adjacent to civil procedure. In early 2019, Ontario announced that it was launching a pilot 
project in this respect: promising news.354 Much of English civil procedure has moved away from 
having the parties control the proceedings to having the courts do so.355 Though parties still control 
the vast majority of procedure in Ontario, slightly moving away from this appears to have been a 
positive development, and Neil Andrews suggests the same is true in England and Wales.356 
Similarly, more active judging has been used in the American federal courts primarily through 
Rule 16.357 Many states have enacted similar rules.358  
This role of more active judging is apparent in civilian legal traditions. In many civil law 
jurisdictions, for instance, there is no process analogous to common law discovery with the court 
controlling the gathering of evidence.359 This is not to suggest that the common law’s virtues of a 
dispassionate judge who listens to the best version of each case from both parties cannot also be a 
true help in the effort to facilitate access to justice.360 Rather, it reflects that common law courts 
 
352  Walker SJ, supra note 5 at 724-725, citing Supreme Court of British Columbia, Practice Direction: Case 
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should not be scared to learn valuable lessons from civilian legal traditions.361 Ultimately, these 
mostly positive effects of increasingly active judging could be seen to support the hypothesis that 
civilian and common law traditions, over time, tend to converge in their procedures.362 
To be sure, the risks of more active judging are not zero. The notion that a common law judge 
should remain relatively passive is frequently defended as necessary to ensure that the judge does 
not lose his or her impartiality, or the perception thereof.363 Stuart Budd, which framed Chapter 
One, is an example of where a judge understandably lost that perception.364 There was a similar 
case cited in Chapter Two where a trial judge appeared overzealous in the use of Rule 2.1.365 And 
several, though a minority of, respondents in Chapter Four viewed more active judging as leading 
to unnecessary and expensive interactions with the court.366 These are real trade-offs. But with 
respect, they appear to be less problematic than the more plentiful benefits. And they also 
complement trends seen elsewhere. 
V) TRANSSYSTEMIC POLLINATION 
This final section seeks to briefly suggest how this dissertation could contribute to access to 
justice conversations in family law and criminal law, which have important distinguishing 
characteristics but still many commonalities. This is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of 
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these issues, or even a comprehensive introduction. But it would seem remiss to exclude 
consideration of how this dissertation could assist discussions of access to justice in these contexts. 
A. Family Law 
This dissertation has not generally sought to comment on family law procedures. Family and 
civil litigation have different purposes, and correspondingly different procedures. This is reflected 
in: Chapter One’s analysis of jurisdiction motions, which excluded family law given the different 
issues at stake;367 Chapter Two’s discussion of Rule 2.1, which the Ontario Court of Appeal has 
held to only be applicable to family litigation in particular ways;368 and Chapter Three’s discussion 
of interlocutory appeals, given the different appeal routes in family law in Ontario.369 Much like 
the presumption of innocence in criminal law, the wide-reaching principle of “best interests of the 
child” permeates much of family law.370 The urgency of many family law matters means that all 
procedural protections that would be ideal cannot always be granted.371 At the same time, there 
are other family law matters with such great stakes that greater procedural protections are not only 
called for but also constitutionalized – such as the right to a state-funded lawyer in certain child 
protection proceedings.372 In other words, family law procedural protections can – and should – 
be both broader and narrower than those in civil litigation depending on specific details of cases. 
But what is at stake frequently varies. Custody of children – particularly at-risk children – is 
not all, or even most, of the purview of family law. Indeed, much of family law concerns division 
 
367  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 87, citing Martha Bailey, “Judicial Jurisdiction Rules for Family Law 
Matters” (2016) (Paper presented to the Symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, Toronto, Ontario, 21 
October 2016) [unpublished]. 
368  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21 at 257, citing Frick, supra note 152 at para 21. 
369  Chapter Three at 168-169. 
370  See, e.g., Donna Bouchard, “The Three-Parent Decision: A Case Commentary on A.A. v B.B.” (2007) 70 Sask L 
Rev 459 at 475. 
371  E.g., Nicholas Bala, “The Charter of Rights & Family Law in Canada: A New Era” (2000) 18 CLFQ 373 at 409. 
372  New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46.  
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of property, albeit in the family context.373 When it comes to matters such as these, or varying of 
support, or appellate practice, or not infrequent abusive steps taken by warring parties,374 many 
principles from civil litigation seem apposite, particularly regarding the need to minimize financial 
costs and maximize speed and simplicity.  
One example seems particularly apposite and has already been noted. Chapter Two noted how 
the Court of Appeal, in Frick v Frick,375 cautioned against bringing Rule 2.1 into the family law 
context. There were and are sound statutory interpretation reasons for this, given the wording of 
the Family Law Rules vis-à-vis the Rules of Civil Procedure.376 But it is important that this not be 
taken too far. Superior courts have inherent authority to control their own processes377 and in this 
sense, the principles animating Rule 2.1 would appear applicable in the family law context. Myers 
J’s analysis in Purcaru is convincing.378 
With respect to the Court of Appeal, insofar as it concluded, in Frick, that Rule 2.1 is not 
applicable, even by analogy, in the family law context, this conclusion may be too rigid. Frick 
only addressed Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules – not Rule 1(7), which holds that:  
If these rules do not cover a matter […] the practice shall be decided by analogy to these 
rules, by reference to the Courts of Justice Act and the Act governing the case and, if the 
court considers it appropriate, by reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.379  
 
Given the overall success of Rule 2.1, one hopes that Frick will not prevent future cases from 
incorporating principles from Rule 2.1 case law into the family law context through Rule 1(7) of 
the Family Law Rules in appropriate – but likely rare – circumstances. 
 
373  This is a hotly contested area of law: see, e.g., Quebec v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61. 
374  It must be remembered that this is not incompatible with a legitimate grievance: see, e.g., Belway v Lalande-
Weber, 2017 ABCA 108, 2017 CarswellAlta 575, per Martin JA (as she then was). 
375  Frick, supra note 152. 
376  Ibid at paras 19-20.  
377  E.g., MacMillan Bloedel, supra note 153 at paras 18, 33. 
378  Purcaru, supra note 154 at para 15. 
379  Frick, supra note 152 vis-à-vis Family Law Rules, O Reg 114/99, Rule 1(7).  
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While civil and family litigation cannot be conflated, the danger of conflation should not lead 
to artificial separation. This is not a novel observation – indeed, the National Action Committee 
on Access to Justice investigates both civil and family matters.380 But whether discussing abusive 
litigation,381 jurisdiction disputes,382 or appellate practice,383 this dissertation evidences underlying 
access to justice-related principles present in both the civil and family law contexts. Those who 
practise family law should seek to learn what civil practice says in these areas. 
B. Criminal Law 
Unlike family law, discussions of access to justice in criminal law frequently take place in an 
entirely different conversation, with little overlap even in areas where issues are common to 
both.384 This is despite the difficulty in obtaining speedy justice in both systems. The costs and 
especially the delay in criminal procedure have been repeatedly noted in recent years, whether in 
the media,385 academic commentary,386 or, most notably, judicial decisions.387 These concerns 
animated the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in R v Jordan, which imposed strict time limits.388 
Jordan may have been a blunt instrument subject to understandable criticism.389 However, it was 
certainly prompted by legitimate concerns.390 
 
380  Roadmap for Change, supra note 296. 
381  Purcaru, supra note 154. 
382  Kennedy Jurisdiction, supra note 79 at 87, citing Bailey, supra note 367. 
383  Chapter Three at 168-169, noting the overlap of this issue in civil and family litigation in British Columbia in 
particular. 
384  The imbalance between prioritizing criminal and civil litigation is noted in, e.g., DA Rollie Thompson, “Legal 
Aid Without Conflict: Nova Scotia” (1998) 16 Windsor YB Access Just 306. 
385  Laura Kane, “From murder to sex assault: More than 200 cases tossed over court delays” The Globe and Mail 
(6 July 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/more-than-200-cases-tossed-over-
delays-since-top-courts-jordan-decision/article35572565/>. 
386  Paciocco, supra note 28. 
387  R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631 [“Jordan”]. 
388  Jordan, ibid. 
389  See, e.g., Keara Lundigran, “R v Jordan: A Ticking Time Bomb” (2018) 41 Man LJ 113. 
390  Jordan, supra note 387 at, e.g., paras 40-42. 
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To some extent, keeping discussions of civil and criminal procedure separate is 
understandable – the stakes are higher in criminal law, where an individual’s liberty is at stake, as 
is his or her reputation as a non-criminal.391 As such, the right to a criminal trial in a reasonable 
time is guaranteed in both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms392 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.393  
At the same time, the term “McJustice”, introduced above, originated in the criminal context 
and is a cautionary term noting the dangers in emphasizing the quantum of cases addressed rather 
than quality of outcomes.394 This concern is prevalent in both criminal and civil litigation. As such, 
criminal and civil procedure can almost certainly learn from each other. Both systems suffer from 
an epidemic of delay and excessive cost, and some of that can likely be attributed to wasteful use 
of court time. While the desire to avoid substantive injustices must be weighed greater in the 
criminal law realm – and remember that it should be given paramount weight in the civil litigation 
realm as well – actors in the justice system should think carefully about whether particular steps 
actually further a just and timely result. Three suggestions from earlier in this dissertation could 
 
391  There are asymmetrical consequences between a “wrongful acquittal” and a “wrongful conviction”. While the 
former is indeed an “error” in terms of achieving substantive justice, the consequences of the latter are much 
more severe – both for the wrongfully convicted person and society’s perception of the justice system. This is 
reflected in Blackstone’s formulation that “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer” (Plaxton, supra note 64). This maxim is so ancient and useful that it would seem wise to keep some 
version of it – when push comes to shove, even critical commentators will concede this (see, e.g., Laura I 
Applebaum, “A Tragedy of Errors: Blackstone, Procedural Asymmetry, and Criminal Justice” (2014) 128 
Harv L Rev F 91). After all, “Blackstone’s maxim” has even earlier origins, being seen in the Pentateuch 
(Genesis 18:32) and the work of Maimonides and Fortescue (Bruce A MacFarlane, QC, “Wrongful 
Convictions: Is It Proper for the Crown to Root Around, Looking for Miscarriages of Justice?” (2012) 36 Man 
LJ 1 at fn 80, citing Alexander Volokh, “Guilty Men” (1997) 146 U Pa L Rev 173 at 178, 182); Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, The Karamozov Brothers, Ignat Avsey, trans (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2008) at 402ff, 
querying about the morality of sitting in judgment of another human as a criminal. 
392  Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [“Charter”], s 11(b). 
393  999 UNTS 172, art 14(5): “Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal.” Cited in Chapter Three at 134 and Gerard J Kennedy, “Persisting 
Uncertainties in Appellate Jurisdiction at the Supreme Court” (2013) 100 CR (6th) 96 at 101. 
394  See, e.g., DiLuca, supra note 23. 
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be of assistance in speeding up criminal procedure: 1) increased written testimony; 2) eliminating 
needless interlocutory steps; and 3) court mergers. 
1. Increased Written Testimony 
Bill C-75, the federal government’s primary legislative response to Jordan, was subject to 
significant criticism, especially by the criminal defence bar.395 Much of this is understandable, but 
much of it may also be unnecessary resistance to change. For instance, one of the criticisms of Bill 
C-75 is giving police officers a prima facie ability to testify by way of affidavit.396 Singling out 
police officers as a unique category of witnesses in this respect is likely inappropriate, suggesting 
their evidence is inherently reliable – something there is good reason to doubt.397  
Having said that, it is worth having a serious discussion about whether all evidence in a 
criminal trial needs to be adduced by live evidence – many matters likely do not require this. This 
dissertation suggests that proceeding in writing can speed up matters with minimal effects on the 
appearance of fairness.398 Given that the appearance of fairness must be given even greater weight 
in the criminal law realm, dispensing with oral evidence should be done with even more reluctance. 
There still appears no reason in principle to prevent particular witnesses in criminal trials giving 
evidence without the need for in-court testimony. This appears to work well in civil litigation, 
where even trials can have certain witnesses testify in writing.399 This is particularly promising 
 
395  See, e.g., Kent W Roach, “The Peter Khill/Jon Styres Case: Jury Selection and Self-Defence” (2018) 66 CLQ 1 
[“Roach Urgent”] at 2.  
396  See, e.g., Stephanie Heyens, “How Bill C-75 fundamentally abrogates due process” (8 May 2018), online: 
<https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/6473/how-bill-c-75-fundamentally-abrogates-due-process>. 
397  See, e.g., Kevin Cyr, “Rethinking Police Testimony — Notes, Lies, and Videotape” (2014) 60 CLQ 522. 
398  Kennedy Rule 2.1, supra note 21; Chapter Four at, e.g., 235. See also MacKenzie SJ, supra note 5. 
399  Experts must produce a written report before testifying in civil matters: Rules, supra note 2 at, e.g., Rules 
52.03(7), 53.03(1). 
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when it comes to expert testimony400 and witnesses testifying about relatively uncontestable 
matters or matters peripheral to the fundamental issues in a criminal case.401 
2. Eliminating Interlocutory Steps: Preliminary Inquiries and Jury Challenges 
Another criticism of Bill C-75 has been its proposed reduction of preliminary inquiries.402 
Somewhat analogous to pre-trial case conferences in civil litigation, these can result in testing of 
the Crown’s case and weeding out weak cases – but do not necessarily do so. Experience from 
England and Wales suggests that alternative obligations such as Crown discovery can fulfill the 
roles of preliminary inquiries.403 While a pilot project eliminating preliminary inquiries may have 
been prudent,404 openness to reform within the established constitutional order should remain.  
Bill C-75 also eliminated peremptory challenges for jurors.405 Despite Bill C-75 being 
partially in response to the high profile acquittal of Gerald Stanley for murder and manslaughter 
of an Indigenous man by an all-white jury,406 and despite the notorious underrepresentation of 
Indigenous Canadians on juries,407 there are opinions that peremptory challenges actually increase 
juries’ diversity.408 In any event, changing criminal procedure in response to a high profile 
 
400  Ibid. 
401  NS, supra note 70 at paras 43-44, notes that not all evidence is “created equal” in criminal law in terms of its 
probative value. 
402  See, e.g., Sarah E Leamon, “Limiting Preliminary Inquiries Will Make Things Worse For The Accused” The 
Huffington Post (14 September 2018), online: <https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/sarah-e-leamon/bill-c-75-
preliminary-inquiries_a_23525467/>. 
403  John Arnold Epp, “Abolishing Preliminary Inquiries in Canada” (1996) 38 CLQ 495. 
404  Often prudent when deciding to follow a new path: see the discussion of a “single judge” model, supra Part 
IV.D. 
405  Described in, e.g., Kent Roach, “A good first step towards diverse, impartial Canadian juries” The Conversation 
(2 April 2018), online: <https://theconversation.com/a-good-first-step-towards-diverse-impartial-canadian-
juries-94257>. 
406  Acquitted of both second-degree murder and manslaughter in the death of Colton Boushie: see, e.g., Roach 
Urgent, supra note 395. 
407  See, e.g., R v Kokopenace, 2015 SCC 28, [2015] 2 SCR 398 [“Kokopenace”]. 
408  See, e.g., John Paul Tasker, “Lawyers say post-Boushie justice reforms could actually make juries less diverse” 
CBC News (30 March 2018), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberal-justice-reforms-jury-selection-
1.4600007>. 
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acquittal is likely imprudent:409 it is precisely when tensions are elevated that fairness can be most 
jeopardized.410 In R v King, an Ontario Superior Court judge recently held that these changes to 
peremptory challenges violated the Charter rights of an accused Indigenous person.411 
But despite these concerns about the circumstances in which the proposed elimination of 
preliminary inquiries arose, and without commentary on the recent King decision, a jury is meant 
to be a random sample of disinterested members of the community.412 Peremptory challenges 
impede a jury being such a random sample.413 Warring anecdotes do not resolve the question of 
whether peremptory challenges increase juries’ diversity – experimentation and research is 
necessary. But one can also fairly question whether having lawyers engage in stereotyping is an 
appropriate way to increase juries’ diversity.  
More germane to this dissertation, however, peremptory challenges waste court time as an 
interlocutory step of dubious value. This led Frank Iacobucci, after his retirement from the 
Supreme Court of Canada, to recommend supervision of their use.414 Juries and peremptory 
challenges are less common in civil litigation415 and moving in that direction may help increase 
the timeliness of criminal justice.416 
 
409  Don Stuart, “Ghomeshi: Dangers in Overreacting to this High Profile Acquittal” (2016) 27 CR (7th) 45. 
410  Sunstein, supra note 205 at 975. 
410  Ibid at 975. See also supra note 217. 
411  2019 ONSC 6386, 2019 CarswellOnt 17827, reported on in Samantha Craggs, “New jury selection rules are 
unfair to Indigenous man, Hamilton judge rules” CBC News (4 November 2019), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/dale-king-yosif-al-hasnawi-1.5346363>. 
412  See, e.g., Kokopenace, supra note 407 at para 190 (per Cromwell J, dissenting, but the principle seems generally 
respected: see, e.g., Kent Roach, “The Urgent Need to Reform Jury Selection after the Gerald Stanley and Colten 
Boushie Case” (2018) 65 CLQ 271 at 277). 
413  Roach, ibid at 274-275. 
414  Frank Iacobucci, “First Nations Representation on Ontario Juries: Report of the Independent Review Conducted 
by The Honourable Frank Iacobucci” (February 2013), online: 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/iacobucci/First_Nations_Representation_Ontar
io_Juries.html>. 
415  Steven Penney, “Mass Torts, Mass Culture: Canadian Mass Tort Law and Hollywood Narrative Film” (2004) 
30 Queen’s LJ 205 at 214. 
416  It nonetheless must be recognized that the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in criminal law: Charter, supra 
note 392, s 11(f). 
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3. Court Mergers 
Both systems could also consider court mergers. As noted in Chapter Three, folding the 
Divisional Court into the Superior Court and Court of Appeal could potentially facilitate access to 
justice. This is analogous to the proposed mergers of the criminal trial courts suggested not only 
by scholars such as Don Stuart but also policymakers such as the late Ian Scott.417 The status quo 
in criminal procedure is sometimes defended on the basis of expertise of Superior Court judges. 
Stuart has cast doubt on this.418 In any event, as discussed above, specialization could occur within 
a broader institution. And the types of inefficiencies noted in Chapter Three due to Ontario having 
multiple appellate courts also occur in the criminal trial courts due to divided jurisdiction.419 An 
example would be the Provincial Court being unable to issue a type of warrant in a case where it 
is already familiar with the facts but only the Superior Court can issue the warrant.420 This is also 
analogous to lost resources in the civil context when multiple judges needlessly address a single 
matter. As noted in Chapter Three, eliminating the Divisional Court is something that would have 
widespread ramifications and should not be done lightly. But it should be considered, just as 
eliminating the distinction between the provincial courts and superior courts has been considered 
in criminal law, and has already occurred in Nunavut.421  
Even this, however, must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis: the Small Claims Court’s 
unique tailoring of its procedures and institutional structure to self-represented litigants may well 
 
417  David Stockwood, “In Conversation: Ian Scott” (1993) 12 Adv Soc J 4 at 9-10, cited in Wayne Renke, “A Single 
Trial Court for Alberta: Consultation Paper” (Edmonton, AB: Alberta Justice/Faculty of Law, University of 
Alberta, 2007), online: <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/18550-
single_trial_court_consult.pdf>; Don Stuart, “The Charter Is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed to Be Stunted: 
Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 21 Nat’l J Const L 245 [“Stuart Charter”] at 247. 
418  Stuart Charter, ibid at 247. 
419  Chapter Three at 180. 
420  E.g., Steven Penney, “National Security Surveillance in an Age of Terror: Statutory Powers and Charter Limits” 
(2010) 48:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 247 at 255, discussing surveillance under Part VI of Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c 
C-46. 
421  Stuart Charter, supra note 417 at 247. 
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benefit from its status as a separate court within the ambit of the Superior Court.422 This illustrates 
that, just as rules are not necessarily always preferable to standards, as discussed above,423 unified 
courts are not necessarily always preferable to specialized courts. 
TREATING A CHRONIC PROBLEM? 
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, over the course of 
time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to 
it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk 
about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. 
Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have 
married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have 
deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce without knowing 
how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little 
plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and 
Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted 
away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and 
grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out.424 
 
Charles Dickens’s Bleak House continues to haunt the legal profession, ringing far too close 
to home.425 It is difficult to disagree with Andrew Pilliar’s astute observation that access to justice 
is not so much of a “crisis” (as is often claimed) but rather a “chronic problem”.426 What is often 
forgotten is that within a generation of Bleak House’s publication, the courts of law and equity 
were merged in England and Ontario, with almost universal consensus that this was to the 
betterment of access to justice.427 But in an instance of “one step forward, two steps back”, 
different and/or new elements of civil procedure have emerged as different access to justice 
 
422  The success of this endeavour is debatable: McGill, supra note 43 at 175. 
423  Conclusion, Part III. 
424  Charles Dickens, Bleak House (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) [originally published in 1853] at 4, 
cited in, e.g., Jimenez v Romeo, 2009 CarswellOnt 7677, [2009] OJ No 5248 (SCJ) at para 1. 
425  As noted in the Introduction at 34, this has been noticed before: see, e.g., The Honourable J Roderick Barr, QC, 
“The Cost of Litigation: Bleak House in the 1990s” (March 1993) 12 Advocates’ Soc J No 1, 12; William 
Kaplan, QC, “The Derivative Action: A Shareholder’s ‘Bleak House’” (2003) 36:3 UBC L Rev 443; Kennedy 
Walrus, supra note 16 at 48; Gorsuch, supra note 111 at ~ 3:49-4:14. 
426  “what will you do about access to justice this year” Legal Aid Ontario Blog (4 February 2014), online: 
<http://blog.legalaid.on.ca/2014/02/04/andrew-pilliar-what-will-you-do-about-access-to-justice-this-year/>. 
427  Moore, supra note 179 at 46-48. 
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obstacles. All of these – ranging from excessive discovery to needless insistence on a full trial or 
disputing whether a particular order can be appealed – are motivated by valid normative concerns 
over fairness. But many have been taken to needless extremes. Rarely does substantive justice 
appear to require such significant procedural protections. And the cost in terms of time and money 
appears to outweigh the value of many steps such as these. This illustrates the Burkean concern of 
the need to be aware of unintended consequences of reforms to established institutions such as the 
court system.428 
This dissertation began by noting how Beverley McLachlin lamented access to justice being 
the greatest crisis in Canada’s justice system today. And there are many metrics on which Canada’s 
civil justice system falls unacceptably short, negatively impacting millions of lives.429 McLachlin 
CJC’s concerns are very legitimate. 
Despite this, it is also clear that the recently retired Chief Justice was a great believer in 
institutions, and recognized that Canada has much to be proud of regarding its justice system.430 
In a celebrated quote in Peter v Beblow, she wrote, “[i]n the rush to substantive justice, the 
 
428  Burke, supra note 139. 
429  Already described for a general audience in Kennedy Walrus, supra note 16, and international audience in IAPL 
Paper, supra note 310. See also Hryniak, supra note 3, fn 2; World Justice Project, 2011 World Justice Progress 
Report, p 21, online: 
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf>; 
The World Justice Project, The Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, online: 
<http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/CAN>; Farrow 2014, supra note 4, fn 1; Trevor CW Farrow, et al, 
Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice System, A White Paper for the 
Association of Canadian Court Administrators (Toronto and Edmonton, 27 March 2012) at 14-16, online: 
<http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/Addressing%20the%20Needs%20of%20SRLs%20ACCA%20White%20
Paper%20March%202012%20Final%20Revised%20Version.pdf>; Julie Macfarlane, supra note 131; Trevor 
CW Farrow, et al, Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in Canada: An Overview Report (Canadian 
Forum on Civil Justice, 2016), online: <http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/Everyday%20Legal%20Problems%20and%20the%20Cost%20of%20Justice%20in
%20Canada%20-%20Overview%20Report.pdf>. 
430  Beverley McLachlin, “Foreward” in Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lorne Sossin, eds, Middle 
Income Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) at ix. 
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principles are sometimes forgotten.”431 This could be interpreted as the Chief Justice not caring 
about substantive justice, but her career shows that such an interpretation would be utterly 
erroneous.432 Rather, this quote recognizes that there can be no justice without first following 
procedure and precedent, and working within established institutions, all of which have substantive 
justice as their aims. Those procedures, precedents, and established institutions can certainly be 
flawed, but if that is the case, it is usually worth seeking to amend these institutions to reflect 
changing realities rather than jettisoning them.433 So let us not be too pessimistic either. After all, 
over thirty-seven million people living together under the rule of law – however imperfectly – is 
an amazing accomplishment.434  
The 2010 Amendments are an example of trying to amend an institution – specifically, Ontario 
procedural law – to ensure substantive justice can be delivered more quickly, and with fewer 
financial costs. The 2010 Amendments are only a discrete step to achieve access to justice. They 
have not created utopia – there is much more work to do, and what some of that work may be is 
discussed elsewhere in this Conclusion. But the 2010 Amendments have been a worthwhile if 
limited step on the journey to make our established procedures and institutions more accessible. 
Indeed, many individuals have had substantive justice delivered more quickly, efficiently, and with 
a fair – albeit abbreviated, in some cases – process. Much more work is to be done. But let us not 
forget the successes. 
  
 
431  [1993] 1 SCR 980 at 988. 
432  David Sandomierski, “Selective Deference and the Judicial Role: Chief Justice McLachlin’s Legacy for Law and 
Legal Education” in Controversies in the Common Law: Tracing the Contributions of Chief Justice 
McLachlin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming). 
433  Burke, supra note 139 at 96. 
434  This is not the state of nature as noted by Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has 
Declined (New York: Viking, 2011); as noted in IAPL Paper, supra note 310, Canada also has much to be proud 
of regarding its civil justice system. 
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APPENDIX A – NUMBER OF CASES, RESULTS, AND APPEALS (EXCLUDING 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA LEAVE APPLICATIONS) (JURISDICTION 
MOTIONS) 
 
2010 
 
 Case Name Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
1.  Cannon v Funds for Canada 
Foundation, 2010 ONSC 
4517, [2010] OJ No 3486 
(SCJ) 
Partially 
Granted 1. 
Affirmed: 2011 
ONCA 185, 
[2011] OJ No 
990 
Partially 
Granted 
2.  Goldmart Farms Inc v Fasig-
Tipton Co, 2010 ONSC 1631, 
[2010] OJ No 1683 (Master) Granted   - Granted 
3.  Magnum Integrated 
Technologies Inc v Integrated 
Industrial Systems, 2010 
ONSC 3389, 84 CPR (4th) 211 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
4.  
Tucows.com Co v Lojas 
Renner SA, 2010 ONSC 5851, 
334 DLR (4th) 564 (SCJ) Granted  2. 
Overturned: 
2011 ONCA 
548, 106 OR 
(3d) 561 Dismissed 
5.  
Brisben v Lunev, 2010 ONSC 
1840, [2010] OJ No 3216 
(SCJ) Dismissed 3. 
Affirmed: 2011 
ONCA 15, 
[2011] OJ No 
87 Dismissed 
6.  MCAP Leasing Limited 
Partnership v Genexa Medical 
Inc, 2010 ONSC 6050, 100 
CPC (6th) 201 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
7.  
McKenna v Gammon Gold Inc, 
2010 ONSC 1591, 88 CPC 
(6th) 27 (SCJ) 
Partially 
Granted  
(other issues 
only: 2011 
ONSC 
3782, 87 
CCLT (3d) 123 
(Div Ct)) 
Partially 
Granted 
8.  Lazer-Tech v Dejerey, 2010 
ONSC 1662, [2010] OJ No 
1080 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
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(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
9.  Cardinali v Strait, 2010 ONSC 
2503, 97 CPC (6th) 290 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
10.  Di Stefano v Energy 
Automated Systems Inc, 2010 
ONSC 493, 68 BLR (4th) 209 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
11.  Kahlon v Cheecham, 2010 
ONSC 1957, [2010] OJ No 
1584 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
12.  
Wolfe v Wyeth, 2010 ONSC 
2368, 84 CPR (4th) 43 (SCJ) Dismissed 4. 
Affirmed: 2011 
ONCA 
347, 373 NSR 
(2d) 79 Dismissed 
13.  Canada Hot Tub Outlet v 
Canada Spas Depot Inc, 2010 
ONSC 2524, 96 CPC (6th) 359 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
14.  Zhejiang Ruyi Canada Inc v 
Transglobal Communications 
Group Inc, 2010 ONSC 204, 
[2010] OJ No 150 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
15.  Collingwood Ethanol LP v 
Humblet Inc, 2010 ONSC 
2132, 91 CLR (3d) 112 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
16.  Litner (Litigation Guardian of) 
v Saunders, 2010 ONSC 4862, 
[2010] OJ No 3901 (SCJ) Granted   - Granted 
17.  
Dundee Precious Metals Inc v 
Marsland, 2010 ONSC 6484, 
104 OR (3d) 51 (SCJ) Granted  5. 
Overturned: 
2011 ONCA 
594, 108 OR 
(3d) 187 Dismissed 
18.  Luk v Pottery Barn, 2010 
ONSC 5540, [2010] OJ No 
5239 (SCJ) Granted   - Granted  
19.  Van Kessel v Orsulak, 2010 
ONSC 6919, 9 CPC (7th) 434 
(SCJ) Granted   - Granted  
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Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
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20.  Dennis v Farrell, 2010 ONSC 
2401, 84 CCLI (4th) 64 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
21.  
Wielgomas v Anglocom Inc, 
2010 ONSC 6289, 335 DLR 
(4th) 745 (SCJ) Granted 6. 
Affirmed 
(except on 
costs): 2011 
ONCA 490, 
335 DLR (4th) 
741 Granted 
22.  Bunyan v Ens, 2010 ONSC 
216, 99 OR (3d) 304 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
23.  Branconnier v Maheux, 2010 
ONSC 1524, [2010] OJ No 
994 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
24.  Salus Marine Wear Inc v 
Queen Charlotte Lodge Ltd, 
2010 ONSC 3063, [2010] OJ 
No 2329 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
25.  Roadtrek Motorhomes Ltd v 
Aralex Acoustics Ltd, 2010 
ONSC 2700, [2010] OJ No 
2217 (SCJ) Granted 7. 
Overturned: 
2010 ONCA 
878, [2010] OJ 
No 5570 Dismissed 
26.  Sun Life Assurance Co of 
Canada v Yellow Pages Group 
Inc, 2010 ONSC 2780, [2010] 
OJ No 2608 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
27.  
Galustian v SkyLink Group of 
Companies Inc, 2010 ONSC 
292, 85 CPC (6th) 132 (SCJ) Granted 8. 
Security for 
costs ordered 
for appeal: 
2010 ONCA 
645, 268 OAC 
157 (no 
apparent 
appeal) Granted 
28.  
Expedition Helicopters Inc v 
Honeywell Inc, 2010 ONSC 
732, [2010] OJ No 462 (SCJ) Dismissed 9. 
Overturned: 
2010 ONCA 
351, 262 OAC 
195 Granted 
29.  Shinoff v BMO Nesbitt Burns 
Inc, 2010 ONSC 926, [2010] 
OJ No 540 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
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(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
30.  Jabbour v Eparchy of Our 
Lady of Lebanon of Los 
Angeles, 2010 ONSC 2475, 
2010 CarswellOnt 10731 
(SCJ) Dismissed 10. 
Affirmed, 2011 
ONCA 140, 
[2011] OJ No 
796 Dismissed 
31.  Wideawake Entertainment 
Group Inc v Lavi, 2010 ONSC 
1659, [2010] OJ No 1701 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
32.  Stubbs v ATS Applied Tech 
Systems Inc, 2010 ONSC 
2838, 87 CCEL (3d) 165 (SCJ) Dismissed 
11. 
Affirmed: 2010 
ONCA 879, 
272 OAC 386 Dismissed 
33.  Moisan v Antonio Sanita Land 
Development Ltd, 2010 ONSC 
3339, [2010] OJ No 3220 
(SCJ) 
Action 
Dismissed 
On Other 
Grounds 
 
- 
Action 
Dismissed 
On Other 
Grounds 
 
2011 
 
 Case Name Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal 
Result 
Final 
Result 
1. Export Packers Co v SPI 
International Transportation, 
2011 ONSC 5907, [2011] OJ 
No 4343 (SCJ) Granted 1. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
481, 294 
OAC 319 Granted 
2. Toronto (City) v Tseng, 2011 
ONSC 4594, 87 MPLR (4th) 
220 (Master) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
3. Galaxy Dragon Ltd v Topwater 
Exclusive Fund IV LLC, 2011 
ONSC 6818, [2011] OJ No 
5255 (SCJ) Granted 
2. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
382, [2012] 
OJ No 2522 Granted 
4. Kais v Abu Dhabi Education 
Council, 2011 ONSC 75, [2011] 
OJ No 33 (Master) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
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 Case Name Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal 
Result 
Final 
Result 
5. 
Bond v Brookfield Asset 
Managements Inc, 2011 ONSC 
2529, [2011] OJ No 1901 (SCJ) Granted 3. 
Affirmed: 
2011 ONCA 
730, 18 CPC 
(7th) 74 Granted 
6. Obégi Chemicals LLC v Kilani, 
2011 ONSC 1636, [2011] OJ 
No 1351 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
7. 1673332 Ontario Ltd v 
Habonim Industrial Valves & 
Actuators Ltd, 2011 ONSC 
4973, [2011] OJ No 3774 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
8. Elfarnawani v International 
Olympic Committee, 2011 
ONSC 6784, 20 CPC (7th) 412 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
9. 1756670 Ontario Inc v Roxboro 
Excavation Inc, 2011 ONSC 
7289, [2011] OJ No 5911 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
10. Comstock Canada Ltd v SPI 
Systems Ltd (cob SPI Controls), 
2011 ONSC 2652, 100 CLR 
(3d) 289 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
11. Jennings v Haas, 2011 ONSC 
2872, 335 DLR (4th) 225 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
12. Moore v Vancouver Fraser Port 
Authority, 2011 ONSC 3692, 
[2011] OJ No 2994 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
13. Thompson v Our Lady of the 
Missions, 2011 ONSC 382, 
[2011] OJ No 512 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
14. 
Jafarzadehahmadsargoorabi v 
Sabet, 2011 ONSC 5827, [2011] 
OJ No 5073 (SCJ) Granted 4. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
391, [2012] 
OJ No 2573 Granted 
15. Title v Canadian Asset Based 
Lending Enterprise (Cable) Inc, 
2011 ONSC 922, [2011] OJ No 
611 (SCJ) Dismissed 5. 
Allowed on 
Other 
Grounds: 
2011 ONCA Dismissed 
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 Case Name Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal 
Result 
Final 
Result 
715, 108 OR 
(3d) 71 
16. Consbec Inc v Walker, 2011 
ONSC 2944, [2011] OJ No 
2146 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
17. Furfari v Juncos, 2011 ONSC 
3624, 38 CPC (7th) 110 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
18. Harster Greenhouses Inc v 
Visser International Trade & 
Engineering BV, 2011 ONSC 
2608, 334 DLR (4th) 481 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
19. Dempsey v Staples, 2011 ONSC 
1709, 12 MVR (6th) 30 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
20. 
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 
2011 ONSC 5105, 92 BLR (4th) 
324 (SCJ) Dismissed 6. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
211, 110 OR 
(3d) 256 Dismissed 
21. Mehmood v Gray, 2011 ONSC 
1735, [2011] OJ No 1177 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
22. Ironrod Investments Inc v 
Enquest Energy Services Corp, 
2011 ONSC 308, [2011] OJ No 
544 (SCJ) Granted 
 
- Granted 
23. Merill Lynch Canada Inc v 
Mineralogy Canada Acquisition 
Corp Pty Ltd, 2011 CarswellOnt 
3755 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
 
2012 
 
 Case Name  Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
1. 
Ontario v Rothmans, Inc, 
2012 ONSC 22, 28 CPC (7th) 
68 (SCJ) Dismissed 1. 
Affirmed: 
2013 ONCA 
353, 115 OR 
(3d) 561 
Dismissed 
2. Central Sun Mining Inc v 
Vector Engineering Inc, 2012 Granted 2. 
Reversed: 
2013 ONCA 
Dismissed 
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 Case Name  Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
ONSC 7331, 18 CLR (4th) 
189 (SCJ) 
601, 117 OR 
(3d) 313 
3. Young v Home Depot, USA, 
Inc, 2012 ONSC 1971, [2012] 
OJ No 1350 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
4. Gordon v Deiotte, 2012 
ONSC 1973, 109 OR (3d) 626 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
5. Alexander v Alexander, 2012 
ONSC 2826, [2012] OJ No 
2099 (Master) Granted  - Granted 
6. Aldo Group Inc v Moneris 
Solutions Corp, 2012 ONSC 
2581, [2012] OJ No 1931 
(SCJ) Dismissed 3. 
Affirmed: 
2013 ONCA 
725, 118 OR 
(3d) 81 Dismissed 
7. McAlpine v McAlpine, 2012 
ONSC 297, 108 OR (3d) 672 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
8. Misyura v Walton, 2012 
ONSC 5397, 112 OR (3d) 462 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
9. 
2249659 Ontario Ltd v 
Siegen, 2012 ONSC 3128, 
[2012] OJ No 3263 (SCJ) Granted 4. 
Reversed: 
2013 ONCA 
354, 115 OR 
(3d) 241 Dismissed 
10. Mackie Research Capital 
Corp v Mackie, 2012 ONSC 
3890, 3 BLR (5th) 312 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
11. Paraie v Cangemi, 2012 
ONSC 6341, 113 OR (3d) 231 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
12. Cugalj v Wick, 2012 ONSC 
2407, 40 CPC (7th) 356 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
13. United States of America v 
Yemec, 2012 ONSC 4207, 41 
CPC (7th) 362 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
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 Case Name  Result 
(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
14. 
Zhang v Hua Hai Li Steel 
Pipe Co, 2012 ONSC 4379, 
[2012] OJ No 3704 (SCJ) Dismissed 5. 
Affirmed: 
2013 ONCA 
103, [2013] OJ 
No 677 Dismissed 
15. Umutomi c Safari, 2012 
CSON 6962, [2012] OJ No 
5822 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
16. Bale-eze Industries Inc v 
Frazier Industrial Co, 2012 
ONSC 4892, [2012] OJ No 
3996 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
17. Cesario v Gondek, 2012 
ONSC 4563, 113 OR (3d) 466 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
18. Nagra v Malhotra, 2012 
ONSC 4497, 111 OR (3d) 446 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
19. Amtim Capital Inc v 
Appliance Recycling Centers 
of America, 2012 ONSC 
1214, [2012] OJ No 958 
(SCJ) Dismissed 6. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
664, 298 OAC 
75 Dismissed 
20. Nadi Inc v Montazemi-Safari, 
2012 ONSC 4723, [2012] OJ 
No 4005 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
21. Colavecchia v Berkeley Hotel 
Ltd, 2012 ONSC 4747, 112 
OR (3d) 287 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
22. Avanti Management and 
Consulting Ltd v Argex 
Mining Inc, 2012 ONSC 
4395, [2012] OJ No 3665 
(SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
23. Frank v Farlie, Turner & Co, 
LLC, 2012 ONSC 5519, 113 
OR (3d) 25 (SCJ) Granted 
 
- Granted 
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(At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
24. Wilson v Riu, 2012 ONSC 
6840, 98 CCLT (3d) 337 
(SCJ) Granted 
 
- Granted 
25. Mining Technologies 
International Inc v Krako Inc, 
2012 ONSC 2239, 2012 
CarswellOnt 8034 (SCJ) Dismissed 
7. 
Affirmed: 
2012 ONCA 
847, 99 CCLT 
(3d) 46 Dismissed 
26. Wynn Las Vegas LLC v Teng, 
2012 ONSC 1927, [2012] OJ 
No 1467 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
 
2013 
 
 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
1.  
Tamminga v Tamminga, 
[2013] OJ No 4515 (SCJ) Granted 1. 
Affirmed: 2014 
ONCA 478, 120 
OR (3d) 671 
Granted 
2.  Kazi v Qatar Airlines, 2013 
ONSC 1370, [2013] OJ No 
992 (Master) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
3.  Inukshuk Wireless Partnership 
v 4253311 Canada Inc, 2013 
ONSC 5631, 117 OR (3d) 206 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
4.  Ghana Gold Corp (Re), 2013 
ONSC 3284, 3 CBR (6th) 220 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
5.  Royal Bank of Canada v DCM 
Erectors Inc, 2013 ONSC 
2864, [2013] OJ No 2233 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
6.  
Greta Inc v De Lange, 2013 
ONSC 3086, [2013] OJ No 
2412 (SCJ) Dismissed 2. 
Affirmed: 2014 
ONCA 107, 
[2014] OJ No 
625 Dismissed 
7.  
Trillium Motor World Ltd v 
General Motors of Canada Dismissed 3. 
Affirmed: 2014 
ONCA 497, 120 
OR (3d) 598, Dismissed 
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Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
Ltd, 2013 ONSC 2289, 51 
CPC (7th) 419 (SCJ) 
2016 SCC 30, 
[2016] 1 SCR 
851 
8.  West Van Inc v Daisley, 2013 
ONSC 1988, [2013] OJ No 
1649 (SCJ) Granted 4. 
Affirmed: 2014 
ONCA 232, 119 
OR (3d) 481 Granted 
9.  Brown v Spagnuolo, 2013 
ONSC 5178, [2013] OJ No 
3853 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
10.  Lixo Investments Ltd v 
Gowling, Lafleur, Henderson, 
2013 ONSC 4862, [2013] OJ 
No 3534 (SCJ) Granted 5. 
Affirmed: 2014 
ONCA 114, 
[2014] OJ No 
667 Granted 
11.  Haufler (Litigation Guardian 
of) v Hotel Riu Palace, 2013 
ONSC 6044, 117 OR (3d) 275 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
12.  Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2013 
ONSC 7494, 28 CCLI (5th) 
229 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
13.  Sullivan v Four Seasons 
Hotels Ltd, 2013 ONSC 4622, 
116 OR (3d) 365 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
14.  
Kaynes v BP plc, 2013 ONSC 
5802, 117 OR (3d) 685 (SCJ) 
Dismissed 
in Part 6. 
Varied: 2014 
ONCA 580, 122 
OR (3d) 162 Granted 
15.  Leone v Scaffidi, 2013 ONSC 
1849, 87 ETR (3d) 93 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
16.  Patterson v EM Technologies, 
Inc, 2013 ONSC 5849, [2013] 
OJ No 4249 (Master) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
17.  Bedford v Abushmaies, 2013 
ONSC 1352, [2013] OJ No 
949 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
18.  
Prince v ACE Aviation 
Holdings Inc, 2013 ONSC 
2906, 115 OR (3d) 721 (SCJ) 
Partially 
granted 7. 
Reversed 
(entirely 
granted due to 
cross-appeal): 
2014 ONCA Granted 
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 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
285, 120 OR 
(3d) 140 
19.  Thinh v Philippe, 2013 ONSC 
7395, 96 ETR (3d) 114 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
20.  Jones v Raymond James Ltd, 
2013 ONSC 4640, [2013] OJ 
No 3199 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
21.  Kozicz v Preece, 2013 ONSC 
2823, [2013] OJ No 2226 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
22.  Petrook v Natuzzi Americas, 
Inc, 2013 ONSC 4508, 10 
CCEL (4th) 317 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
23.  Bouzari v Bahremani, 2013 
ONSC 6337, [2013] OJ No 
5690 (SCJ) Dismissed 8. 
Reversed: 2015 
ONCA 275, 126 
OR (3d) 223 Granted 
24.  Century Indemnity Co v 
Viridian Inc, 2013 ONSC 
4412, [2013] OJ No 3265 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
25.  Bearsfield Developments Inc v 
McNabb, 2013 ONSC 7063, 
[2013] OJ No 5141 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
 
2014 
 
 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
1.  
Harrowand SL v Dewind 
Turbines Ltd, 2014 ONSC 
2014, [2014] OJ No 2022 
(Master) Dismissed 
1. Reversed: 
2014 
CarswellOnt 
19177 (Div 
Ct) 
Allowed 
2.  Khan v Layden, 2014 ONSC 
6868, [2014] OJ No 5632 
(SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- 
Dismissed 
3.  Manson v Canetic Resources 
Ltd, 2014 ONSC 261, [2014] 
OJ No 288 (SCJ) Allowed 
 
- 
Allowed 
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 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
4.  Leonard v GC Surplus, [2014] 
OJ No 1906 (Small Claims 
Court) Dismissed 
 
- 
Dismissed 
5.  Christmas v Fort McKay First 
Nation, 2014 ONSC 373, 119 
OR (3d) 21 (SCJ) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
6.  Szecsodi v MGM Resorts 
International, 2014 ONSC 
1323, [2014] OJ No 946 
(Master) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
7.  Kavanagh v Magna Exteriors 
and Interiors Corp (cob 
Servicios Decoplas), 2014 
ONSC 4540, [2014] OJ No 
4949 (SCJ) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
8.  David S Laflamme 
Construction Inc v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2014 
ONSC 1379, 31 CLR (4th) 285 
(SCJ) 
Action 
dismissed 
on other 
grounds 
 
 
2. 
Affirmed: 
2014 ONCA 
775, 34 CLR 
(4th) 187 
Action 
dismissed 
on other 
grounds 
9.  Montel Inc v Kipawa Sales & 
Services Inc, 2014 ONSC 83, 
[2014] OJ No 219 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
10.  Victory v Sattar, 2014 ONSC 
641, [2014] OJ No 437 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
11.  Central Sun Mining Inc v 
Vector Engineering Inc, 2014 
ONSC 1849, [2014] OJ No 
1981 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
12.  Kornhaber v Starwood Hotels 
and Restaurants Worldwide 
Inc, 2014 ONSC 6182, [2014] 
OJ No 4986 (SCJ) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
13.  
Solloway v Klondex Mines Ltd, 
2014 ONSC 391, [2014] OJ No 
285 (SCJ) Allowed 
3. Affirmed: 
2014 ONCA 
672, [2014] OJ 
No 4572 Allowed 
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 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
14.  Endress + Hauser Canada Ltd 
v Aikman, 2014 ONSC 3067, 
[2014] OJ No 2677 (SCJ) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
15.  Romanko v Nettina, 2014 
ONSC 5153, 44 CCLI (5th) 96 
(SCJ) Allowed 
 
- Allowed 
16.  Wu v Ng, 2014 ONSC 7126, 6 
ETR (4th) 104 (SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
17.  Ismail v Pafco Insurance, 2014 
ONSC 1290, [2014] OJ No 890 
(SCJ) Dismissed 
 
- Dismissed 
18.  
Ibrahim v Robinson, 
unreported (SCJ) Dismissed 
 Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
21, 124 OR 
(3d) 106 Dismissed 
 
2015 
 
 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
1. Tyoga Investments Ltd v 
Service Alimentaire Desco 
Inc, 2015 ONSC 3810, [2015] 
OJ No 3133 (SCJ) Dismissed 1. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
15, [2016] OJ 
No 79 
Dismissed 
2. Hitlab Inc v Anderson, 2015 
ONSC 2535, [2015] OJ No 
2083 (SCJ) Granted  - 
Granted 
3. Legge v Young, 2015 ONSC 
775, 125 OR (3d) 67 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
4. Orthoarm Inc v American 
Orthodontics Corp, 2015 
ONSC 1880, 125 OR (3d) 312 
(SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
5. Currie v Farr’s Coach Lines 
Ltd, 2015 ONSC 2352, [2015] 
OJ No 2075 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
6. Goldhar v Haaretz.com, 2015 
ONSC 1128, 125 OR (3d) 619 
(SCJ) Dismissed 2. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
Granted 
(after 
404 
 
 
 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
515, 132 OR 
(3d) 331 
Reversed: 
2018 SCC 28, 
[2018] 2 SCR 
3 
 
chapter 
published) 
7. 
Arsenault v Nunavut, 2015 
ONSC 4302, [2015] OJ No 
3494 (SCJ) Granted 3. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
207, 30 CCEL 
(4th) 46 Granted 
8. Shah v LG Chem, Ltd, 2015 
ONSC 2628, 125 OR (3d) 773 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
9. Airia Brands Inc v Air 
Canada, 2015 ONSC 5332, 
126 OR (3d) 756 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
10. 
Machado v Catalyst Capital 
Group Inc, 2015 ONSC 6313, 
27 CCEL (4th) 116 (Master) Dismissed 4. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONSC 
6719, 34 
CCEL (4th) 
274 (Div Ct) Dismissed 
11. Silveira v FY International 
Auditing & Consulting Corp, 
2015 ONSC 338, 37 BLR 
(5th) 308 (Master) Granted  - Granted 
12. QBD Cooling Systems Inc v 
Sollatek (UK) Ltd, 2015 
ONSC 947, [2015] OJ No 
1578 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
13. Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce v Glasford, 2015 
ONSC 197, [2015] OJ No 87 
(SCJ) Granted 5. 
Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
523, [2015] OJ 
No 3622 Granted 
14. James Bay Resources Ltd v 
Mak Mera Nigeria Ltd, 2015 
ONSC 1538, 39 BLR (5th) 
313 (SCJ) Dismissed 6. 
Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
781, 128 OR 
(3d) 198 Dismissed 
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 Case Name Result (At 
Motion) 
Appeal Appeal Result Final 
Result 
15. Candoo Excavating Services 
Ltd v Ipex Inc, 2015 ONSC 
809, 42 CLR (4th) 153 (SCJ) Dismissed  - Dismissed 
16. 
Forsythe v Westfall, 2015 
ONSC 758, 125 OR (3d) 135 
(SCJ) Granted 7. 
Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
810, 128 OR 
(3d) 124 Granted 
17. Algonquins of Barriere First 
Nations v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2015 ONSC 3505, 
[2015] OJ No 3031 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
18. Carolina Foods Inc v 838116 
Ontario Inc, 2015 ONSC 
1342, [2015] OJ No 953 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
19. Cook v 1293037 Alberta Ltd 
(cob Traveller’s Cloud 9), 
2015 ONSC 7989, [2015] OJ 
No 6765 (SCJ) Granted 8. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
836, [2016] OJ 
No 5698 Granted 
20. Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS 
Vehicle Distributors ULC, 
2015 ONSC 519, [2015] OJ 
No 979 (SCJ) Dismissed 9. 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
977, [2016] OJ 
No 6644* Dismissed 
21. CP Ships Ltd v Icecorp 
Logistics Inc, 2015 ONSC 
6243, [2015] OJ No 5319 
(SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
22. Mannarino v Brown Estate, 
2015 ONSC 3167, 50 CCLI 
(5th) 122 (SCJ) Granted  - Granted 
 
*Original motion overturned in 2016 ONCA 60, 129 OR (3d) 37, but re-dismissed in 2016 
ONSC 2980, [2016] OJ No 2372, leading to the second appeal.  
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APPENDIX B – COSTS (JURISDICTION MOTIONS) 
 
Costs Awards (Motions) in Order of Magnitude: 
 
 Costs Decision Costs of 
Motion 
Unique 
Characteristics 
1. Khan v Layden, 2015 ONSC 146, [2015] OJ No 43 
(SCJ) $1,921 
 
2. Paraie v Cangemi, 2012 ONSC 6341, 113 OR (3d) 231 
(SCJ) $2,000 
 
3. Mehmood v Gray, 2011 ONSC 1735, [2011] OJ No 
1177 (SCJ) $2,500 
 
4. Endress + Hauser Canada Ltd v Aikman, 2014 ONSC 
3067, [2014] OJ No 2677 (SCJ) $3,000 
 
5. Kahlon v Cheecham, 2010 ONSC 1957, [2010] OJ No 
1584 (SCJ) $3,000 
 
6. Silveira v FY International Auditing & Consulting Corp, 
2015 ONSC 338, 37 BLR (5th) 308 (Master) $3,304.51 
 
7. Cugalj v Wick, 2012 ONSC 2407, 30 CPC (7th) 356 
(SCJ) $3,500 
 
8. Stubbs v ATS Applied Tech Systems Inc, 2010 
CarswellOnt 10562 (SCJ) $3,500 
 
9. McAlpine v McAlpine, 2012 ONSC 297, 108 OR (3d) 
672 (SCJ) $3,604.71 
 
10. Moore v Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 2011 ONSC 
3692, [2011] OJ No 2994 (SCJ) $4,000 
 
11. Comstock Canada Ltd v SPI Systems Ltd (cob SPI 
Controls), 2011 ONSC 2652, 100 CLR (3d) 289 (SCJ) $4,500 
 
12. Kazi v Qatar Airlines, 2013 ONSC 1370, [2013] OJ No 
992 (Master) $5,000 
 
13. Dempsey v Staples, [2011] OJ No 5326 (SCJ) $5,000  
14. Lazer-Tech v Dejerey, 2010 ONSC 1662, [2010] OJ No 
1080 (SCJ) $5,000 
 
15. Roadtrek Motorhomes Ltd v Aralex Acoustics Ltd, 2010 
ONCA 878, [2010] OJ No 5570, rev’g 2010 ONSC 
2700, [2010] OJ No 2217 (SCJ) 
$5,000 
 
16. Litner (Litigation Guardian of) v Saunders, 2010 ONSC 
4862, [2010] OJ No 3901 (SCJ) $5,334 
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 Costs Decision Costs of 
Motion 
Unique 
Characteristics 
17. Goldmart Farms Inc v Fasig-Tipton Co, 2010 ONSC 
1631, [2010] OJ No 1683 (Master) $5,489 
 
18. Alexander v Alexander, 2012 ONSC 2826, [2012] OJ 
No 2099 (Master) $6,000 
 
19. Zhang v Hua Hai Li Steel Pipe Co, 2012 ONSC 5298, 
[2012] OJ No 4506 (SCJ) $6,000 
 
20. Di Stefano v Energy Automated Systems Inc, 2010 
ONSC 493, 68 BLR (4th) 209 (SCJ) $6,500 
 
21. Bearsfield Developments Inc v McNabb, 2013 ONSC 
7063, [2013] OJ No 5141 (SCJ) $7,000 
 
22. CP Ships Ltd v Icecorp Logistics Inc, 2015 ONSC 6243, 
[2015] OJ No 5319 (SCJ) $7,500 
 
23. Wynn Las Vegas LLC v Teng, 2012 ONSC 1927, [2012] 
OJ No 1467 (SCJ) $7,500 
 
24. Salus Marine Wear Inc v Queen Charlotte Lodge Ltd, 
2010 ONSC 5170, [2010] OJ No 4389 (SCJ) $7,500 
 
25. Montel Inc v Kipawa Sales & Services Inc, 2014 ONSC 
83, [2014] OJ No 219 (SCJ) $8,600 
 
26. Hitlab Inc v Anderson, 2015 ONSC 2535, [2015] OJ No 
2083 (SCJ) $9,500 
 
27. Export Packers Co v SPI International Transportation, 
2011 ONSC 6906, [2011] OJ No 5227 (SCJ) $9,606.39 
 
28. Orthoarm Inc v American Orthodontics Corp, 2015 
ONSC 1880, 125 OR (3d) 312 (SCJ) $10,000 
 
29. Carolina Foods Inc v 838116 Ontario Inc, 2015 ONSC 
1342, [2015] OJ No 953 (SCJ) $10,000 
 
30. Wu v Ng, 2015 ONSC 320, 6 ETR (4th) 117 (SCJ) $10,000  
31. Glasford v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2015 
ONSC 1843, [2015] OJ No 1393 (SCJ) $10,298.20 
 
32. Wielgomas v Anglocom Inc, 2011 ONCA 490, 335 DLR 
(4th) 741, var’g 2010 ONSC 6289, 335 DLR (4th) 745 
(SCJ) 
$12,750 
 
33. Christmas v Fort McKay First Nation, 2014 ONSC 373, 
119 OR (3d) 21 (SCJ) $13,000 
 
34. Jafarzadehahmadsargoorabi v Sabet, 2011 ONSC 7166, 
[2011] OJ No 6228 (SCJ) $13,136.65 
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 Costs Decision Costs of 
Motion 
Unique 
Characteristics 
35. Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2014 ONSC 210, 28 CCLI (5th) 
240 (SCJ) $13,935.78 
 
36. Legge v Young, 2015 ONSC 775, 125 OR (3d) 67 (SCJ) $14,321.67  
37. Bale-eze Industries Inc v Frazier Industrial Co, 2012 
ONSC 5505, [2012] OJ No 4568 (SCJ) $14,595.34 
 
38. Amtim Capital Inc v Appliance Recycling Centers of 
America, 2012 ONSC 1902, [2012] OJ No 1330 (SCJ) $15,000 
 
39. Colavecchia v Berkeley Hotel Ltd, 2012 ONSC 5868, 
[2012] OJ No 4888 (SCJ) $15,000 
 
40. 1673332 Ontario Ltd v Habonim Industrial Valves & 
Actuators Ltd, 2011 ONSC 4973, [2011] OJ No 3774 
(SCJ) 
$15,000 
 
41. Tucows.com Co v Lojas Renner SA, 2010 ONSC 5851, 
334 DLR (4th) 564 (SCJ) $15,000 
 
42. Luk v Pottery Barn, 2010 ONSC 5540, [2010] OJ No 
5239 (SCJ) $15,000 
 
43. Consbec Inc v Walker, 2011 ONSC 2944, [2011] OJ No 
2146 (SCJ) $15,719.50 
 
44. Leone v Scaffidi, 2013 ONSC 2847, 87 ETR (3d) 105 
(SCJ) $18,000 
 
45. Petrook v Natuzzi Americas, Inc, 2013 ONSC 5855, 
[2013] OJ No 4376 (SCJ) $19,177.07 
Substantial 
Indemnity 
46. Cook v 1293037 Alberta Ltd (cob Traveller’s Cloud 9), 
2015 ONSC 7989, [2015] OJ No 6765 (SCJ) $20,000 
 
47. Haufler (Litigation Guardian of) v Hotel Riu Palace, 
2014 ONSC 2686, [2014] OJ No 2659 (SCJ) $20,000 
 
48. James Bay Resources Ltd v Mak Mera Nigeria Ltd, 2015 
ONSC 2487, [2015] OJ No 1888 (SCJ) $21,000 
 
49. Brown v Spagnuolo, 2013 ONSC 6665, [2013] OJ No 
5028 (SCJ) $21,000 
 
50. Manson v Canetic Resources Ltd, 2014 ONSC 1480, 
[2014] OJ No 1037 (SCJ) $23,896.92 
Substantial 
Indemnity 
51. Lixo Investments Ltd v Gowling, Lafleur, Henderson, 
2013 ONSC 6181, [2013] OJ No 4488 (SCJ) $24,000 
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 Costs Decision Costs of 
Motion 
Unique 
Characteristics 
52. Dundee Precious Metals Inc v Marsland, 2011 ONCA 
594, 108 OR (3d) 187, rev’g 2010 ONSC 6484, 104 OR 
(3d) 51 (SCJ) 
$25,000 
 
53. Greta Inc v De Lange, 2013 ONSC 4931, [2013] OJ No 
3598 (SCJ) $25,000 
 
54. Mackie Research Capital Corp v Mackie, 2012 ONSC 
3890, 3 BLR (5th) 312 (SCJ) $26,000 
 
55. Elfarnawani v International Olympic Committee, 2011 
ONSC 6784, 20 CPC (7th) 412 (SCJ) $28,823.73 
 
56. Victory v Sattar, 2014 ONSC 1763, [2014] OJ No 1361 
(SCJ) $30,000 
 
57. Harster Greenhouses Inc v Visser International Trade & 
Engineering BV, 2011 ONSC 3708, [2011] OJ No 2853 
(SCJ) 
$30,000 
 
58. Nadi Inc v Montazemi-Safari, 2012 ONSC 5492, [2012] 
OJ No 4570 (SCJ) 
$32,000 
“Somewhat 
more” than 
partial 
indemnity costs 
59. Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Yellow Pages 
Group Inc, 2010 ONSC 2780, [2010] OJ No 2608 (SCJ) $33,000 
 
60. Bond v Brookfield Asset Managements Inc, 2011 ONSC 
3761, [2011] OJ No 2760 (SCJ) $35,000 
Class Action 
61. Title v Canadian Asset Based Lending Enterprise 
(Cable) Inc, 2011 ONSC 1562, [2011] OJ No 1104 
(SCJ) 
$35,000 
 
62. Kais v Abu Dhabi Education Council, 2011 ONSC 100, 
[2011] OJ No 29 (Master) $39,566.90 
 
63. Solloway v Klondex Mines Ltd, 2014 ONSC 1632, 
[2014] OJ No 1171 (SCJ) $42,000 
 
64. Bouzari v Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275, 126 OR (3d) 
223, rev’g 2013 ONSC 6337, [2013] OJ No 5690 (SCJ) $50,000 
 
65. Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 
2016 ONSC 3798, [2016] OJ No 3033 (SCJ), also 
including costs of 2015 ONSC 519, [2015] OJ No 979 
(SCJ) 
$50,000 
 
66. Merill Lynch Canada Inc v Mineralogy Canada 
Acquisition Corp Pty Ltd, 2011 ONSC 3032, [2011] OJ 
No 2317 (SCJ) 
$56,564.29 
Substantial 
Indemnity 
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 Costs Decision Costs of 
Motion 
Unique 
Characteristics 
67. Harrowand SL v Dewind Turbines Ltd, 2014 
CarswellOnt 19177 (Div Ct), rev’g 2014 ONSC 2014, 
[2014] OJ No 2022 (Master) 
$63,300 
 
68. Collingwood Ethanol LP v Humblet Inc, 2010 ONSC 
2132, 91 CLR (3d) 112 (SCJ) $64,000 
 
69. Cannon v Funds for Canada Foundation, 2010 ONSC 
5658, [2010] OJ No 4374 (SCJ) $66,105.76 
Class Action 
70. Ghana Gold Corp (Re), 2013 ONSC 5790, 3 CBR (6th) 
220 (SCJ) $69,917.58 
 
71. Wilson v Riu, 2013 ONSC 635, 98 CCLT (3d) 342 
(SCJ), var’d 2013 ONSC 2586, 2 CCLT (4th) 169 (SCJ) 
$72,508.60 
Judge made 
arithmetical 
error, requiring 
variation 
72. Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 ONCA 580, 122 OR (3d) 162 
var’g 2013 ONSC 5802, 117 OR (3d) 685 (SCJ) $75,000 
Class Action 
73. McKenna v Gammon Gold Inc, 2010 ONSC 3630, 88 
CPC (6th) 83 (SCJ) $100,000 
Class Action 
74. Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2011 ONSC 7055, [2011] 
OJ No 5912 (SCJ) $250,000 
 
75. Ontario v Rothmans, Inc, 2012 ONSC 1804, 28 CPC 
(7th) 103 (SCJ) $575,520 
Tobacco 
 
Costs Awards (Appeals) in Order of Magnitude: 
 
 Appellate (Costs) Decision Costs of 
Appeal 
Unique 
Characteristics 
1. Arsenault v Nunavut, 2016 ONCA 207, 30 
CCEL (4th) 46 $5,000  
2. Stubbs v ATS Applied Tech Systems Inc, 2010 
ONCA 879, 272 OAC 386 $5,000  
3. Wielgomas v Anglocom Inc, 2011 ONCA 490, 
335 DLR (4th) 741 $5,000  
4. Roadtrek Motorhomes Ltd v Aralex Acoustics 
Ltd, 2010 ONCA 878, [2010] OJ No 5570 $5,000  
5. Jabbour v Eparchy of Our Lady of Lebanon of 
Los Angeles, 2011 ONCA 140, [2011] OJ No 
796 $6,000  
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 Appellate (Costs) Decision Costs of 
Appeal 
Unique 
Characteristics 
6. Glasford v Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, 2015 ONCA 523, [2015] OJ No 
3622 $7,500  
7. James Bay Resources Ltd v Mak Mera Nigeria 
Ltd, 2015 ONCA 781, 128 OR (3d) 198 $7,500  
8. Cook v 1293037 Alberta Ltd (cob Traveller’s 
Cloud 9), 2016 ONCA 836, [2016] OJ No 5698 $7,500  
9. Tamminga v Tamminga, 2014 ONCA 478, 120 
OR (3d) 671 $7,500  
10. West Van Inc v Daisley, 2014 ONCA 232, 119 
OR (3d) 481 $7,500  
11. Ibrahim v Robinson, 2015 ONCA 21, 124 OR 
(3d) 106 $7,500  
12. Galaxy Dragon Ltd v Topwater Exclusive Fund 
IV LLC, 2012 ONCA 382, [2012] OJ No 2522 $7,500  
13. Galustian v SkyLink Group of Companies Inc, 
2010 ONCA 645, 268 OAC 157 
$9,000 Security for Costs 
Ordered for Appeal 
14. Tyoga Investments Ltd v Service Alimentaire 
Desco Inc, 2016 ONCA 15, [2016] OJ No 79 $10,000  
15. Solloway v Klondex Mines Ltd, 2014 ONCA 
672, [2014] OJ No 4572 $10,000  
16. Machado v Catalyst Capital Group Inc, 2016 
ONSC 6719, 34 CCEL (4th) 274 (Div Ct) $10,000  
17. Jafarzadehahmadsargoorabi v Sabet, 2012 
ONCA 391, [2012] OJ No 2573 
$11,070 
 
18. Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of 
Canada Ltd, 2014 ONCA 497, 120 OR (3d) 598 
$12,000 
 
19. Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle 
Distributors ULC, 2016 ONCA 977, [2016] OJ 
No 6644 
$13,000 
 
20. Amtim Capital Inc v Appliance Recycling 
Centers of America, 2012 ONCA 664, 298 OAC 
75  
$15,000 
 
21. Export Packers Co v SPI International 
Transportation, 2012 ONCA 526, [2012] OJ No 
3652 $15,000  
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 Appellate (Costs) Decision Costs of 
Appeal 
Unique 
Characteristics 
22. Brisben v Lunev, 2011 ONCA 15, [2011] OJ No 
87 $15,000  
23. Greta Inc v De Lange, 2014 ONCA 107, [2014] 
OJ No 625 $15,000  
24. Dundee Precious Metals Inc v Marsland, 2011 
ONCA 594, 108 OR (3d) 187 $17,000  
25. Lixo Investments Ltd v Gowling, Lafleur, 
Henderson, 2014 ONCA 114, [2014] OJ No 667 $17,000  
26. Harrowand SL v Dewind Turbines Ltd, 2014 
CarswellOnt 19177 (Div Ct) $17,500  
27. David S Laflamme Construction Inc v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 775, 34 CLR 
(4th) 187 $17,500  
28. 
Mining Technologies International Inc v Krako 
Inc, 2012 ONCA 847, 99 CCLT (3d) 46 $20,000 
There was also a 
motion for leave to 
appeal to the 
Divisional Court, but 
that appears to be 
related to either 
unrelated relief and/or 
was made erroneously 
in the wrong court: see 
2012 ONSC 3555, 
[2012] OJ No 2877 
(SCJ) and 2012 ONSC 
4505, [2012] OJ No 
3687 (SCJ) 
29. Bond v Brookfield Asset Managements Inc, 2011 
ONCA 730, 18 CPC (7th) 74 $20,000 Class Action 
30. Tucows.com Co v Lojas Renner SA, 2011 ONCA 
548, 106 OR (3d) 561 $24,000 
 
31. 2249659 Ontario Ltd v Siegen, 2013 ONCA 513, 
[2013] OJ No 3566 $24,000 
 
32. Cannon v Funds for Canada Foundation, 2011 
ONCA 185, [2011] OJ No 990 $25,000  
Class Action 
33. Wolfe v Wyeth, 2011 ONCA 347, 282 OAC 64 $25,000  
34. Expedition Helicopters Inc v Honeywell Inc, 
2010 ONCA 351, 262 OAC 195 $25,000 
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 Appellate (Costs) Decision Costs of 
Appeal 
Unique 
Characteristics 
35. Title v Canadian Asset Based Lending 
Enterprise (Cable) Inc, 2011 ONCA 715, 108 
OR (3d) 71 $25,000 
 
36. Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector Engineering 
Inc, 2013 ONCA 601, 117 OR (3d) 313 $25,000 
 
37. Goldhar v Haaretz.com, 2016 ONCA 515, 132 
OR (3d) 331 $30,000 
 
38. Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 ONCA 580, 122 OR (3d) 
162 $50,000 
Class Action 
39. Prince v ACE Aviation Holdings Inc, 2014 
ONCA 285, 120 OR (3d) 140 $50,000 
Class Action 
40. Ontario v Rothmans, Inc, 2013 ONCA 642, 118 
OR (3d) 213 $237,332.50 
Tobacco Litigation 
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APPENDIX C – DELAY (JURISDICTION MOTIONS) 
 
Cases Without Appeals (Sorted By Length of Delay) 
 
 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of Claim 
Date of Motion 
Resolution 
Delay in 
Months 
1. Ghana Gold Corp (Re), 2013 ONSC 
3284, 3 CBR (6th) 220 (SCJ) 
May 8, 2013 June 7, 2013 1 
2. Obégi Chemicals LLC v Kilani, 2011 
ONSC 1636, [2011] OJ No 1351 
(SCJ) 
December 23, 2010 March 24, 2011 3 
3. Avanti Management and Consulting 
Ltd v Argex Mining Inc, 2012 ONSC 
4395, [2012] OJ No 3665 (SCJ) 
April 4, 2012 July 27, 2012 4 
4. Wu v Ng, 2014 ONSC 7126, 6 ETR 
(4th) 104 (SCJ) 
July 2014  December 9, 
2014 
5 
5. Alexander v Alexander, 2012 ONSC 
2826, [2012] OJ No 2099 (Master) 
Mid-December 2011  May 11, 2012 5 
6. Century Indemnity Co v Viridian Inc, 
2013 ONSC 4412, [2013] OJ No 
3265 (SCJ) 
January 3, 2013 June 26, 2013 5 
7. Royal Bank of Canada v DCM 
Erectors Inc, 2013 ONSC 2864, 
[2013] OJ No 2233 (SCJ) 
December 2012 May 16, 2013 5 
8. Toronto (City) v Tseng, 2011 ONSC 
4594, 87 MPLR (4th) 220 (Master) 
March 8, 2011 July 28, 2011 5 
9. Inukshuk Wireless Partnership v 
4253311 Canada Inc, 2013 ONSC 
5631, 117 OR (3d) 206 (SCJ) 
March 7, 2013 September 6, 
2013 
6 
10. Ironrod Investments Inc v Enquest 
Energy Services Corp, 2011 ONSC 
308, [2011] OJ No 544 (SCJ) 
June 2010  January 25, 
2011 
7 
11. Candoo Excavating Services Ltd v 
Ipex Inc, 2015 ONSC 809, 42 CLR 
(4th) 153 (SCJ) 
July 11, 2014 February 4, 
2015 
7 
12. Carolina Foods Inc v 838116 
Ontario Inc, 2015 ONSC 1342, 
[2015] OJ No 953 (SCJ) 
August 6, 2014 March 2, 2015 7 
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 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of Claim 
Date of Motion 
Resolution 
Delay in 
Months 
13. Orthoarm Inc v American 
Orthodontics Corp, 2015 ONSC 
1880, 125 OR (3d) 312 (SCJ) 
September 5, 2014  March 30, 2015 7 
14. Patterson v EM Technologies, Inc, 
2013 ONSC 5849, [2013] OJ No 
4249 (Master) 
Early 2013 September 17, 
2013 
7 
15. McAlpine v McAlpine, 2012 ONSC 
297, 108 OR (3d) 672 (SCJ) 
April 29, 2011 January 12, 
2012 
8 
16. Shinoff v BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc, 
2010 ONSC 926, [2010] OJ No 540 
(SCJ) 
May 22, 2009  February 8, 
2010 
8 
17. Kahlon v Cheecham, 2010 ONSC 
1957, [2010] OJ No 1584 (SCJ) 
July 11, 2009  April 20, 2010 9 
18. Bearsfield Developments Inc v 
McNabb, 2013 ONSC 7063, [2013] 
OJ No 5141 (SCJ) 
February 1, 2013 November 14, 
2013 
9 
19. Endress + Hauser Canada Ltd v 
Aikman, 2014 ONSC 3067, [2014] 
OJ No 2677 (SCJ) 
August 1, 2013 June 5, 2014 10 
20. Legge v Young, 2015 ONSC 775, 125 
OR (3d) 67 (SCJ) 
May 2014 March 10, 2015 10 
21 Nadi Inc v Montazemi-Safari, 2012 
ONSC 4723, [2012] OJ No 4005 
(SCJ) 
October 26, 2011  August 28, 
2012 
10  
22. Manson v Canetic Resources Ltd, 
2014 ONSC 261, [2014] OJ No 288 
(SCJ) 
 
February 21, 2013 
January 13, 
2014 
11 
23. Van Kessel v Orsulak, 2010 ONSC 
6919, 9 CPC (7th) 434 (SCJ) 
Mid-January 2010 December 24, 
2010 
11 
24. Victory v Sattar, 2014 ONSC 641, 
[2014] OJ No 437 (SCJ) 
Late January 2013 January 29, 
2014 
12 
25. Mehmood v Gray, 2011 ONSC 1735, 
[2011] OJ No 1177 (SCJ) 
March 2010 March 18, 2011 12 
26. Patterson v EM Technologies, Inc, 
2013 ONSC 5849, [2013] OJ No 
4249 (Master) 
September 2012 September 17, 
2013 
12 
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 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of Claim 
Date of Motion 
Resolution 
Delay in 
Months 
27. Petrook v Natuzzi Americas, Inc, 
2013 ONSC 4508, 10 CCEL (4th) 
317 (SCJ) 
May 11, 2012 July 3, 2013 14 
28. Umutomi c Safari, 2012 CSON 6962, 
[2012] OJ No 5822 (SCJ) 
September 19, 2011 December 6, 
2012 
15 
29. Khan v Layden, 2014 ONSC 6868, 
[2014] OJ No 5632 (SCJ) 
July 2013 November 26, 
2014 
16 
30. Shah v LG Chem, Ltd, 2015 ONSC 
2628, 125 OR (3d) 773 (SCJ) 
December 24, 2013 April 23, 2015 16 
31. Montel Inc v Kipawa Sales & 
Services Inc, 2014 ONSC 83, [2014] 
OJ No 219 (SCJ) 
September 11, 2012 January 17, 
2014 
16 
32. United States of America v Yemec, 
2012 ONSC 4207, 41 CPC (7th) 362 
(SCJ) 
Late March 2011 August 24, 
2012 
17 
33. Furfari v Juncos, 2011 ONSC 3624, 
38 CPC (7th) 110 (SCJ) 
Late December 
2009-Early January 
2010 
June 13, 2011 17 
34. QBD Cooling Systems Inc v Sollatek 
(UK) Ltd, 2015 ONSC 947, [2015] 
OJ No 1578 (SCJ) 
August 14, 2013 February 11, 
2015 
18 
35. Currie v Farr’s Coach Lines Ltd, 
2015 ONSC 2352, [2015] OJ No 
2075 (SCJ) 
October 2013  April 23, 2015 18 
36. Kais v Abu Dhabi Education Council, 
2011 ONSC 75, [2011] OJ No 33 
(Master) 
March 25, 2009 January 5, 2011 21 
37. Wilson v Riu, 2012 ONSC 6840, 98 
CCLT (3d) 337 (SCJ) 
Early January 2011  November 29, 
2012 
22 
38. Frank v Farlie, Turner & Co, LLC, 
2012 ONSC 5519, 113 OR (3d) 25 
(SCJ) 
Late December 2010 October 2, 2012 22 
39. Szecsodi v MGM Resorts 
International, 2014 ONSC 1323, 
[2014] OJ No 946 (Master) 
March 2012 March 3, 2014 24 
40. Bedford v Abushmaies, 2013 ONSC 
1352, [2013] OJ No 949 (SCJ) 
December 2010 March 6, 2013 27 
417 
 
 
 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of Claim 
Date of Motion 
Resolution 
Delay in 
Months 
41. 1673332 Ontario Ltd v Habonim 
Industrial Valves & Actuators Ltd, 
2011 ONSC 4973, [2011] OJ No 
3774 (SCJ) 
Early March 2009 August 22, 
2011 
29 
42. Kavanagh v Magna Exteriors and 
Interiors Corp (cob Servicios 
Decoplas), 2014 ONSC 4540, [2014] 
OJ No 4949 (SCJ) 
February 29, 2012 July 31, 2014 29 
43. Dennis v Farrell, 2010 ONSC 2401, 
84 CCLI (4th) 64 (SCJ) 
September 12, 2007 April 23, 2010 31 
44. Bale-eze Industries Inc v Frazier 
Industrial Co, 2012 ONSC 4892, 
[2012] OJ No 3996 (SCJ) 
January/February 
2009  
August 28, 
2012 
42 
45. Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector 
Engineering Inc, 2014 ONSC 1849, 
[2014] OJ No 1981 (SCJ) 
May 10, 2010  April 28, 2014 47 
46. Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2013 ONSC 
7494, 28 CCLI (5th) 229 (SCJ) 
Late 2009  December 5, 
2013 
48 
47. Haufler (Litigation Guardian of) v 
Hotel Riu Palace, 2013 ONSC 6044, 
117 OR (3d) 275 (SCJ) 
Late 2008  September 27, 
2013 
58 
48. Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada, 2015 
ONSC 5332, 126 OR (3d) 756 (SCJ) 
September 21, 2006 August 26, 
2015 
107 
 
Cases With Appeals (Sorted By Length of Delay) 
 
 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of 
Claim 
Date of 
Motion 
Resolution 
Delay 
in 
Months 
1. James Bay Resources Limited v Mak Mera 
Nigeria Limited, 2015 ONSC 1538, 39 
BLR (5th) 313 (SCJ), aff’d 2015 ONCA 
781, 128 OR (3d) 198 
September 10, 
2014 
November 
11, 2015 
14 
2. Mining Technologies International Inc v 
Krako Inc, 2012 ONSC 2239, 2012 
CarswellOnt 8034 (SCJ), aff’d ONCA 847, 
99 CCLT (3d) 46 
Early-to-mid-2011  November 
22, 2012 
14 
3. Galaxy Dragon Ltd v Topwater Exclusive 
Fund IV LLC, 2011 ONSC 6818, [2011] OJ 
January 27, 2011 May 30, 
2012 
16 
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 Decision Date Service of 
Statement of 
Claim 
Date of 
Motion 
Resolution 
Delay 
in 
Months 
No 5255 (SCJ), aff’d 2012 ONCA 382, 
[2012] OJ No 2522 
4. Brisben v Lunev, 2010 ONSC 1840, [2010] 
OJ No 3216 (SCJ), aff’d 2011 ONCA 15, 
[2011] OJ No 87 
June 2009  January 7, 
2011 
19 
5. Tyoga Investments Ltd v Service 
Alimentaire Desco Inc, 2015 ONSC 3810, 
[2015] OJ No 3133 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 
ONCA 15, [2016] OJ No 79 
May 7, 2014 January 8, 
2016 
20 
6. Wielgomas v Anglocom Inc, 2010 ONSC 
6289, 335 DLR (4th) 745 (SCJ), aff’d 2011 
ONCA 490, 335 DLR (4th) 741 
Summer 2009 June 29, 
2011 
23 
7. Lixo Investments Ltd v Gowling, Lafleur, 
Henderson, 2013 ONSC 4862, [2013] OJ 
No 3534 (SCJ), aff’d 2014 ONCA 114, 
[2014] No 667 
January 2012 February 
2, 2014 
25 
8. Arsenault v Nunavut, 2015 ONSC 4302, 
[2015] OJ No 3494 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 
ONCA 207, 30 CCEL (4th) 46 
February 3, 2014 March 3, 
2016 
25 
9. Jabbour v Eparchy of Our Lady of Lebanon 
of Los Angeles, 2010 ONSC 2475, 2010 
CarswellOnt 10731 (SCJ), aff’d 2011 
ONCA 140, [2011] OJ No 796 
November 8, 2008 February 
23, 2011 
27 
10. 2249659 Ontario Ltd v Siegen, 2012 ONSC 
3128, [2012] OJ No 3263 (SCJ), rev’d 2013 
ONCA 354, 115 OR (3d) 241 
January 11, 2011 May 31, 
2013 
 
29  
11. Wolfe v Wyeth, 2010 ONSC 2368, 84 CPR 
(4th) 43 (SCJ), aff’d 2011 ONCA 347, 373 
NSR (2d) 79 
December 3, 2007  May 5, 
2011 
41 
12. Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle 
Distributors ULC, 2015 ONSC 519, [2015] 
OJ No 979 (SCJ), rev’d 2016 ONCA 60, 
129 OR (3d) 37; re-decided 2016 ONSC 
2980, [2016] OJ No 2372 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 
ONCA 977, [2016] OJ No 6644 
March 22, 2013 December 
23, 2016 
45 
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Cases With Supreme Court Leave Applications (Sorted By Length of Delay) 
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APPENDIX D – ALL CASES BY DATE (RULE 2.1) 
 
 
Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
1 Gao v Ontario 
(Workplace Safety 
and Insurance 
Board) 
07-Nov-14 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2014 ONSC 
6100, 37 CLR 
(4th) 1 
2014 ONSC 
6497, 31 CPC 
(7th) 153 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
 
18 Days: October 
20, 2014 to 
November 7, 2014 
Myers 
Motion in dismissed 
claim 
Unclear 
2 Markowa v 
Adamson 
Cosmetic Facial 
Surgery Inc 
14-Nov-14 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2014 ONSC 
6664, [2014] OJ 
No 5430 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
25 Days: October 
20, 2014 to 
November 14, 2014 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
3 
Ali v Ford 14-Nov-14 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2014 ONSC 
6665, [2014] OJ 
No 5426 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
25 Days: October 
20, 2014 to 
November 14, 2014 
Myers OPCA 
Yes 
4 
Crawford v Carey 05-Dec-14 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2014 ONSC 
7054, [2014] OJ 
No 5824 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
28 Days: November 
7, 2014 to 
December 5, 2014 
Myers 
Tortious acts of 
building owner and 
developer Unclear 
5 
Nolan v Law 
Society of Upper 
Canada 
11-Dec-14 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2014 ONSC 
7196, [2014] OJ 
No 5989 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
52 Days: October 
20, 2014 to 
December 11, 2014 
(plaintiff could not 
be reached) 
Myers 
Forced resignation 
from Law Society in 
1986 
Unclear 
6 
Brown v Lloyds of 
London Insurance 
Market 
05-Jan-15 SCJ Unclear N/A  N/A 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
235, [2015] 
OJ No 1739 
None 
Unclear/About 120 
Days: Unclear to 
December 2014 to 
April 9, 2015 
(appeal) 
Myers 
Not discernible; no 
cause of action 
Yes 
7 
Hawkins v 
Schlosser 
28-Jan-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
646, [2015] OJ 
No 372 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A $1,148.02: 
2015 ONSC 
1691, [2015] 
OJ No 1346 
13 Days: January 
15, 2015 to January 
28, 2015 
Ellies 
Procedurally flawed 
family proceeding 
Unclear 
8 Stefanizzi v 
Ontario 
(Landlord and 
Tenant Board) 
05-Feb-15 SCJ Registrar N/A 
2015 ONSC 
859, [2015] OJ 
No 562 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
11 Days: January 
25, 2015 to 
February 5, 2015 
Kurke 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Unclear 
9 
Williams v Law 
Society of Upper 
Canada 
09-Feb-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
913, [2015] OJ 
No 619 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear 
N/A 
Myers 
Mental distress due 
to poor Law Society 
regulation 
Unclear 
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Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
10 
Park v Short 26-Feb-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONSC 
1292, [2015] OJ 
No 926 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 0 Days Myers 
Commenced in 
violation of 
vexatious litigant 
order Yes 
11 
Rousay v Rousay 27-Feb-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONSC 
1336, [2015] OJ 
No 930 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
66 Days: December 
23, 2014 to 
February 27, 2015 
McEwen 
Attempt to re-
litigate; not 
discernible Yes 
12 Raji v Borden 
Ladner and 
Gervais LLP 
02-Mar-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
801, [2015] OJ 
No 307 
2015 ONSC 
2915, [2015] OJ 
No 976 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: January 
26, 2015 to March 
2, 2015 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Unclear 
13 Chowdhury v 
Bangladeshi-
Canadian 
Community 
Services 
06-Mar-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
1534, [2015] OJ 
No 1081 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear 
N/A 
Myers 
Argument plaintiff’s 
motion premature 
Unclear 
14 
Beatty v Ontario 
(Attorney 
General) 
06-Mar-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
1519, [2015] OJ 
No 1290 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
28 Days: February 
6, 2015 to March 6, 
2015 
Gray 
Attempt to force 
province to alter 
policies in absence 
of factual basis Yes 
15 
Lin v Greither 09-Mar-15 SCJ Unclear N/A  
2015 ONSC 
1541, [2015] OJ 
No 1086 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
19 days: February 
18, 2015 to March 
9, 2015 
Myers 
Wrongful dismissal 
in 2009 in 
Vancouver; 
complaints against 
court for judgments; 
complaints against 
police for failing to 
investigate crime Yes 
16 
Gledhill v Toronto 
(City) Police 
Services Board 
18-Mar-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
1006, [2015] OJ 
No 733 (second 
notice) 
2015 ONSC 
1755, [2015] OJ 
No 1297 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
33 Days: February 
13, 2015 to March 
18, 2015 
Myers 
Not discernible and 
attempt to re-litigate 
Yes 
17 
Clarke v Canada 
(Human Rights 
Commission) 
18-Mar-15 SCJ Unclear 
2015 ONSC 
1789, [2015] OJ 
No 1341 
2015 ONSC 
2564, 2015 
Carswell Ont 
5611 
Claim 
Withdrawn 
Against 1 
Defendant on 
Consent 
N/A 
None 
27 Days: February 
19, 2015 to March 
18, 2015  
Myers 
Medical malpractice 
claim against 
improper defendant 
Yes 
18 
Husain v Craig 18-Mar-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
1754, [2015] OJ 
No 1300 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Claim against 
criminal defence 
lawyer Yes 
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Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
19 
Di Marco v 
Lattuca 
10-Apr-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
2341, [2015] OJ 
No 1845 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
50 Days: February 
19, 2015 to April 
10, 2015 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Unclear 
20 
Lin v Rock 14-Apr-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONSC 
2421, [2015] OJ 
No 1851 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Myers 
Motion brought 
before wrong 
decision-maker Yes 
21 
Gledhill v Toronto 
(City) Police 
Services Board 
14-Apr-15 SCJ Unclear 
2015 ONSC 
2068, 2015 
CarswellOnt 
5323 
2015 ONSC 
2418, [2015] OJ 
No 1847 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
15 Days: March 30, 
2015 to April 14, 
2015 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
22 
Covenoho v 
Ceridian Canada 
16-Apr-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2468, [2015] OJ 
No 1889 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear 
N/A 
Myers 
Defendants attempt 
to raise merits in 6-
page submissions Yes 
23 
Cao v Whirlpool 
Corp 
20-Apr-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
1266, [2015] OJ 
No 884 
2015 ONSC 
2582, [2015] OJ 
No 1990 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
54 Days: February 
25, 2015 to April 
20, 2015 
Myers 
Attempt to bring 
motion in dismissed 
action Yes 
24 Tunney v 51 
Toronto (City) 
Police 
24-Apr-15 SCJ Unclear 
[2015] OJ No 
2148 
2015 
CarswellOnt 
6140 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
37 Days: March 18, 
2015 to April 24, 
2015 
Myers 
Purporting to sue on 
behalf of another 
without standing Yes 
25 Nguyen v 
Economical 
Mutual Insurance 
Co 
24-Apr-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONSC 
2646, 49 CCLI 
(5th) 144 
Dismissed in 
Context of 
Other Motion 
N/A $2,000 (to 
defendant 
given other 
success) 
N/A Dow 
Insurance claim 
(procedural error by 
defendant) 
Yes 
26 
Salman v Patey 27-Apr-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2727, 72 CPC 
(7th) 368 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Lawyer’s 
negligence (alleged 
res judicata) Yes 
27 
Haidari v 
Sedeghi-Pour 
04-May-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2904, 73 CPC 
(7th) 191 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers Car accident 
No 
28 
Scaduto v Law 
Society of Upper 
Canada 
05-May-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2563, [2015] OJ 
No 2005 
N/A  
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2015 ONCA 
733, 343 OAC 
87, leave to 
appeal ref’d, 
[2015] SCCA 
No 488, 2016 
CarswellOnt 
21905 
Unclear 
15 Days: April 20, 
2015 to May 5, 
2015 to November 
2, 2015 to April 21, 
2016 
Myers 
Allegations against 
Law Society for 
permitting a lecture 
Yes 
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Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
29 
Guettler v Royal 
Bank of Canada 
05-May-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
2905, 72 CPC 
(7th) 295 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
176 Days: 
November 10, 2014 
to May 5, 2015 
Di Tomaso 
Wilful interference 
with right to 
peaceful life Yes 
30 
Pilieci v Ontario 
(Attorney 
General) 
25-May-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3298, [2015] OJ 
No 2616 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Attempt to sue court 
staff for how 
another proceeding 
was handled Yes 
31 Brown v Fred 
Victor 
Organization 
28-May-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2728, [2015] OJ 
No 2133 
2015 ONSC 
3421, [2015] OJ 
No 2681 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
31 Days: April 27, 
2015 to May 28, 
2015  
Myers 
Not discernable; 
failure to respond to 
offers to settle Yes 
32 Keedi v 
McDonald’s Corp 
Canada 
01-Jun-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
3516, [2015] OJ 
No 3428 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
45 Days: April 17, 
2015 to June 1, 
2015 
Beaudoin Unintelligible 
Yes 
33 
Becky v Ontario 
(Attorney 
General) 
04-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
[2015] OJ No 
4061, 2015 
CarswellOnt 
12048 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
37 Days: March 30, 
2015 to May 6, 
2015 
Grace 
Upset police entered 
apartment complex 
and sued the world 
Yes 
34 
Nemmour v 
Durdle 
12-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
2561, [2015] OJ 
No 1999 
2015 ONSC 
3772, [2015] OJ 
No 3074 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
53 days: April 20, 
2015 to June 12, 
2015 
Myers 
Allegations against 
city re shelter 
Yes 
35 
Godzicz v 
McPherson 
12-Jun-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
3776, [2015] OJ 
No 3071 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
38 Days: May 5, 
2015 to June 12, 
2015 
Myers 
Excessively long 
and not discernable 
Yes 
36 
Craven v Chmura 12-Jun-15 SCJ Unclear 
N/A (referred to 
in 2015 ONSC 
4843, [2015] OJ 
No 4088) 
 N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Broad 
Motion within 
broader case 
No 
37 
Ibrahim v Toronto 
Transit 
Commission 
17-Jun-15 SCJ Judge N/A 
2015 ONSC 
3912, [2015] OJ 
No 3155 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
234, [2016] 
OJ No 1631, 
leave to 
appeal ref’d, 
[2016] SCCA 
No 231, 2016 
CarswellOnt 
15338 
Unclear 
20 Days: May 28, 
2015 to June 17, 
2015 to March 31, 
2016 to October 6, 
2016 
Myers 
Not something civil 
action can redress 
Yes 
38 
Vasiliou v Hallett 19-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3207, [2015] OJ 
No 2567 
2015 ONSC 
3997, [2015] OJ 
No 3227 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
30 Days: May 20, 
2015 to June 19, 
2015 
Myers 
Litigation over will 
of mother 
Yes 
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39 
Lee v Future 
Bakery Ltd 
19-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3208, [2015] OJ 
No 2546 
2015 ONSC 
3996, [2015] OJ 
No 3217 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
30 Days: May 20, 
2015 to June 19, 
2015 
Myers 
Non-
comprehensible 
interlocutory step 
brought Yes 
40 
Posadas v Khan 23-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4077, 75 CPC 
(7th) 118 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Badly phrased 
counterclaims 
Yes (but 
lawyer) 
41 
Asghar v Ontario 23-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4071, [2015] OJ 
No 3326 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Asks province to 
provide job, fix 
romance issues, etc. 
Yes 
42 
Raji v Myers 23-Jun-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
4066, 75 CPC 
(7th) 115 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin Sues Myers J 
Yes 
43 
Clancy v Ontario 29-Jun-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
4194, [2015] OJ 
No 3422 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
116 days: March 5, 
2015 to June 29, 
2015 
Johnston 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
44 Hurontario Travel 
Centre v Ontario 
(Attorney 
General) 
30-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3296, [2015] OJ 
No 2613 
2015 ONSC 
4246, [2015] OJ 
No 3469 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
36 Days: May 25, 
2015 to June 30, 
2015 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
45 
Maden v 
Longstreet 
30-Jun-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3425, [2015] OJ 
No 2691 
2015 ONSC 
4247, [2015] OJ 
No 3473 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
34 Days: May 27, 
2015 to June 30, 
2015 
Myers 
Not discernable 
claim against 
lawyer Yes 
46 Persaud v 
Boundry Road 
Apts Ltd 
02-Jul-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONSC 
4275, [2015] OJ 
No 3586 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Daley 
Unintelligible, 
attempt to re-
litigate, no standing Yes 
47 
Allevio 
Healthcare Inc v 
Kirsh 
14-Jul-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4539, 77 CPC 
(7th) 211 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Defamation claim 
based on privileged 
communications – 
requires hearing Unclear 
48 
Asghar v Toronto 
(City) 
20-Jul-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4075, [2015] OJ 
No 3325 
2015 ONSC 
4650, 42 MPLR 
(5th) 138 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
27 Days: June 23, 
2015 to July 20, 
2015 
Myers 
Sued city after 
lifeguard said he 
was swimming too 
slowly in fast lane Yes 
49 
Kadiri v 
Harikumar 
04-Aug-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3777, [2015] OJ 
No 3073 
2015 ONSC 
4894, [2015] OJ 
No 4103 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A Unclear 
(substantial 
indemnity) 
53 Days: June 12, 
2015 to August 4, 
2015 
Myers 
Allegation that baby 
was stolen 
Yes 
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50 
Cheng v Lee 14-Aug-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
5148, 77 CPC 
(7th) 141 
 N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Accusations of 
sabotaging business 
($25M counterclaim 
on $30K claim) Yes 
51 
Tunney v Crew & 
Tango 
15-Aug-14 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4537, [2015] OJ 
No 3875 
2015 ONSC 
5140, 2015 
CarswellOnt 
12347 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
31 Days: July 14, 
2015 to August 14, 
2015 
Myers 
Plaintiff upset 
police arrested his 
tenant 
Yes 
52 
Ebriniss v 
D’Ovidio 
24-Aug-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4649, [2015] OJ 
No 3842 
2015 ONSC 
5295, [2015] OJ 
No 4446 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: July 20, 
2015 to August 24, 
2015 
Myers 
Baseless claim in 
occupier’s liability 
– on its face cannot 
succeed 
(acknowledges self-
reps need help) Yes 
53 
Gallion v Ontario 
Mortgage Corp 
25-Aug-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
4770, [2015] OJ 
No 3966 
2015 ONSC 
5320, [2015] OJ 
No 4433 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
29 Days: July 27, 
2015 to August 25, 
2015 
Myers 
Eviction 35 years 
ago 
Yes 
54 
Asghar v Avepoint 
Toronto 
04-Sep-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
5164, [2015] OJ 
No 4331 
2015 ONSC 
5544, [2015] OJ 
No 4611 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
21 Days: August 14, 
2015 to September 
4, 2015 
Myers 
Defendant offered 
and then reneged on 
job interview Yes  
55 
Kyriakopoulos v 
Lafontaine 
30-Sep-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6067, [2015] OJ 
No 5029 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
“Wholly 
inappropriate use of 
Rule 2.1” No 
56 
Mesa v TD Direct 
Investment 
14-Oct-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
5543, [2015] OJ 
No 4589 
2015 ONSC 
6337, [2015] OJ 
No 5292 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
40 Days: September 
4, 2015 to October 
14, 2015 
Myers 
Alleged failure to 
pay over investment 
Yes 
57 
Fine v Botelho 15-Oct-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
 N/A 
2015 ONSC 
6284, [2015] OJ 
No 5321 
Dismissed in 
Context of 
Other Motion 
N/A Not 
Applicable 
(other issues) 
N/A 
Graham 
(Master) 
Declined to use in 
context of broader 
motion Yes 
58 
Raji v Canada 
(RCMP) 
16-Oct-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
5414, [2015] OJ 
No 4515 
2015 ONSC 
6392, [2015] OJ 
No 5486 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
53 Days: August 24, 
2015 to October 16, 
2015 
Beaudoin 
Massive attempt to 
re-litigate alleged 
terrorist plot 
concerning plaintiff Yes  
59 
Raji v Downtown 
Legal Services 
16-Oct-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
5770, [2015] OJ 
No 4812 
2015 ONSC 
6391, [2015] OJ 
No 5474 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
29 Days: September 
17, 2015 to October 
16, 2015 
Beaudoin 
Collateral attack on 
provincial court 
decision Yes 
60 
Grigorov v Booth 04-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6066, [2015] OJ 
No 5025 
2015 ONSC 
6804, [2015] OJ 
No 5745 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: September 
30, 2015 to 
November 4, 2015 
Myers 
Lawyer’s 
negligence 
Yes 
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61 
Minor v Leonard 04-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6069, [2015] OJ 
No 5293 
2015 ONSC 
6801, [2015] OJ 
No 5744  
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
(“with costs”) 
35 Days: September 
30, 2015 to 
November 4, 2015 
Myers 
Damages based on 
absolutely 
privileged events 
from previous cases Yes 
62 Obermuller v 
Kenfinch Co-
Operative 
Housing Inc 
04-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6065, [2015] OJ 
No 5031 
2015 ONSC 
6800, [2015] OJ 
No 5743 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
330, [2016] 
OJ No 2362 
Unclear 
(trial); $2,000 
(appeal) 
35 Days: September 
30, 2015 to 
November 4, 2015 
to May 3, 2016 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate Landlord-
Tenant Board 
proceedings Yes 
63 
Charendoff v 
McLennan 
09-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6883, [2015] OJ 
No 6469 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A None N/A Myers 
Questionable late 
attempt to add 
plaintiff’s lawyer as 
third party No 
64 
Kavuru v Ontario 
(Public Guardian 
and Trustee) 
09-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6344, [2015] OJ 
No 5288 
2015 ONSC 
6877, 2015 
CarswellOnt 
18764 (partially 
granted); 2015 
ONSC 7697, 
[2015] OJ No 
6468 (fully 
granted) 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
758, [2016] 
OJ No 5557 
Unclear 
27 Days: October 
13, 2015 to 
November 9, 2015 
(to December 9, 
2015 to October 14, 
2016) 
Myers 
Suit against 
Attorney General 
due to decision of 
Divisional Court 
and other claims 
against Public 
Guardian and 
Trustee 
Yes 
65 
Perkins-Aboagye 
v Becker 
26-Nov-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6812, [2015] OJ 
No 6472 
2015 ONSC 
7366, [2015] OJ 
No 6291 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
23 Days: November 
3, 2015 to 
November 26, 2015 
Beaudoin 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
66 
Hagey v Ontario 
(Racing 
Commission) 
27-Nov-15 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2015 ONSC 
7506, [2015] OJ 
No 6203 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear Unclear Nadeau 
Claim for breach of 
procedural fairness 
by Racing 
Commission Yes 
67 Nguyen v 
Economical 
Mutual Insurance 
Co 
01-Dec-15 SCJ Unclear 
2015 ONSC 
6802, [2015] OJ 
No 5723 
2015 ONSC 
7449, [2015] OJ 
No 6251 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
27 Days: November 
4, 2015 to 
December 1, 2015  
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
68 
Munroe v 
Salvation Army 
01-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
7448, [2015] OJ 
No 6220 
N/A 
Lack of 
Notice 
Reconsidered: 
2016 ONSC 
5564, [2016] 
OJ No 4643 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Wrongful dismissal 
with outrageous 
facts  
Yes 
69 Gebremariam v 
Toronto (City) 
Police Service 
01-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
7447, [2015] OJ 
No 6243 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers Police brutality 
Unclear 
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70 
Ghasempoor v 
DSM Leasing Ltd 
07-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
7628, [2015] OJ 
No 6422 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers Equipment lease 
Yes 
71 Shafirovitch v 
Scarborough 
Hospital 
07-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
Dismissed 
without notice 
2015 ONSC 
7627, 85 CPC 
(7th) 149 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
None 0 Days Myers 
Belief hospital 
threw bugs at him 
Yes 
72 
Brown v Loblaws 
Companies Ltd 
07-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6501, [2015] OJ 
No 5440 
2015 ONSC 
7629, [2015] OJ 
No 6394 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
47 Days: October 
21, 2015 to 
December 7, 2015 
Myers 
Claims related to 
denied credit card 
application Yes 
73 
Asghar v Alon 14-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
3835, 74 CPC 
(7th) 311 
2015 ONSC 
7823, [2015] OJ 
No 6573 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
182 Days: June 15, 
2015 to December 
14, 2015 
Myers Libel 
Yes 
74 MacLeod v Bell 
Canada 
Enterprises 
22-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
7116, [2015] OJ 
No 5958 
2015 ONSC 
8019, [2015] OJ 
No 6770 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
35 Days: November 
17, 2015 to 
December 22, 2015 
Myers 
Simply gave a 
collection of bills 
Yes 
75 
MacLeod v 
Ontario 
22-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
7240, [2015] OJ 
No 6047 
2015 ONSC 
8020, [2015] OJ 
No 6772 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
32 Days: November 
20, 2015 to 
December 22, 2015 
Myers 
Incomprehensible; 
request for 
exemption from 
credit check Yes 
76 
MacLeod v 
Hanrahan Youth 
Services 
22-Dec-15 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
8018, [2015] OJ 
No 6771 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear 0 Days Myers 
Request to dismiss 
defendant’s motion 
(itself frivolous and 
vexatious) Yes 
77 
Reyes v Esbin 11-Jan-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2015 ONSC 
6885, [2015] OJ 
No 6469 
2016 ONSC 
254, [2016] OJ 
No 97 
Partially 
Granted 
N/A Unclear 
(submissions 
called for) 
63 Days: November 
9, 2015 to January 
11, 2016 
Myers 
Loss of valuable 
chattels after 
eviction Yes 
78 
Frick v Frick 18-Feb-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A – Formal 
Motion Brought 
2016 ONSC 
359, 78 RFL 
(7th) 430 
Dismissed 
After Appeal 
Allowed in 
Part: 2016 
ONCA 799, 
132 OR (3d) 
321 
Unclear 
70 Days: December 
10, 2015 to 
February 18, 2016 
to October 31, 2016 
Ellies Family law use 
No 
79 
Purcaru v Vacaru 07-Mar-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
1037, [2016] OJ 
No 726 
2016 ONSC 
1609, 76 RFL 
(7th) 333 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
25 Days: February 
10, 2016 to March 
7, 2016 
Myers Family law dispute 
Yes 
80 Dias v Ontario 
(Workplace Safety 
& Insurance 
Board) 
10-Mar-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
980, [2016] OJ 
No 671 
2016 ONSC 
1752, [2016] OJ 
No 2464 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
30 Days: February 
8, 2016 to March 
10, 2016  
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate WSIB 
Yes 
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81 
Lee v Future 
Bakery Ltd 
10-Mar-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
1764, [2016] OJ 
No 1266 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 0 Days Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Unclear 
82 
Ochnik v Belusa 10-Mar-16 SCJ Unclear 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
1767, [2016] OJ 
No 1302 
Granted – 
Notice 
Unclear 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate but different 
party Unclear 
83 
Ochnik v Belusa 10-Mar-16 SCJ Unclear 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
1861, [2016] OJ 
No 1386 
Granted – 
Notice 
Unclear 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate but different 
party Unclear 
84 
Noddle v Attorney 
General (Ontario) 
14-Mar-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
1826, [2016] OJ 
No 1317 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
None N/A Myers 
Claim against 
government for 
medical malpractice 
and incarceration Yes 
85 
Rallis v 
Scarborough 
Hospital 
04-Apr-16 SCJ Unclear 
2016 ONSC 
1763, [2016] OJ 
No 1264 
2016 ONSC 
2263, [2016] OJ 
No 1773 
Ordered to 
Serve 
Amended 
Pleading 
N/A 
Unclear 
25 Days: March 10, 
2016 to April 4, 
2016 
Myers Medical malpractice 
Yes 
86 
Goralczyk v Beer 
Store 
04-Apr-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
993, [2016] OJ 
No 675 
Mostly granted: 
2016 ONSC 
2265, [2016] OJ 
No 1763 and 
entirely granted: 
2016 ONSC 
4416, [2016] OJ 
No 3597 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None (against 
some); 
Unclear 
(against 
others) 
55 Days: February 
8, 2016 to April 4, 
2016 to July 5, 2016 
(More time granted 
on March 9 and 
May 9: 2016 ONSC 
1699, [2016] OJ No 
1196) 
Myers 
Mostly 
incomprehensible 
claim including 
slip-and-fall 
Yes 
87 
Nguyen v Bail 04-Apr-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
1828, [2016] OJ 
No 1316 
2016 ONSC 
2259, [2016] OJ 
No 1769 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
21 Days: March 14, 
2016 to April 4, 
2016  
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
88 Nguyen v 
Economical 
Mutual Insurance 
Co 
04-Apr-16 SCJ Unclear N/A  
2016 ONSC 
2260, 2016 
CarswellOnt 
5186 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
40 Days: February 
23, 2016 to April 4, 
2016 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
89 
Lin v ICBC 
Vancouver Head 
Office 
04-Apr-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
2262, [2016] OJ 
No 1766 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONSC 
3934, [2016] 
OJ No 3223 
(Div Ct), 2016 
ONCA 788, 
[2016] OJ 
6071, leave to 
appeal ref’d, 
Unclear 
25 Days: March 10, 
2016 to April 4, 
2016 to October 
2016 to April 13, 
2017 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate – appeals 
dismissed under 
Rule 2.1 
Yes 
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[2016] SCCA 
No 561, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
807 (SCC) 
90 
Nguyen v Bail 07-Apr-16 SCJ Unclear 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
2365, [2016] OJ 
No 1840 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 0 Days Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
91 
Leandre v 
Windsor Regional 
Hospital 
20-Apr-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2657, [2016] OJ 
No 2300 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Faieta 
Discrimination/ 
failure to honour 
insurance 
Unclear 
92 Ramlall v Jahir 
Ullah Pharmacy 
Inc #1333 
22-Apr-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2705, [2016] OJ 
No 2139 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A  Myers 
Failure to honour 
sale prices 
Yes 
93 
Chalupnicek v 
Children’s Aid 
Society of Ottawa 
26-Apr-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2353, [2016] OJ 
No 1940 
2016 ONSC 
2787, [2016] OJ 
No 2122 
Granted After 
Notice 
Request for 
re-
consideration 
denied: 2016 
ONSC 4452, 
[2016] OJ No 
3876  
Affirmed: 
2017 ONSC 
1278, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
272 (Div Ct) 
None (Trial); 
$17,684.83 
(Appeal - full 
indemnity) 
19 Days: April 7, 
2016 to April 26, 
2016 to July 6, 2016 
to February 23, 
2017 
MacLeod 
(Master) 
Kidnapping of 
children 
No 
94 Dias v Ontario 
(Liquor Control 
Board) 
12-May-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2364, [2016] OJ 
No 1827 
2016 ONSC 
3135, [2016] OJ 
No 2465 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: April 7, 
2016 to May 12, 
2016 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
95 
Murray v Toronto 
(City) 
12-May-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2355, [2016] OJ 
1839 
2016 ONSC 
3137, [2016] OJ 
No 2472 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: April 7, 
2016 to May 12, 
2016 
Myers Seeks public inquiry 
Yes 
96 Leandre v 
Children’s Aid 
Society of London 
18-May-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2472, [2016] OJ 
No 1902 
2016 ONSC 
3250, [2016] OJ 
No 2959 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
35 Days: April 13, 
2016 to May 18, 
2016 
Diamond 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
97 
Thompson v WJ 
Holdings Ltd 
31-May-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
2704, [2016] OJ 
No 2145 
2016 ONSC 
3591, [2016] OJ 
No 2942 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
39 Days: April 22, 
2016 to May 31, 
2016 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
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98 
SC v Children’s 
Aid Society 
31-May-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
3592, [2016] OJ 
No 2953 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Claim against CAS 
for bad treatment 
Yes 
99 Chaloob v 
Canada (Attorney 
General) 
31-May-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
3569, [2016] OJ 
No 3002 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
55 Days: April 6, 
2016 to May 31, 
2016 
Beaudoin Unclear 
Unclear 
100 
Ochnik v Belusa 31-May-16 SCJ Unclear 
2016 ONSC 
1860, [2016] OJ 
No 1385 
2016 ONSC 
3589, [2016] OJ 
No 2950 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
77 Days: March 15, 
2016 to May 31, 
2016 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
101 Leandre v 
Collection 
Services of 
Windsor Ltd 
01-Jun-16 SCJ Unclear 
2016 ONSC 
2733, [2016] OJ 
No 2125 
2016 ONSC 
2733, [2016] OJ 
No 2931 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
37 Days: April 25, 
2016 to June 1, 
2016 
Diamond 
Motion to seek 
immediate arrest of 
many individuals 
Yes 
102 TFB v Office of 
the Children’s 
Lawyer 
07-Jun-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
3816, [2016] OJ 
No 3024 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
77 Days: March 22, 
2016 to June 7, 
2016 
Trimble 
Claims against 
children’s lawyer 
not actionable Yes 
103 Mitchell v Ontario 
(Ministry of 
Transportation) 
16-Jun-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
4016, [2016] OJ 
No 3643 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
118 Days: February 
18, 2016 to June 16, 
2016 
Daley 
Obviously meritless 
appeal brought in 
wrong court Unclear 
104 
Marleau v 
Brockville (City) 
30-Jun-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
4364, [2016] OJ 
No 3634 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A $5500: 2016 
ONSC 5901, 
[2016] OJ No 
4961 
Unclear Trousdale 
Statutory abuse of 
power, etc 
Yes 
105 
Jarvis v Morlog 07-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
1827, [2016] OJ 
No 1314 
2016 ONSC 
4476, [2016] OJ 
No 3662 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A $2,256.39: 
2016 ONSC 
5061, 2016 
CarswellOnt 
12693 
(substantial 
indemnity) 
115 Days: March 
14, 2016 to July 7, 
2016 
Myers 
Freeman on the land 
submissions 
regarding criminal 
court summons 
Yes 
106 
Irmya v Mijovick 15-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
3608, [2016] OJ 
No 2935 
2016 ONSC 
4629, [2016] OJ 
No 3797 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A $13,615.94, 
$6706.65, 
$9,865.19 
(full 
indemnity, 
against three 
different 
parties): 2016 
ONSC 5276, 
[2016] OJ No 
4372 
45 Days: May 31, 
2016 to July 15, 
2016 
Myers Condo dispute 
Yes 
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Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
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Rep? 
107 
Asghar v Toronto 
(City) Police 
Services Board 
27-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4844, [2016] OJ 
No 4028 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Faieta Unclear 
Unclear 
108 
Park v Crossgate 
Legal Services 
28-Jul-16 SCJ Registrar N/A 
2016 ONSC 
4864, [2016] OJ 
No 4021 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
0 Days 
Myers 
Commenced in 
violation of 
vexatious litigant 
order Unclear 
109 
Noddle v Canada 
(Deputy Attorney 
General) 
28-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4866, [2016] OJ 
No 4038 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Faeita 
Suit alleging 
defamation based 
on contents of past 
pleadings Unclear 
110 
Polanski v 
Scharfe 
29-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4892, [2016] OJ 
No 4039 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Strange claim based 
on dismissal from 
articling Unclear 
111 D’Orazio v 
Ontario (Attorney 
General) 
29-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
4893, [2016] OJ 
No 4031 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
(partial) 
0 Days Myers 
Acknowledged 
attempt to re-litigate 
Yes 
112 
Mester v Weh 29-Jul-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
December 17, 
2015 (not 
reported – by 
registrar) 
2016 ONSC 
4887, [2016] OJ 
No 4274 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
None 
253 Days: 
November 19, 2015 
to July 29, 2016 
Maddalena 
Serious allegations 
but detailed 
Unclear 
113 
Musole v Buset & 
Partners LLP 
02-Aug-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4429, [2016] OJ 
No 3886 
2016 ONSC 
5561, [2016] OJ 
No 4699 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
63 Days: July 5, 
2016 to September 
6, 2016 
Beaudoin 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
114 
Carby-Samuels v 
Carby-Samuels 
05-Aug-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4974, [2016] OJ 
No 4188 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Muddled but 
discernible claim 
Unclear 
115 Graff v Network 
North Reporting 
and Mediation 
15-Aug-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
5158, [2016] OJ 
No 4301 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Myers 
Claim against 
former medical 
experts Unclear 
116 MacLeod 
(Litigation 
guardian of) v 
Hanrahan Youth 
Services 
19-Aug-16 SCJ Unclear 
2016 ONSC 
5231, [2016] OJ 
No 4342 
2016 ONSC 
5845, [2016] OJ 
No 4814 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
33 Days: August 17, 
2016 to September 
19, 2016 
Myers 
Attempt to litigate 
prerogative of 
family courts 
Yes 
117 
Lochner v 
Toronto (City) 
Police Service 
26-Aug-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
5384, [2016] OJ 
No 4534 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Goldstein 
Motion was 2.1ed 
after determination 
on other issues 
Yes 
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Master) Claim Type 
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Rep? 
appears to have 
rendered moot 
118 
Zhang v Oh 31-Aug-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
3734, [2016] OJ 
No 3021 
2016 ONSC 
5484, [2016] OJ 
No 4710 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
86 Days: June 6, 
2016 to August 31, 
2016 
Beaudoin 
Suit of senator for 
being spy 
Yes 
119 
Reyes v Buhler 06-Sep-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
5559, [2016] OJ 
No 4635 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear (full 
indemnity) 
N/A Myers 
Commenced in 
violation of 
vexatious litigant 
order Unclear 
120 
Reyes v Jocelyn 06-Sep-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
5568, [2016] OJ 
No 4642 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear (full 
indemnity) 
N/A Myers 
Commenced in 
violation of 
vexatious litigant 
order Unclear 
121 
Reyes v Embry 06-Sep-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
5558, [2016] OJ 
No 4636 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear (full 
indemnity) 
N/A Myers 
Commenced in 
violation of 
vexatious litigant 
order Unclear 
122 Dias v Ontario 
(Workplace Safety 
& Insurance 
Board) 
09-Sep-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
5226, [2016] OJ 
No 4355 
2016 ONSC 
5636, [2016] OJ 
No 4662 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
23 Days: August 17, 
2016 to September 
9, 2016 
Braid 
Attempt to re-
litigate Toronto 
actions 
Yes 
123 
Sagos v Edelson 23-Sep-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
4482, [2016] OJ 
No 3894 
2016 ONSC 
5987, [2016] OJ 
No 4936 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
78 Days: July 7, 
2016 to September 
23, 2016 
Beaudoin 
Statute-barred, 
likely jurisdiction-
barred, unclear 
claim against 
lawyer Yes 
124 
Bisumbule v 
Conway 
30-Sep-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
6138, [2016] OJ 
No 5209 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Arguable res 
judicata/limitations 
period Unclear 
125 Troncanada & 
Associates v 
B2Gold Corp 
06-Oct-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
6271, [2016] OJ 
No 5190 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear 
N/A Dow 
Arguable attempt to 
re-litigate 
Unclear 
126 MS v Elia 
Associates 
Professional Corp 
26-Oct-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
5375, [2016] OJ 
No 4479 
2016 ONSC 
6714, [2016] OJ 
No 5628 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
62 Days: August 25, 
2016 to October 26, 
2016 
Beaudoin 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
127 
Sagos v Bermuda 
(Attorney 
General) 
01-Nov-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
5664, [2016] OJ 
No 4709 
2016 ONSC 
6806, 2016 
CarswellOnt 
17293 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
50 Days: September 
12, 2016 to 
November 1, 2016 
Beaudoin 
Attempt to sue 
Bermudan police in 
Ontario 
Yes 
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128 
Chapadeau v 
Addelman 
01-Nov-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
6803, [2016] OJ 
No 5655 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
None N/A Beaudoin “Arguable issues” 
Unclear 
129 Bouragba v 
Conseil des 
Écoles Publiques 
de l’Est de 
l’Ontario 
01-Nov-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
6810, [2016] OJ 
No 5652 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Claims arising from 
suspension from 
school 
Yes 
130 
Zeleny v Canada 18-Nov-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
7226, [2016] OJ 
No 6101 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Minnema 
Sought half-billion 
dollars as per 
obviously fake 
bonds Yes 
131 
Clark v Sports 
Cafe Champions 
21-Nov-16 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
7303, [2016] OJ 
No 5991 
2016 ONSC 
8046, [2016] OJ 
No 6605 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
28 Days: November 
23, 2016 to 
December 21, 2016 
Myers 
Wrong forum, no 
standing 
Yes 
132 
Beseiso v Halton 
(Regional) Police 
17-Dec-16 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
7986, [2016] OJ 
No 6752 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
23 Days: November 
24, 2016 to 
December 17, 2016 
Beaudoin Unclear 
Yes 
133 
R v Samuels 04-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
7748, [2016] OJ 
No 6396 
2017 ONSC 67, 
[2017] OJ No 
20 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
26 Days: December 
9, 2016 to January 
4, 2017 
Myers 
Attempt to stay 
criminal case 
through civil 
proceedings Yes 
134 
Noddle v Canada 
(Attorney 
General) 
10-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
215, [2017] OJ 
No 154 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Unclear 
135 
Mpamugo v 
Canada (Revenue 
Agency) 
17-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONSC 
7569, [2017] 1 
CTC 186 
2017 ONSC 
406, [2017] OJ 
No 200 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
43 Days: December 
5, 2016 to January 
17, 2017 
Myers 
Attempt to re-
litigate (submissions 
suggest potential 
change of 
circumstances) Yes 
136 
Van Sluytman v 
Department of 
Justice (Canada) 
23-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A (January 5, 
2017 per appeal 
decision) 
2017 ONSC 
481, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
9603 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2018 ONCA 
32, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
301, leave to 
appeal denied, 
[2018] SCCA 
No 206, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
18335 
Unclear 
18 Days: January 5, 
2017 to January 23, 
2017 (to January 16, 
2018) 
Wood 
Statute-barred, 
many actions 
Yes 
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137 
Van Sluytman v 
Orillia Soldiers’ 
Memorial 
Hospital 
27-Jan-17 SCJ Judge N/A 
2017 ONSC 
692, [2017] OJ 
No 445 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2018 ONCA 
32, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
301, leave to 
appeal denied, 
[2018] SCCA 
No 206, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
18335 
Unclear 
24 Days: January 3, 
2017 to January 27, 
2017 to January 16, 
2018 
DiLuca 
Statute-barred, 
many actions 
Yes 
138 
2222028 Ontario 
Inc v Adams 
27-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
690, [2017] OJ 
No 565 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Matheson 
Badly drafted claim 
alleging 
misappropriation of 
funds 
Non-
Lawyer 
Purports 
to Act 
139 
Bresnark v 
Canada 
31-Jan-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
767, [2017] OJ 
No 960 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Chiappetta Unclear 
Unclear 
140 
Caliciuri v 
Matthias 
07-Feb-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
748, [2017] OJ 
No 547 
Dismissed in 
Context of 
Other Motion 
N/A 
Unclear 
137 Days (formal 
motion in 
conjunction with 
Rule 21): 
September 23, 2016 
to February 7, 2017 
MacLeod 
Alleged attempt to 
re-litigate 
No 
141 
Lin v Ontario 
(Ombudsman) 
10-Feb-17 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2017 ONSC 
966, [2017] OJ 
No 699 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
79 Days: November 
23, 2016 to 
February 10, 2017 
Chiappetta Many actions 
Yes 
142 
Milne v 
Livingston 
27-Feb-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1367, [2017] OJ 
No 1031 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Chiappetta 
“On its face” 
abusive 
Unclear 
143 
Ellis v Wernick 
03-Mar-17 
SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
1461, [2017] OJ 
No 1070 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Marrocco 
Attempt to 
challenge Royal 
Proclamation of 
1763 Yes 
144 
Strang v Toronto 
(City) 
10-Mar-17 SCJ Judge 
2017 ONSC 
997, [2017] OJ 
No 680 
2017 ONSC 
1622, [2017] OJ 
No 1295 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
29 Days: February 
9, 2017 to March 
10, 2017 
Myers 
Hallmarks of 
vexatiousness 
Yes 
145 
Strang v Paragon 
Security 
10-Mar-17 SCJ Judge 
2017 ONSC 
996, [2017] OJ 
No 684 
2017 ONSC 
1623, [2017] OJ 
No 1299 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
29 Days: February 
9, 2017 to March 
10, 2017 
Myers 
Hallmarks of 
vexatiousness 
Yes 
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146 Strang v Ontario 
Public Service 
Employees Union 
10-Mar-17 SCJ Judge 
2017 ONSC 
995, [2017] OJ 
No 683 
2017 ONSC 
1625, [2017] OJ 
No 1298 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
29 Days: February 
9, 2017 to March 
10, 2017 
Myers 
Hallmarks of 
vexatiousness 
Yes 
147 
Strang v Ontario  10-Mar-17 SCJ Judge 
2017 ONSC 
994, [2017] OJ 
No 682 
2017 ONSC 
1625, [2017] OJ 
No 1297 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
29 Days: February 
9, 2017 to March 
10, 2017 
Myers 
Hallmarks of 
vexatiousness 
Yes 
148 
Strang v Ontario 
(Treasury Board) 
13-Mar-17 SCJ 
Judge 
2017 ONSC 
993, [2017] OJ 
No 681 
2017 ONSC 
1638, [2017] OJ 
No 1296 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
32 Days: February 
9, 2017 to March 
13, 2017 
Myers 
Hallmarks of 
vexatiousness 
Yes 
149 
Zhang v Zang 17-Mar-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1183, [2017] OJ 
No 950 
2017 ONSC 
1772, [2017] OJ 
No 1858 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
23 Days: February 
22, 2017 to March 
17, 2017 
Beaudoin 
Attempt to re-
litigate allegations 
of spying Yes 
150 
DeMasi v Toronto 
(City) 
24-Mar-17 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2017 ONSC 
1916, [2017] OJ 
No 1541 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
162 Days: October 
13, 2016 to March 
24, 2017 
Dunphy Incomprehensible 
Yes 
151 
Fex v McCarthy 
Tetrault LLP 
27-Mar-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1280, [2017] OJ 
No 905 
2017 ONSC 
1907, [2017] OJ 
No 1548 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
31 Days: February 
24, 2017 to March 
27, 2017 
Sweeny 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
152 Dias v Ontario 
(Workplace Safety 
& Insurance 
Appeal Tribunal) 
27-Mar-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1277, [2017] OJ 
No 902 
2017 ONSC 
1888, [2017] OJ 
No 1542 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
31 Days: February 
24, 2017 to March 
27, 2017 
Sweeny 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
153 
Van Sluytman v 
Brewster 
28-Mar-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
1957, [2017] OJ 
No 2287 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2018 ONCA 
32, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
301, leave to 
appeal denied, 
[2018] SCCA 
No 206, 2018 
CarswellOnt 
18335 
Unclear 
61 Days: January 
26, 2017 to March 
28, 2017 
DiLuca 
Obviously statute-
barred 
Yes 
154 
White v Graham 10-Apr-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1268, [2017] OJ 
No 948 
2017 ONSC 
2236, [2017] OJ 
No 1856 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
47 Days: February 
22, 2017 to April 
10, 2017 
Beaudoin 
Outrageous, 
delusional claims 
Yes 
155 
Reyes v KL 12-Apr-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
308, [2017] OJ 
No 192 
2017 ONSC 
2304, [2017] OJ 
No 2195 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
90 Days: January 
12, 2017 to April 
12, 2017 
Faieta 
Scandalous and/or 
statute-barred 
employment 
allegations Yes 
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156 Ramsarran v 
Assaly Asset 
Management 
Corp 
19-Apr-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
2394, [2017] OJ 
No 1937 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Trying to explain 
why abusive 
through argument 
No 
157 
Carby-Samuels v 
Carby-Samuels 
12-May-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
2911, [2017] OJ 
No 2406 
N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear 
N/A 
 
Beaudoin 
“Clearly 
inappropriate” 
attempt to short 
circuit defendant’s 
summary judgment 
motion after failure 
to file notice of 
motion Unclear 
158 Foster v 
Children’s Aid 
Society 
15-May-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
2086, [2017] OJ 
No 2692 
2017 ONSC 
2990, [2017] OJ 
No 2693 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
42 Days: April 3, 
2017 to May 15, 
2017 
Beaudoin 
No material facts 
pleaded – simply 
demanded money Yes 
159 Korolew v 
Canadian Union 
of Public 
Employees 
05-Jun-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
2984, [2017] OJ 
No 2696 
2017 ONSC 
3474, [2017] OJ 
No 2949 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
21 Days: May 15, 
2017 to June 5, 
2017 
Beaudoin 
Statement of Claim 
containing one 
word: Dafamation 
(sic) Yes 
160 
Gebremariam v 
Jenkins 
21-Jun-17 SCJ Unclear N/A 
2017 ONSC 
3845, [2017] OJ 
No 3197 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
55 Days: April 27, 
2017 to June 21, 
2017  
Glustein 
Attempt to re-
litigate, unknown 
claim Yes 
161 
Kashani v 
Algonquin 
College 
28-Jun-17 SCJ 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
3971, [2017] OJ 
No 3513 
N/A 
Notice 
Ordered; 
Unclear 
Result 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Beaudoin 
Manifestly frivolous 
and/or in the wrong 
court 
Yes 
162 
Khan v Krylov & 
Company LLP 
N/A SCJ Unclear N/A N/A 
Dismissed 
After Appeal 
Reversed: 
2017 ONCA 
625, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
16235 
$2,000 (trial); 
$3,000 
(appeal) 
N/A 
Daley 
Not “clearest of 
cases” Yes 
163 
R. v Jayaraj 03-Nov-14 Div Ct Judge N/A 
2014 ONSC 
6367, 69 CPC 
(7th) 287 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
14 Days: October 
20, 2014 to 
November 3, 2014 
Nordheimer 
Seeking to quash 
appointments of 
judges Unclear 
164 
Beard Winter LLP 
v Shekhdar 
15-Mar-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
1852, [2016] OJ 
No 1350 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
1 Day: Judge Asked 
Day Before 
Marrocco 
Improper attempt to 
“review and set 
aside” earlier 
decision Yes 
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165 
Lin v Zhang 18-Apr-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
2485, [2016] OJ 
No 1988 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A None 
27 Days: March 22, 
2016 to April 18, 
2016 
Sachs 
Seeking damages in 
Divisional Court 
based on Landlord-
Tenant proceeding Yes 
166 
Lin v Springboard 22-Jul-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
4705, [2016] OJ 
No 3917 
Granted After 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2016 ONCA 
787, [2016] 
OJ No 6072, 
Leave to 
appeal 
refused: 
[2016] SCCA 
No 562, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
2700 
Unclear 
42 Days: June 10, 
2016 to July 22, 
2016 to October 26, 
2016 to February 
23, 2017 
Sachs 
Seeks relief that 
cannot be granted in 
judicial review 
Yes 
167 
Cerqueira Estate 
v Ontario 
18-Aug-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
5112, [2016] OJ 
No 4353 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
77 Days: June 2, 
2016 to August 18, 
2016 
Sachs 
Attempt to re-
litigate (dealt with 
by SJ in SCJ) Yes 
168 Gates v Humane 
Society of Canada 
for the Protection 
of Animals and 
the Environment 
(cob The Humane 
Society of 
Canada) 
24-Aug-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
5345, [2016] OJ 
No 4424 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
$8,000: 2016 
ONSC 6051, 
[2016] OJ No 
4957 
N/A Horkins 
Dismissal of appeal 
of Small Claims 
Court decision after 
many frivolous 
steps 
No 
169 
Adamson v 
Iracleous 
27-Sep-16 Div Ct Unclear 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6055, [2016] OJ 
No 4943 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
Attempt to JR to 
“fix to do what is 
right” Yes 
170 
El Zayat v 
Hausler 
28-Sep-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6099, [2016] OJ 
No 4984 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
“Motion” really 
attempt to have 
second appeal Yes 
171 
Adamson v Lo 29-Sep-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6114, [2016] OJ 
No 5012 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
Attempt to JR to 
“fix to do what is 
right” Yes 
172 Graff v Capreit 
Limited 
Partnership 
03-Oct-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6173, [2016] OJ 
No 5073 
Dismissed 
After Notice 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Nordheimer 
Landlord dispute 
that had become 
moot Yes 
173 Lin v Toronto 
(City) Police 
Services Board 
27-Oct-16 Div Ct Unclear 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6736, [2016] OJ 
No 5540 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
37 Days: September 
20, 2016 to October 
27, 2016 
Nordheimer Unintelligible 
Yes 
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Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
174 Stefanizzi v 
Ontario 
(Landlord and 
Tenant Board) 
09-Nov-16 Div Ct 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2016 ONSC 
6932, [2016] OJ 
No 5779 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Gauthier 
Divisional Court 
obviously not 
proper forum 
Yes 
175 
Hemchand v 
Toronto (City) 
16-Nov-16 Div Ct 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
Unreported 
(referred to in 
2016 ONSC 
7134, [2016] OJ 
No 5857) 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
No jurisdiction for 
Divisional Court 
Yes 
176 Coady v Law 
Society of Upper 
Canada 
02-Dec-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
7543, [2016] OJ 
No 6194 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
Seeking relief that 
cannot be granted 
Yes 
177 
Son v Khan 06-Dec-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
7621, [2016] OJ 
No 6283  
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
$2,611.93 
N/A Price 
Attempt to re-
litigate  
Yes 
178 Cerqueira (Estate 
Trustee of) v 
Ontario 
19-Dec-16 Div Ct Unclear N/A 
2016 ONSC 
7961, [2016] OJ 
No 6512 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
33 Days: November 
16, 2016 to 
December 19, 2016 
Nordheimer 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
179 
Nithiananthan v 
Quash 
09-Jan-17 Div Ct Registrar N/A 
2017 ONSC 
155, [2017] OJ 
No 62 
Granted After 
Notice 
No appeal 
allowed: 2017 
ONSC 1359, 
2017 
CarswellOnt 
2764 
None 
20 Days: December 
20, 2016 to January 
9, 2017 
Nordheimer 
Seeking leave to 
appeal a decision 
declining leave to 
appeal. No right of 
appeal per 
Marrocco ACJ Yes 
180 Volnyansky v 
Ontario (Attorney 
General) 
14-Mar-17 Div Ct 
Responding 
Party 
2017 ONSC 
1692, [2017] OJ 
No 1330 N/A 
Notice Not 
Ordered 
N/A 
Unclear N/A Daley 
Arguable attempt to 
re-litigate 
Yes 
181 Apollo Real 
Estate Ltd v 
Streambank 
Funding 
23-Mar-17 Div Ct Judge 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
1877, [2017] OJ 
No 1463 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None N/A Nordheimer 
Denying frivolous 
motion for leave to 
appeal 
Unclear 
182 
Lin v Fluery 09-Jun-17 Div Ct Judge 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
3601, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
8926 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
Affirmed: 
2017 ONCA 
695, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
13756 
None 
3 Days: Notice of 
Appeal filed June 6; 
appeal dismissed 
June 9 
Nordheimer 
Dismissal of appeal 
without jurisdiction 
Yes 
183 
Khan v 1806700 
Ontario Inc 
15-Jun-17 Div Ct Judge 
N/A 
2017 ONSC 
3726, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
9122 
Granted 
Without 
Notice 
N/A 
None 
7 Days: June 8, 
2017 to June 15, 
2017 
Nordheimer 
Dismissal of 
attempt to appeal 
denial of leave to 
appeal Yes 
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Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Court Source 
Notice 
Ordered? Decision Result Appeal Costs 
Delay: Notice to 
Final Disposition 
Judge(s) 
(noted if 
Master) Claim Type 
Self-
Rep? 
184 
Okel v Misheal 15-Oct-14 CA Judge N/A 
2014 ONCA 
699, [2014] OJ 
No 4842 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None 0 Days 
Juriansz, 
Rouleau, 
Pepall 
Vexatious step by 
family law litigant 
Yes 
185 
Gallos v Toronto 
(City) 
20-Nov-14 CA Judge N/A 
2014 ONCA 
818, [2014] OJ 
No 5570 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 0 Days 
Feldman, 
Juriansz, 
MacFarland 
Attempt to re-open 
appeal after 
Supreme Court 
denied leave to 
appeal Yes 
186 
Hoang v Mann 
Engineering Ltd 
02-Dec-15 CA 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2015 ONCA 
838, [2015] OJ 
No 6316 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
$1,500 N/A 
Strathy, 
LaForme, 
Huscroft 
Second attempt to 
rehear appeal 
No 
187 Simpson v The 
Chartered 
Accountants 
Institute of 
Ontario 
01-Nov-16 CA 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2016 ONCA 
806, [2016] OJ 
No 6382 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
None Unclear 
Laskin, 
Sharpe, 
Miller 
Attempt to re-
litigate 
Yes 
188 
Collins v Ontario 19-Apr-17 CA 
Responding 
Party 
N/A 
2017 ONCA 
317, [2017] OJ 
No 1982 
Partially 
Granted 
N/A 
Unclear 
106 Days: January 
3, 2017 to April 19, 
2017 
LaForme, 
Peppall, 
Pardu 
Appellant refusing 
to perfect appeal 
Yes 
189 
Damallie v Ping 17-Feb-17 CA 
Responding 
Party 
2016 ONCA 
603, [2016] OJ 
No 4009 
2017 ONCA 
146, [2017] OJ 
No 1229 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A 
Unclear 
205 Days: July 27, 
2016 to February 
17, 2017 
Gillese, 
referred to 
MacFarlane, 
van 
Rensburg, 
Huscroft 
Attempts to re-
litigate 
Yes 
190 
Children’s Aid 
Society of Toronto 
v VD 
19-Jun-17 CA Judge 
N/A 
2017 ONCA 
514, 2017 
CarswellOnt 
9499 
Granted After 
Notice 
N/A None 
47 Days: May 3, 
2017 to June 19, 
2017 
Epstein, 
referred to 
Rouleau, 
Benotto, 
Hourigan  
Attempt to bring 
frivolous motions 
and appeals not in 
interests of child 
Yes 
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APPENDIX E – COSTS ORDERS (RULE 2.1) 
 Case Name First Instance Costs Appeal Costs 
1.  Hawkins v Schlosser, 2015 ONSC 1691, 
[2015] OJ No 1346 (SCJ) 
$1,148.02 None 
2.  Nguyen v Economical Mutual Insurance 
Co, 2015 ONSC 2646, 49 CCLI (5th) 144 
(SCJ) 
 
$2,000 None 
3.  Obermuller v Kenfinch Co-Operative 
Housing Inc, 2015 ONSC 6800, [2015] OJ 
No 5743 (SCJ), aff’d 2016 ONCA 330, 
[2016] OJ No 2362 
 
Unclear $2,000 
4.  Chalupnicek v The Children’s Aid Society 
of Ottawa, 2017 ONSC 1278, 2017 
CarswellOnt 272 (Div Ct) 
 
None $17,684.83 (full 
indemnity) 
5.  Marleau v Brockville (City), 2016 ONSC 
5901, [2016] OJ No 4961 (SCJ) 
$5,500 None 
6.  Jarvis v Morlog, 2016 ONSC 5061, 2016 
CarswellOnt 1269 (SCJ) 
$2,256.39 
(substantial 
indemnity) 
 
None 
7.  Irmya v Mijovick, 2016 ONSC 5276, 
[2016] OJ No 4372 (SCJ) 
$30,187.78 (full 
indemnity, three 
defendants) 
 
None 
8.  Khan v Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 
ONCA 625, 2017 CarswellOnt 16235 
$2,000 $3,000 
9.  Gates v Humane Society of Canada for the 
Protection of Animals and the Environment 
(cob The Humane Society of Canada), 
2016 ONSC 6051, [2016] OJ No 4957 (Div 
Ct) 
 
$8,000 None 
10.  Son v Khan, 2016 ONSC 7621, [2016] OJ 
No 6283 (Div Ct) 
$2,611.93 None 
11.  Hoang v Mann Engineering Ltd, 2015 
ONCA 838, [2015] OJ No 6316 
$1,500 None 
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APPENDIX F – CALCULATION OF DELAY (RULE 2.1) 
Disposition Number of 
Cases 
 
Superior 
Court 
Divisional 
Court 
Court of 
Appeal 
Granted 136 111 19 6 
 After Notice 121 99 16 6 
 Average Delay – Excluding 
Appeal (102) 
45 Days 
(102) 
45 Days 
(92) 
31 Days 
(8) 
126 Days 
(2) 
 Average Delay – Including 
First Appeal (13) 
232 Days 
(13) 
274 Days 
(10) 
80 Days 
(3) 
N/A (0) 
 Average Delay – Including 
Second Appeal and/or 
Supreme Court Leave 
Application (4) 
338 Days 
(4) 
411 Days 
(3) 
120 Days 
(1) 
N/A (0) 
 Unclear About Notice 2 2 0 0 
 Delay Not Calculable 
 Without Notice 13 10 3 0 
 Average Delay 0 Days 
Partially Granted 2 1 0 1 
 Average Delay (2) 84.5 Days 63 Days N/A 106 Days 
Notice Ordered of Dismissal Being 
Considered But Final Disposition Not 
Reported 
 
13 13 0 0 
 Delay Not Calculable 
New Pleading Ordered 1 1 0 0 
 Delay (1) 25 Days N/A 
Resolved After Claim Withdrawn 
Against One Defendant on Consent 
 
1 1 0 0 
 Delay (1) 28 Days N/A 
Dismissed 37 35 2 0 
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Disposition Number of 
Cases 
 
Superior 
Court 
Divisional 
Court 
Court of 
Appeal 
 No Notice Ordered 27 26 1 0 
Average Delay 0 Days 
 After Notice  4 3 1 0 
Average Delay (3) 108 Days 108 Days Unreported N/A 
 In Context of Broader Motion 3 3 0 0 
Average Delay Not Informative 
 After Amended Pleading 
Served 
 
1 1 0 0 
 Average Delay 180 Days N/A 
 After Appeal 2 2 0 0 
 Average Delay 326 Days 
(1) 
326 Days 
(1) 
 
N/A 
Total 190 162 21 7 
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APPENDIX G – ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL DECISIONS CONSIDERING DISPUTES OVER INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL DISTINCTION 
 Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Decision 
Result (how came before 
court) Appeal Subsequent Costs 
Delay: Quashing to 
Disposition 
Self-Rep? 
(Result if 
Yes) Remedy 
1 Wong v Gong 2010-Jan-13 2010 ONCA 25, [2010] OJ No 121 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
2 
Griffin v Dell Canada Inc 2010-Jan-20 2010 ONCA 29, 98 OR (3d) 481 Final (motion) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2010] SCCA No 75, 
2010 CanLII 27725 
Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N N/A 
3 Jones v Foresi 2010-Feb-9 2010 ONCA 108, [2010] OJ No 546 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $3,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
4 
Silver v IMAX Corp 
2010-May-
18 
[2010] OJ No 6242, 2010 
CarswellOnt 11219 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
Leave denied: 2011 
ONSC 1035, 105 OR 
(3d) 212 
$5,000 
8 Months, 27 Days: 
May 18, 2010 until 
February 14, 2011 
N Quash 
5 Harrop (Litigation guardian of) v 
Harrop 
2010-Jun-1 2010 ONCA 390, 85 CPC (6th) 1 Decided not to decide (unclear) None/unreported Not Applicable $4,500 Not Applicable N N/A 
6 1550188 Ontario Inc v Mutual 
Development Corp 
2010-Sept-
24 
2010 ONCA 618, [2010] OJ No 3999 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $700 Not Applicable N Quash 
7 Aecon Buildings, a Division of Aecon 
Construction Group Inc v Brampton 
(City) 
2010-Nov-
15 
2010 ONCA 773, [2010] OJ No 4860 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $10,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
8 Willmot v Benton 2011-Feb-4 2011 ONCA 104, 11 CPC (7th) 219 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported None  Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
9 
Lukezic v Southward 
2011-Apr-
13 
2011 ONCA 295, CarswellOnt 
16211 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $3,595.80 Not Applicable N Quash 
10 B & M Handelman Investments Ltd v 
Curreri 
2011-May-
20 
2011 ONCA 395, 278 OAC 199 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable  N N/A 
11 
Ontario v Lipsitz 
2011-Jun-22 2011 ONCA 466, 281 OAC 67 Final (raised on appeal) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2011] SCCA No 407, 
2012 CarswellOnt 1520 
Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N N/A 
12 
Lindhorst v Stone & Co 2011-Oct-19 2011 ONCA 657, [2011] OJ No 4594 Interlocutory (unclear) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2011] SCCA No 564, 
2012 CarswellOnt 4238 
None/unreported $1,500 Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
13 White v Garrow 2011-Dec-8 [2011] OJ No 6482 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $750 Not Applicable N Quash 
14 
Trainor v Canada (Customs and 
Revenue Agency) 
2011-Dec-8 2011 ONCA 794, 20 CPC (7th) 227 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported 
Appeal allowed after 
leave granted: 2012 
ONSC 3450, [2012] 
OJ No 2665 
$10,000 
6 Months, 4 Days 
Days: December 8, 
2011 to June 12, 
2012 
N Quash 
15 
Almrei v Canada (Attorney General) 
2011-Dec-
13 
2011 ONCA 779, 345 DLR (4th) 475 Final (motion) None/unreported Issues morphed $5,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
16 3574423 Canada Inc v Imvescor 
Restaurants Inc 
2011-Dec-
16 
2011 ONCA 800, [2011] OJ No 5779 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
17 Carleton Condominium Corp No 396 v 
Burdet 
2012-Mar-
13 
2012 ONCA 169, [2012] OJ No 1163 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
18 
Dewan v Burdet 
2012-Mar-
13 
2012 ONCA 169, [2012] OJ No 1163 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
19 Carmen Alfano Family Trust (Trustee 
of) v Piersanti 
2012-Jun-25 2012 ONCA 442, [2012] OJ No 2847 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $3,500 Not Applicable N N/A 
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 Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Decision 
Result (how came before 
court) Appeal Subsequent Costs 
Delay: Quashing to 
Disposition 
Self-Rep? 
(Result if 
Yes) Remedy 
20 Malamas v Crerar Property Corp 2012-Jun-28 2012 ONCA 465, [2012] OJ No 2984 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $3,000 Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
21 
Simmonds v Armtec Infrastructure Inc 2012-Jun-29 
2012 ONCA 467, [2012] OJ No 
2981, with further reasons: 2012 
ONCA 774, 299 OAC 20 
Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported 
Appeal dismissed: 
2013 ONSC 331, 303 
OAC 299 
None 
6 Months, 17 Days: 
June 29, 2012 to 
January 15, 2018 
N Quash 
22 NM Sutherland Developments Ltd v 
Platinum Plus Products Inc 
2012-Jul-20 2012 ONCA 509, [2012] OJ No 3374 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $2,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
23 Nazarinia Holdings Inc v 2049080 
Ontario Inc (cob JW Car Care) 
2012-Sep-28 2012 ONCA 652, [2012] OJ No 4530 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
24 Soden v Soden 2012-Oct-5 2012 ONCA 678, [2012] OJ No 4668 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $3,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
25 
Almrei v Canada (Attorney General) 
2012-Nov-
15 
2012 ONCA 779, 11 Imm LR (4th) 
175 
Interlocutory (reconsideration of 
earlier motion in light of 
developments) 
None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
26 
Martin v Martin 
2012-Nov-
22 
2012 ONCA 814, [2012] OJ No 5499 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
27 1250264 Ontario Inc v Pet Valu Canada 
Inc 
2012-Dec-
20 
2012 ONCA 901, [2012] OJ No 6754 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $2,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
28 
Royal Bank of Canada v Trang 
2012-Dec-
21 
2012 ONCA 902, 97 CBR (5th) 52 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported Unclear Not Applicable N Quash 
29 Child and Family Services for York 
Region v LH 
2012-Dec-
28 
2012 ONCA 912, [2012] OJ No 6756 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
30 
Ashak v Ontario (Family Responsibility 
Office) 
2013-Jun-6 2013 ONCA 375, 115 OR (3d) 401 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported 
Leave denied: 2013 
ONSC 39, 357 DLR 
(4th) 560 
$10,000 
7 Months, 1 Day: 
June 6, 2013 to 
January 7, 2017 
N Quash 
31 Simmonds v Simmonds 2013-Jul-16 2013 ONCA 479, 117 OR (3d) 479 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $3,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
32 D’Amato v Kovachis 2013-Oct-8 2013 ONCA 603, [2013] OJ No 4508 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N Quash 
33 Clarke (Litigation guardian of) v 
Richardson 
2013-Nov-
21 
2013 ONCA 731, [2013] OJ No 5896 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
34 Dams v TD Home and Auto Insurance 
Co 
2013-Dec-3 2013 ONCA 730, [2013] OJ No 6338 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $9,950 Not Applicable N Quash 
35 
Murphy v Wheeler 
2013-Dec-
17 
2013 ONCA 762, [2013] OJ No 5771 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $10,000 Not Applicable Y (won) Quash 
36 
Ambrose v Zuppardi 
2013-Dec-
18 
2013 ONCA 768, 368 DLR (4th) 749 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $1,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash and 
extend time 
37 Pelletier v U-Haul Co (Canada) 2014-Feb-12 2014 ONCA 120, [2014] OJ No 690 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
38 Chahal v Chabrra 2014-Mar-6 2014 ONCA 180, 317 OAC 243 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
39 
Punit v Punit 2014-Apr-2 2014 ONCA 252, 43 RFL (7th) 84 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
Reconstitute 
as Div Ct 
40 
Xela Enterprises Ltd v Castillo 2014-Apr-7 2014 ONCA 275, [2014] OJ No 1666 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
Appeal dismissed 
after leave granted: 
2015 ONSC 866, 70 
CPC (7th) 224, aff’d 
2016 ONCA 437, 
131 OR (3d) 193, 
$5,000 
10 Months, 12 Days 
(plus): April 7, 2014 
to February 19, 
2015 
N 
Quash 
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 Case Name 
Resolution 
Date Decision 
Result (how came before 
court) Appeal Subsequent Costs 
Delay: Quashing to 
Disposition 
Self-Rep? 
(Result if 
Yes) Remedy 
leave to appeal 
denied, [2016] SCCA 
No 366, 2017 
CarswellOnt 2690 
41 
Bank of Nova Scotia v McLennan 
2014-Apr-
25 
2014 ONCA 331, [2014] OJ No 1977 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported 
$5,800 (full 
indemnity) 
Not Applicable N 
Quash 
42 Susin v Susin 2014-Jun-12 2014 ONCA 461, [2014] OJ No 2809 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $3,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
43 Hopkins v Kay 2014-Jul-2 2014 ONCA 514, [2014] OJ No 6670 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $5,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
44 
Henderson v Henderson 2014-Aug-1 2014 ONCA 571, 324 OAC 138 
Interlocutory (defence to 
motion) 
None/unreported None/unreported $24,000 Not Applicable N 
Dismissed 
45 Hanisch v McKean 2014-Oct-14 2014 ONCA 698, 325 OAC 253 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N N/A 
46 Liu v Bagg Group  2014-Oct-20 2014 ONCA 718, [2014] OJ No 4890 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable Y (lost) Dismissed 
47 Mader v South Easthope Mutual 
Insurance Co 
2014-Oct-21 2014 ONCA 714, 123 OR (3d) 120 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
Dismissed 
48 
Brown v Ontario 
2014-Nov-
17 
2014 ONCA 806, [2014] OJ No 5456 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $2,000 Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
49 Raba v Toronto (City) Police Services 
Board 
2015-Jan-12 2015 ONCA 12, [2015] OJ No 119 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $2,000 Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
50 Pinsky v Smiley 2015-Jan-27 2015 ONCA 52, [2015] OJ No 443 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $2,500 Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
51 
Waldman v Thomson Reuters Canada 
Ltd 
2015-Jan-28 2015 ONCA 53, 330 OAC 142 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported 
Appeal allowed after 
leave granted: 2016 
ONSC 2622, 131 OR 
(3d) 367 
None 
15 Months: January 
28, 2015 to April 
28, 2016 
N 
Quash 
52 Dynasty Furniture Manufacturing Ltd v 
Toronto-Dominion Bank 
2015-Mar-2 2015 ONCA 137, [2015] OJ No 945 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $20,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
53 
Bilich v Toronto (City) Police Services 
Board 
2015-Mar-6 2015 ONCA 149, [2015] OJ No 1077 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
Leave denied: 2015 
ONSC 5873, [2015] 
OJ No 4870 
$2,000 
6 Months, 16 Days: 
March 6, 2015 to 
September 22, 2015 
Y (lost) 
Quash 
54 
Parsons v Ontario  
2015-Mar-
13 
2015 ONCA 158, 125 OR (3d) 168 
Final (own initiative, over 
dissent) 
Other Issues Only Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
55 Natario v Rodrigues 2015-Apr-2 2015 ONCA 227, 71 CPC (7th) 285 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $4,145 Not Applicable N Quash 
56 
Akagi v Synergy Group (2000) Inc 
2015-May-
22 
2015 ONCA 368, 125 OR (3d) 401 
Final (seemingly raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
57 Cheung v Sheun 2015-Jun-4 2015 ONCA 403, [2015] OJ No 2921 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $18,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
58 
Meisels v LAWPRO 2015-Jun-8 2015 ONCA 406, 126 OR (3d) 448 
Final (seemingly raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported Not Applicable $10,000 Not Applicable N 
N/A 
59 
Baradaran v Tarion Warranty Corp 2015-Jun-29 2015 ONCA 490, [2015] OJ No 3419 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported 
Leave denied: 2015 
ONSC 7333, [2015] 
OJ No 6101 
$7,294.30 
4 Months, 26 Days: 
June 29, 2015 to 
November 24, 2015 
Y (lost) 
Quash 
60 
1793670 Ontario Ltd v Chan 2015-Jul-9 2015 ONCA 522, [2015] OJ No 2620 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported 
$7,000 
(substantial 
indemnity) 
Not Applicable N 
Quash 
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61 Must v Shkuryna 2015-Aug-4 [2015] OJ No 4077 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported Unclear Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
62 
Must v Shkuryna 2015-Oct-1 2015 ONCA 665, [2015] OJ No 5087 Interlocutory (unclear) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2015] SCCA No 482, 
2016 CarswellOnt 5396 
None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
63 Drywall Acoustic Lathing and Insulation 
Local 675 Pension Fund (Trustees of) v 
SNC-Lavalin Group Inc 
2015-Oct-28 2015 ONCA 718, 340 OAC 271 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $2,000 Not Applicable N 
N/A 
64 
Mullin v Legace 2015-Nov-6 2015 ONCA 757, 81 CPC (7th) 254 
Final (raised as defence on 
appellant’s motion for other 
relief) 
None/unreported Not Applicable None Not Applicable N 
Quash 
65 
Catalyst Capital Group Inc v Moyse 
2015-Nov-
17 
2015 ONCA 784, 127 OR (3d) 625 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
Leave denied: 2016 
ONSC 554, [2016] 
OJ No 320 
$5,000 
2 Months, 5 Days: 
November 17, 2015 
to January 22, 2016 
N 
Quash 
66 Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and 
Technology v AU Optronics Corp 
2015-Nov-
24 
2015 ONCA 808, [2015] OJ No 6137 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $2,500 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
67 
Speciale Law Professional Corp v 
Schrader Canada Ltd 
2015-Dec-7 2015 ONCA 856, [2015] OJ No 6418 Final (unclear) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2016] SCCA No 56, 
2016 CarswellOnt 7592 
Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
68 Walchuk Estate v Houghton 2015-Dec-9 2015 ONCA 862, [2015] OJ No 6492 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $6,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
69 
Ontario Psychological Assn v Mardonet 
2015-Dec-
11 
2015 ONCA 883, 128 OR (3d) 637 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $2,500 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
70 RREF II BHB IV Portofino LLC v 
Portofino Corp 
2015-Dec-
21 
2015 ONCA 906, 33 CBR (6th) 9 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
71 Building Solutions International Inc v 
Benazzi 
2016-Feb-9 2016 ONCA 112, [2016] OJ No 696 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $8,500 Not Applicable N 
Dismissed 
72 
Shoukralla v Shoukralla 2016-Feb-11 2016 ONCA 128, 41 CBR (6th) 6 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported 
$7,000 (one-
quarter of issues) 
Not Applicable 
Y 
(decision 
not 
affecting 
self-rep’s 
position) Quashed 
73 Canadian Union of Postal Workers v 
QuebecorMedia Inc 
2016-Mar-
14 
2016 ONCA 206, 129 OR (3d) 711 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
Unclear 
74 
Chand v Quereshi 
2016-Mar-
29 
2016 ONCA 231, [2016] OJ No 1596 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable 
Y (all 
sides self-
repped) Quash 
75 
Olumide v Conservative Party of 
Canada 
2016-Apr-
28 
2016 ONCA 314, [2016] OJ No 2284 Interlocutory (unclear) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2016] SCCA No 425, 
2017 CarswellOnt 6254 
None/unreported 
$750 (half of two 
motions) 
Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Dismissed 
(motion to 
review) 
76 
Balice v Serkeyn 
2016-May-
17 
2016 ONCA 372, 349 OAC 218 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
N/A 
77 NAN Corporate Services (cob 
Nishnawbe Aski Nation) v Kocsis 
2016-May-
19 
2016 ONCA 382, [2016] OJ No 2612 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
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78 Fram Elgin Mills 90 Inc v Romandale 
FarmsLtd 
2016-May-
26 
2016 ONCA 404, 131 OR (3d) 455 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported Unclear/settled Not Applicable N 
Quash 
79 Treats International Franchise Corp v 
2247383 Ontario Inc 
2016-Jun-2 2016 ONCA 429, [2016] OJ No 2889 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported Silent Not Applicable N 
Quash 
80 
R & G Draper Farms (Keswick) Ltd v 
Nature’s Finest Produce Ltd 
2016-Jun-16 2016 ONCA 481, 350 OAC 198 Final (raised on appeal) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2016] SCCA No 399, 
2016 CarswellOnt 
16389 
Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
81 Chirico v Szalas 2016-Jul-22 2016 ONCA 586, 132 OR (3d) 738 Final (unclear) None/unreported Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N N/A 
82 
VandenBussche Irrigation & Equipment 
Ltd v Kejay Investments Inc 
2016-Aug-4 2016 ONCA 613, [2016] OJ No 4185 
Interlocutory (raised on motion 
for extension of time) 
None/unreported None/unreported Silent Not Applicable N 
Dismissed 
(motion to 
extend time) 
83 
Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and 
Technology v AU Optronics Corp 
2016-Aug-
11 
2016 ONCA 621, 132 OR (3d) 81 Interlocutory (raised on appeal) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2016] SCCA No 442, 
2016 CarswellOnt 
17004 
None/unreported 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
Do Not 
Entertain 
84 Enerzone Inc v Ontario (Minister of 
Revenue) 
2016-Sep-30 2016 ONCA 717, [2016] OJ No 5070 Interlocutory (raised on appeal) None/unreported None/unreported $3,500 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
85 
C-A Burdet Professional Corp v Gagnier 2016-Oct-7 2016 ONCA 735, [2016] OJ No 5176 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable Y (won) 
N/A 
86 Quinto v Stadler 2016-Oct-18 2016 ONCA 766, [2016] OJ No 5391 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $1,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
87 Buccilli v Pillitteri 2016-Oct-24 2016 ONCA 775, 410 DLR (4th) 480 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable $5,000 Not Applicable N N/A 
88 Williams v Grand River Hospital 2016-Oct-26 2016 ONCA 793, 134 OR (3d) 319 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
89 John Deere Financial Inc v 1232291 
Ontario Inc (cob Northern Haul 
Contracting) 
2016-Nov-8 2016 ONCA 838, [2016] OJ No 5739 Interlocutory (raised on appeal) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
Quash 
90 
Skunk v Ketash 
2016-Nov-
10 
2016 ONCA 841, 135 OR (3d) 180 Interlocutory (raised on appeal) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
Quash 
91 1100997 Ontario Ltd v North Elgin 
Centre Inc 
2016-Nov-
14 
2016 ONCA 848, 409 DLR (4th) 382 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
N/A 
92 
Rana v Unifund Assurance Co 
2016-Nov-
29 
2016 ONCA 906, [2016] OJ No 6151 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported Not Reported Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
93 
Fatahi-Ghandehari v Wilson 2016-Dec-6 2016 ONCA 921, [2016] OJ No 6291 Interlocutory (raised on motion) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
Dismissal of 
request 
94 
Wallace (Re) 
2016-Dec-
16 
2016 ONCA 958, 43 CBR (6th) 210 Final (motion) None/unreported Not Applicable None Not Applicable N 
N/A 
95 
Talbot v Bergeron 
2016-Dec-
19 
2016 ONCA 956, 2016 CarswellOnt 
19874 
Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
N/A 
96 
Colenbrander v Savaria Corp Unclear 
Unreported (assuming 2016 given 
lateness of Div Ct decision in 2016) 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported 
2016 ONSC 8051, 
2016 CarswellOnt 
20383 (Div Ct) 
Not Reported Not Calculable N 
Quash 
97 PM v MA 2017-Jan-4 2017 ONCA 6, [2016] OJ No 6746 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported Silent Not Applicable N Quash 
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98 Sennek v Carleton Condominium Corp 
No 116 
2017-Feb-21 2017 ONCA 154, [2017] OJ No 873 
Interlocutory (reason to dismiss 
motion) 
None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
99 Density Group Ltd v HK Hotels LLC 2017-Mar-8 2017 ONCA 205, [2017] OJ No 2346 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
100 
Kent v Chin and Orr Lawyers 
2017-Mar-
20 
2017 ONCA 223, [2017] OJ No 1484 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $1,500 Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
101 
Huang v Pan 
2017-Mar-
30 
2017 ONCA 268, 16 CPC (8th) 59 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $1,500 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
102 McClintock v Karam 2017-Apr-3 2017 ONCA 277, [2017] OJ No 1636 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $10,000 Not Applicable N Quash 
103 
Lawrence v International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 773 
2017-Apr-
20 
2017 ONCA 321, 138 OR (3d) 129 Final (motion) 
Affirmed (other issues): 
2018 SCC 11, [2018] 2 
SCR 3 
Not Applicable Other Issues Only 
3 Months: January 
20, 2017 to April 
20, 2017 (to being 
heard with appeal) 
N 
N/A 
104 
JK v Ontario 
2017-Apr-
26 
2017 ONCA 332, 9 CPC (8th) 22 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $5,192.50 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
105 
Azzeh (Litigation guardian of) v 
Legendre 
2017-May-
12 
2017 ONCA 385, 135 OR (3d) 721 Interlocutory (unclear) 
Leave to appeal denied: 
[2017] SCCA No 289, 
2018 CarswellOnt 2058 
None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
Heard 
interlocutory 
portions 
106 
Doskova v Dimitrov Estate 
2017-May-
19 
2017 ONCA 412, [2017] OJ No 2606 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
107 Cowan v General Filters Inc 2017-Jun-2 2017 ONCA 456, [2017] OJ No 2859 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $7,500 Not Applicable N Quash 
108 Durbin v Brant 2017-Jun-5 2017 ONCA 463, [2017] OJ No 2991 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (lost) Quash 
109 2441472 Ontario Inc v Collicutt Energy 
Services Corp 
2017-Jun-5 2017 ONCA 452, 48 CBR (6th) 173 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
110 Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc v Lalonde 2017-Jun-20 2017 ONCA 515, 137 OR (3d) 750 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N Quash 
111 Paradigm Quest Inc v McInroy 2017-Jun-22 2017 ONCA 547, [2017] OJ No 3413 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable Y (won) Quash 
112 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Society of 
Essex County v Windsor (City) 
2017-Jun-30 2017 ONCA 555, [2017] OJ No 3444 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
Appeal allowed after 
leave granted: 2018 
ONSC 2350, [2018] 
OJ No 1932 
$3,000 
9 Months, 13 Days: 
June 30, 2017 to 
April 12, 2018 
N 
Quash 
113 Bonello v Gores Landing Marina 2017-Aug-2 2017 ONCA 632, 39 CCLT (4th) 175 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable Other Issues Only Not Applicable N N/A 
114 Westmount-Keele Ltd v Royal Host 
Hotels and Resorts Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
2017-Aug-
28 
2017 ONCA 673, [2017] OJ No 4686 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported 
$10,000 (half of 
total award) 
Not Applicable N 
Quash 
115 Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society 
v CSD 
2017-Sep-25 2017 ONCA 743, [2017] OJ No 4937 Interlocutory (own initiative) None/unreported None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
Quash 
116 Deltro Group Ltd v Potentia Renewables 
Inc 
2017-Oct-6 2017 ONCA 784, 139 OR (3d) 239 Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported None/unreported $5,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
117 
Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada 2017-Oct-17 2017 ONCA 792, 417 DLR (4th) 467 Final (unclear) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
N/A 
118 
Zafar v Saiyid 
2017-Nov-
28 
2017 ONCA 919, [2017] OJ No 6206 Final (raised on appeal) None/unreported Not Applicable 
Other Issues 
Dominate 
Not Applicable N 
N/A 
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119 
Toronto-Dominion Bank v Froom 
2017-Dec-
18 
2017 ONCA 998, [2017] OJ No 6619 Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported None/unreported 
$8,773.39: 2018 
ONCA 15, [2018] 
OJ No 715 
Not Applicable Y (lost) 
Quash 
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APPENDIX H – ONTARIO DIVISIONAL COURT DECISIONS CONSIDERING DISPUTES OVER INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL DISTINCTION 
 Case Name Resolution Date Decision 
Result (how it came 
before Court) Appeal Costs Delay: Decision to Resolution Self-Rep? Result 
1 Petgrave (Litigation guardian of) v Maheru 2010-Mar-25 
2010 ONSC 1710, 
[2010] OJ No 1211 
Final (own initiative) None/unreported $4,000 Not Applicable N 
Quash 
2 Beard Winter LLP v Shekdhar 2010-Sept-16 
2010 ONSC 4947, 
[2010] OJ No 4354 
Final (motion) None/unreported $2,500 Not Applicable Y 
N/A 
3 
Drosophilinks Consulting Inc v Canadian 
National Railway 
2010-Sept-22 
2010 ONSC 5156, 
2010 CarswellOnt 
9246 
Interlocutory (raised 
on leave motion) 
None/unreported $5,000 
3 Months, 1 Day: June 21, 2010 to 
September 22, 2010 
N 
Leave denied 
4 Ravenda Homes Ltd v Ontario 1372708 Ltd 2010-Nov-17 
2010 ONSC 6338, 
5 CPC (7th) 440 
Interlocutory (raised 
on appeal) 
None/unreported $8,500 
4 Months, 2 Days: July 15, 2010 to 
November 17, 2010 
N 
Appeal dismissed 
5 Varshavska v Varshavskiy 2011-Apr-5 
2011 ONSC 1396, 
[2011] OJ No 1613 
Interlocutory (raised 
on appeal) 
None/unreported $2,945 Not Calculable Y 
Appeal “not heard” 
6 
570 South Service Road Inc v Lawrence-Paine 
& Associates Ltd 
2011-Jun-3 
2011 ONSC 3410, 
3 CLR (4th) 1 
Interlocutory (raised 
on appeal) 
None/unreported Reserved to trial judge 
5 Months, 18 Days: December 16, 
2010 to June 3, 2011 
N 
Quash 
7 Ellins v McDonald 2012-Sep-25 
2012 ONSC 4831, 
[2012] OJ No 4556 
Final (raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
N/A 
8 Trifield Construction Co v HC Matcon Inc 2013-Oct-30 
2013 ONSC 6514, 
[2013] OJ No 4916 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
$22,000: 2013 ONSC 7164, 
[2013] OJ No 5270, leave to 
appeal denied: 2014 ONSC 
3318, [2014] OJ No 6568 
Not Calculable N 
Quash 
9 Kostyniuk & Bruggeman Barristers v Burnell 2013-Nov-15 
2013 ONSC 6705, 
[2013] OJ No 5188 
Interlocutory (raised 
on appeal) 
None/unreported $5,000 
10 Months, 24 Days: November 28, 
2012 to October 22, 2013 
N 
Appeal dismissed 
10 Beamer v Beamer 2013-Nov-28 
2013 ONSC 7379, 
[2013] OJ No 5395 
Interlocutory (own 
initiative) 
None/unreported $5,000 
Not Insightful: Too Many Other 
Issues 
N 
Appeal dismissed 
11 Minkofski v Dost Estate 2014-Mar-28 
2014 ONSC 1904, 
321 OAC 38 
Interlocutory (judge 
clarifying self-rep’s 
grounds of appeal) 
None/unreported Other issues only 
Not Insightful: Too Many Other 
Issues 
Y 
Appeal dismissed 
12 Belway v Petro-Canada Fuels Inc 2014-Jun-2 
2014 ONSC 3344, 
[2014] OJ No 2621 
Interlocutory (motion) 
Affirmed: 2015 ONSC 
675, [2015] OJ No 416 
$34,000 
7 Months, 12 Days (15 Months, 3 
Days, 8 Days): October 21, 2013 to 
June 2, 2014 (to January 29, 2015) 
N 
Quash 
13 
Urbacon Building Groups Corp v Guelph 
(City) 
2014-Jun-24 
2014 ONSC 3840, 
327 OAC 6 
Interlocutory (raised 
on motion for stay 
pending appeal) 
None/unreported Not Reported Not Calculable N 
Appeal dismissed 
14 
1309395 Ontario Ltd v Pronesti Investments 
Inc 
2014-Jul-31 
2014 ONSC 4466, 
[2014] OJ No 5019 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported Other issues only 
Not Insightful: Too Many Other 
Issues 
Y 
Motions for leave to 
appeal dismissed 
15 Tran v Kerbel 2014-Sep-15 
2014 ONSC 5233, 
[2014] OJ No 4285 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported $3,500 
7 Months, 3 Days: January 7, 2014 to 
September 10 2014 
Y 
Quash 
16 Mazinani (cob Mazinani Law Offices) v Clark 2014-Dec-10 
2014 ONSC 7100, 
[2014] OJ No 5886 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported $5,000 
7 Months: May 8, 2014 to December 
8, 2014 
Y 
Appeal dismissed 
17 C&M Properties Inc v 1788333 Ontario Inc 
2015-Feb-4 
2015 ONSC 706, 
[2015] OJ No 534 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported Other Issues Dominate Not Applicable N 
Reconstitutes as SCJ 
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18 Polmat Group Inc v E Ring Corp 
2015-Feb-24 
2015 ONSC 1233, 
2015 CarswellOnt 
2864 
Did not decide 
(motion) 
None/unreported Other Issues Dominate Not Applicable N 
Decided on other grounds 
19 Barbalata v Barbalata 2015-Mar-4 
2015 ONSC 2964, 
[2015] OJ No 3115 
Interlocutory (unclear) None/unreported $2,000 
Not Applicable (matter proceeded 
regardless) 
Y 
Appeal dismissed 
20 Thaker v Affinia Canada ULC 2015-Mar-19 
2015 ONSC 1787, 
[2015] OJ No 1388 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported 
$7,000 (substantial 
indemnity) 
Not Applicable (many interlocutory 
matters) 
N 
Quash 
21 Awad v Dover Investments Ltd 2015-Jun-19 
2015 ONSC 3955, 
[2015] OJ No 3204 
Final (motion for 
directions) 
None/unreported None Not Applicable Y 
Directions given 
22 Winsa v Henderson 2016-Mar-22 
2016 ONSC 1736, 
81 RFL (7th) 74 
Final (raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
23 Mancinelli v Royal Bank of Canada 2017-Mar-6 
2017 ONSC 1526, 
2017 CarswellOnt 
3161 
Did not decide (raised 
on appeal brought out 
of caution) 
None/unreported Not Reported Not Calculable N Adjourned sine die 
pending CA decision 
24 Dircam Electric v Am-Stat Corp 2017-Jun-2 
2017 ONSC 3421, 
72 CLR (4th) 256 
Final (raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported Other Issues Dominate Not Applicable N 
N/A 
25 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 v 
Toronto Transit Commission 
2017-Jun-30 
2017 ONSC 4084, 
279 LAC (4th) 221 
Final (raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported 
$20,000: 2017 ONSC 4538, 
[2017] OJ No 3872 
Not Insightful: Too Many Other 
Issues 
N 
Quash 
26 
HMI Construction Inc v Index Energy Mills 
Road Corp 
2017-Jul-5 
2017 ONSC 4075, 
[2017] OJ No 3491 
Final (raised on 
appeal) 
None/unreported Other Issues Only Not Applicable N 
N/A 
27 2128445 Ontario Inc v Sherk 2017-May-31 Unreported Interlocutory (motion) 
Reconsideration denied: 
2017 ONSC 5996, [2017] 
OJ No 5783 
$10,000 (from motion to 
reconsider) 
Not Applicable N 
Quash 
28 
Ontario Provincial Council of Carpenters 
Benefit Trust Funds (Trustee of) v RES 
Canada Construction (Ontario) LP 
2017-Aug-18 
2017 ONSC 4877, 
[2017] OJ No 4318 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported Unreported/settled 
15 Months, 21 Days: April 27, 2016 
to August 18, 2017 
N 
Quash 
29 Loftus v Chamberlain 2017-Sep-27 
2017 ONSC 5751, 
[2017] OJ No 5175 
Did not decide 
(mentioned in passing) 
None/unreported None Not Applicable N 
N/A 
30 Nifco v Nifco 2017-Dec-14 
2017 ONSC 7475, 
6 RFL (8th) 212 
Interlocutory (motion) None/unreported $8,000 
6 Months, 7 Days: June 6, 2017 to 
December 13, 2017 
N 
Quash 
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APPENDIX I: BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL DECISIONS ADDRESSING DISPUTES OVER THE INTERLOCUTORY/FINAL DISTINCTION 
N.B.: Times New Roman font indicates cases decided under rule in effect after amendment that came into effect May 31, 2012; cases in Arial font indicate those decided under previous rule. 
 Case Name Date Decision Result Appeal Remedy 
1 Purple Echo Productions Inc v KCTS Television 23-Jan-07 2007 BCCA 132, 237 BCAC 118 Final N/A N/A 
2 Barker v Hayes 29-Jan-07 2007 BCCA 51, 64 BCLR (4th) 90 Final N/A N/A 
3 British Columbia v Ismail 31-Jan-07 2007 BCCA 55, 235 BCAC 299 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
4 McCulloch v Sherman 5-Feb-07 2007 BCCA 66, 64 BCLR (4th) 249 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
5 Randhawa v Legendary Developments Ltd 27-Mar-07 2007 BCCA 184, 238 BCAC 308 Final N/A N/A 
6 Skogstad v Law Society (British Columbia) 4-May-07 2007 BCCA 266, 69 BCLR (4th) 52 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
7 Lesiczka v Sahota 11-May-07 2007 BCCA 334, 70 BCLR (4th) 281 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
8 Kimpton v Victoria (City) 12-Jun-07 2007 BCCA 376, 243 BCAC 158 Final N/A N/A 
9 Pearlman v Insurance Corp of British Columbia 25-Jul-07 2007 BCCA 451, 55 CCLI (4th) 7 Final Other issues only N/A 
10 Robertson v Slater Vecchio (A Partnership) 18-Sep-07 2007 BCCA 453, 70 BCLR (4th) 199 Interlocutory N/A Time extended to seek leave 
11 Gateway Casinos LP v BCGEU 25-Sep-07 2007 BCCA 465, 72 BCLR (4th) 101 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
12 Hayes Forest Services Ltd v Weyerhaeuser Co 16-Oct-07 2007 BCCA 497, 76 BCLR (4th) 39 Final Aff’d: 2008 BCCA 120, 78 BCLR (4th) 251 N/A 
13 Soleil Hotel & Suites Ltd v Soleil Management Inc 19-Oct-07 2007 BCCA 545, 73 BCLR (4th) 253 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
14 Birrell v Providence Health Care Society 2-Nov-07 2007 BCCA 573, 72 BCLR (4th) 326 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
15 Singh v Bains 30-Nov-07 2007 BCCA 590, 248 BCAC 317 Not appealable N/A 
Directed to reappear before trial 
judge 
16 
Forest Glen Wood Products Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests) 17-Jan-08 Unreported Final Aff’d: 2008 BCCA 480, 58 BCLR (4th) 330 N/A 
17 Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General) 11-Feb-08 2008 BCCA 60, 77 BCLR (4th) 318 Final Aff’d: 2008 BCCA 329, 82 BCLR (4th) 11 N/A 
18 Okanagan Land Development Corp v Stonecroft Management Ltd 26-Mar-08 2008 BCCA 184, 2008 CarswellBC 831 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
19 Kwon v Jung Developments Ltd 31-Mar-08 2008 BCCA 183, 255 BCAC 86 Interlocutory N/A Leave granted 
20 Yaremy v Insurance Corp of British Columbia 6-Jun-08 2008 BCCA 235, 83 BCLR (4th) 119 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
21 Te Kiapilanoq v British Columbia 11-Jun-08 2008 BCCA 244, 256 BCAC 304 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
22 Soleil Hospitality Inc v Louie 11-Jul-08 2008 BCCA 293, 257 BCAC 299 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
23 Te Kiapilanoq v British Columbia 9-Oct-08 2008 BCCA 398, 259 BCAC 317 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
24 Strata Plan VR 2000 v Grabarczyk-Nagy 14-Oct-08 2008 BCCA 405, 261 BCAC 75 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
25 Holland (Guardian ad litem of) v Marshall 13-Nov-08 2008 BCCA 456, 261 BCAC 102 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
26 Strata Plan LMS 1751 v Scott Management Ltd 19-Jan-09 2009 BCCA 15, 2009 CarswellBC 49 Final N/A N/A 
27 Amezcua v Taylor 6-Feb-09 2009 BCCA 42, 2009 CarswellBC 214 Final N/A N/A 
28 Cosgrove v L & C Canada Coastal Aviation Inc 20-Feb-09 2009 BCCA 81, 55 BLR (4th) 161 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
29 North Pender Island Trust Committee v Hunt 7-Apr-09 2009 BCCA 164, 91 BCLR (4th) 71 Final N/A N/A 
30 IBEW, Local 213 v Hochstein 22-Apr-09 2009 BCCA 171, 270 BCAC 33 Final N/A N/A 
31 Holland (Guardian ad litem of) v Marshall 6-May-09 2009 BCCA 199, 273 BCAC 33 Interlocutory Aff’d: 2009 BCCA 582, 281 BCAC 69 Leave refused 
32 Jamieson v Loureiro 8-May-09 2009 BCCA 254, 275 BCAC 3 Final N/A N/A 
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33 Canada v Leeado Enterprises Ltd 10-Jun-09 2009 BCCA 330, 2009 CarswellBC 2019 Interlocutory N/A Directed to seek leave 
34 Gibson Estate, Re 4-Aug-09 2009 BCCA 347, 2009 CarswellBC 1984 Final N/A N/A 
35 Transpacific Petroleum Corp v Dover Investments Ltd 11-Sep-09 2009 BCCA 407, 2009 CarswellBC 2999 Interlocutory Other issues only 
Applications for extension of time 
dismissed 
36 Synex Pharmaceutical v Lee 2-Nov-09 2009 BCCA 473, 277 BCAC 252 Interlocutory N/A Notice of appeal declared nullity 
37 Thompson v Canada (Attorney General) 6-Jan-10 2010 BCCA 60, 2010 CarswellBC 575 Final N/A N/A 
38 Jensen v Jackman 7-Jan-10 2010 BCCA 6, 293 BCAC 225 Final N/A N/A 
39 Holmes v United Furniture Warehouse Ltd Partnership 24-Feb-10 2010 BCCA 110, 283 BCAC 276 Final N/A N/A 
40 Moulton Contracting Ltd v British Columbia 12-Jul-10 2010 BCCA 350, 296 BCAC 103 Final N/A N/A 
41 Bank of Montreal v Peri Formwork Systems Inc 20-Aug-10 2010 BCCA 444, 294 BCAC 53 Final N/A N/A 
42 Brenner v Brenner 30-Aug-10 2010 BCCA 387, 9 BCLR (5th) 266 Interlocutory N/A Leave granted 
43 Bea v Strata Plan LMS 2138 16-Sep-10 Unreported Interlocutory Aff’d: 2010 BCCA 463, 94 CPC (6th) 117 Directed to seek leave 
44 Dosanjh v Singh 29-Sep-10 2010 BCCA 425, 2010 Carswell BC 2567 Did not decide Other issues only Leave granted 
45 Cridge v Ivancic 28-Oct-10 2010 BCCA 476, 10 BCLR (5th) 296 Final N/A N/A 
46 Lefebvre v Durakovic Estate 2-Dec-10 2010 BCCA 545, 297 BCAC 101 Final N/A N/A 
47 Beltz v West Vancouver (City) 9-Feb-11 2011 BCCA 58, 2011 CarswellBC 197 Interlocutory N/A Leave refused 
48 Chouinard v O’Connor 22-Feb-11 2011 BCCA 121, 302 BCAC 10 Final N/A N/A 
49 Gemex Developments Corp v Coquitlam (City) 3-Mar-11 2011 BCCA 119, 81 MPLR (4th) 60 Interlocutory N/A Leave denied 
50 Tylon Steepe Homes Ltd v Pont 30-Mar-11 2011 BCCA 162, 303 BCAC 139 Interlocutory N/A Quash 
51 Keremelevski v VWR Capital Corp 4-May-11 Unreported Interlocutory 
Aff’d: 2011 BCCA 469, [2011] BCJ No 
2249, leave to appeal ref’d, [2012] SCCA 
No 187, 2012 CarswellBC 1881 Directed to seek leave 
52 Pacifica Mortgage Investment Corp v Laus Holdings Ltd 6-Jun-11 2011 BCCA 317, 2011 CarswellBC 1837 Interlocutory N/A Leave denied 
53 Laidar Holdings Ltd v Lindt & Sprungli (Canada) Inc 17-Jun-11 2011 BCCA 320, 2011 CarswellBC 1847 Final N/A N/A 
54 Ehattesaht First Nation v British Columbia (Agriculture & Lands) 28-Jun-11 2011 BCCA 325, 308 BCAC 93 Interlocutory N/A Leave denied 
55 Pope & Talbot Ltd, Re 8-Jul-11 2011 BCCA 326, 21 BCLR (5th) 270 Interlocutory N/A Leave granted 
56 Ahmed v Vancouver (City) 29-Dec-11 2011 BCCA 538, 315 BCAC 75 Mixed N/A N/A; leave denied 
57 da Costa Duarte v British Columbia (Attorney General) 12-Jan-12 2012 BCCA 6, 314 BCAC 306 Interlocutory N/A Leave denied 
58 Unlu v Air Canada 1-May-12 2012 BCCA 179, 346 DLR (4th) 134 Interlocutory N/A Leave granted 
59 Morrison v Van Den Tellaart 2-May-12 2012 BCCA 185, 321 BCAC 185 Did not decide N/A Quashed for being out of time 
60 Monych v Beacon Community Services Society 25-May-12 2012 BCCA 231, 322 BCAC 162 Interlocutory N/A Leave denied 
61 Yao v Li 20-Jun-12 2012 BCCA 315, 39 BCLR (5th) 241 Limited appeal N/A Leave denied 
62 Pearlman v Critchley 16-Aug-12 2012 BCCA 344, 326 BCAC 234 Did not decide N/A Leave denied 
63 Royal Bank of Canada v Miller 23-Oct-12 2012 BCCA 419, 329 BCAC 72 Final N/A N/A 
64 Bradshaw v Stenner 28-Nov-12 2012 BCCA 481, 39 BCLR (5th) 241 Limited appeal Aff’d: 2013 BCCA 61, 334 BCAC 52 Leave denied 
65 Bentley v British Columbia (Police Complaint Commissioner) 21-Dec-12 2012 BCCA 514, 40 BCLR (5th) 266 Final N/A N/A 
66 Aleong v Aleong 7-Mar-13 2013 BCCA 167, 335 BCAC 48 Limited appeal N/A Leave granted 
67 Wallman v John Doe 14-Mar-13 2013 BCCA 110, 43 BCLR (5th) 103 Final N/A N/A 
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68 LPT v MR 27-Mar-13 2013 BCCA 140, 30 RFL (7th) 69 Limited appeal N/A Leave refused 
69 Tomic v Tough 3-May-13 2013 BCCA 212, 337 BCAC 281 Final N/A N/A 
70 Aldergrove Credit Union v Hoessmann Estate 3-May-13 2013 BCCA 213, 45 BCLR (5th) 249 Final N/A N/A 
71 Mission Creek Mortgage Ltd v Angleland Holdings Ltd 22-May-13 2013 BCCA 347, 341 BCAC 199 Limited appeal N/A Appeal dismissed 
72 Clifford v Lord 25-Jun-13 2013 BCCA 302, 46 BCLR (5th) 87 Final N/A N/A 
73 Morgan v Thompson 11-Jul-13 2013 BCCA 329, 2013 CarswellBC 2115 Final N/A N/A 
74 
Sociedade-De-Fomento Industrial Private Ltd v Pakistan Steel Mills Corp 
(Private) Ltd 10-Oct-13 2013 BCCA 474, 51 BCLR (5th) 343 Final N/A N/A 
75 British Columbia (Director of Civil Forfeiture) v Lloydsmith 21-Feb-14 2014 BCCA 72, 56 BCLR (5th) 309 Limited appeal N/A Appeal quashed 
76 McGregor v Holyrod Manor 22-Jul-14 
Unreported (Referred to in 2015 BCCA 157, 
370 BCAC 224) Final N/A N/A 
77 Leroux v Canada Revenue Agency 14-Aug-14 2014 BCCA 355, 361 BCAC 60 Final N/A N/A 
78 Fitzgibbon v Fitzgibbon 23-Oct-14 2014 BCCA 403, 65 BCLR (5th) 131 Did not decide N/A Appeal considered 
79 696591 BC Ltd v Madden 10-Nov-14 2014 BCCA 517, 364 BCAC 9 Limited appeal N/A Leave refused 
80 Do Process LP v Infokey Software Inc 3-Dec-14 2014 BCCA 470, 364 BCAC 78 Limited appeal N/A Leave granted 
81 Creyke v Creyke 3-Dec-14 2014 BCCA 519, 2014 CarswellBC 4051 Final N/A N/A 
82 Regional District Fraser-Fort George v Norlander 28-Jan-15 2015 BCCA 98, 368 BCAC 6 Final N/A N/A 
83 Cotter v Point Grey Golf and Country Club 8-May-15 
Unreported (referred to in 2015 BCCA 331, 
377 BCAC 1) Limited appeal N/A Directed to seek leave 
84 Kouznetsova v Kouznetsov 13-May-15 2015 BCCA 230, 373 BCAC 30 Limited appeal N/A Appeal dismissed 
85 Harras v Lhotka 3-Jul-15 2015 BCCA 329, 375 BCAC 15 Final N/A N/A 
86 N(SHF) v N(AB) 8-Jul-15 2015 BCCA 314, 62 RFL (7th) 335 Limited appeal N/A Leave granted 
87 Wright v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada 8-Jul-15 2015 BCCA 312, 375 BCAC 19 Limited appeal Aff’d: 2015 BCCA 528, 383 BCAC 26 Appeal quashed 
88 Freshwest Equities Trading Corp v Dosanjh 25-Nov-15 2015 BCCA 482, 2015 CarswellBC 3386 Limited appeal N/A Dismissed motion for extension of time 
89 Leung v Yung 21-Jan-16 2016 BCCA 64, 384 BCAC 1 Final N/A N/A 
90 Law Society of British Columbia v Boyer 20-Apr-16 2016 BCCA 169, 2016 CarswellBC 1051 Final N/A N/A 
91 Century Services Inc v Leroy 19-May-16 2016 BCCA 228, 2016 CarswellBC 3938 Limited appeal N/A Time extended for motion 
92 Michael Wilson & Partners, Ltd v Desirée Resources Inc 30-Jun-16 2016 BCCA 296, 389 BCAC 305 Limited appeal Aff’d: 2017 BCCA 139, 2017 CarswellBC 945 Leave refused 
93 Island Savings Credit Union v Brunner 7-Jul-16 2016 BCCA 308, 2016 CarswellBC 2187 Limited appeal N/A 
Leave refused (after conversion to 
notice of appeal) 
94 Smithies Holdings Inc v RCV Holdings Ltd 12-Jul-16 2016 BCCA 311, 91 BCLR (5th) 19 Limited appeal N/A Notices of appeal struck 
95 MacLachan v Nadeau 11-Oct-16 2016 BCCA 410, 2016 CarswellBC 3018 Limited appeal Aff’d: 2017 BCCA 326, 2 BCLR (6th) 223 Leave refused 
96 Tri-City Capital Corp v 0942317 BC Ltd 18-Oct-16 2016 BCCA 407, 3 CPC (8th) 277 Limited appeal N/A 
Appeal dismissed with permission to 
re-apply for leave 
97 Pixhug Media Inc v Steeves 3-Nov-16 2016 BCCA 433, 92 BCLR (5th) 20 Final N/A N/A 
98 M(AAA) v British Columbia (Director of Adoption) 25-Nov-16 Unreported Final Rev’d: 2017 BCCA 27, 95 CPC (7th) 215 N/A 
99 
Fraser Valley Community College Inc v Private Career Training 
Institutions Agency 6-Dec-16 2016 BCCA 488, 2016 CarswellBC 3407 Limited appeal N/A Appeal dismissed 
100 Denton v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal) 30-Mar-17 2017 BCCA 138, 97 BCLR (5th) 133 Final N/A N/A 
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101 311165 BC Ltd v Derewenko 4-May-17 2017 BCCA 182, 2017 CarswellBC 1903 Final N/A N/A 
102 Cambie Surgeries Corporation v British Columbia (Attorney General) 31-Jul-17 2017 BCCA 287, 99 BCLR (5th) 338 Limited appeal N/A Leave denied 
103 Hu v Ting 23-Aug-17 2017 BCCA 305, 1 BCLR (6th) 285 Final N/A N/A 
104 Smith v Smith 7-Sep-17 2017 BCCA 319, [2017] BCJ No 1855 Final N/A N/A 
105 Price v Robson 1-Dec-17 2017 BCCA 419, 14 CPC (8th) 20 Limited appeal N/A Appeal dismissed 
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APPENDIX J – SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
1. Has the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak v Mauldin affected your approach to and/or 
experience in practice in recent years (since 2014)? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
d) What is Hryniak v Mauldin? 
 
2. Explain your answer to Question 1. 
 
3. Have the 2010 amendments to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure affected your 
approach to and/or experience in practice in recent years? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
d) What amendments? 
 
4. Explain your answer to Question 3. 
 
5. Has there been a noticeable change in how quickly you have resolved civil cases in recent 
years (since 2010)? 
a) Yes – they are being resolved more quickly 
b) Yes – they are taking longer to resolve 
c) No change 
d) Not sure 
 
6. Explain your answer to Question 5. 
 
7. Adjusting for inflation, has there been a noticeable change in the financial expense (in 
terms of legal fees and disbursements) required to resolve civil actions in recent years 
(since 2010)? 
a) Yes – even adjusting for inflation, litigation is becoming more expensive 
b) Yes – adjusting for inflation, litigation is becoming less expensive 
c) No change 
d) Not sure 
 
8. Explain your answer to Question 7. 
 
9. Has there been an increase or decrease in the rate of settlement in recent years (since 
2010)? 
a) Increase 
b) Decrease 
c) No change 
d) Not sure 
 
10. Explain your answer to Question 9. 
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11. Has there been an increase or decrease in the quality of settlements and/or clients’ 
satisfaction from settlements in recent years (since 2010)? 
a) Increase 
b) Decrease 
c) No change 
d) Not sure 
 
12. Explain your answer to Question 11. 
 
13. Has there been an increase or decrease in the use of alternative dispute resolution in recent 
years (since 2010)? 
a) Increase 
b) Decrease 
c) No change 
d) Not sure 
 
14. Explain your answer to Question 13. 
 
15. Do your answers to the foregoing questions change depending on whether a self-
represented litigant is involved in a proceeding? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
 
16. Explain your answer to Question 15 
 
17. Do your answers to the foregoing questions change depending on the demographic status 
of the litigants involved (e.g., their race and/or gender)? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
 
18. Explain your answer to Question 17 
 
19. Do you believe that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2016 decision in R v Jordan has had 
any effects on access to civil justice? 
a) Yes – Jordan has helped access to civil justice 
b) Yes – Jordan has hurt access to civil justice 
c) No – Jordan has had no effects on access to civil justice 
d) Not sure 
e) I do not know what Jordan is 
 
20. Explain your answer to Question 19. 
 
21. Do you believe a “culture shift” has been occurring this decade in the conduct of civil 
litigation oriented towards promoting access to justice? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Not sure 
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22. Explain your answer to Question 21. If you answered “Yes”, please explain what the 
culture shift looks like. If you answered “No”, please explain whether you believe there 
should be a culture shift and what it should look like.  
 
23. Do you self-identify as: 
a) Male 
b) Female 
c) Other 
d) Prefer Not to Answer 
24. Are you a member of a racialized 
community? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Prefer Not to Answer 
 
25. Do you self-identify as a member 
of the LGBT+ community? 
a) Yes 
b) No  
c) Prefer Not to Answer 
 
26. Do you identify as a person with 
a disability? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Prefer Not to Answer 
27. Do you identify as an Indigenous 
Canadian? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Prefer Not to Answer 
28. When were you called to the bar? 
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APPENDIX K – RESPONDENTS’ ANSWERS BY YEAR OF CALL 
QUESTION GROUP ANSWERS 
 
1 (Hryniak’s 
Effects) 
TOTAL 48.9% Yes 28.9% No 2.2% What is 
Hryniak? 
20% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 53.3%% 
Yes 
35.6% No 0 What is 
Hryniak? 
11.1% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 42.9%Yes 23.8% No 4.8% What is 
Hryniak? 
28.6% Not 
Sure 
3 (2010 
Amendments’ 
Effects) 
TOTAL 33.3% Yes 48.9% No  1.1% What 
Amendments? 
16.7% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 48.9% Yes 46.7% No 0 What 
Amendments 
4.4% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 16.7% Yes 52.4% No 2.4% What 
Amendments?  
28.6% Not 
Sure 
5 (Length of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 12.2% 
Longer 
4.4% 
Quicker 
52.2% No 
Change 
31.1% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 24.4% 
Longer 
4.4% 
Quicker 
57.8% No 
Change 
13.3% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 4.8% Longer 0 Quicker 47.6% No 
Change 
47.6% Not 
Sure 
7 (Cost of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 38.9% 
More 
2.2% Less 20% No 
Change 
38.9% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 53.3% More 4.4% Less 24.4% No 
Change 
17.8% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 23.8% More 0 Less 14.3% No 
Change  
61.9% Not 
Sure 
9 (Rate of 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 8.9% 
Increase 
6.7% 
Decrease 
40% No 
Change 
44.4% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 11.1% 
Increase  
6.7% 
Decrease 
48.9% No 
Change 
33.3% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 7.1% 
Increase 
7.1% 
Decrease 
31% No Change 54.8% Not 
Sure 
11 
(Satisfaction 
with 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 6.7% 
Increase 
5.6% 
Decrease 
48.3% No 
Change 
39.3% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 6.7% 
Increase 
8.9% 
Decrease 
60% No 
Change 
24.4% Not 
Sure 
Post-2010 4.8% 
Increase 
2.4% 
Decrease 
38.1% No 
Change 
54.8% Not 
Sure 
13 (Use of 
ADR) 
TOTAL 26.7% 
Increase 
2.2% 
Decrease 
38.9% No 
Change 
32.2% Not 
Sure 
Pre-2010 31.1% 
Increase 
4.4% 
Decrease 
51.1% No 
Change 
13.3% Not 
Sure 
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Post-2010 21.4% 
Increase 
0 Decrease 26.2% No 
Change 
52.4% Not 
Sure 
15 (Relevance 
of a Self-Rep) 
TOTAL 34.4% Yes 33.3% No 32.2% Not Sure 
Pre-2010 33.3% Yes 40% No 26.7% Not Sure 
Post-2010 35.7% Yes 28.6% No 35.7% Not Sure 
17 (Relevance 
of Litigants’ 
Demographics) 
TOTAL 9.1% Yes 55.7% No 35.2% Not Sure 
Pre-2010 13.3% Yes 68.9% No 17.8% Not Sure 
Post-2010 5% Yes 45% No 50% Not Sure 
19 (Effects of 
Jordan) 
TOTAL 3.3% 
Helped 
50% 
Hurt 
7.8% No 
Effect 
7.8% 
Unaware 
of Jordan  
31.1% 
Not Sure 
Pre-2010 4.4% 
Helped 
62.2% 
Hurt 
8.9% No 
Effect 
2.2% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
22.2% 
Not Sure 
Post-2010 2.4% 
Helped 
40.5% 
Hurt 
7.1% No 
Effect 
9.5% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
40.5% Not 
Sure 
21 (Presence 
of Culture 
Shift) 
TOTAL 28.9% Yes 46.7% No 24.4% Not Sure 
Pre-2010 24.4% Yes 53.3% No 22.2% Not Sure 
Post-2010 33.3% Yes 40.5% No 26.2% Not Sure 
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APPENDIX L – RESPONDENTS’ ANSWERS BY GENDER 
QUESTION GROUP ANSWERS 
 
1 (Hryniak’s 
Effects) 
TOTAL 48.9% Yes 28.9% No 2.2% What is 
Hryniak? 
20% Not 
Sure 
Male 54.9% Yes 25.5% No 2% What is 
Hryniak 
17.6% Not 
Sure 
Female 38.9% Yes 36.1% No 0 25% Not 
Sure 
3 (2010 
Amendments’ 
Effects) 
TOTAL 33.3% Yes 48.9% No  1.1% What 
Amendments? 
16.7% Not 
Sure 
Male 33.3% Yes 51% No 2.4% What 
Amendments? 
13.7% Not 
Sure 
Female 33.3% Yes 44.4% No 0  22.2% Not 
Sure 
5 (Length of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 12.2% 
Longer 
4.4% 
Quicker 
52.2% No 
Change 
31.1% Not 
Sure 
Male 15.7% 
Longer 
2.0% 
Quicker 
56.9% No 
Change 
25.5% Not 
Sure 
Female 8.3% Longer 5.6% Quicker 47.2% No 
Change 
38.9% Not 
Sure 
7 (Cost of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 38.9% 
More 
2.2% Less 20% No 
Change 
38.9% Not 
Sure 
Male 45.1% More 3.9% Less 23.5% No 
Change 
27.4% Not 
Sure 
Female 30.6% More  0 Less 16.7% No 
Change  
52.7% Not 
Sure 
9 (Rate of 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 8.9% 
Increase 
6.7% 
Decrease 
40% No 
Change 
44.4% Not 
Sure 
Male 5.9% 
Increase 
5.9% 
Decrease 
41.1% No 
Change 
47.1% Not 
Sure 
Female 13.9% 
Increase 
8.3% 
Decrease 
38.9% No 
Change 
38.9% Not 
Sure 
11 
(Satisfaction 
with 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 6.7% 
Increase 
5.6% 
Decrease 
48.3% No 
Change 
39.3% Not 
Sure 
Male 2% Increase 6% 
Decrease 
52% No 
Change 
40% Not 
Sure 
Female 13.9% 
Increase 
5.6% 
Decrease 
44.4% No 
Change 
36.1% Not 
Sure 
13 (Use of 
ADR) 
TOTAL 26.7% 
Increase 
2.2% 
Decrease 
38.9% No 
Change 
32.2% Not 
Sure 
Male 23.5% 
Increase 
2% 
Decrease 
39.2% No 
Change 
33.3% Not 
Sure 
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Female 33.3% 
Increase 
0 Decrease 38.9% No 
Change 
27.8% Not 
Sure 
15 (Relevance 
of a Self-Rep) 
TOTAL 34.4% Yes 33.3% No 32.2% Not Sure 
Male 33.3% Yes 39.2% No 27.5% Not Sure 
Female 36.1% Yes 25% No 38.9% Not Sure 
17 (Relevance 
of Litigants’ 
Demographics) 
TOTAL 9.1% Yes 55.7% No 35.2% Not Sure 
Male 6.3% Yes 62.5% No 31.2% Not Sure 
Female 13.9% Yes 50% No 36.1% Not Sure 
19 (Effects of 
Jordan) 
TOTAL 3.3% 
Helped 
50% 
Hurt 
7.8% No 
Effect 
7.8% 
Unaware 
of Jordan  
31.1% 
Not Sure 
Male 5.8% 
Helped 
56.9% 
Hurt 
9.8% No 
Effect 
2.0% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
25.5% 
Not Sure 
Female 0 Helped 44.4% 
Hurt 
2.8% No 
Effect 
16.7% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
36.1% Not 
Sure 
21 (Presence 
of Culture 
Shift) 
TOTAL 28.9% Yes 46.7% No 24.4% Not Sure 
Male 27.4% Yes 45.1% No 27.4% Not Sure 
Female 33.3% Yes 44.4% No 22.2% Not Sure 
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APPENDIX M – RESPONDENTS’ ANSWERS BY RACE 
QUESTION GROUP ANSWERS 
 
1 (Hryniak’s 
Effects) 
TOTAL 48.9% Yes 28.9% No 2.2% What is 
Hryniak? 
20% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 50% Yes 14.3% No 0 What is 
Hryniak? 
35.7% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 46.5% Yes 33.8% No 1.4% What is 
Hryniak? 
18.3% Not 
Sure 
3 (2010 
Amendments’ 
Effects) 
TOTAL 33.3% Yes 48.9% No  1.1% What 
Amendments? 
16.7% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 42.9% Yes 28.6% No 0 28.6% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 31% Yes 52.1% No 1.4% What 
Amendments? 
15.5% Not 
Sure 
5 (Length of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 12.2% 
Longer 
4.4% 
Quicker 
52.2% No 
Change 
31.1% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 14.3% 
Longer 
0 Quicker 28.6% No 
Change 
57.1% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 12.7% 
Longer 
1.4% Quicker 59.2% No 
Change 
26.8% Not 
Sure 
7 (Cost of 
Litigation) 
TOTAL 38.9% 
More 
2.2% Less 20% No 
Change 
38.9% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 35.7% More 0 Less 14.3% No 
Change 
50% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 40.8% More 1.4% Less 22.5% No 
Change 
35.2% Not 
Sure 
9 (Rate of 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 8.9% 
Increase 
6.7% 
Decrease 
40% No 
Change 
44.4% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 14.3% 
Increase 
14.3% 
Decrease 
28.6% No 
Change 
42.9% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 7.0% 
Increase 
5.6% 
Decrease 
42.7% No 
Change 
42.7% Not 
Sure 
11 
(Satisfaction 
with 
Settlement) 
TOTAL 6.7% 
Increase 
5.6% 
Decrease 
48.3% No 
Change 
39.3% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 0 15.4% 
Decrease 
38.5% No 
Change 
46.2% Not 
Sure 
Non-Racialized 5.6% 
Increase 
4.2% 
Decrease 
52.1% No 
Change 
38% Not 
Sure 
13 (Use of 
ADR) 
TOTAL 26.7% 
Increase 
2.2% 
Decrease 
38.9% No 
Change 
32.2% Not 
Sure 
Racialized 28.6% 
Increase 
0 Decrease 21.4% No 
Change 
50% Not 
Sure 
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Non-Racialized 28.2% 
Increase 
2.8% 
Decrease 
42.3% No 
Change 
26.8% Not 
Sure 
15 (Relevance 
of a Self-Rep) 
TOTAL 34.4% Yes 33.3% No 32.2% Not Sure 
Racialized 35.7% Yes 7.1% No 57.1% Not Sure 
Non-Racialized 35.2% Yes 36.6% No 28.2% Not Sure 
17 (Relevance 
of Litigants’ 
Demographics) 
TOTAL 9.1% Yes 55.7% No 35.2% Not Sure 
Racialized 28.6% Yes 21.4% No 50% Not Sure 
Non-Racialized 5.8% Yes 63.8% No 30.4% Not Sure 
19 (Effects of 
Jordan) 
TOTAL 3.3% 
Helped 
50% 
Hurt 
7.8% No 
Effect 
7.8% 
Unaware 
of Jordan  
31.1% 
Not Sure 
Racialized 14.3% 
Helped 
42.9% 
Hurt 
7.1% No 
Effect 
7.1% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
28.6% 
Not Sure 
Non-Racialized 1.4% 
Helped 
54.9% 
Hurt 
5.6% No 
Effect 
8.5% 
Unaware 
of Jordan 
29.6% Not 
Sure 
21 (Presence 
of Culture 
Shift) 
TOTAL 28.9% Yes 46.7% No 24.4% Not Sure 
Racialized 21.4% Yes 42.9% No 35.7% Not Sure 
Non-Racialized 31.0% Yes 45.1% No 23.9% Not Sure 
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APPENDIX N – YORK UNIVERSITY ETHICS APPROVAL,  
CERTIFICATE # STU - 070, DATED MAY 22, 2018 
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APPENDIX O – YORK UNIVERSITY ETHICS RENEWAL-AMENDMENT 
APPROVAL, CERTIFICATE # STU - 070, DATED MAY 22, 2019 
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APPENDIX P – YORK UNIVERSITY ETHICS AMENDMENT APPROVAL, 
CERTIFICATE # STU - 070, DATED JULY 18, 2019 
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APPENDIX Q – INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX R – TEXT OF RULE 20 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RRO 
1990, REG 194 
RULE 20  SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHERE AVAILABLE 
To Plaintiff 
20.01 (1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered a statement of defence or served a 
notice of motion, move with supporting affidavit material or other evidence for summary 
judgment on all or part of the claim in the statement of claim.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, 
r. 20.01 (1). 
(2) The plaintiff may move, without notice, for leave to serve a notice of motion for summary 
judgment together with the statement of claim, and leave may be given where special urgency is 
shown, subject to such directions as are just.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.01 (2). 
To Defendant 
(3) A defendant may, after delivering a statement of defence, move with supporting affidavit 
material or other evidence for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim in the 
statement of claim.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.01 (3). 
EVIDENCE ON MOTION 
20.02 (1) An affidavit for use on a motion for summary judgment may be made on information 
and belief as provided in subrule 39.01 (4), but, on the hearing of the motion, the court may, if 
appropriate, draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to provide the evidence of any 
person having personal knowledge of contested facts.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 12. 
(2) In response to affidavit material or other evidence supporting a motion for summary 
judgment, a responding party may not rest solely on the allegations or denials in the party’s 
pleadings, but must set out, in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 12. 
FACTUMS REQUIRED 
20.03 (1) On a motion for summary judgment, each party shall serve on every other party to the 
motion a factum consisting of a concise argument stating the facts and law relied on by the 
party.  O. Reg. 14/04, s. 14. 
(2) The moving party’s factum shall be served and filed with proof of service in the court office 
where the motion is to be heard at least seven days before the hearing.  O. Reg. 394/09, s. 4. 
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(3) The responding party’s factum shall be served and filed with proof of service in the court 
office where the motion is to be heard at least four days before the hearing.  O. Reg. 394/09, s. 4. 
(4) REVOKED:  O. Reg. 394/09, s. 4. 
DISPOSITION OF MOTION 
General 
20.04 (1) REVOKED:  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (1). 
(2) The court shall grant summary judgment if, 
(a) the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim 
or defence; or 
(b) the parties agree to have all or part of the claim determined by a summary judgment and 
the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant summary judgment.  O. Reg. 284/01, 
s. 6; O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (2). 
Powers 
(2.1) In determining under clause (2) (a) whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the 
court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties and, if the determination is being made 
by a judge, the judge may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the 
interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial: 
1. Weighing the evidence. 
2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent. 
3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (3). 
Oral Evidence (Mini-Trial) 
(2.2) A judge may, for the purposes of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule (2.1), 
order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on its 
presentation.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (3). 
Only Genuine Issue Is Amount 
(3) Where the court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is the amount to which the moving 
party is entitled, the court may order a trial of that issue or grant judgment with a reference to 
determine the amount.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (3); O. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (4). 
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Only Genuine Issue Is Question Of Law 
(4) Where the court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is a question of law, the court may 
determine the question and grant judgment accordingly, but where the motion is made to a 
master, it shall be adjourned to be heard by a judge.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (4); O. Reg. 
438/08, s. 13 (4). 
Only Claim Is For An Accounting 
(5) Where the plaintiff is the moving party and claims an accounting and the defendant fails to 
satisfy the court that there is a preliminary issue to be tried, the court may grant judgment on the 
claim with a reference to take the accounts.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (5). 
WHERE TRIAL IS NECESSARY 
Powers of Court 
20.05 (1) Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the court may make an 
order specifying what material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, and 
order that the action proceed to trial expeditiously.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
Directions and Terms 
(2) If an action is ordered to proceed to trial under subrule (1), the court may give such directions 
or impose such terms as are just, including an order, 
(a) that each party deliver, within a specified time, an affidavit of documents in accordance 
with the court’s directions; 
(b) that any motions be brought within a specified time; 
(c) that a statement setting out what material facts are not in dispute be filed within a 
specified time; 
(d) that examinations for discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery plan 
established by the court, which may set a schedule for examinations and impose such 
limits on the right of discovery as are just, including a limit on the scope of discovery to 
matters not covered by the affidavits or any other evidence filed on the motion and any 
cross-examinations on them; 
(e) that a discovery plan agreed to by the parties under Rule 29.1 (discovery plan) be 
amended; 
(f) that the affidavits or any other evidence filed on the motion and any cross-examinations 
on them may be used at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery; 
(g) that any examination of a person under Rule 36 (taking evidence before trial) be subject 
to a time limit; 
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(h) that a party deliver, within a specified time, a written summary of the anticipated 
evidence of a witness; 
(i) that any oral examination of a witness at trial be subject to a time limit; 
(j) that the evidence of a witness be given in whole or in part by affidavit; 
(k) that any experts engaged by or on behalf of the parties in relation to the action meet on a 
without prejudice basis in order to identify the issues on which the experts agree and the 
issues on which they do not agree, to attempt to clarify and resolve any issues that are the 
subject of disagreement and to prepare a joint statement setting out the areas of 
agreement and any areas of disagreement and the reasons for it if, in the opinion of the 
court, the cost or time savings or other benefits that may be achieved from the meeting 
are proportionate to the amounts at stake or the importance of the issues involved in the 
case and, 
(i) there is a reasonable prospect for agreement on some or all of the issues, or 
(ii) the rationale for opposing expert opinions is unknown and clarification on areas 
of disagreement would assist the parties or the court; 
(l) that each of the parties deliver a concise summary of his or her opening statement; 
(m) that the parties appear before the court by a specified date, at which appearance the court 
may make any order that may be made under this subrule; 
(n) that the action be set down for trial on a particular date or on a particular trial list, subject 
to the direction of the regional senior judge; 
(o) for payment into court of all or part of the claim; and 
(p) for security for costs.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
Specified Facts 
(3) At the trial, any facts specified under subrule (1) or clause (2) (c) shall be deemed to be 
established unless the trial judge orders otherwise to prevent injustice.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
Order re Affidavit Evidence 
(4) In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (j), the fact that an adverse party may 
reasonably require the attendance of the deponent at trial for cross-examination is a relevant 
consideration.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
Order re Experts, Costs 
(5) If an order is made under clause (2) (k), each party shall bear his or her own costs.  O. Reg. 
438/08, s. 14. 
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Failure to Comply with Order 
(6) Where a party fails to comply with an order under clause (2) (o) for payment into court or 
under clause (2) (p) for security for costs, the court on motion of the opposite party may dismiss 
the action, strike out the statement of defence or make such other order as is just.  O. Reg. 
438/08, s. 14. 
(7) Where on a motion under subrule (6) the statement of defence is struck out, the defendant 
shall be deemed to be noted in default.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
COSTS SANCTIONS FOR IMPROPER USE OF RULE 
20.06 The court may fix and order payment of the costs of a motion for summary judgment by a 
party on a substantial indemnity basis if, 
(a) the party acted unreasonably by making or responding to the motion; or 
(b) the party acted in bad faith for the purpose of delay.  O. Reg. 438/08, s. 14. 
EFFECT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
20.07 A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment may proceed against the same defendant for 
any other relief.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.07. 
STAY OF EXECUTION 
20.08 Where it appears that the enforcement of a summary judgment ought to be stayed pending 
the determination of any other issue in the action or a counterclaim, crossclaim or third party 
claim, the court may so order on such terms as are just.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.08. 
APPLICATION TO COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSSCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS 
20.09 Rules 20.01 to 20.08 apply, with necessary modifications, to counterclaims, crossclaims 
and third party claims.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.09. 
 
